2025-01-20

Ceasefire and hostage exchange

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

by Neil Godfrey

In case certain details were not reported on your local news media…..

The freed Palestinians included 69 women and 21 teenage boys – some as young as 12 – from the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. — Among them was Khalida Jarrar, 62, a leading member of the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who had been held for six months in solitary confinement under “administrative detention”, which allows Israeli authorities to jail suspects indefinitely without charge or court verdict.

You can read their names and other biographhical details here.

Per the custom on hearing good news handing out sweets, Brisbane, Sunday 19th January ….

One of the Palestinian speakers at Sunday’s rally, Remah Naji, will be the first Palestinian elected to Federal Parliament if she wins the seat of Moreton. The right wing Advance Australia party has set aside ten million dollars in an effort to remove the only voices standing up for Palestine from the Australian Parliament.


The Name of the Apostle Paul

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

by Neil Godfrey

In a future post I will address a relatively recent paper that discusses the origin of the name of Paul in Acts. Since that paper will refer to an older publication that is not readily accessible I am posting a translation of that earlier work here, along with another note making a revision in the light of a subsequent archaeological find. This post is background preparation for another soon to come. 

The translated article below discusses Sergius Paulus of Acts 13.  Readers will be interested to learn that…

The family of the Sergii Paulli is attested as senatorial in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD. . . .  Close ties linked them to the Roman colony of Antioch Caesarea in Pisidia: monuments have been found there that were dedicated to members of this family. – Groag (trans)

Original text:

Title: Der Name des Apostels Paulus 
Author(s): H. Dessau
Source: Hermes, 45. Bd., H. 3 (1910), pp. 347-368
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4473239

347

The Name of the Apostle Paul

This inscription honouring Sergius Paulus is said to date to the latter half of the first century. The family name is prominent through to the time of the latter half of the second century. (Sacred Destinations)

Many of the Orientals mentioned in the New Testament bore a second name in addition to their original one, often to distinguish themselves from others with the same name. Sometimes this second name was adopted for interactions with the “Hellenes” or the government, to avoid the difficulty of their foreign and hard-to-pronounce names. Additionally, it occasionally occurred that individuals, at a turning point in their lives, adopted a new name to outwardly signify this change.

In practice, the usage of the two names varied widely in individual cases. Sometimes the new name entirely replaced the old one, while at other times the old name eventually prevailed. In some cases, both names were regularly used side by side, and this fluctuating usage is also reflected in the writings of the New Testament.

The Apostle Thomas is simply called Thomas, although the Gospel of John consistently notes at each new mention (11:16, 20:24, 21:2) that he was also called Didymus. Regarding Barnabas, Acts 4:36 reports that this name was given to him by the original apostles, while his real name was Joseph; thereafter, the text exclusively uses his new name. In the case of John, the cousin of Barnabas, the same text repeatedly (12:12, 12:25, 15:37) adds the clarification, “who was also called Mark” (ὁ ἐπικαλούμενος Μᾶρκος). During one narrative (15:39), he is referred to once simply as Marcus, and in two other instances (13:5, 13), this clarification is omitted altogether.

Simon, who was named Cephas or Peter by Jesus himself, is referred to as Simon in the Gospels of Mark and Luke until the point where the conferring of the new name is mentioned (Mark 3:16; Luke 6:14). From then on, he is called Peter, except that Luke once places both names side by side (5:8). Both Luke and Mark subsequently allow the acting persons, particularly Jesus himself, to use the old name.

Matthew, who does not narrate the conferral of the name by Jesus, initially presents the two names in a way that makes Peter appear as the surname (4:18; 10:2 Σίμων ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος), or simply juxtaposes them (16:16 Σίμων Πέτρος). However, from 8:14 onward, and consistently from 14:29, 15:15, and 16:22, he uses the name Peter alone, except for one instance where Jesus himself addresses the disciple as Simon (17:25).

The Gospel of John, by contrast, uses the double name Simon Peter from the very beginning, at every new mention. This clearly reflects a deliberate intention. Among the other evangelists, one notices a tension and overlap between their striving for accuracy—avoiding the use of the new name prematurely—and their desire to orient the reader as quickly as possible about the individual, alongside their habitual use of the younger name.

348

The Apostle Paul’s name usage is quite peculiar. In his epistles, he consistently refers to himself as Paul, not only in the introductory greetings and closing notes (e.g., 1 Cor. 16:21) but also within the text itself (e.g., Eph. 3:1; 1 Cor. 3:4 ff.; Col. 1:23). However, in the Acts of the Apostles, he is initially called Saulos (9:4, 17; in the vocative Saoul). Suddenly, during a dramatic encounter with the proconsul of Cyprus, Sergius Paulus, which reportedly made a strong impression on the proconsul, the text states that Saulos was also called Paulos (13:9, Σαῦλος δὲ καὶ Παῦλος). From that point onward, only the name Paulos is used, except in the literal retelling of earlier events, where Saoul reappears in direct speech (22:7, 13).

Any perceptive reader must conclude that the narrator believed a name change occurred here. It would have seemed obvious to speculate that the adoption of the new name was connected to the proconsul’s name, as the apostle reportedly converted him to the faith. This assumption was first explicitly made, to my knowledge, by Jerome.¹ Augustine later adopted it in one of his later writings, whereas Rufinus, Jerome’s old adversary, refuted it with arguments that remain compelling today.²

Jerome, at the beginning of his commentary on the Epistle to Philemon (Commentarius in Philemonem, 7, p. 746 Vall., 7, p. 640 Migne), wrote:

“Just as Scipio, after subduing Africa, took the name Africanus for himself, and Metellus, having conquered Crete, brought the title Creticus to his family, and just as Roman generals even now receive names like Adiabenicus, Parthicus, or Sarmaticus from the peoples they conquer, so too Saulus, sent to preach to the Gentiles, bore the trophies of his victory from his first conquest, the proconsul Sergius Paulus, and raised his banner to be called Paulus instead of Saulus.”

He expressed a similar idea in De viris illustribus 5 and hinted at it in his commentary on Isaiah (Book 7, ch. 17, 1; 4, p. 278 Vall., 4, p. 2481 Migne). Augustine, in Confessiones 8:4, said:

“When the proconsul Paulus was brought under Christ’s yoke through his (Paul’s) ministry… Paul also chose to be called Paulus instead of Saulus, as a mark of his great victory.”²

Rufinus countered this in an appendix to the preface of Origen’s commentary on Romans (Origen, p. 460 de la Rue, Patrologia Graeca XIV, p. 836):

“Some believe that the Apostle adopted the name of the proconsul Paulus, whom he converted to Christ on Cyprus, just as kings are named Parthicus or Gothicus after their victories over the Parthians or Goths. Thus, they claim the Apostle, having brought Paulus into submission, was named Paulus himself. While this interpretation cannot be entirely dismissed, it lacks precedent in the divine scriptures. It is better to seek understanding from examples provided in them.”

¹ It is a common misconception, shared by figures like Mommsen (Gesammelte Schriften III, p. 434), that Origen referred to this hypothesis, which first appears in Jerome. The relevant passage in the preface to Origen’s commentary on Romans is from the Latin editor. Jerome explicitly claimed the theory as his own (In Philem.):

“No scripture records why Saul was called Paul. Therefore, I will boldly, but perhaps truthfully, assert my suspicion based on Acts of the Apostles.”

¹ See below, p. 364.

² Originally, Augustine held a different view (De spiritu et littera 7:12, 10, p. 207 Migne): “The Apostle Paul, formerly called Saulus, seems to have chosen this name to show his humility, as though he were the least of the apostles,” a theme he repeated often in sermons. Nonetheless, Augustine always believed a name change had occurred.

349 – from bottom of page: “Er bringt dann…”

He then presents several examples of dual names from the Old and New Testaments and concludes:

“According to this custom, it seems to us that Paul also used two names. While he ministered to his own people, he was called Saulus, as this name appeared more native to his homeland. However, he was called Paulus when he wrote laws and instructions to the Greeks and Gentiles. For even the scripture that says, ‘Saulus, who is also called Paulus,’ does not indicate that the name Paulus was newly given to him at that time, but rather shows that it was an older appellation.”

Recently, this question has been revisited. For a long time, the prevailing opinion was that the Apostle had changed his name—an idea often linked, without sufficient basis, not precisely to his conversion but at least to events surrounding it.¹ However, leading scholars today—including Deißmann,² Ramsay,³ and Mommsen⁴—believe that the Apostle carried both names from his youth.⁵

The main reason for this view is that it seems unusual for a provincial to adopt the cognomen of a prominent Roman, such as the proconsul in this case. Such an event was as rare as the frequent adoption of a Roman gentilicium, which usually occurred upon obtaining Roman citizenship. Paul, however, apparently already possessed Roman citizenship when he arrived in Cyprus.¹ It demonstrates a significant misunderstanding of Roman customs when proponents of the older view² refer to the example of the historian Josephus, who received the name Flavius from his patron Vespasian.

In my opinion, Jerome was essentially correct: Paul adopted this name in Cyprus, following his acquaintance with the proconsul Sergius Paulus.

¹ For example, John Chrysostom in a sermon (vol. III, p. 122, 133, ed. Montfaucon; Patrologia Graeca LI, p. 137, 148). While the preacher spoke for three full days on the Apostle’s name (see the second cited passage), I find no clear explanation of the name’s origin, only a rejection of false etymologies (Σαῦλος from σαλεύειν, Παῦλος from παύσασθαι, etc.; see p. 110 Montf., p. 126 Migne).

² Bibelstudien (1895), p. 181.

³ St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen (3rd ed., 1897), p. 30 ff.

⁴ “Die Rechtsverhältnisse des Apostels Paulus,” Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft II (1901), p. 81 ff.; reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften III, p. 431 ff., on which the following citations are based.

⁵ Schwartz, Charakterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur, 2nd ed., p. 117, also considers, albeit cautiously, the Apostle’s dual name as one of the common Jewish practices of the time. Advocates of the perspective discussed on p. 355 regarding the Acts of the Apostles would need to ask why Acts refers to Paul as Saulus at the beginning of his ministry. They might answer that the author erroneously identified Paul with a Saul involved in Stephen’s stoning.

¹ See below, p. 356.

² Max Krenkel, Beiträge zur Aufhellung der Geschichte des Apostels Paulus (1890), p. 18.

351

First, it must be emphasized that it would have been an extraordinary coincidence if the first prominent man, the first representative of the Roman state with whom the Apostle came into contact during his travels, had borne the same name as he did. Such a coincidence would undoubtedly have struck the proconsul himself. While it might not have been surprising for him to meet someone named Paulus in Corinth, Carthage, Syracuse, or even Ephesus, hearing his own name in Cyprus from a Jewish sage or miracle worker must have seemed unusual.

Dessau thinks it strange that it should have occurred to Paul’s parents, living so far in the East, to give him a Latin name. But when one considers that they lived in Tarsus, a busy metropolis of a Roman province often visited by prominent Romans after the middle of the first century B.C., e.g. Cicero, Caesar, Mark Antony, that they were themselves Roman citizens and that several Jewish associates of Paul had Roman names, to say nothing of the fact that Paullus was a Roman name already widely known in the Roman Empire in both Greek and Latin form, and that, as we have shown, Romanized foreigners very often gave their sons Roman names, Dessau’s objection has little weight. Dessau again states that the assumption of the name Paul was really a change of cognomen, and that this is not unheard of even though not common. It is in fact extremely uncommon. Moreover, if the name Paul was assumed in Cyprus, it would be more in accordance with the custom in the Greek East to consider it an added name, a signum. Dessau’s study here suffers from a lack of information which Lambertz’ later work would have given him. The ὁ καὶ connecting the Saul and Paul surely has been shown by this study to be a practical proof of the association of the signum with part of the formal tria nomina. (Harrer, 28f)

And how could Paul, before his acquaintance with the proconsul, or how could his parents, if they had indeed given him this name, have chosen it? It is true that in the circles Paul came from, it was not uncommon to adopt a second name suitable for interaction with the “Hellenes” and the authorities. However, Greek names were the obvious and most abundant choice for this purpose. The adoption of a Latin name at that time, while not unheard of, was much rarer and, unless it involved certain common names of generally transparent meaning (see below, p. 367), must have had a specific rationale in each case. The name Paulus, while not exceedingly rare, was not very common either and held an air of the highest distinction.

352 from top: “‘Weil dein Vater etwas mehr war als der eines deiner Collegen….”

“Because your father was somewhat more than that of one of your colleagues (namely, a freedman and not one who died as a slave): hoc tibi Paulus et Messala videris?” says Horace (Satires I 6, 41), addressing the son of a freedman who had attained public office—though this was two generations before the period with which we are concerned. Even two generations later, in Juvenal (8, 21), Paulus remained a distinguished name. While there were always individuals in Italy who bore the name in humble positions, the influx from rural areas and from circles unfamiliar with urban customs prevented the aristocracy from monopolizing this otherwise unassuming name.

In the East, however, the prestige of the name remained unblemished after it became widely known through the conqueror of Macedonia. A few Roman governors who later bore the name did not vulgarize it. The name remained rare in the East until the triumph of Christianity.¹

It is often assumed that the similarity to the Hebrew name influenced the choice of the Latin name, but this assumption is based on the spelling of the names, and in reality, no such similarity exists. The Hebrew name appears to be reasonably accurately rendered by Σαούλ—the Greek form of the name of the king of Israel, whose tribe Paul claimed as his own. However, Σαῦλος is also Hellenized, aside from the ending. As for the other name, it was certainly pronounced Póllos rather than Paúlos. The Greek simply followed the Roman spelling, which, as is well known, did not reflect pronunciation.²

If a similar-sounding name were chosen, it would depend on the pronunciation, not on how the two names, imperfectly transcribed into Greek, appeared side by side.¹

¹ For example, aside from Roman governors, the name does not appear in the third volume of Cagnat’s Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes, which includes Greek inscriptions from Roman times covering much of Asia Minor, Cilicia, Syria, and Arabia. In the West, it was somewhat different. A noble Batavian in Roman service could call himself Julius Paulus (Tacitus, Histories 4, 12), but for him, Greek names were irrelevant, unlike for the Jew from Tarsus, for whom they were the most natural choice.

² The corresponding female name, found in fewer inscriptions, is almost always written as Polla in Latin and Πώλλα in Greek (see Eckinger, Die Orthographie lateinischer Wörter in griechischen Inschriften, p. 14).

¹ Franz Delitzsch, in his Hebrew translation of the New Testament, rightly gave the two names a completely different appearance. The meticulous care with which the distinguished scholar, in this work he regarded as sacred, considered the Hebrew transcription of Παῦλος can be seen in the introduction and notes to his translation of the Epistle to the Romans (Leipzig, 1870, p. 73) and in Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie 38 (1877), p. 12.

353

Now, even if we set aside the difficulties of assuming that Paul bore this name from a young age, the question remains as to why the Acts of the Apostles only begins to use the name from his encounter with the proconsul Sergius Paulus onward. Some have tried to attribute the change in name usage to a change in source material or to different traditions. The passages with Saulus are thought to stem from a Jewish-Christian tradition, while those with Paulus are believed to come from a Pauline tradition.²

But how oblivious would the author of Acts have had to be to the reports before him if he failed to substitute the name familiar to him and his readers consistently—or at least to introduce the name at the beginning of the narrative to orient the reader? If, as is quite possible, the author drew his knowledge of Paul’s earlier years from oral reports in the Aramaic language, then he should naturally have replaced the Hebrew name with the Greek equivalent when writing his account in Greek.

The hypothesis of different traditions or sources completely fails here, as it is implausible to suggest that the author switched sources in the middle of the account of Paul’s stay in Cyprus. We would expect to see the second name used as early as Acts 13:2 (at the commissioning from Antioch) or at least in 13:7.

A widely held opinion is that the author of Acts aligned the name change of his protagonist with Paul’s own practice: that while Paul had the name Paulus from the beginning, he only began to use it more frequently or consistently as the Apostle to the Gentiles. Put simply, Paul was called Paulus from the start but only began using the name regularly from his incidental encounter with the proconsul Paulus onward.

It may be reasonable to assume that the Apostle used his Roman name more frequently after the start of his major missionary journeys. However, there can hardly be any doubt that Paul would still have found himself in situations after his time in Cyprus where it would have been fitting to use his Hebrew name—for example, during his later visits to Jerusalem. If Paul himself merely began using his Roman name more frequently from Cyprus onward and the narrator simply reflected this reality, we would still expect the name Saulus to appear occasionally in the second half of the narrative.

One cannot argue that stylistic reasons required avoiding frequent name changes; after all, no one objects to reading in the Gospel of Mark (14:37): λέγει (Ἰησοῦς) τῷ Πέτρῳ· Σίμων, καθεύδεις (“Jesus said to Peter, ‘Simon, are you sleeping?'”). Cicero, in his speech on behalf of the poet Archias, skillfully alternates between the names A. Licinius and Archias depending on whether he is discussing his client’s claims to Roman citizenship or his claims to poetic fame.

The opinion that the “compiler of Acts” somehow “misused the otherwise unobjectionable encounter with the proconsul of the same name in an inappropriate way” (Mommsen, Gesammelte Schriften III, p. 435) seems entirely dismissible. For what purpose would this have been done? Presumably to create the impression that Paul’s name was linked to the encounter with the proconsul, as Jerome suggested (see above, p. 349). However, Jerome may have been justified in forming such an opinion based on the report available to him, and he presented it as a hypothesis. By contrast, the author of Acts supposedly left his unfounded and erroneous assumption unspoken but hinted at it through the arbitrary removal of one name from earlier sections and the other from later sections of the narrative—an equally peculiar, crafty, and high-handed method.

² C. Weizsäcker, Das apostolische Zeitalter, p. 67.

354 from bottom: Nun soll zwar, nach…..

Now, according to many scholars, the author of the Acts of the Apostles is said to have allowed himself considerable liberties and is accused of having committed numerous peculiarities. However, none of these liberties could compare to the one supposed here. According to many,¹ the author belonged to a later period and lacked a proper understanding of the events he narrates. He is said to have expressed his own views, reflecting the outlook of his time, in the book, which naturally resulted in some peculiarities. Given the abundance of material, he sometimes became confused and, for instance, treated different accounts of the same event as though they referred to different events, resorting to forced interpretations during his compilation.

He is also accused of indulging his biases, allegedly softening or obscuring conflicts between his various protagonists to an improper degree. And there are other such accusations.

But what could this author—or indeed anyone at any time—have intended by removing the name Paulus from earlier reports of the Apostle’s activity and, from the time of the proconsul Sergius Paulus, replacing it with Saulus? Did he believe he was elevating or making his protagonist more intriguing by leading his readers to think that the Apostle owed his well-known name to a Roman proconsul?

Moreover, how skillfully and consistently must this author, otherwise prone to arbitrary treatment of his material, have proceeded! He is said to have made many errors, such as leaving traces of other interpretations intact. No, everything points to the conclusion that the author of Acts found the transition from one name to the other already indicated in the sources available to him, precisely at the point where he notes it. According to his understanding, even if he does not explicitly state it, the Apostle arrived in Cyprus as Saul and left the island as Paul.

¹ For a characterization of this view of the Acts of the Apostles, see now Harnack, Die Apostelgeschichte> (1908), pp. 19 ff.

355

Now, this is by no means as unbelievable or entirely without analogy as is often assumed today. It should naturally be considered—and modern scholars have consistently taken this into account—that according to a statement made by the Apostle during a remarkable conversation with the Roman garrison commander in Jerusalem, the cohort tribune Claudius Lysias,¹ he was a Roman citizen by birth (Acts 22:28). In any case, he arrived in Cyprus as a Roman citizen.

As a Roman citizen, he was entitled to bear a Roman gentilicium (family name)—though whether he ever did so remains an open question.² His common name, since the praenomen had lost its significance, followed the gentilicium according to the prevailing custom and functioned as a cognomen.³ Thus, adopting the name Paulus involved changing the cognomen.

Now, while it was by no means common, it was not unheard of for an adult Roman citizen to change their cognomen. We happen to know of an upstart from the Caesarian period who, when preparing to run for public office, abandoned his previous cognomen, Quintio, and adopted a more distinguished-sounding one, Sabinus.

¹ Paul not only, as earlier in Philippi (Acts 16:22, 37), allowed himself to be arrested in Jerusalem without revealing his Roman citizenship but only invoked it later. This prompted Renan (Saint Paul, 1869, p. 526, note 1) to doubt his Roman citizenship. Furthermore, in the second case, when the arresting commander asked about his identity, Paul identified himself as a Jew and a citizen of Tarsus in Cilicia (Acts 21:39), thus deliberately concealing his Roman citizenship. Various explanations could be offered for this. The most curious aspect, however, is that the commander, without any provocation, confesses to his prisoner that he purchased his own Roman citizenship. This seems more objectionable than many issues Schwartz criticized in Göttinger Nachrichten (1907, pp. 288 ff.). Yet, this does not indicate interpolation or a late addition but rather reflects how the narrator envisioned the situation. (The scenario itself is plausible; Lysias may have been among those who purchased citizenship and officer posts during Messalina’s time.)

² In the Delphic proxeny list from the first half of the 2nd century BCE (see the following note), there is mention of a Νίκανδρος Μενεχράτεος Ῥωμαῖος (Nicander, son of Menecrates, a Roman), who apparently did not exercise his right to bear a Roman gentilicium.

³ The earliest documented example of this usage appears in the Delphic proxeny list from the first half of the 2nd century BCE, with the entry from 190/189 BCE: Μᾶρκος Ὀαλέριος Ὁμοπτῶνης. This refers to the Numidian Muttines, who was granted Roman citizenship by the consul M. Valerius Laevinus (see my Inscriptiones selectae 8764, line 84, annotation 7).

¹ Catalect. Vergil. 10 (8) v. 8 (Baehrens Poetae Lat. min. II p. 171); Cic. ep. 15, 20, 1. Vgl. Buecheler Rhein. Museum XXXVIII 1883 S. 518., Mommsen in dies. Ztschr. XXVIII 1893 S. 605 (= Ges. Sehr. IV S. 175).

357 from 3rd line, Von einem gewissenlosen Ehrgeizigen einer….

Cicero (Pro Cluentio 26, 72) recounts the case of an unscrupulous social climber from an earlier period, a certain Staienus, who selected one of the cognomina of the noble gens Aelia. However, this case was different insofar as Staienus appears to have entered the Aelian family through a fictitious adoption (Cic. Brutus 68, 240). Nevertheless, it seems that changing one’s cognomen was not so rare among individuals of lower status aiming to ascend socially.

At the beginning of Augustus’ reign, such ambitions were likely shared by the freedman L. Crassicius of Tarentum. After humble beginnings on public stages, he transitioned to scholarly writing and replaced his cognomen Pasicles with the more distinguished-sounding Pansa (cognomine Pasicles, mox Pansam se transnominavit, Suet. De gramm. 12). Whether the choice of this name was influenced by its similarity in sound—evidenced by the spelling Pasa on reliable inscriptions of that era²—or by connections to a noble Pansa remains unknown.

A different motive prompted a freedman of Emperor Vespasian, named Cerylus (likely Flavius Cerylus), to replace his cognomen with the no more distinguished-sounding Laches (Suet. Vesp. 23). He sought to obscure his origins and reduce his patron’s claims to his inheritance. Such fraudulent name changes could be punished.³ However, a name change that did not infringe on anyone’s rights was explicitly permitted.⁴

In the case of the Apostle, it was not a simple name change, nor the adoption of a random noble cognomen, but rather the adoption of the cognomen of a specific prominent man—a sitting proconsul—with whom the Apostle had either a temporary or newly established relationship. Yet even the names of the most prominent individuals did not enjoy legal protection against such appropriations, with one significant exception: freedmen.

Freedmen, who upon their emancipation and acquisition of Roman citizenship typically adopted the gentilicium of their patron (and, from the early imperial period, also their praenomen¹), were prohibited from adopting noble cognomina, particularly those of their patrons. This restriction extended, to some extent, to the sons of freedmen. It was entirely unacceptable for a freedman to give his son the cognomen of his former master, as this would make the offspring of the slave indistinguishable from the noble master.

Had this been permissible, we would frequently encounter the ancient, illustrious Roman names—the patrician gentilicia with their associated cognomina—which, as we know, nearly all disappeared.² For instance, a freedman of the highly aristocratic M. Aurelius Cotta, a consul in AD 20, named M. Aurelius Zosimus, named his son Cottanus, presumably in grateful remembrance of his former master.³ Calling him Cotta, however, would have been a laughable presumption.

² For example, the tomb inscription of the consul from 43 BCE uses Pasa (Notizie degli Scavi 1899, p. 435).

³ Paulus (Sententiae 5, 25, 11): <Qui sibi falsum nomen imposuerit, genus parentesve finxerit, quo quid alienum interciperet possideret, poena legis Corneliae de falsis coercetur.

Codex Iustinianus 9, 25, 1.

¹ Mommsen, Staatsrecht III, p. 427.

² The Cornelii Scipiones, Cornelii Dolabellae, Caecilii Metelli, and other noble families, some of which survived into Augustus’ reign only through adoptions, disappeared during or by the end of the 1st century. It never occurred to freedmen of these families to propagate the noble names by giving them to their offspring. Conversely, a certain M. Tullius from (likely) Paestum, who had no connection with Cicero of Arpinum (as evidenced by his tribus), amusingly adopted the cognomen Cicero, naming himself M. Tullius M. f. Cicero, like the orator (CIL X 482, 483; Inscriptiones selectae 6448, 6449). The Fabii Maximi reappear in the 4th century, likely without any connection to the patrician house of the same name.

³ See this journal, p. 25.

359

—— A similar restraint may also have been imposed on provincials who were granted Roman citizenship. For example, when a man from Gades (modern Cádiz), who later played an extremely influential role in Rome under the name L. Cornelius Balbus during Caesar’s time, was granted Roman citizenship by Pompey in 72 BCE, he took the name L. Cornelius—likely in honor of the young L. Cornelius Lentulus, whom we later see as a supporter of Pompey, or another distinguished L. Cornelius to whom he owed his recommendation to Pompey. As a cognomen, he chose Balbus, since he did not wish to use his (unknown) native name—likely Punic—which would have constantly reminded the Romans of his foreign origin.

Similarly, other Punic individuals, as well as Iberians, Gauls, and members of non-Hellenized peoples of the East, when granted Roman citizenship and wishing to be regarded as Romans—not merely using or abusing their citizenship occasionally—might have adopted some Roman cognomen. However, they typically chose neutral and non-distinguished names rather than the names of their noble patrons.¹

By contrast, Greeks and Hellenized Asians, upon receiving Roman citizenship, and even with ongoing connections to Romans, rarely felt the need to adopt a Latin cognomen. Their Greek names were generally sufficient for Roman interactions.² It is more likely, one might think, that such fully Romanized Greeks or Asians would give their children Roman names, occasionally even those of Roman statesmen to whom they owed their citizenship, directly or indirectly. However, this was certainly uncommon. Otherwise, names like Scaevola, Sulla, or Lucullus would frequently appear among inhabitants of the province of Asia, while in fact they are rare or entirely unheard of.³

(The adoption of Roman names was hindered not only by lingering patriotism, which clung to such symbolic expressions, but also by linguistic sensibilities.) Even in the imperial era, when Roman gentilicia and cognomina began to spread among Greeks and Asians alongside Roman citizenship, the names of prominent governors² were by no means the most popular. Generally, people opted for names of neutral sound and meaning, such as Quadratus, Rufus, or Severus.

It is possible, for example, that a Pergamene named Ti. Claudius Vetus³ owed his cognomen to one of the two proconsuls of Asia named Antistius Vetus. This might have been because the cognomen was bestowed on him or an ancestor in admiration of the proconsul, or because an ancestor adopted the cognomen upon receiving Roman citizenship during the Claudian dynasty. However, such conjectures are often entirely speculative, particularly since in almost all such cases we cannot be sure whether we are dealing with native citizens of Hellenic cities or rather with Romans or Italians who had settled in Asia and obtained local citizenship in those cities.

¹ In most cases, especially when the new citizens did not plan to relocate to Rome but remained in their original communities, they likely used their native names as Roman cognomina. For example, the Haeduan C. Iulius Vercondaridubnus, the first priest of the altar of Augustus in Lugdunum in 12 BCE (Livy, Periochae139).

² Conversely, Romans and Italians who moved to Greece often had their names Hellenized or allowed them to be rendered in Greek form (e.g., omission of the gentilicium and identification solely by their first name and their father’s name in the genitive case; later, even omitting terms like νίός or ἀπελεύθερος). See Mommsen, Eph. epigr. VII, p. 452 ff.

³ See Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 117, regarding a Σμίρνας Σμύρνας, Asiarch and “most admirable orator” from Philadelphia in Lydia. Plutarch’s friend Sulla came from the Latin half of the empire, specifically from Carthage (Prosopography of the Roman Empire III, pp. 239 and 4961).

² King Herod notably named his grandson, born in 10 BCE, Agrippa after the recently deceased imperial administrator. This Agrippa later named one of his sons the same, while also naming two other children after members of the imperial household: Drusus and Drusilla. The latter, Iulia Drusilla, born in 38 CE (Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes, 13, p. 573), bore the same name as Emperor Caligula’s recently deceased favorite sister. Through the Herodian dynasty, the name Agrippa spread further in the East. If the name Drusilla in Tac. <Hist. 5, 9 is accurate, another royal house of that time also borrowed cognomina from the imperial family.

³ Fränkel, Inschriften von Pergamon 466.

361 from 5th line.. Vollends seit Vespasian, seit dem häufiger werden­…

Especially since the time of Vespasian, with the increasing entry of Asians into the state career and the Senate¹ and the inevitable intermarriages between the local aristocracy of Asia and the Roman imperial aristocracy, Roman cognomina became increasingly common in the East. Attempting to trace their origin or the circumstances of their adoption is generally futile.

I will only mention that Apollonius of Tyana² lamented the frequent adoption of Roman names by the Greeks of Asia. By contrast, Plutarch, despite his Roman citizenship and his close ties to many distinguished Romans, did not give any of his children a Latin given name. Even the gentilicium adopted by new Roman citizens from Greece and the East was usually not that of the governor or patron who secured their Roman citizenship but rather that of the emperor, who was the sole authority granting it, though the former practice still occurred occasionally.³

However, it was particularly rare for a subject to adopt or introduce all three Roman names (praenomen, gentilicium, cognomen) of a governor into their family. Yet this did happen, and it occurred in the same location where, in my opinion, Paul adopted the name of the governor: in Cyprus, at Paphos, shortly before Paul’s presence there.

One of Sergius Paulus’ immediate predecessors as proconsul of Cyprus, and the last whose name we know, was C. Ummidius Quadratus, who later became governor of Syria.¹ This name appears in a prominent Paphian family of the 1st century. According to two inscriptions,² seemingly from the temple of the Paphian Aphrodite, a certain C. Ummidius Quadratus and his wife Claudia Rhodoclea, a high priestess, dedicated a statue of their son C. Ummidius Pantauchus Quadratianus to the goddess. Another inscription records the dedication of a statue of C. Ummidius Quadratus himself, who also bore the additional surname Pantauchianus. The statue was dedicated by his grandmother Claudia Appharion, a high priestess of Demeter for all Cyprus.

The exact relationship between the individuals mentioned in these two inscriptions is unclear; in particular, it is uncertain whether we are dealing with one or two men named C. Ummidius Quadratus. The most likely scenario is that a man named Pantauchus, who received Roman citizenship through the mediation of the proconsul C. Ummidius Quadratus, named himself C. Ummidius Pantauchus and his son C. Ummidius Quadratus. The latter was occasionally referred to as ὁ καὶ Παντανχεανός (Pantauchianus).

From this, we see that it was not unheard of in Cyprus at that time for provincials to adopt even the cognomen of a Roman governor. Thus, there is no reason to doubt that the Apostle, if he wished to adopt a new name around that time for any reason, could have taken the cognomen of the sitting governor.

¹ See this journal, p. 16 f.

² Epigraphica 71, 72 (I, p. 365, ed. Kayser, 1870).

³ Plutarch, as is well known, received his Roman family name from his friend, the later proconsul of Asia, L. Mestrius Florus. The fact that a number of distinguished Lycians in the 2nd century CE bore the name Q. Veranius (Cagnat, Inscr. Graec. ad res Rom. pert. III, nos. 589, 628, 704; I, 739, ch. 63) clearly stems from the fact that their ancestors obtained Roman citizenship under Claudius through the mediation of the imperial governor Q. Veranius (cf. Prosopography of the Roman Empire III, p. 399, no. 266).

¹ On this man, see Prosopography of the Roman Empire III, p. 468, no. 600 (his primary inscription, the sole evidence of his proconsulship in Cyprus, is also Inscr. sel. 972). His full nomenclature also included a second gentilicium (Durmius), though this was usually omitted.

² Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum2637 = Waddington 2801 (= Cagnat, Inscr. Graec. ad res Rom. pert. III, 950; also no. 951).

362

The sequence of events may be imagined roughly as follows: Saul, who had managed perfectly well with this one name in Tarsus, Antioch, Damascus, and Jerusalem,¹ likely made little to no use of the Roman gentilicium he was entitled to bear as a Roman citizen.³ During his first major missionary journey, upon arriving in the capital of Cyprus and already considering further travel to Pamphylia and Pisidia, he felt the need for a name more familiar to Greeks and Romans.

His Roman citizenship did not hinder this choice, any more than it did for Quintio during the Caesarian era, Pasicles in the Augustan period, or Cerylus in Vespasian’s time when adopting new cognomina. The proconsul’s name, given that Saul had been introduced to him and treated in an especially cordial manner, naturally presented itself. Any other Greek or Latin name could have served the same purpose.

It was not the similarity between Paulus and Saul—which did not exist—nor the original meaning of the Latin name, which was probably unknown to him and to most of those he initially interacted with, that influenced his choice.² However, he surely chose the name willingly, as it reminded him of his first successful engagement with a representative of the wider world. In this limited sense, Jerome’s hypothesis (see p. 349) seems entirely accurate.

It should not be thought, though, that Paul chose the name to remind others of his acquaintance with the proconsul—nor should we draw inappropriate comparisons to Roman victory titles. If the Apostle sought the proconsul’s permission to adopt his cognomen, this permission would have been granted without hesitation; after all, not long before, a predecessor of Sergius Paulus, C. Ummidius Quadratus, had permitted Cypriots to adopt his full Roman name.

¹ See p. 356.

² Later, the original meaning of the name played a significant role among the Latins, as seen in Augustine’s writings before he encountered Jerome’s explanation (see above, p. 349). Augustine states in Sermon 168, §7 (5, p. 914, Migne): quid est Paulus? minimus (“What does Paul mean? Small, for paullum in Latin means little”). He connects this to 1 Cor. 15:9 (Ἐγώ γάρ εἰμι ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστόλων, “For I am the least of the apostles”), as in Sermon 101, §1 (5, p. 605, Migne) and elsewhere.

³ His Roman citizenship neither required him to adopt a Roman cognomen (see this journal, p. 17, note A) nor obligated his parents to give him one.

364 from top … Vielleicht hat aber….

It is possible, however, that the Apostle did not seek such permission at all. What was considered permissible in Cyprus in this regard could have been conveyed to him either by his friend Barnabas, a native Cypriot who had brought him to the island and was now at his side, or by other acquaintances he undoubtedly made among the Cypriots. In another provincial capital, such as Ephesus, the adoption of the cognomen of the sitting proconsul by a provincial might have been considered inappropriate by some of the many Romans residing there or might have been ridiculed by both Greeks and Romans.

In Cyprus, however, neither the proconsul, who would soon leave the island never to return, nor the Romans conducting business there, nor the locals cared in the slightest if a Saul adopted the cognomen of the patrician Aemilii or Sergii families. Paul, of course, did not abandon or deny his original name. He likely continued to use it where he spoke Aramaic or Hebrew, for example, during his subsequent visits to Jerusalem. However, our narrator consistently and appropriately uses the new name from the moment in the story when it became relevant, except when quoting earlier direct addresses to the Apostle (22:7, 13), where exact wording was crucial.

One might criticize the narrator for not explicitly recounting the Apostle’s adoption of his new name, as this indeed was not done. The words Σαῦλος ὁ καὶ Παῦλος² merely serve as a necessary link between the sections using Saul and those using Paul. The narrator contented himself with briefly highlighting the identity of the person during the transition from one name to the other. Why he proceeded in this way is unclear; perhaps he did not consider the matter important, or perhaps he was not fully aware of the motives and circumstances. During Paul’s long sea voyages and his time in captivity, he had more pressing matters to teach his companions than how he came by his second name.

The narrator’s treatment of Paul’s deeds was generally subjective. Incidentally, even the Gospel of Matthew does not explicitly recount the much more significant name change of Peter.¹

¹ Similarly, modern historians in analogous cases would mark the transition from Bonaparte to Napoleon or from Disraeli to Lord Beaconsfield at the point where the person adopted (or, like Napoleon, emphasized) the second name, unless specific intent or narrative structure disrupted this natural approach.

² Deißmann is correct in Bibelstudien (1895, p. 183) in observing this, but he errs when he continues (cf. Rufinus above, p. 350): “The ὁ καί allows no other conclusion than that he was already called Saulus Paulus before his arrival in Cyprus.” The phrase ὁ καί says nothing about the timing or manner of the adoption of the second name.

¹ The Gospel of Matthew similarly glosses over Simon’s renaming as Peter in 10:2 with the words Σίμων ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος—at the same point in the narrative where Mark and Luke explicitly report the renaming—just as Acts 13:9 does with Σαῦλος ὁ καὶ Παῦλος.

365

I must not fail to point out that the foundation of both the above and all earlier investigations into the name of Paul has recently been shaken. Like all my predecessors, I assumed that the Acts of the Apostles marks the name change in chapter 13:9, at Paul’s appearance before the proconsul of Cyprus. However, a Latin version of Acts, preserved in a 13th-century manuscript, places the change slightly earlier, in chapter 12:25. Similarly, it seems that a Greek manuscript of Acts, used by a 7th-century Syrian scholar, followed this pattern.

According to Blass,¹ this and many other variations stem from the first edition of Acts, which was later replaced by a second edition by the author himself. There is no need to pass judgment here—or at all—on the attempt to reconstruct an original version from fragments of various kinds and origins, claiming it to be the original in comparison to the received text.²

However, a word should be said about Blass’s explanation of why the name Paulus appears earlier in the supposedly first edition than in the later one. Originally, according to Blass, the author introduced the name Paulus in chapter 12:25, a particularly fitting point. But in chapter 13:7, he reverted to the old name to avoid confusion with the proconsul Sergius Paulus, who is mentioned there. Only in chapter 13:9 does the new name reappear, first alongside the old one, before fully taking over.

The author, upon reviewing his work, supposedly disliked this arrangement and in a second edition definitively moved the introduction of the new name to chapter 13:9. However, it seems to me that if, for any reason, the Apostle had already been called Paul before chapter 13, the single mention of another Paul—or rather Sergius Paulus, the proconsul—could not have caused any misunderstanding. For instance, the mention of another Simon, distinct from Peter, in Luke 7:40ff, is far more prone to misunderstanding.

It is unwarranted to assume that the author, fearing such confusion, shifted the name change from one point he deemed appropriate to another. The textual variant concerning the name of the Apostle Paul² has even less claim than any other to be considered ancient.³

¹ In his edition of Acts, secundum formam quae videtur Romanam, preface, p. IX.

² Cf. Harnack, Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1895, p. 491; 1899, pp. 150, 316; 1900, p. 12; H. v. Soden, Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments in ihrer ältesten erreichbaren Textgestalt (1902), I, p. 12; Harnack, Theologische Literaturzeitung, 1907, p. 401.

³ See also Ramsay, Expositor, Series V, 6 (1897), p. 460.

366

Finally, a few words must be said about other instances of double (or multiple) names from the circles and time of Paul, in which the second (or final) name was Latin. I know of four such cases explicitly attested in the New Testament: Jesus, who is called Justus (Col. 4:10); Joseph Barsabbas, who was surnamed Justus (Acts 1:23); John, who was also called Mark (see above, p. 347); and Symeon, who was called Niger (Acts 13:1).

It can be stated with confidence that the three Latin names appearing here (Justus twice) had a far more ordinary and modest connotation than Paulus. Each of these names also appears elsewhere among Jews of the time. For example, Justus was the name of the well-known rival of the historian Josephus,¹ Niger was one of the leaders of the revolt of 66 CE (Josephus, Bell. 2, 19, 2), and Marcus was the son of an alabarch of Alexandria (Josephus, Ant. 19, 5, 1).

Two of these names, Justus and Niger, carry self-explanatory meanings, which account for their popularity or emergence. Marcus was one of the Roman praenomina that, having nearly lost their original significance in Rome and becoming restricted to familial use, reemerged in the East as primary names. Mommsen² discussed this phenomenon in connection with the jurist Gaius. Similarly, the New Testament mentions a Gaius (Acts 20:4), a Lucius (Acts 13:1), and a Titus.

While names like Justus were popular and Niger at least not unknown among Jews of that time, both were foreign to the old Roman aristocracy. Until then, no representative of the Roman state with the name Niger or Justus had traveled to the East.³ As for Marcus, it was a common name shared by many proconsuls and legates as well as their servants and clients. These four cases clearly demonstrate that Paul’s situation was unique.

A unique situation also applied to a bearer of a double name who was particularly close to Paul, though his double name is not explicitly attested. It is generally assumed, and likely correctly, that Silas, Paul’s companion on his second major journey—who allowed himself to be arrested with Paul in Philippi and later invoked his Roman citizenship (Acts 16:37)—is identical to Silvanus, who co-signed Paul’s letters to the Thessalonians.

Like Paulus, Silvanus was not a widespread or overused name at the beginning of the imperial period. It was primarily associated with a patrician family, the Plautii, which had been represented in the Senate and among provincial governors for several generations (Prosopography of the Roman Empire III, p. 46, no. 361 ff.).¹ It is reasonable to assume that some connection to a noble Roman named Silvanus helped Paul’s companion acquire his name,² whether it was given to him in his youth or adopted as an adult.³

Nothing has been handed down about these connections. However, in Paul’s case, we know of his relationship with a proconsul of that name, and we should not overlook the minor yet significant detail that, as Paul took his first steps beyond the provinces familiar to him from his youth into new regions, he adopted the cognomen of a Roman proconsul.

¹ Justus was also the name of a geisiarch (synagogue leader) mentioned in a recently discovered inscription near Ostia, Notizie degli scavi< 1906, p. 411 (with commentary by Ghislanzoni), Eph. epigr. 9, 583 (printed edition).

² Gesammelte Schriften II, p. 27.

³ By the Neronian period, this had changed; under Nero, we find a procurator of Thrace named T. Iulius Iustus and a proconsul of Asia named Vettius Niger.

¹ Also found among a noble Pompeian and possibly a member of the Pomponii family of the time (Prosopography III, pp. 71, 495; 80, 565), but not among the common people.

² The external similarity of the names undoubtedly played a role, but neither Silas himself nor his parents would have chosen Silvanus entirely on their own. It is therefore unlikely, as Ramsay (St. Paul, p. 176) suggests, that Silvanus was the original name and Silas the abbreviated form.

³ An older but noteworthy case is the Pharisee Pollio (Josephus, Ant. 15, 1, 1; 10, 4). Whether or not this man is identical to the Abtalion mentioned in Jewish sources (Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes i, II³, p. 358), his name likely became known in Judea through Herod’s close relationship with C. Asinius Pollio (Josephus, Ant. 15, 10, 1).

Charlottenburg

H. DESSAU


Dessau, H. “Der Name Des Apostels Paulus.” Hermes 45, no. 3 (1910): 347–68.

Groag, E. “L. Sergius Paullus.” In Paulys Real-Encyclopadie Der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, II, A,2:cols 1715-18, 1923. http://archive.org/details/PWRE51.

Harrer, G. A. “Saul Who Also Is Called Paul.” The Harvard Theological Review 33, no. 1 (1940): 19–33.



2025-01-18

Challenging the Authenticity of Paul’s Letters

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

by Neil Godfrey

Continuing from:

  1. New Book Questioning Authenticity of Paul’s Letters
  2. Nina Livesey’s The Letters of Paul in their Roman Literary Context

–o0o–

This book argues that these seven letters* are … pseudonymous, literary, and fictional, letters-in-form-only. Their likely origin is Marcion’s mid-second-century speculative/philosophical school in Rome, the site and timeframe of our earliest evidence of a collection of ten Pauline epistles (c. 144 CE). Deploying the letter genre, trained authors of this school crafted teachings in the name of the Apostle Paul for peer elite audiences.

This study contributes to an important conceptual shift in our under­standing of early Christianity. (2)

* – referring to the seven of the New Testament letters that are widely accepted as genuinely authored by Paul or his secretary: Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, Philemon.

But how is the layperson, someone with an interest in Christianity but busy with other matters, to know “what’s what” about the sources? I am also mindful of the interest in the Christ Myth theory among several readers here and in the course of these posts I will point out where I believe some popular notions in that quarter might need rethinking.

Hopefully interested laypersons will find something to think about from this part review of The Letters of Paul in their Roman Literary Context.

A good place to start is getting our bearings on how we got to the position today where a core of the NT letters are considered to be genuine writings of Paul.

Scripture Status from the Beginning

To begin at the beginning, as NL does, we are not surprised to learn that notable Church Fathers such as Irenaeus and Tertullian (late second and early third centuries) appealed to their copies of Paul’s letters as if they were authoritative scripture. But is that how those (or the one) responsible for the letters meant them to be read? NL replies:

In that these authors are only at a slight remove, likely only several decades, from those responsible for the Pauline letters (see Chapter 4), it is reasonable to assume that their assessment of them as scriptural is how they were first envisioned to be. (36 – bolded highlighting is my own in all quotations)

Keep in mind that Irenaeus and Tertullian protested virulently against another prominent figure, Marcion, whom they accused of falsifying the letters. The actual words Paul supposedly wrote were matters of heaven or hell from the very first time we read about them in the external witnesses. That note does surely raise the question of how informal correspondence to scattered places could have been placed so soon on a par with Scriptures.

Criticism and Rescue

One of my favourite books as a teenage history buff. Its opening words of chapter 1: In 1784, at the height of the Age of Enlightenment, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote an article for a popular audience explaining the meaning of the word that gave the age its name. “Enlightenment”, Kant began, “is man’s emergence from his nonage. This nonage, or immaturity, he continued, was caused not by lack of intelligence, but lack of determination and courage to use that intelligence without another’s guidance. Sapere aude! Dare to know! Have the courage to use your own intelligence.”

The European Enlightenment was the age of Isaac Newton, Mozart, Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, Locke and James Cook. The new rationalist spirit sought to discover what could be understood about Paul’s letters by examining what the letters indicated about the situation of the author and his addressees. It is worth noting some of the milestone critics for a better perspective on modern views:

EE’s conclusion on the gospels and the beginning of his arguments on the letters begin here (archive.org).

Edward Evanson (1731-1805) proposed criteria and tests to determine the authenticity of the letters and their historical reliability.

His conclusion: All except for 1&2 Corinthians, 1&2 Thessalonians, Galatians and 1&2 Timothy were inauthentic. The only trustworthy gospel was that of Luke. Acts was also a useful guide to testing which letters were genuine.

As we too often find even among modern scholars, Evanson’s criteria and methods were often circular and more subjective than he might have liked to admit.

Wilhelm M.L. de Wette (1780-1849), assuming the letters to be genuine, laboured over reconstructing the historical setting of those to whom the letters were written along with teasing out clues that would allow a more graphic biography of Paul himself. This approach

serves to give the impres­sion – without adequate evidence – of the realia of Paul, his communities, and the letters as genuine correspondence . . . . (41)

The reader is taken away from the main theological and doctrinal contents of the letters and ushered into a socio-historical-biographical world of Paul and his churches. The foundations of this world, however, are the letters themselves along with Acts, so again we encounter a circular process. The letters are understood in terms of the social world and persons and communities that are taken from the letters themselves.

De Wette had the imagination and gift to breathe life into Paul and his communities, their trials and successes, but alas, reading imaginatively into a text and seeing a life behind it is not the most disciplined of scholarship.

De Wette was dismissed from Berlin in 1819 on account of his having written a letter of consolation to the mother of Karl Ludwig Sand, the murderer of Kotzebue. A petition in his favour presented by the senate of the university was unsuccessful, and a decree was issued not only depriving him of the chair, but banishing him from the Prussian kingdom. (Wikisource)

De Wette has won a more positive memory for his dissertation arguing that Deuteronomy was composed around the time of Josiah, not by Moses, in only a few dozen pages.

For at least one-hundred and thirty years, W.M.L.de Wette (1780-1849) has been cited in practically every scholarly discussion of the history of textual and source criticism of the Pentateuch . . . (Harvey/Halpern, 47)

You can peruse a translation of his Historico-Critical Introduction to the Canonical Books of the New Testament at archive.org.

Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860)

F.C. Baur (not to be confused with Bruno Bauer) is a name many readers have heard of for good (or “not so good”, depending on your point of view) reason. His influence is still with biblical scholarship however much his views have been modified. Baur’s focus was on understanding Christian origins. He concluded that Christianity arose from a “spiritual insight” under the guiding light of Paul in reaction against an essentially legalistic Judaism led by the apostles James and Peter. For Baur, only four epistles were genuine: Galatians, 1&2 Corinthians, Romans (the Hauptbriefe). Those four were to be the platform from which to view Christian origins: Acts was unreliable as history.

Baur’s analysis, however, contained a fatal methodological flaw. He deployed circular reasoning. That is, “NT documents [the Hauptbriefe] are used to reconstruct early Christian history; the recon­struction of early Christian history provides the framework for the assessment of NT documents [the Hauptbriefe].” Otherwise put, Baur posits a great rift between Judaism and Christianity from reading the Hauptbriefe, and then relies on those same letters to confirm his historical reconstruction. (45f)

F. C. Baur

Further, NL points out that Baur came to his understanding of Christian origins largely as a result of his attachment to the notion that Judaism was a kind of primitive legalistic religion and Christianity a liberating spiritual one, along with the belief that ancient historical narratives almost by definition windows, however much darkened, into real historical events. There was also a prevailing view that history’s conflicts were stepping stones towards an overall advancement of human civilization.

Critics arose but in varying ways they embraced Baur’s assumptions — especially their high esteem for the person of Paul as a religious innovator. How to determine a letter’s authenticity? Four guidelines prevailed:

1. Did a letter fit the Christian-spiritual vs Judaism-legalistic model of Christian origins? This question led to the final conclusion, still accepted today, that seven of the letters are authentic: Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, Philemon.

2. Did a letter conform to Pauline style?

3. Are there early external witnesses to a letter?

4. Did a letter agree with Acts?

Such guidelines have become standard to the extent that I think many lay readers accept them as reasonable grounds for assessing authenticity. NL prompts us to pause and think and take note that they cannot function as independent tests of authenticity.

Thus NL traces the emergence of criticism of Paul’s letters through to the current generally held opinion that seven are from the hand of Paul or his secretary. Paul is the pivotal genius responsible for the shape of Christianity.

The main point that NL is stressing is that the value of these letters since the Enlightenment rests on their historical veracity and what they reveal about the true historical situation of the early church.

. . . for biblical literature to be credible and worthy, it needed to be historically reliable. (53)

I add a note here for those who rely on Paul’s letters for their view that Jesus began as a mythical figure who was later historicized. If we remove ourselves from Baur’s influence and consider the possibility that none of the letters are first century compositions and not written many years before the gospels, how securely can we maintain the interpretation that their author understood Christ to have been a heavenly and not an earthly figure? If he were writing around the same time as the gospels were appearing would we not expect some explicit evidence — whether in the gospels, letters or other sources — of a clash of the heavenly against the earthly career of Jesus? Might not the dearth of historical details of Jesus in the letters simply be a consequence of the author/s placing themselves as an independent voice in a post earthly Jesus time setting?

Genuine Letters?

G. A. Deissmann

In many ways Paul’s letters don’t look like other letters. Compare for a start the rambling openings in which the author asserts his authority and makes historical notes about the recipients on the one hand with the normal letter opening of the time on the other: “To Rufus, Greetings…” The foundational scholar on this question is the philologist Gustav Adolf Deissmann (1866-1937).

As with Baur, NL addresses the apologetic assumptions guiding the investigation. The letters look different, Deissmann explained, because they are written within a spontaneous spiritual fervour that cast aside formal literary discipline and wrote from the heart. (Another scholar attributed the “uniqueness” of the gospels to a similar origin.) The letters were “artless, personal, genuine, and [therefore] historically reliable” (57).

Deissmann and others scoured ancient personal letters especially from Egypt and the Levant for comparison, studying presentations and words used in known manuscripts and newly discovered papyri, to find “natural” settings for many of the details (biographical, structural, wording) thus “confirming” their genuineness.

For NL, the enormous scholarship undertaken in these studies was misdirected. For example, Paul’s letters are closer in length to the letter-treatises of upper class Romans like Cicero and Seneca than to any personal letters from the papyri.

So scholarship has ever since been seeking to find commonalities between Paul’s letters and other letter formats to establish that they are genuine letters, while at the same time putting their differences down to the unique situation of early Christian “spiritual life” and particular circumstances. We are asked to believe that the letters are genuine outpourings from the intoxication of “new beliefs”, especially the  expectation of an apocalyptic return of Jesus. It is sometimes claimed that a letter of Paul is essentially a “directly spoken world” without literary artifice without any authorial attention to literary artifice. Such a view defies all that we otherwise know about any form of writing.

But biblical scholarship in some quarters at least has come to learn (especially, as I understand it, from anthropological studies) that new religions do not romantically erupt in a wave of spiritual fervour generated by new beliefs (such movements usually break out within established religions) but that rather, “in the beginning”, is ritual, practice. Myths come later to explain the rituals.

Deissmann posited an understanding of early Christianity that was ahistorical, and mythical. There was no Urchristentum as Deissmann (and Overbeck) imagined. Modern scholars of religion remark that rather than a concept or belief at a religion’s core, one finds instead practices. Only later is meaning applied to those practices. (64)

If beliefs and letters are not at the starting gate, what is?

The problem of positing “belief” as the seed and core of early Christianity is in part set out in an article available publicly (and cited by NL): The Concept of Religion and the Study of the Apostle Paul by Brent Nongbri. As further noted by NL, Nongbri draws upon “The Origins of Christianity Within, and Without, ‘Religion’: A Case Study”, which is the final essay in William Arnal’s and Russell McCutcheon’s The Sacred Is the Profane. The Political Nature of “Religion”. (The title is a reply to Mircea Eliade‘s pioneering The Sacred and the Profane of 1959.) Arnal and McCutcheon address the general isolation of biblical studies within the broader academy along with their all too often clearly flawed methodologies. “Religion” itself is largely a modern concept that has the unfortunate result of deflecting scholarly investigation away from specific practices, community behaviours and identities, that formed the real foundation of what became Christianity. Our focus on New Testament and related texts further blinkers us from other evidence that suggest quite different practices and tastes that can be discerned in archaeological remains and in what we know of other community formations. Indeed, it is suggested that the New Testament authors meant to impose a new textual understanding on the communities. The authors of these texts were literati who “viewed themselves as schools”. The texts constructed Jesus as an outsider figure who represented the communities themselves. They don’t mention Bruno Bauer but BB said as much more than a century and a half ago. In Arnal and McCutcheon’s words,

Speaking about Jesus as a particular type of social strategy was attractive for exactly the same reasons that, at the same time and among similar people, escapist novels, Stoic philosophy, and voluntary associations also flourished. (Sacred Is the Profane, 168)

I find it very easy to accept NL’s argument given what surely must have been many displaced persons looking for a clearer identity after the destruction of the Jewish way of life in Palestine and beyond as a result of the savage wars of Trajan and Hadrian to suppress Jewish uprisings. Not only Jews themselves but the gentile proselytes and “god-fearers” who had been attracted to “Judaism” would have been seeking a necessarily revised identity.

Continuing…..


Arnal, William, and Russell T. McCutcheon. The Sacred Is the Profane: The Political Nature Of “Religion.” New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Halpern, Baruch, Paul B. Harvey, and Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette. “W.M.L. de Wette’s ‘Dissertatio Critica …’: Context and Translation,” January 1, 2004. https://www.academia.edu/1202115/de_Wette_diss_crit.

Livesey, Nina E. The Letters of Paul in Their Roman Literary Context: Reassessing Apostolic Authorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. 

Nongbri, Brent. “The Concept of Religion and the Study of the Apostle Paul.” Journal of the Jesus Movement in Its Jewish Setting: From the First to the Seventh Century 2 (2015): 1–26.



2025-01-10

Nina Livesey’s The Letters of Paul in their Roman Literary Context

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by Neil Godfrey

With thanks to Cambridge University Press for an inspection copy.

Nina Livesey’s The Letters of Paul in their Roman Literary Context raises questions that go beyond the authenticity and date of Paul’s letters. If we no longer discern a wandering charismatic preacher, one who is competing with other preachers, and planting house churches in Asia Minor and Greece as he works his way, via a thriving Jerusalem, to Rome, then what do we have in his place?

The argument structure of The Letters is as follows:

  • — an explanation of the origin of the current consensus that the New Testament letters of Paul include some that are authentic, mid-first century, writings to real churches; Nina Livesey (NL) shows that the arguments giving rise to this view [that is, the historicity of Paul, the authenticity of the letters, their first century date, and the related “home churches”] are circular and grounded more in conservative piety than independent evidence;
  • — a comparison of the letters of Paul with letter-writing more generally at this time (the Roman world of the first and second centuries); NL explains how the training of authors prepared them to create characters, both of apparent authors and recipients, and situations that attracted readers because they seemed “so real” and “personal”; NL further compares Seneca’s use of fiction to teach applied Stoic philosophy through artificial letters with the Pauline correspondence, pinpointing many similar literary devices. A case is made that Paul’s letters were a collection intended for general publication from the point of their creation by “a school” of a highly educated elite.
  • independent evidence that explains the contents of the letters does not appear until the wake of the Bar Kochba war that (132-135 CE), far more than the first Jewish war of 66-70 CE, saw a genocide of the inhabitants of Palestine and even a denial of their name for their homeland as an ultimate punishment. In the context of Judea and Jewish practices like circumcision becoming a byword for all that Rome found contemptible, “Christian” teachers migrated to Rome where they set up “schools” not unlike other philosophical schools. It was from here that one such teacher, Marcion (later relegated by the “proto-orthodox” teachers as a “heretic”), identified with “Paul” and purportedly produced the letters under his name around 144 CE.

Further, the letters point to intertextuality with Acts and the gospels, indicating that the authors of all these works knew one another. Indeed, in Acts one finds the name of Paul emerging in the context of a work with a cluster of other fictional names, double-names and cipher (or symbolic) names (e.g. Stephen, the first martyr, meaning “crown”).

I look forward to discussing some aspects of NL’s book in more depth. This post is only an introductory overview.

NL’s overall argument does not identify an indisputable, concrete piece of evidence that directly places the letters of Paul (PL) in the mid second century and no doubt many readers will prefer to fall back on their “gut feelings” about the epistles. What NL offers is an argument that has fewer unsupported assumptions than are required by those who trust in at least their partial authenticity. The NL view appeals more directly and simply to the context of the external evidence. This external evidence is used to offer more direct explanations of the contents, the style and the known first appearances of the PL. Most simply:

  • — there is no first century external evidence to explain the contents and traditional beliefs about PL
  • — there is second century external evidence that does explain the contents and style of the PL
  • — what is known of literary education of the time further explains the PL as consisting of literary devices to teach a philosophical or theological set of beliefs; many inconsistencies and other difficulties within the PL that have engaged scholars who read the PL at face value are resolved by NL’s hypothesis of a second century school producing them.

Not too long ago I posted a very lengthy series on three books by Thomas Witulski proposing a Bar Kochba War context for the Book of Revelation. Witulski understood not only that war but the rebellions and massacres of Jews in the eastern Mediterranean under Trajan (prior to Hadrian) had a major impact on “Christians” at that time that was expressed in the “four horsemen” chapters of Revelation preluding the Bar Kochba revolt. Revelation expresses a remarkably different kind of Christianity that we know from the gospels and PL (see Couchoud’s discussions), even pointing an accusing finger at Christians who appear to embrace customs that surface in the PL (e.g. eating meat sacrificed to idols). Joseph Turmel (=Henri Delafosse) considered the “Man of Sin” Antichrist figure of 2 Thessalonians (see 2 Thess at his commentary page) to have been Bar Kochba but I wonder if a better case could be made for it being Hadrian, especially given Revelation’s favourable view of Bar Kochba (Witulski). How that interpretation might fit with NL’s arguments is a question I’d like to think through. Certainly Hermann Detering’s scenario of the “Little Apocalypse” prophecy of Mark 13 (and Matthew 24 and Luke 21) being best explained in Hadrianic times comes to the fore, as does his evidence (much drawn from Rudolf Steck) for Paul’s opponents belonging to the second century. The surviving writings of Justin (post the Bar Kochba War) also strongly suggest — contrary to conventional attempts to read his knowledge of our canonical gospels into his works — a time when there was a free-for-all scope for interpreting Jewish Scriptures as prophecies of “Christianity”.

So you can see how NL’s book ties in with many ideas I have been toying with for some years now. I look forward to discussing some of its details.


Livesey, Nina E. The Letters of Paul in Their Roman Literary Context: Reassessing Apostolic Authorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.



2025-01-09

New Book Questioning Authenticity of Paul’s Letters

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by Neil Godfrey

Nina E. Livesey is Professor of Religious Studies, Emerita at the University of Oklahoma.

Today I received a review copy from Cambridge University Press of Nina E. Livesey’s The Letters of Paul in their Roman Literary Context: Reassessing Apostolic Authorship. I have already read the Introduction and Chapter 4 and highlighted along the way a few dozen other works referenced by Livesey to follow up. But what I found most inviting is that quite a few other references I have already posted about — and in some cases translated — here on Vridar. It is encouraging to meet a friend who likes and has found value in my other friends.

The first reference that stands out is Patricia Rosenmeyer. I posted on one of Rosenmeyer’s works in 2006 and it is one Livesey refers to often (as I also have done in subsequent posts):

Livesey references many scholars I have discussed here (some more extensively than others) but some names stand out as being more “radical” than others — to name but a handful some long-term blog readers may recognize:

  • Bruno Bauer — whose relevant works discussed by Livesey I translated and made available here: see his Pauline Letters and Christ and the Caesars. Livesey writes of BB, “his arguments are more sophisticated than those typically found in current Pauline scholarship” (19). Nice.
  • Paul Louis Couchoud — a very nice surprise to see him make an appearance
  • Rudolf Steck — my translation of one of his works is online at https://vridar.info/
  • Joseph Tyson — I posted at length on his work on Marcion and Luke-Acts
  • Herman Detering — whose scholarship is vastly under-rated by at least one prominent name who notably failed to do a basic Bayesian analysis of his work (see Staged Forgeries — another work I have translated)
  • Markus Vinzent
  • Richard Pervo
  • Boyarin, Daniel — of whom Larry Hurtado expressed distinct discomfort for his forays into New Testament studies

Nina Livesey argues that the Pauline letters all date from the mid second century — after the Bar Kochba War.

I feel a little ashamed that till now I have only allowed myself to wonder if all of the New Testament writings should be dated to the post Bar Kochba war period. Livesey takes that step boldly.

Drawing on Rosenmeyer and numerous others I look forward to reading Livesey contextualizes the Pauline letters within the ancient custom of “schools” and teachers writing letters in the name of others in order to teach and persuade. Paul’s letters are not the product of a “wandering charismatic preacher” but of someone belonging to the wealthy elite.

Such a portrait, however, poorly suits an individual both trained and socially positioned to produce such letters. On the other hand, there is ample evidence of creative literary activity and production in schools (haereses). As I argue in what follows, a second-century social and political context and a school setting, such as that of Marcion, are suggestive of a viable location for the creation of doctrinal exhortative letters written in the name of the Apostle Paul. (xif)

And the thesis extends beyond the letters:

While certainly a contentious and debated issue, the dating of NT writings plays an important role in my thesis. Not only Acts, but also the canonical Gospels are more recently considered not first- but second century writings. If we consider – as did the Dutch Radicals – that the Pauline letters were produced alongside of and in a complex and dynamic relationship with the Gospels and Acts, the forward shift in the dating of the latter lends further support to a second-century provenance of the letters. (27f)

So it’s back to Marcion and the post Bar Kochba era for “everything”.

“Christian” teachers arrived in Rome in the wake of the Bar Kokhba revolt and established schools under Roman authority near one other. “Christian” literature, including gospel texts, flourished during this time, with compositions reflecting a post-Jewish temple and post-Judaea social and political reality. Marcion’s publication of what has been inter­preted as the First New Testament, consisting of a gospel (Evangelion) and a collection of Pauline letters (Apostolikon), is likely one of the earliest among these compositions. (251)

I look forward very much to reading the work in full and posting about it as opportunity permits.


Livesey, Nina E. The Letters of Paul in Their Roman Literary Context: Reassessing Apostolic Authorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.



2025-01-08

Justifiable Appeal to Consensus; Take 2

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by Neil Godfrey

For the ordinary lay person who does not have the background to draw upon to enable a confident “vetting” the arguments of a consensus, I thought the three-part conditions set out by Avazier Tucker were a good rule of thumb for when to justify appeal to a consensus. It certainly provides a good answer to anti-vaxxers. Similarly, it offers good guidance to conspiracy theorists of various types. (Not that many of them would be convinced, of course, but it is nonetheless good to have “an answer” out there for those who are ready to change their minds.)

Richard Carrier thought Tuckers’ three part program was no answer at all to the problems he raised. It’s my fault entirely. I sneakily hid Tucker’s antidotes to the very problems Carrier raised in between the title and the last line of the post so anyone can be excused for missing them.

Carrier wrote,

These conditions cannot be met in captured fields (e.g. you will never ever see a “consensus” in biblical studies by this definition that Jesus did not rise from the dead and is not God or the literal Son of God), so it is not useful as a metric.

Oh dear — my fault entirely. I should not have hidden the fact that Tucker’s three point proposition is explaining exactly why what is regarded as a consensus in biblical studies is not a justifiable or trustworthy consensus. I really do have to stop hiding the main points of my posts beneath their titles.

But more to the point, and by way of demonstrating how biblical studies fails on Tucker’s point 2 — the issues of Thomas Thompson and Thomas Brodie certainly illustrated the failure of Tucker’s points 1 (coercion) and 3 (coercion but also alert to the public about the heterogeneous character of the opposition to the consensus) in the field of biblical studies — more to the point, as I said, I must point to a work by Michael Alter published in the SHERM journal, Dataset Analysis of English Texts Written on the Topic of Jesus’ Resurrection: A Statistical Critique of Minimal Facts Apologetics

This article’s abstract:

This article collects and examines data relating to the authors of English-language texts written and published during the past 500 years on the subject of Jesus’ resurrection and then compares this data to Gary R. Habermas’ 2005 and 2012 publication on the subject. To date, there has been no such inquiry. This present article identifies 735 texts spanning five centuries (from approximately 1500 to 2020). The data reveals 680 Pro-Resurrection books by 601 authors (204 by ministers, 146 by priests, 249 by people associated with seminaries, 70 by laypersons, and 22 by women). This article also reveals that a remarkably high proportion of the English-language books written about Jesus’ resurrection were by members of the clergy or people linked to seminaries, which means any so-called scholarly consensus on the subject of Jesus’ resurrection is wildly inflated due to a biased sample of authors who have a professional and personal interest in the subject matter. Pro-Resurrection authors outnumber Contra-Resurrection authors by a factor of about twelve-to-one. In contrast, the 55 Contra-Resurrection books, representing 7.48% of the total 735 books, were by 42 authors (28 having no relevant degrees at the time of publication). The 42 contra authors represent only 6.99% of all authors writing on the subject.

The article is available at the link above. The book referred to with the complete study is A Thematic Access-Oriented Bibliography of Jesus’s Resurrection. I don’t know how Michael had the stamina to undertake such a study, but again, it’s good to have things like this done and available.


2025-01-07

How to Recognize a Trustworthy Consensus

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by Neil Godfrey

Consensus per se is not a reliable sign of rationality. It depends on how consensus is reached. All sorts of methods can yield consensus: brain-washing, the threat of the rack or burning at the stake, totalitarian control of the sources of information. Consensus reached by these means does not guarantee rationality. — Goldman

Recent discussions have sent me back to a second look at Aviezer Tucker’s Our Knowledge of the Past. (I posted about this book back in 2013.) A detail I had forgotten in the meantime is Tucker’s interesting explanations about when a consensus is more likely to be trustworthy than not. Here is part of what he writes:

In the real world, there is no universal consensus on beliefs because some people always dissent. There are still people who deny that the earth is round or that it revolves around the sun and others who deny that there was a Holocaust. This led philosophers who consider consensus to be philosophically valuable to attempt to prescribe whose opinions matter for determining whether or not there is a consensus on beliefs. Reliance on professional organizations or academic institutions, affiliations, and certifications is a tempting approach. If all professional astronomers agree that the earth is round and revolves around the sun, it must be because they have knowledge of the heavens and those who honestly dissent must be either ignorant or irrational. At their best, professional and academic institutions should indeed reflect the qualities that make consensus among their members significant as a possible indicator of knowledge. Still, this appeal to authority failed too often in history. Academic and professional institutions have proved themselves to be too susceptible to political threats and manipulation, economic dependence and graft, or the common biases of a class of people who share professional interests and often social background. The corruption of the German academic system under the Nazis, the rejection of relativity in physics, the destruction of psychology, anthropology, and historiography in favor of dark racist fantasies is just the most extreme example of the ever-present temptation of academic and professional institutions, even in previously excellent academic systems, to prefer their institutional, class, and professional interests to intellectual integrity. (33)

So what does Tucker advise given the fact that the consensus of authorities may not always be a reliable guide to the truth of a matter?

The alternative approach I present here does not have to rely on authority, nor does it require universal consensus. It merely requires unique noncoerced heterogeneity: It does not matter if some do not agree to a set of beliefs, as long as the people who do, are sufficiently different from each other to reject alternative hypotheses to the knowledge hypothesis, and those who dissent are sufficiently homogenous to support hypotheses that explain their dissent by particular biases. For example, the group that reached consensus on Darwinian evolution is uniquely heterogeneous, it includes people who are secular and religious, and of many different faiths. The community that upholds the alternative “creationism” is quite homogenous, composed exclusively of biblical fundamentalists, almost all of whom are American Protestants, though many American Protestants believe in Darwinian evolution. Their bias in favor of an anachronistic, historically insensitive interpretation of Genesis is the best explanation of their beliefs. (34)

I know many readers of this blog will be thinking of the consensus on the historicity of Jesus. In the light of the above, we may see a reason certain critics of the Christ myth theory attempt to portray “mythicists” as a singular group of Christian-hating atheists. By ignoring the broad spectrum of “mythicists” — atheists, Buddhists, prominent public intellectuals, and even faithful Christians and others who have expressed a high regard for Christianity — the mythicists are portrayed as a narrow, homogenous group with a unique hatred of Christianity and thus able to be comfortably dismissed.

Tucker says a reliable consensus must be uncoerced and sufficiently large. How large?

The heterogeneous group that reaches consensus must be sufficiently large to avoid accidental results. Small groups can never be sufficiently heterogeneous to exclude hidden biases. . . . If only four scientists work on a particular problem and they agree on a set of related beliefs, it does not imply that their agreement reflects common knowledge. The four may be a professor, her assistant, a former student, and an untenured member of faculty who needs her vote on the tenure committee. The minimal size of a significant consensus depends on local circumstances such as whether the people who develop a consensus are related socially, the nature of their relations, and whether they attempted to replicate the process that generated the beliefs or merely accepted the conclusions of others on faith or authority (Sarkar, 1997, p. 510). Usually, when the consensus involves hundreds of people who are geographically, institutionally, and professionally dispersed, it is safe to assume that it is large enough. If the consensus is on an esoteric topic, and only a handful of experts are competent or interested enough to reach the consensus, they may possess knowledge, but their consensus cannot function as an indicator of knowledge. It is necessary to follow their reasoning to evaluate the status of their beliefs. (34)

Those are three key features for “mere outsiders” to look out for when deciding whether they have a right to hold any reservations about a consensus among the experts:

  1. The consensus is uncoerced;
  2. The consensus is found among a “sufficiently large” and heterogenous group;
  3. Dissenting voices are from a “sufficiently homogenous” group such that their biases are readily apparent.

They look like a neat rule of thumb to me.


Goldman, Alvin I. “Foundations of Social Epistemics.” Synthese 73, no. 1 (October 1987): 109–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485444.

Tucker, Aviezer. Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography. Cambridge University Press, 2009.



2025-01-05

On Doing History with Jesus, Bayes and Carrier

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by Neil Godfrey

This post continues my thoughts on a case for the non-historicity of Jesus that I began with these posts:

And two related afterthoughts to the above:

Since I began drafting this post, Richard Carrier has responded specifically to some of my subsequent comments that were made in an exchange over what I, rightly or wrongly, understood to be some confusion about my view of Bayes’ theorem. He has not, as far as I see — again, I am open to correction and reminding — responded to the central argument of these posts. Further, I began posting a detailed review (scroll to bottom of the page for the reviews) of Carrier’s Proving History in 2012 but other questions arose that distracted me from that project after three posts. This series might be seen as an update on my views of Carrier’s application of Bayes’ theorem to history generally and Jesus in particular.

My position on the historical Jesus

To begin with, I think the only figures of Jesus of any relevance to the historian are

  • the Jesus in our early sources (especially the New Testament writings)
  • and the political shapes of Jesus through the ages.

Attempting to “discover” a Jesus “behind” the sources through memory theory or other means (criteria of authenticity, form criticism) necessarily begins with the assumption that the stories told in the gospels have some kind of relationship with a historical Jesus. In other words, they assume a historical figure was the starting point of everything. (A passage found in a work by the Jewish historian Josephus, even if only partially authentic, can tell us nothing more than what was being said about Jesus some sixty years after he was supposed to have lived.)

My position regarding Bayes’ Theorem

One more point I should reiterate. I have said many times now that Bayes’ theorem is a fine tool to apply to many hypotheses. My point, though, is that I see little historical value in hypothesizing the existence or non-existence of Jesus per se. What is of historical interest is how Christianity emerged. A hypothetical Jesus or hypothetical non-Jesus alone doesn’t help us with that question. We simply don’t know if there was a figure identifiable as Jesus at or near the start of Christianity. The reason we do not know arises from the lack of independent and empirical data to establish his presence. Historical explanations can draw on hypothetical scenarios but when they do they can never be more than hypothetical proposals. I prefer that a historian works more modestly with what can be securely known and seeks to explain that much.

My position with respect to Richard Carrier’s historical methods

When Richard Carrier’s books Proving History and On the Historicity of Jesus first appeared I was intrigued by the Bayesian approach and in large measure rode with it. But what especially attracted me was the comprehensiveness of Carrier’s approach to the question that had at that time been a “hot topic” ever since Earl Doherty’s contributions. At the time I attempted to shelve some discomfort I felt over Carrier’s portrayal of “what historians do” and “how they do things” more generally. He seemed to me to be returning to a positivist view of history, a view that had largely been left in the margins especially since the mid twentieth century. One other discomfort I had was that I thought he was weakening his position and making himself too-easy-a-target for critics by adding new speculative arguments to those of Earl Doherty. I felt a stronger case and smaller target would have been made with less rather than more — with zeroing in on a selection of core arguments from Doherty rather than trying to cover everything that had been argued and adding even to that.

Though I have written many posts in favour of the application of Bayes’ Theorem to questions arising in biblical studies (and I have Richard Carrier to thank for introducing me to the usefulness of Bayes) I have also found myself in disagreement with some of Carrier’s views:

Ironically, in most of those cases, I think that it is Carrier who has dropped the Bayesian ball along with “rational-empirical” argument and it is yours truly who is using Bayesian reasoning to demonstrate where some of Carrier’s views are amiss.

At the time I held back my criticisms mainly because I did not want to be seen as part of what was then a hostile internet backlash against Carrier. But since I have recently been deeply re-engaging with the nature of historical knowledge and history itself I have felt the time is right to try to resolve some issues raised by Carrier’s work that originally left me a little uncomfortable.

Misapplied Conclusions from Bayesian Analysis

If we conclude from Bayesian reasoning that a historical Jesus is not likely to have existed, it tells us nothing useful. All it would mean is that if Jesus did exist there were many views expressed about him that gave rise to suspicions about his existence among later readers. He would not be the first.

No historical event is the same as another and no historical person is the same as another. Each and every historical event and historical person and circumstance is unique in some way. Hypotheses about the existence or non-existence of Jesus are hypotheses about a unique event.

But it is impossible to compute the frequencies of events that are unique. (Tucker, 136 — Tucker further notes, without comment, Carrier’s response to this problem, which is to assign a range of probabilities including subjective but informed probability estimates of experts — that is, measuring )

A Case Study

Carrier argues that even subjective expectations are ultimately (though perhaps hidden from one’s immediate consciousness) based on calculable frequencies of the same kinds of events:

Any time you talk about degrees of belief or certainty, just think about what you base that judgment on, and what facts would change your mind. Always at root you will find some sort of physical frequency that you were measuring or estimating all along. (272)

I am not so sure. Are “degrees of belief” or subjective “certainty” always or necessarily based on conscious or subconscious rational calculation? If so, there can be no such thing as “subjective” belief: every belief would be at some level a rational calculation based on relevant frequencies. I am not as confident as Carrier in the fundamental rationality of all subjective beliefs and expectations.

Alexander David Cooper – THE DEATH OF KING WILLIAM II. Image from https://clasmerdin.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-death-of-william-rufus-accident-or.html

Let’s take a unique historical event, one that Carrier discusses in Proving History, and examine his argument. The historical hypothesis here is that Henry I plotted to kill William II.

In our personal correspondence, C. B. McCullagh observed that to apply BT to questions in history

the hypothetical event has to be considered as a generic type, similar in some respect to others. That might worry historians, whose hypotheses are so often quite particular. For instance, consider how the hypothesis that Henry planned to kill William II in order to seize his throne explains the fact that after his death Henry quickly seized the royal treasure. The relation between these events is rational, not a matter of frequency. . . . (The example being referred to is discussed in C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 22.)

But, in fact, if the connection alleged is rational, then by definition it is a matter of frequency, entailed by a hypothetical reference class of comparable scenarios. To say it is rational is thus identical to saying that in any set of relevantly similar circumstances, most by far will exhibit the same relation. If we didn’t believe that (if we had no certainty that that relation would frequently obtain in any other relevantly similar circumstances), then the proposed inference wouldn’t be rational. Explaining why confirms the point that all epistemic probabilities are approximations of physical frequencies. The evidence in this case is that Henry not only seized the royal treasure with unusual rapidity, but that his succeeding at this would have required considerable preparations before William’s death, and such preparations entail foreknowledge of that death. Already to say Henry seized the royal treasure “with unusual rapidity” is a plain statement of frequency, for unusual = infrequent, and this statement of frequency is either well-founded or else irrational to maintain. And if that frequency is irrational to maintain, we are not warranted in saying anything was unusual about it. Likewise, saying “it would have required considerable preparations” amounts to saying that in any hypothetical set of scenarios in all other respects identical, successful acquisition of the treasure so quickly will be infrequent, and thus improbable, unless prior preparations had been made (in fact, if it is claimed such success would have been impossible without those preparations, that amounts to saying no member of the reference class will contain a successful outcome except members that include preparations). Again, the result is said to be unusual without such preparations, or even impossible; and unusual = infrequent, while impossible = a frequency of zero. Hence such a claim to frequency must already be defensible or it must be abandoned. Similarly for every other inference: making preparations in advance of an unexpected death is inherently improbable for anyone not privy to a conspiracy to arrange that death, and being privy to such a conspiracy is improbable for anyone not actually part of that conspiracy, and in each case we have again a frequency: we are literally saying that in all cases of foreknowing an otherwise unpredicted death, most of those cases will involve prior knowledge of a planned murder, and in all cases of having foreknowledge of a planned murder, few will involve people not part of that plan. If those frequency statements are unsustainable, so are the inferences that depend on them. And so on down the line.

Thus even so particular a case as this reduces to a network of generalized frequencies. And all our judgments in this case necessarily assume we know what those frequencies are (with at least enough accuracy to warrant confidence in the conclusion). We won’t know exactly the frequencies involved, but we know they must be generally in the ballpark stated, otherwise we wouldn’t be making a rational inference at all. (273f – my highlighting in all quotations)

Here Carrier notes as background knowledge that “considerable preparations” would have been required “before William’s death” for Henry’s actions to have succeeded. He confuses this background knowledge with “evidence” but understanding the complexities involved in asserting full control of the royal treasure is really background knowledge. That background knowledge forms the basis of the hypothesis that Henry murdered William. Carrier leaves this aside. He suggests that Henry’s ‘unusual rapidity’ in taking control reflects subconscious knowledge of how infrequently such events occur under normal circumstances. But I do not know how Carrier could verify that historians really do reflect on how many times a royal treasure has been taken over with such speed, or how often comparable “classes of events” have occurred. Carrier does not give examples of similar “reference class acts” with which to compare and I suspect most historians will need time to think before they could offer instances. Even if one did compile a list of comparable successions in an attempt to establish a reference class with which to compare Henry’s succession of William, historians would be hard pressed to tease out all factors that made each situation unique and to justify its relevance to the particular event of Henry’s replacement of William. Rather, it is simpler and more likely that historians who are informed of the political structures and scale of England at the time use that background knowledge to infer that the speed of Henry’s acts points to the likelihood of murder.

While typing up this post I was distracted by a news item about a woman being interviewed who said that she was told she had a “only a 10%” chance of contracting a certain terminal illness but now she had it. There was no longer any 10% business about it. Statistics and probabilities are relevant when dealing with effectively infinite numbers of factors. But historical contingency is not a probability event. It happens to a particular person with a certainty of 1 regardless of what the odds are in an infinite universe and there was no way to estimate in advance that that particular woman was going to get the illness. That that unfortunate person was part of a 10% subset within a population of many thousands was meaningless to her and her loved ones. A science body had produced statistics. This person experienced an historical event. Most historical events are unforeseen — except, as I keep saying, in hindsight.

Confusing History with Science

Geology and paleontology, for instance, are largely occupied with determining the past history of life on earth and of the earth itself, just as cosmology is mainly concerned with the past history of the universe as a whole. . . . 

History is the same. The historian looks at all the evidence that exists now and asks what could have brought that evidence into existence. . . .

And just as a geologist can make valid predictions about the future of the Mississippi River, so a historian can make valid (but still general) predictions about the future course of history, if the same relevant conditions are repeated (such prediction will be statistical, of course, and thus more akin to prediction in the sciences of meteorology and seismology, but such inexact predictions are still much better than random guessing). Hence, historical explanations of evidence and events are directly equivalent to scientific theories, and as such are testable against the evidence, precisely because they make predictions about that evidence. . . .

[T]he logic of their respective methods is also the same. The fact that historical theories rest on far weaker evidence relative to scientific theories, and as a result achieve far lower degrees of certainty, is a difference only in degree, not in kind. Historical theories otherwise operate the same way as scientific theories, inferring predictions from empirical evidence—both actual predictions as well as hypothetical. Because actual predictions (such as that the content of Julius Caesar’s Civil War represents Caesar’s own personal efforts at political propaganda) and hypothetical predictions (such as that if we discover in the future any lost writings from the age of Julius Caesar, they will confirm or corroborate our predictions about how the content of the Civil War came about) both follow from historical theories. This is disguised by the fact that these are more commonly called ‘explanations.’ But theories are what they are. (46ff)

I have recently addressed historical positivism at

Hempel (left) and Carnap

What Carrier is describing here is a “positivist” view of history. This is a notion of history that was more widespread up to the middle of the last century. One of its leading exponents was Hempel who argued that historians should be seeking to discover predictable cause-effect relationships. (Hempel took positivism a step further than Carrier by claiming actual “laws” in history could be found.) His colleague, Carnap, stressed the importance of probabilistic reasoning in such an endeavour. The view that history could aspire to be akin to the natural sciences in method grew out of the Enlightenment when there was burgeoning confidence that Reason and Empiricism could liberate humanity from the shackles of superstition and dogma. But positivist history has long since been under strong attack from many quarters.

It is this positivist approach to history that explains the relevance of Carrier’s use of Reference Class. The idea of a reference class is to generalize historical events or incidents so that they can be compared with one another as a common type. That means they are temporarily removed from their historical contingency and treated as sharing common features for the sake of comparison. The point is to isolate generalized cause-effect principles.

Strictly speaking, prior probability is the probability of getting a specific kind of h when you draw at random from a reference class of all possible h → e [hypothesis to evidence] correlations. Those correlations don’t have to be causal, although in history they usually are. Because, in history, we are almost always asking what caused e and proposing h as the answer (see chapters 2 and 3). I’ll thus focus mainly on causal hypotheses and explain how to ascertain prior probabilities in a way that can produce intersubjective agreement among expert historians, and when and why such a process is logically valid. Some critics of BT are skeptical of causal language in applying the theorem, but that’s fundamental to many theories, especially historical ones, since any statement about what happened in history reduces to a statement about what caused the evidence we have. And you can’t propose historical explanations without proposing causes. Historians do distinguish claims about what happened (or once existed) from claims about why it happened (or why it existed). But ultimately all claims about ‘what’ entail claims about ‘why.’ (229)

I pause and ask if that is so. Many historians may agree with the above, but even among those who do, I think most would be sceptical about any attempt to assess varying degrees of causal probability to any of the factors associated with an event. Understanding human behaviour is not so mechanical an enterprise. The example Carrier offers does to me come across as unrealistically mechanically causal and even positivist with a vengeance:

. . . a hypothesis that a religious riot was caused by prior beliefs of that community (such as an ancient prophecy) in conjunction with new events (such as the appearance of a comet) obviously proposes a causal relationship between those prior beliefs and the riot . . . (230)

Such a view of human nature in general and historical events in particular is not one I share. I doubt that many historians have ever concluded that there can ever be such a simplistic one-to-one cause-effect of a riot as “a belief” of some kind. I propose that where riots occur a range of conditions will normally be found to help us understand the what and the why.

I think the principle applies to most works of historians today. Few, I believe, would think they can reduce historical events to isolated or particular combinations of specific causes each bearing a certain probability factor in the final equation.

In another instance, this time in On the Historicity of Jesus, Carrier continues the same refrain: the existence of prophecies would in effect have caused would-be messiahs to seek martyrdom, so in such a context, Christianity “almost becomes predictable”.

God had promised that the Jews would rule the universe (Zech. 14), but their sins kept forestalling his promise (Jer. 29; Dan. 9), which would also create a motive for would-be messiahs to perform atonement acts, which could include substitutionary self-sacrifice (see Element 43), out of increasing desperation (Elements 23-26). Christianity almost becomes predictable in this context. (OHJ 71)

Admittedly Carrier relegates this statement to a footnote but it does further illustrate the simplistic cause-effect positivism approach he has to the question of Christian origins: prophecy — would have inspired (caused) — would be prophets — to do an atonement act like Jesus — Christianity conceptually predictable (law of cause and effect) in such a scenario. If there were historically verifiable prophets acting that way, most historians would prefer to seek a deeper understanding about why such behaviour emerged at that time and place than the mere existence of a prophecy rolled away in the scrolls.

A recent work of history that I read is Killing for Country by David Marr. Along with Tom Petrie’s Reminiscences of Early Queensland and Libby Connor’s Warrior, I have been left with a deep sense of shame about white treatment of the indigenous population of my state and a strong political and social conviction of what we owe their survivors. Those historical works were not about “cause and effect” but about understanding and awareness. There will always be causal elements in any explanation but causes per se are not always what history is about.

Reference Class Revisited

As far as I understand Carrier’s approach, he introduces Reference Class in the question of the historicity of Jesus in order to establish a prior notion of how likely a certain idea of Jesus is the result of a generalized cause-effect class of events. This is an attempt, as I understand it, to introduce some kind of “scientific” validity to the study of history. If we understand the “scientific” approach as one that seeks to establish the general from the particular, this is the intended function of assigning Jesus to the Rank-Raglan hero class and drawing probabilistic inferences based on cause-effect principles found in that class.

The idea is that among figures found in a subset of the Rank-Raglan class few or none are known to be historical. The principle Carrier wants us to conclude from this is that stories of a certain type are “caused” by something other than a historical figure behind them.

If therefore we find Jesus within this subset of story types, then it logically follows that those stories about him likewise owe their existence to something other than an actual historical figure of Jesus.

I agree that in principle — and it is the principle that counts — that is a correct conclusion. Lord Raglan himself expressed the same point:

If, however, we take any really historical person, and make a clear distinction be­tween what history tells us of him and what tradition tells us, we shall find that tradition, far from being supplementary to history, is totally unconnected with it, and that the hero of history and the hero of tra­dition are really two quite different persons, though they may bear the same name. (The Hero, 165)

Further, I think a good many biblical scholars will also agree that what we read in the gospels about Jesus is in large measure unconnected with a historical Jesus. Many argue that the stories that arose about Jesus were fabricated to meet the needs of later generations.

In other words, the reference class itself is irrelevant to the question of the historicity of Jesus. It is a misguided attempt to establish a quasi-scientific or positivist approach to history by establishing a principle that transcends the uniqueness of each historically contingent event and person.

The mythical stories about Jesus tell the historian something important to the interests of early Christianities but as Lord Raglan pointed out by implication — those stories of themselves cannot have any relevance to the question of whether there was some kind of historical Jesus at the start of it all. If we think otherwise we would need to argue the case with evidence.

Of course, many other biblical scholars are quick to deny this point and will claim “memory theory” and “triangulating” “gists” of gospel stories and sayings can help them see “through a glass darkly” some outline of the historical Jesus. But such notions are founded entirely on the assumption that Lord Raglan was wrong and that the stories did evolve from a historical person.

We simply have no way of knowing if “a historical Jesus” existed. There are many interesting studies that explain the New Testament sources emerging from within the historical, philosophical and literary milieu of the day without appealing to a hypothetical role for a historical Jesus. We don’t need to over-reach and try to “prove” anything within any margin of probability. Hypothetical notions relating to the existence or nonexistence of Jesus cannot help the historian produce any serious reconstruction or understanding of Christian origins. Let’s be content with what we cannot know and focus on what we do know. Carrier’s On the Historicity of Jesus, especially its Backgound/Context section, offers many areas for further study. As I pointed out above, I think there are some areas where even Carrier can more consistently and profitably apply Bayesian analysis.


Carrier, Richard. Proving History: Bayes’s Theorem and the Quest for the Historical Jesus. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 2012.

Carrier, Richard. On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014.

Tucker, Aviezer. “The Reverend Bayes vs. Jesus Christ,” History and Theory 55, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 129–40.



2024-12-30

How Did We Get Here? Part 2: Belief

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by Tim Widowfield

European airport departure table

Each time I start to write one of these posts, I have to pause when I realize that I haven’t yet introduced some fundamental concept. And I run the risk of leaving the station with passengers standing on the platform, confused by the timetables. I’m thinking of the first time I traveled in Europe and found that the departure board was listed chronologically. In the U.S., we show departures in alphabetical order, by city. So I stood there for quite some time, neurons firing incoherently.

Now imagine if the very word “departure” meant something subtly different in Frankfurt from what it means in Atlanta. Does the departure time refer to when the plane leaves the ground, when the plane pushes back from the gate, or when boarding of the jet is arbitrarily halted? Or does it mean something else altogether?

What is belief?

The political left, center, and right sometimes talk past one another because they often use the same words to mean different concepts. Some fundamental concepts are understood differently on the religious right and the far right. One key example is what it means to believe something. If you’re like me, you presume that belief has something to do with the evaluation of a proposition, in which you use evidence and logic to decide whether something is true. In classes on religion, we’re taught that in certain circumstances evidence and logic sometimes aren’t enough, so we have to take a “leap of faith.” Sometimes, belief needs a kick in the pants. Continue reading “How Did We Get Here? Part 2: Belief”


2024-12-28

A Historian Noticing Historical Jesus and Mythicism Debates

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by Neil Godfrey

Hayden White

Hayden White is a historian of some notoriety (or acclaim, depending on one’s point of view) in his field, generally acknowledged as the founder of postmodernist history. So some readers may be interested to note what he wrote a decade and a half ago with reference to both historical Jesus studies and the question of the existence of Jesus.

Here is where “historical research” enters: its aim is to establish whether the new event belongs to “history” or not, or whether it is some other kind of event. The event in question need not be new in the sense of having only recently arrived to historical consciousness. For the event may have already been registered as having happened in legend, folklore, or myth, and it is, therefore, a matter of identifying its historicity, narrativizing it, and showing its propriety to the structure or configuration of the context in which it appeared. An example and even a paradigm of this situation would be the well-known “search for the historical Jesus” or the establishment of the historicity (or ahistoricity) of the “Jesus” who was represented in the Gospels, not only as a worker of miracles but as Himself the supreme miracle of miracles, the Messiah or God Incarnate whose death and resurrection can redeem the world.

If some thoughts expressed by certain mainstream biblical scholars be any guide, I suspect some of them will be a little chagrined that White should be so “naive” as to place the question of the historicity of Jesus (“mythicism”, if you will) alongside, without qualification or demeaning predicate, studies on the historical Jesus.

2024-12-24

‘Tis that time of year when . . .

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by Neil Godfrey

. . . I am reminded, thanks to the inevitable replay of Jingle Bells in shopping centres that I cannot avoid, that I spent my entire childhood wondering, mystified, over what sort of contraption was so much fun to ride — you know, the one they sing (as it sounded to my ears year after year) a “one horse sloaplinslay”. I did eventually learn that the slay part was a sleigh, but never till I was an adult did I learn the truth of what a “sloaplin” or “slopeland” sleigh was. Childhood can be such a lonely experience, lost in wonderment, never quite knowing what the world was trying to say to you to make you feel happy.

sloaplandslay

2024-12-15

Is Everything a Question of Probability?

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by Neil Godfrey

Here I want to briefly try to explain what I believe is the fundamental difference between a “known event” in history and a “probable” event. (This is, of course, a continuation of the ideas I presented in my four-part series on what I attempted to argue was Richard Carrier’s misapplication to Bayesian probability to “all historical claims”.)

Carrier does not believe that all our knowledge is a question of degree of probability.

All claims have a nonzero epistemic probability of being true, no matter how absurd they may be (unless they’re logically impossible or unintelligible), because we can always be wrong about anything. And that entails there is always a nonzero probability that we are wrong, no matter how small that probability is. And therefore there is always a converse of that probability, which is the probability that we are right (or would be right) to believe that claim. This holds even for many claims that are supposedly certain, such as the conclusions of logical or mathematical proofs. For there is always a nonzero probability that there is an error in that proof that we missed. Even if a thousand experts check the proof, there is still a nonzero probability that they all missed the same error. The probability of this is vanishingly small, but still never zero. Likewise, there is always a nonzero probability that we ourselves are mistaken about what those thousand experts concluded. And so on. The only exception would be immediate experiences that at their most basic level are undeniable (e.g., that you see words in front of you at this very moment, or that “Caesar was immortal and Brutus killed him” is logically impossible). But no substantial claim about history can ever be that basic. History is in the past and thus never in our immediate experience. And knowing what logically could or couldn’t have happened is not even close to knowing what did. Therefore, all empirical claims about history, no matter how certain, have a nonzero probability of being false, and no matter how absurd, have a nonzero probability of being true. Therefore, because we only have finite knowledge and are not infallible, apart from obviously undeniable things, some probability always remains that we are mistaken or misinformed or misled. (Proving History, 24f)

When I first read those words soon after Proving History was published I went along with them, believing them to be at least theoretically true. In theory, yes, we can always be wrong about anything, so yes, even the most secure knowledge must have a non-zero chance of being wrong even if that chance is infinitesimally small. But is that really true in practice, or in the practical world of experience?

Yes, history is “in the past” but does it follow, as Carrier reasons above, that every single claim about the past has a “nonzero probability of being false”? In theory I might surmise that to be so. I might surmise that I don’t even exist and everything I am experiencing is someone else’s dream. But in reality, in the real world where I have to live, I don’t really believe that.

Look at the exception that I have highlighted in the quotation. What the example points to is empirical experience, the experience of our senses. We can call this empirical knowledge. We do not think that there is a nonzero possibility that we are wrong, that there is some chance that we are not really experiencing these words right now. Some things we do know with absolute certainty.

We not only know what we can empirically experience but we can also communicate our empirical knowledge to one another. Further, we can establish ways of assuring others that the knowledge we transmit is reliable. When I read inscribed words on monuments testifying to a tragic event that happened before my time, I know that event happened. There are a host of empirical markers that assure me of the authenticity of the event being recorded in the inscription: the public space the monument occupies, the official emblems and standardised quality of the monument, the names and dates I can verify in other public records, and so forth. There is no doubt and no room for doubt — not even an “infinitesimally small” doubt — that the event memorialised actually happened. I have used the example of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor as an example of such an empirically grounded historical event for which there is no room at all to doubt that it happened.

It does not follow that because something is not part of our immediate experience, that it happened in the past, that there is necessarily some room for doubt about its past reality. Is there room for any doubt about the reality of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Or of the events known as the Holocaust? Or of the displacement of indigenous peoples by white settlers in certain countries throughout the nineteenth century? We have records that we can test for authenticity and that confirm these events of the past. There is no room for any doubts at all. They are all empirically established facts of the past. We can prove they all happened without any shadow of doubt.

The further back we go, generally speaking, the fewer remains we have of past events and the less we know. But what we do know is based on the same kinds of verifiable empirical evidence. (I am speaking generally. Sometimes hoaxers, for example, planted forgeries with the intent to deceive. But those sorts of examples only highlight the need for care we take as a rule to authenticate our sources.)

Humans have the ability to communicate information along with ways of assuring others of its authenticity. Being human, we know how easy it is to be deceived and for others to practise deception. Hence we build safeguards and apply empirical methods to establish authenticity and assurance.

When historians research the events of the past, as a rule they are researching events that have been empirically determined to have happened. They are seeking to understand those events. Different historians will have different views about those events but the events themselves will be empirically determined to have happened. (Yes, there are some grey areas where doubts are raised but I am speaking generally, for the most part.)

Where the Historical Problem Enters

If after I have empirically established the reality of the event of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, I still have a giant gap in my knowledge. What is missing is not complete assurance that it happened — I have full assurance that it happened — but I do not know the reality of what it was like. I do not know all the details and I can only guess or imagine what the participants experienced. The event is gone. It no longer exists. It has to be reconstructed. That’s where my imagination enters, informed as best it can be by surviving records of the event. No reconstruction can ever recreate the event exactly as it happened. Every reconstruction must inevitably be partial and from a particular perspective.

That is the problem of historical knowledge per se. In the history wars in Australia, for example, different parties want to reconstruct past events relating to the Aboriginals differently. Some want to see the killings as the work of a few “bad apples” and far from systematic. Others believe it is necessary to introduce other sources that point to racist attitudes that enabled the killings. Some debate the relevance and interpretations of those new sources. And so forth. That is where the historical debates tend to happen. There is no question that certain events did actually take place. Arguments will often centre over the physical extent of those events, the motivations or awareness of those involved, etc.

Some can view the British and Roman empires as blessings to humanity. Some will view them as horrific blights on history. Others will have various shades in between. But that there were such empires in history cannot be doubted any more than you can doubt that you are reading these words right now. The empirical evidence for them leaves no room for doubt.

Empirically established knowledge is not the same as Bayesian probabilistic knowledge.


2024-12-13

The Folly of Bayesian Probability in “Doing History”

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by Neil Godfrey

A few readers have indicated to me that my recent series of posts on the problematic use of Bayes Theorem for assessing “historical claims” have failed to make their intended point.

Hopefully here I can succinctly explain why Bayes cannot help us decide whether Christianity began with a historical Jesus.

Reason #1: If our question is simply, Did Jesus Exist? then it is meaningless. What is of interest is the question of how Christianity originated. What might Jesus have done that gave birth to the Christian religion? What did others do during the time of Jesus or after him that shaped or established Christianity? Those are the meaningful questions.  Simply saying Jesus did or did not exist is somewhat pointless — unless, perhaps, one wants a negative answer in order to irritate believers.

Reason #2: If by using Bayes one concludes that Jesus “probably did not exist” then again, we have to ask, So what? If it appears unlikely that he existed then after weighing up the probabilities on the basis of the various strands of data, that tells the historian nothing useful at all. Simply saying that Jesus fits the pattern of mythical persons, if that’s where Bayesian inference leads, does not answer the question of whether he existed or not. Simply saying that there is, say, an 80% chance he did not exist still leaves open the possibility that he did exist. So what has been achieved? Nothing useful for the historian at all. Likewise, calculating that there is an 80% chance that he did exist would still leave open the possibility that he did not. The historian is no better off with either result.

I suspect King Philip II of Spain saw the odds of his Spanish Armada crushing the English fleet as overwhelmingly high. The odds against an event happening are irrelevant are irrelevant if they happen. And many times the unexpected and “out of the blue” does happen in history. That they may have been judged to have been unlikely at the time makes no difference to the fact that they happened and are part of the historical record.

Most historical events are “unlikely” or unforeseen until after they happen. After they happen commentators and the rest of us can see how “inevitable” they were. We can always predict what will happen after it happens. Carrier’s mythicist hypothesis can predict the type of evidence the historian will find after the hypothesis was originally formulated on the basis of that evidence. One might look at any number of events in the past and ask, What was the likelihood of X happening? The chances that I will be struck by lightning are very slim indeed. But if I were to be struck by lightning this weekend — stormy weather appears to be approaching — the odds against it happening will mean absolutely nothing against the fact (fingers crossed it won’t be a fact) that it “happened”! Odds against something happening are meaningless when investigating “what did happen”.

We don’t need Bayesian calculations to decide whether there was a Roman empire, or whether its emperors were worshiped as deities, or whether the Roman power destroyed the Jewish temple in 70 CE. The kind of evidence we have for the “raw facts” of the past, including who lived and who did what, are grounded in the same kinds of judgments we make in testing the authenticity of modern claims, whether they be events reported in the news or checking the reliability of advertised claims about a product that interests us. Some of us are less careful with respect to such matters than is healthy and easily believe false claims, present and past. When a historian is interested in whether “new facts” can be dug up to throw new light on a question, it is to the archives, to official records, to diaries and letters and reports of various kinds that they turn. These are tested for authenticity and reliability. If there is doubt about any detail it is more likely to find its way into publication by way of a footnote — with its questionable status clearly noted.

The only justifiable approach to reconstructing Christian origins is to build on the sources we have and on what we know about them — not on what we surmise about them. That approach will not allow us to join in the games of imagining what Jesus and his followers may have done. (We have stories of Jesus and we cannot assume — without justification that would pass the test in any other field of sound empirical inquiry — that they must be based on true events.) We will not have the wealth of details we would like if we avoid make-believe games. But the professional will not apologize for tailoring the question and scope of inquiry to accord with the extent and nature of the source material.

Sure, there is room for Bayesian probability when it comes to drawing certain kinds of inferences from archaeological data or for comparing the likelihood of competing hypotheses, but claiming that so-and-so did or did not exist is by itself a rather meaningless exercise for the reason I stated above.

(See also the section of my earlier post pointing out that not even postmodernist historians work with “what probably happened“.)

To address one specific point I referred to in my recent series: It may well be that one can find in literature more mythical persons who fit a Rank-Raglan hero type, but that is irrelevant to the fact that some historical persons did resurface in later literature wearing Rank-Raglan features (born of a virgin, died on a hill, etc). But even Raglan himself understood that the historicity of a figure was unrelated to the fact that fanciful tales were later told about him or her. If Jesus scores more highly than other historical figures on the R-R scale, so be it: such a “fact” would have no bearing whatever on whether or not he might have been historical. Ask Raglan himself.


2024-11-27

Jesus Mythicism and Historical Knowledge, Part 4: Did Jesus Exist?

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by Neil Godfrey

Previous posts in this series:

  1. Jesus Mythicism and Historical Knowledge, Part 1: Historical Facts and Probability
  2. Jesus Mythicism and Historical Knowledge, Part 2: Certainty and Uncertainty in History
  3. Jesus Mythicism and Historical Knowledge, Part 3: Prediction and History


* For an excellent introduction to Bayes‘ approach to problem solving read Sharon McGrayne’s  The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy. In brief, McGrayne explains the essence of the approach of Bayes thus, as applied to a person with his back to billiard table figuring out where a ball had stopped:

Next, he devised a thought experiment, a 1700s version of a computer simulation. Stripping the problem to its basics, Bayes imagined a square table so level that a ball thrown on it would have the same chance of landing on one spot as on any other. Subsequent generations would call his construction a billiard table, but as a Dissenting minister Bayes would have disapproved of such games, and his experiment did not involve balls bouncing off table edges or colliding with one another. As he envisioned it, a ball rolled randomly on the table could stop with equal probability anywhere.

We can imagine him sitting with his back to the table so he cannot see anything on it. On a piece of paper he draws a square to represent the surface of the table. He begins by having an associate toss an imaginary cue ball onto the pretend tabletop. Because his back is turned, Bayes does not know where the cue ball has landed.

Next, we picture him asking his colleague to throw a second ball onto the table and report whether it landed to the right or left of the cue ball. If to the left, Bayes realizes that the cue ball is more likely to sit toward the right side of the table. Again Bayes’ friend throws the ball and reports only whether it lands to the right or left of the cue ball. If to the right, Bayes realizes that the cue can’t be on the far right-hand edge of the table.

He asks his colleague to make throw after throw after throw; gamblers and mathematicians already knew that the more times they tossed a coin, the more trustworthy their conclusions would be. What Bayes discovered is that, as more and more balls were thrown, each new piece of information made his imaginary cue ball wobble back and forth within a more limited area.

As an extreme case, if all the subsequent tosses fell to the right of the first ball, Bayes would have to conclude that it probably sat on the far left-hand margin of his table. By contrast, if all the tosses landed to the left of the first ball, it probably sat on the far right. Eventually, given enough tosses of the ball, Bayes could narrow the range of places where the cue ball was apt to be.

Bayes’ genius was to take the idea of narrowing down the range of positions for the cue ball and—based on this meager information—infer that it had landed somewhere between two bounds. This approach could not produce a right answer. Bayes could never know precisely where the cue ball landed, but he could tell with increasing confidence that it was most probably within a particular range. Bayes’ simple, limited system thus moved from observations about the world back to their probable origin or cause. Using his knowledge of the present (the left and right positions of the tossed balls), Bayes had figured out how to say something about the past (the position of the first ball). He could even judge how confident he could be about his conclusion. (p. 7)

In the late 1990s Earl Doherty revitalized public interest in the question of whether Jesus had been a historical figure with the Jesus Puzzle website (a new version is now available here) and book, The Jesus Puzzle (link is to a publicly available version — though Doherty subsequently published a much more detailed volume a few years later). In the wake of that controversy Richard Carrier undertook to examine the arguments for and against the existence of Jesus with the authority of a doctorate in ancient history behind him. To this end, Carrier initially published two works, the first, Proving History, laying the groundwork of the method he would be using to address the question of Jesus’ historicity, and then On the Historicity of Jesus, the volume in which he applied his Bayesian probability* approach to the question. In that second volume Carrier concluded that the odds against Jesus having existed were significantly higher than the opposing view.

Carrier regularly argued that the evidence to be found in the New Testament was predicted or could well have been predicted by the hypothesis that Jesus did not exist. As noted in my previous post, the term he used most often was “expected”, but he made clear in Proving History by “expectation” in this context he meant “predicted”.

Prediction or Circularity?

It would have been more accurate to have simply said that the evidence cited is consistent with the view that Jesus did not exist. The hypothesis did not “predict” any evidence. Indeed, one might even say that the hypothesis was drawn from the sources in the first place, so it is circular logic to then say that the hypothesis predicted the evidence that gave rise to that hypothesis.

Carrier’s stated aim is to form a

hypotheses that make[s] … substantial predictions. This will give us in each case a mini­mal theory, one that does not entail any ambitious or questionable claims . . . a theory substantial enough to test. (On the Historicity [henceforth = OHJ], 30 – bolding is my own in all quotations)

I argue, rather, that all Carrier has been able to accomplish is to show that a hypothesis is consistent with the data that it was created to explain. Historical research, as I have been attempting to show in the previous posts, cannot “predict” in the ways Carrier asserts.

Carrier begins with a “minimal Jesus myth theory”:

. . . the basic thesis of every competent mythicist, then and now, has always been that Jesus was originally a god, just like any other god (properly speaking, a demigod in pagan terms; an archangel in Jewish terms; in either sense, a deity), who was later historicized, just as countless other gods were, and that the Gospel of Mark (or Mark’s source) originated the Christian myth familiar to us by building up an edifying and symbolically meaningful tale for Jesus, drawing on passages from the Old Testament and popular literature, coupled with elements of revelation and pious inspiration. The manner in which Osiris came to be historicized, moving from being just a cosmic god to being given a whole narrative biography set in Egypt during a specific histor­ical period, complete with collections of wisdom sayings he supposedly uttered, is still an apt model, if not by any means an exact one. Which is to say, it establishes a proof of concept. It is in essence what all mythicists are saying happened to Jesus.

Distilling all of this down to its most basic principles we get the follow­ing set of propositions:

1. At the origin of Christianity, Jesus Christ was thought to be a celestial deity much like any other.

2. Like many other celestial deities, this Jesus ‘communicated’ with his subjects only through dreams, visions and other forms of divine inspi­ration (such as prophecy, past and present).

3. Like some other celestial deities, this Jesus was originally believed to have endured an ordeal of incarnation, death, burial and resurrection in a supernatural realm.

4. As for many other celestial deities, an allegorical story of this same Jesus was then composed and told within the sacred community, which placed him on earth, in history, as a divine man, with an earthly family, companions, and enemies, complete with deeds and sayings, and an earthly depiction of his ordeals.

5. Subsequent communities of worshipers believed (or at least taught) that this invented sacred story was real (and either not allegorical or only ‘additionally’ allegorical).

That all five propositions are true shall be my minimal Jesus myth theory. (OHJ 52f)

By explaining that his “minimal myth theory” consists of the core of what Jesus myth exponents themselves have claimed, Carrier in fact is conceding that his “minimal” points are based on the information available in the sources that he will proceed to say he will “expect” to find, or to “predict” will be in the sources. (Earl Doherty, in particular, was Carrier’s source for the interpretation that Jesus was originally understood to be a deity in heaven rather than a man on earth.)

Now those mythicists such as Earl Doherty arrived at their concept of a mythical Jesus in large measure as a result of analysing and drawing conclusions directly from the New Testament itself as well as from extra-biblical sources. So when Carrier declares that the evidence in the New Testament is what his “minimal Jesus myth theory” “expected” or “predicted”, he is in effect reasoning in a circle. The mythicist view of Doherty (and of many other earlier mythicists) was based on his reading of the New Testament. So the passages in the New Testament can hardly have been what would be “expected” according to mythicism; rather, they were the beginning of the “theory”, not its expected conclusion.

The approach as Carrier sets it out sounds scientific enough ….

We have to ask of each piece of evidence:

1. How likely is it that we would have this evidence if our hypothesis is true? (Is this evidence expected? How expected?)

2. How likely is it that the evidence would look like it does if our hypothesis is true? (Instead of looking differently; having a different content, for example.)

3. Conversely, how likely is it that we would have this evidence if the other hypothesis is true? (Again, is this evidence expected? How expected?)

4. And how likely is it that the evidence would look like it does if that other hypothesis is true? (Instead of looking differently; having a different content, for example.)

And when asking these questions, the ‘evidence’ includes not just what we have, but also what we don’t have. Does the evidence—what we have and what we don’t, what it says and what it doesn’t—make more sense on one hypothesis than the other? How much more? That’s the question. (OHJ, 278)

But the problem is that all of those questions were raised and fully addressed by Earl Doherty and others when they formulated their view that, on the basis of their answers to those questions, Jesus was a mythical creation and not a historical figure. So to turn around and begin with the conclusions of mythicists to say that the evidence we find in the New Testament is exactly what we would expect according to mythicism, is to simply work backwards from what the mythicists have done in the first place.

In other words, there is no prediction of what one might find in the evidence. There is no “expectation” that we might find such and such sort of idea. Rather, the sources themselves have long raised the kinds of questions that have led to the mythicist theory in the first place.

Example 1: Clement’s Letter

Look at the example of Carrier’s reference to the letter of 1 Clement:

The fact that this lengthy document fully agrees with the expectations of minimal mythicism, but looks very strange on any version of historicity, makes this evidence for the former against the latter. . . . [O]n minimal mythicism this is exactly the kind of letter we would expect to be written in the first century entails that its consequent probability on mythicism is 100% (or near enough). (OHJ, 314f – italics in the original in all quotations)

But Doherty’s mythicist view was shaped by such evidence. So the characteristics of Clement’s letter are what lay behind the mythicist view, so it is erroneous to say that the letter is what we would expect if mythicism were true. Doherty, for example, notes

Clement must be unfamiliar with Jesus’ thoughts in the same vein, as presented in Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount and Luke’s Sermon on the Plain. Clement also shows himself to be unfamiliar with the Gospel teachings of Jesus on many other topics discussed in his letter.

When Clement comes to describe Jesus’ suffering (ch.16) we must assume that he has no Gospel account to paraphrase or quote from memory, for he simply reproduces Isaiah 53. His knowledge of Jesus’ passion comes from scripture. Clement’s ignorance on other Gospel elements has been noted at earlier points in this book. . . .

Since Clement knows so little of oral traditions about Jesus . . . .

We have seen in the Pauline letters that the heavenly Christ was regarded as giving instructions to prophets through revelation. Clement shares in the outlook that sees Christ’s voice as residing in scripture. . . .

In Clement’s world, these things have come to be associated with revelations from the spiritual Christ. . . (Jesus Puzzle, 261f)

The oddities in the letter of Clement have piqued the curiosity of those who have seen in them support for the mythicist view of Jesus. The mythicist view of Jesus does not “predict” that such a letter would exist. It is the other way around.

Example 2: Extra-Biblical Sources

Notice another instance of this circularity.

When it came to the pervasive silence in other external documents (Chris­tian and non-Christian), and the lack of many otherwise expected docu­ments, I assigned no effect either way (although sterner skeptics might think that far too generous to minimal historicity). . . .

The probabilities here estimated assume that nothing about the extrabibli­cal evidence is unexpected on minimal mythicism. So the consequent prob­ability of all this extrabiblical evidence on … (minimal mythicism) can be treated as 100% across the board . . . . Either way, as a whole, the extrabiblical evidence argues against a historical Jesus. It’s simply hard to explain all its oddities on minimal historicity, but not hard at all on minimal mythicism. (OHJ, 356, 358)

On the contrary, it is the extra-biblical sources that have been in part responsible for generating doubts about the historicity of Jesus ever since at least the early nineteenth century. If the extra-biblical evidence were different then the question of Jesus’ historicity is unlikely to have arisen in the first place.

I have no quibble with Carrier’s last two sentences in the above quotation if they are taken alone, without the context of “expectation/prediction”. What they are really confirming is that the available evidence is consistent with the mythicist view, not that it is predicted by mythicism.

Example 3: Expected Fiction?

In discussing one particular miraculous event in the life of Jesus Carrier concludes:

As history, all this entails an improbable plethora of coincidences; but as historical fiction, it’s exactly what we’d expect. (OHJ, 487)

In this case what is said to be “expected” is nothing more than a definition of the nature of fiction. The unbelievable coincidences define the story as fiction. They are not the expected observation of something already known to be fiction. They are the fiction.

Example 4: Paul’s Letters

The foundation of all Jesus myth views from Arthur Drews and Paul-Louis Couchoud to George Albert Wells and Earl Doherty has been the epistles of Paul. The questions raised by what Paul does not say and the ways he speaks in what he has to say have raised perennial questions among theologians so there is no surprise to find many passages becoming  bedrock among mythicist arguments. So to say that those passages in Paul are what might be predicted by mythicism is getting everything back to front. Those passages are largely the foundation of the mythicist views, the port from which mythicism sailed, not the new continent of evidence it discovered or “expected”.

Again Carrier phrases the problem in terms of “prediction” of what one will find in the sources:

So even if, for example, a passage is 90% expected on history (and thus very probable in that case), if that same passage is 100% expected on myth, then that evidence argues for myth . . . . This is often hard for historians to grasp, because they typically have not studied logic and don’t usually know the logical basis for any of their modes of reasoning . . . .

I have to conclude the evidence of the Epistles, on all we presently know, is simply improbable on h (minimal historicity), but almost exactly what we expect on -h (minimal mythicism). . . . 

Paul claimed these things came to him by revelation, another thing we expect on mythicism. . . .

On the [mythicism] theory, this is pretty much exactly what we’d expect Paul to write. . . .

This passage in Romans is therefore improbable on minimal historicity, but exactly what we could expect on minimal mythicism. . . .

Whereas this is all 100% expected on minimal mythicism.

The evi­dence of the Epistles is exactly 100% expected on minimal mythicism. . . In fact, these are pretty much exactly the kind of letters we should expect to now have from Paul (and the other authors as well) if minimal mythicism is true.  (OHJ, 513, 528, 536, 566, 573, 574, 595)

Predicting or Matching the Evidence?

So Carrier is able to conclude,

All the evidence is effectively 100%, what we could expect if Jesus didn’t exist and minimal mythicism, as defined [above], is true. (OHJ, 597)

On the contrary, I suggest that many readers have noticed that the sources contain difficulties if we assume Jesus to have lived in the real world outside the gospels. It is from those “difficulties” that are apparently inconsistent with a historical figure that the Jesus myth view has arisen. By proposing to “test” the mythicist view by setting up “expectations” of what we will find in the sources really comes down to merely confirming the problematic passages in the sources that gave rise to the myth view in the first place.

What Carrier is doing, I suggest, is simply describing the sources that have given rise to doubts about the existence of Jesus. There is no prediction involved at all. He is describing the state of the evidence and showing how it is consistent with his “minimal Jesus myth theory”, something all other Jesus myth scholars before him have done — only without the veneer of scientific assurance.

Historians as a rule cannot predict what will be found in the available sources that might test their hypotheses. They usually do no more than point to what they believe to be consistent with their hypotheses.

The Rank-Raglan Hero Class and Prediction Therefrom

In the opening post of this series I addressed Carrier’s use of the Rank-Raglan “hero class” as a conceptual framework for certain types of persons in ancient myths and legends. There I noted that it is misleading to apply a percentage probability figure to Jesus (or anyone) being a member of that class because the total number of persons sharing the features of that class are well below 100. This is more than a pedantic point. The numbers of characters are not only limited, but they belong to distinctively unique cultural settings. This is the nature of all historical events. No two events are ever alike and no events are ever repeated except in the most general sense. Yes, there have been wars forever, but no two wars are ever alike. Each has had its own causes that are unrepeatable.

Here are the twenty-one names studied by Raglan as sharing a features (born from a virgin, nothing of his childhood is known, etc) from a second list of random length (Raglan said he could have added many more common features — see the earlier post):

  1. Oedipus
  2. Theseus
  3. Romulus
  4. Heracles
  5. Perseus
  6. Jason
  7. Bellerophon
  8. Pelops
  9. Asclepios
  10. Dionysos
  11. Apollo
  12. Zeus
  13. Joseph
  14. Moses
  15. Elijah
  16. Watu Gunung
  17. Nyikang
  18. Sigurd or Siegfried
  19. Llew Llawgyffes
  20. Arthur
  21. Robin Hood

We know that historical persons have been associated with mythical stories overlapping with the lives of those in the above list: Sargon, Cyrus, Alexander the Great, even Plato was said to have been born from a virgin mother, fathered by the god Apollo. But those mythical or “hero class” features of Cyrus and Alexander are quite distinct from the actual historical person; that fantastical myths have been told about real people makes no difference to the reality of those historical persons. As Raglan himself declared:

If, however, we take any really historical person, and make a clear distinction be­tween what history tells us of him and what tradition tells us, we shall find that tradition, far from being supplementary to history, is totally unconnected with it, and that the hero of history and the hero of tra­dition are really two quite different persons, though they may bear the same name. (The Hero, 165)

If historical persons are known to have accrued mythical features of the Rank-Raglan type, then it does not follow that any person about whom such tales are told is likely to have not existed in reality. Simply counting up so many features (e.g. born of a virgin, attempt on his life as a child, etc) and saying “real myths” had more of those features than historical persons does not make any difference. Adding up more “hero class” labels to apply to any one person would be nothing more than evidence of more highly creative composers. Moreover, such fanciful tales appear to be born from the minds of the literate at a specific time and are not haphazard accretions of illiterate storytelling:

If biblical scholars took note of Raglan’s point here about such myths being literary and not popular in origin they would need to take a second hard look at their attempts to find the historical Jesus through oral traditions and memory theory, since oral traditions and memory theory are built on the assumption that the tales were of popular origin.

It should . . . be noted that this association of myths with historical characters is literary and not popular. There is no evidence that illiterates ever attach myths to real persons. The mythical stories told of English kings and queens—Alfred and the cakes, Richard I and Blondel, Queen Eleanor and Fair Rosamund, Queen Margaret and the robber, and so on—seem to have been deliberately composed; a well-known charac­ter and an old story were considered more interesting when combined. . . .

“From the researchers of J. Bedier upon the epic personages of William of Orange, Girard de Rousillon, Ogier the Dane, Raoul de Cambrai, Roland, and many other worthies, it emerges that they do not correspond in any way with what historical documents teach us of their alleged real prototypes. (The Hero, 172, 174 — the latter citing A. van Gennep)

The conclusion we must draw is that the miraculous tales told about Jesus are at most evidence of the creative imaginations of literate classes. Whether a Jesus existed historically behind these tales is still quite possible and the mythical tales about him make no difference to that possibility. Tales are indeed told of historical persons that “do not correspond in any way” with the true historical figure. The only aspect in common seems to have been their name. If Jesus has more and more amazing tales told about him than others it follows that literate story tellers were more abundant or creative than for other figures. Such tales tell us nothing about the likelihood of his historicity.

I conclude that it is erroneous to use the Rank-Raglan hero class to indicate a prior probability of whether Jesus existed or not. Every situation in history is different. If the Greeks had many heroes of a certain type, and if the tales told about Jesus shared many tropes of those Greek heroes, it might mean nothing more than that very fanciful tales were told about Jesus that caused the “real Jesus” to be lost behind the world of myth. Many theologians would agree. In other words, the historian cannot make predictions based on probabilities to determine how likely any historical event or person might have been. Historical events and persons are contingent. They are all distinctive and unrepeatable. They either happen or exist or they do not. Or the researcher simply does not know if they did or not. Probability does not enter the discussion.

The Evidence: Expected or Known in Advance?

What Carrier calls “expected evidence” is, rather, a description of what has been with us (and Jesus myth researchers) from the beginning. The state of evidence gave rise to certain questions that led to suspicions that Jesus was not a historical figure. So returning to that evidence and saying that the myth notion “predicted” the state of that evidence is a misplaced project.

Try to imagine, if you can, that you have never heard of Christianity. Try to imagine what a new ancient religion would look like if it combined features of Greco-Roman mystery cults and some form of Judaism. If you had never heard of Christianity would you really imagine a religion that turned out to be very much like Christianity? I doubt it. You might postulate a series of angelic beings or just one of them, or a translated Enoch, in the distant mythical past turned into saviour deities in some fashion. You would surely see little reason to introduce a human deity in recent times. Yet Carrier concludes his major study on the historicity of Jesus with the conviction that his hypothesis predicted (or “could have predicted”) the beginnings of Christianity:

So we should actually have expected Jewish culture to find a way to integrate the same idea; after all, every other national culture was doing so. And this is where we have to look at the possibilities in light of what we now know. Had I been born in the year 1 and was asked as a young educated man what a Jewish mystery religion would look like, based on what I knew of the common features of mystery cult and the strongest features of Judaism, I could have described Christianity to you in almost every relevant particular—before it was even invented. It would involve the worship of a mythical-yet-historicized per­sonal savior, a son of god, who suffered a death and resurrection, by which he obtained salvation for those who communed with his spirit, thereby becoming a fictive brotherhood, through baptism and the sharing of sacred meals. How likely is it that I could predict that if that wasn’t in fact how it came to pass? Influence is the only credible explanation. To propose it was a coincidence is absurd. (OHJ, 611)

It is very easy to predict the current state of the evidence that has been with us from the beginning. Prediction in hindsight is easy. It is so easy to know what to have expected after the event. We only have to compare the many predictions that the recent US elections would be a tight race between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. After the election it was easy to look back and see what we “should have expected” and why.

Jesus either existed or he did not. If he existed it was not with a probability of less than 1. If he existed he existed 100%. If we can’t be sure he existed then we are not sure or we cannot know. If we cannot know we cannot say he may have existed at a 30% probability. That would make no sense if he existed. If the historian does not know for sure then the historian does not know. The historian may say it is likely or not likely he existed, but that still leaves the question unanswered. Those are the fundamental options with respect to any historical event — it either happened or it didn’t or we have no evidence or at best ambiguous evidence for it happening.

Thomas Bayes (Wikimedia)

Don’t get me wrong. I like Bayes’ theorem. It is a brilliant tool at doing what it was designed to do. But historical research is not a science and few historians, maybe a few die-hard stubborn empiricist historians, would claim it is a science that can predict what will be found in the sources or even sometimes what will happen in the future. Historical events are unique. The justified historical approach to the question of Jesus is to study the Jesus bequeathed to us in the surviving sources. Whether a historical figure behind the myth and theology historically existed is an unknown and unknowable question, and, I think, ultimately irrelevant.


Carrier, Richard. On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt. Sheffield Phoenix, 2014.

Doherty, Earl. The Jesus Puzzle: Did Christianity Begin with a Mythical Christ? Canadian Humanist Publications, 1999.

Rank, Otto, Raglan, and Alan Dundes. In Quest of the Hero. Mythos. Princeton University Press, 1990.