2025-01-20

Ceasefire and hostage exchange

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by Neil Godfrey

In case certain details were not reported on your local news media…..

The freed Palestinians included 69 women and 21 teenage boys – some as young as 12 – from the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. — Among them was Khalida Jarrar, 62, a leading member of the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who had been held for six months in solitary confinement under “administrative detention”, which allows Israeli authorities to jail suspects indefinitely without charge or court verdict.

You can read their names and other biographhical details here.

Per the custom on hearing good news handing out sweets, Brisbane, Sunday 19th January ….

One of the Palestinian speakers at Sunday’s rally, Remah Naji, will be the first Palestinian elected to Federal Parliament if she wins the seat of Moreton. The right wing Advance Australia party has set aside ten million dollars in an effort to remove the only voices standing up for Palestine from the Australian Parliament.


2025-01-07

How to Recognize a Trustworthy Consensus

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by Neil Godfrey

Consensus per se is not a reliable sign of rationality. It depends on how consensus is reached. All sorts of methods can yield consensus: brain-washing, the threat of the rack or burning at the stake, totalitarian control of the sources of information. Consensus reached by these means does not guarantee rationality. — Goldman

Recent discussions have sent me back to a second look at Aviezer Tucker’s Our Knowledge of the Past. (I posted about this book back in 2013.) A detail I had forgotten in the meantime is Tucker’s interesting explanations about when a consensus is more likely to be trustworthy than not. Here is part of what he writes:

In the real world, there is no universal consensus on beliefs because some people always dissent. There are still people who deny that the earth is round or that it revolves around the sun and others who deny that there was a Holocaust. This led philosophers who consider consensus to be philosophically valuable to attempt to prescribe whose opinions matter for determining whether or not there is a consensus on beliefs. Reliance on professional organizations or academic institutions, affiliations, and certifications is a tempting approach. If all professional astronomers agree that the earth is round and revolves around the sun, it must be because they have knowledge of the heavens and those who honestly dissent must be either ignorant or irrational. At their best, professional and academic institutions should indeed reflect the qualities that make consensus among their members significant as a possible indicator of knowledge. Still, this appeal to authority failed too often in history. Academic and professional institutions have proved themselves to be too susceptible to political threats and manipulation, economic dependence and graft, or the common biases of a class of people who share professional interests and often social background. The corruption of the German academic system under the Nazis, the rejection of relativity in physics, the destruction of psychology, anthropology, and historiography in favor of dark racist fantasies is just the most extreme example of the ever-present temptation of academic and professional institutions, even in previously excellent academic systems, to prefer their institutional, class, and professional interests to intellectual integrity. (33)

So what does Tucker advise given the fact that the consensus of authorities may not always be a reliable guide to the truth of a matter?

The alternative approach I present here does not have to rely on authority, nor does it require universal consensus. It merely requires unique noncoerced heterogeneity: It does not matter if some do not agree to a set of beliefs, as long as the people who do, are sufficiently different from each other to reject alternative hypotheses to the knowledge hypothesis, and those who dissent are sufficiently homogenous to support hypotheses that explain their dissent by particular biases. For example, the group that reached consensus on Darwinian evolution is uniquely heterogeneous, it includes people who are secular and religious, and of many different faiths. The community that upholds the alternative “creationism” is quite homogenous, composed exclusively of biblical fundamentalists, almost all of whom are American Protestants, though many American Protestants believe in Darwinian evolution. Their bias in favor of an anachronistic, historically insensitive interpretation of Genesis is the best explanation of their beliefs. (34)

I know many readers of this blog will be thinking of the consensus on the historicity of Jesus. In the light of the above, we may see a reason certain critics of the Christ myth theory attempt to portray “mythicists” as a singular group of Christian-hating atheists. By ignoring the broad spectrum of “mythicists” — atheists, Buddhists, prominent public intellectuals, and even faithful Christians and others who have expressed a high regard for Christianity — the mythicists are portrayed as a narrow, homogenous group with a unique hatred of Christianity and thus able to be comfortably dismissed.

Tucker says a reliable consensus must be uncoerced and sufficiently large. How large?

The heterogeneous group that reaches consensus must be sufficiently large to avoid accidental results. Small groups can never be sufficiently heterogeneous to exclude hidden biases. . . . If only four scientists work on a particular problem and they agree on a set of related beliefs, it does not imply that their agreement reflects common knowledge. The four may be a professor, her assistant, a former student, and an untenured member of faculty who needs her vote on the tenure committee. The minimal size of a significant consensus depends on local circumstances such as whether the people who develop a consensus are related socially, the nature of their relations, and whether they attempted to replicate the process that generated the beliefs or merely accepted the conclusions of others on faith or authority (Sarkar, 1997, p. 510). Usually, when the consensus involves hundreds of people who are geographically, institutionally, and professionally dispersed, it is safe to assume that it is large enough. If the consensus is on an esoteric topic, and only a handful of experts are competent or interested enough to reach the consensus, they may possess knowledge, but their consensus cannot function as an indicator of knowledge. It is necessary to follow their reasoning to evaluate the status of their beliefs. (34)

Those are three key features for “mere outsiders” to look out for when deciding whether they have a right to hold any reservations about a consensus among the experts:

  1. The consensus is uncoerced;
  2. The consensus is found among a “sufficiently large” and heterogenous group;
  3. Dissenting voices are from a “sufficiently homogenous” group such that their biases are readily apparent.

They look like a neat rule of thumb to me.


Goldman, Alvin I. “Foundations of Social Epistemics.” Synthese 73, no. 1 (October 1987): 109–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485444.

Tucker, Aviezer. Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography. Cambridge University Press, 2009.



2024-12-30

How Did We Get Here? Part 2: Belief

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by Tim Widowfield

European airport departure table

Each time I start to write one of these posts, I have to pause when I realize that I haven’t yet introduced some fundamental concept. And I run the risk of leaving the station with passengers standing on the platform, confused by the timetables. I’m thinking of the first time I traveled in Europe and found that the departure board was listed chronologically. In the U.S., we show departures in alphabetical order, by city. So I stood there for quite some time, neurons firing incoherently.

Now imagine if the very word “departure” meant something subtly different in Frankfurt from what it means in Atlanta. Does the departure time refer to when the plane leaves the ground, when the plane pushes back from the gate, or when boarding of the jet is arbitrarily halted? Or does it mean something else altogether?

What is belief?

The political left, center, and right sometimes talk past one another because they often use the same words to mean different concepts. Some fundamental concepts are understood differently on the religious right and the far right. One key example is what it means to believe something. If you’re like me, you presume that belief has something to do with the evaluation of a proposition, in which you use evidence and logic to decide whether something is true. In classes on religion, we’re taught that in certain circumstances evidence and logic sometimes aren’t enough, so we have to take a “leap of faith.” Sometimes, belief needs a kick in the pants. Continue reading “How Did We Get Here? Part 2: Belief”


2024-11-21

How Did We Get Here? Part 1

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by Tim Widowfield

Like many Americans, I’m still stunned about the 2024 election. In fact, it still feels a bit unreal. The morning after, I decided to suspend my Facebook and Threads accounts for mental health reasons. Doom-scrolling for countless hours will hurt your brain. But enough of that.

Over the past few years, I’ve been studying areas of history, historiography, and the philosophy of history not normally taught in U.S. universities. In particular, I’m focusing on the longue durée. You’ll sometimes see this perspective used “safely” with regard to geography and climate. However, political historians in my country tend to ignore it, chiefly because too many of its practitioners rely on the analysis of Marxian class structures and how they play out over time. Continue reading “How Did We Get Here? Part 1”


2024-10-15

Palestinians, written out of their rights to the land – compared with a new history

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by Neil Godfrey

Compare . . .

1 Palestinians have little basis for their claims against Zionists to the land:

A fundamentalist Christian view:

Since becoming a nation in 1948, the Israelis have developed a productive, fertile and wealthy nation in a desert wasteland. They have been outstanding custodians of their homeland. . . .

. . . . many Palestinian Muslims believe they also have a religious claim to the land of Palestine. That is why they have fought and will continue to fight so ferociously for it.

The Jewish Virtual Library:

When Jews began to immigrate to Palestine in large numbers in 1882, fewer than 250,000 Arabs lived there, and the majority of them had arrived in recent decades. Palestine was never an exclusively Arab country, although Arabic gradually became the language of most of the population after the Muslim invasions of the seventh century. No independent Arab or Palestinian state ever existed in Palestine. When the distinguished Arab-American historian, Princeton University Prof. Philip Hitti, testified against partition before the Anglo-American Committee in 1946, he said: “There is no such thing as ‘Palestine’ in history, absolutely not.” In fact, Palestine is never explicitly mentioned in the Koran . . . .”

Prior to partition, Palestinian Arabs did not view themselves as having a separate identity. When the First Congress of Muslim-Christian Associations met in Jerusalem in February 1919 to choose Palestinian representatives for the Paris Peace Conference, the following resolution was adopted:

We consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria, as it has never been separated from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, natural, economic and geographical bonds.

In 1937, a local Arab leader, Auni Bey Abdul-Hadi, told the Peel Commission, which ultimately suggested the partition of Palestine: “There is no such country [as Palestine]! ‘Palestine’ is a term the Zionists invented! There is no Palestine in the Bible. Our country was for centuries part of Syria.”

The Jewish Policy Center:

“A land without a people for a people without a land” is a phrase that gets under the skin of most Palestinians, who think that the authors of the phrase looked at Ottoman Palestine, did not see them, and instead saw an empty land. Yet perhaps this phrase would have made sense if we zoomed in on the meaning of the word “people.”

Whoever coined the phrase that became a Zionist slogan did not use the word people to describe a bunch of humans dwelling on a certain land. People, in this phrase, is used to mean a nation, a state or a nation-state.

Before 1948, the Arabs who lived in Palestine had never organized themselves in a state, but had, for centuries, lived as subjects of empires that ruled them from faraway capitals, such as Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and Istanbul. In the history of the Arabs, Jerusalem never served as the seat of any dynasty and never practiced sovereignty. At best, the city served as a provincial capital. In this sense, when the Zionists looked at Ottoman Palestine, they did not see a nation-state. They saw Arab provinces of successive empires, Arab or Turkish. This is why the land looked one without a people, that is without a nation state.

A pro-Zionist website:

Historically, the word “Palestinian” did not refer to Arabs living in the region, but to the region itself. Some 100 years ago, the land was administered by the British, and its inhabitants were Jewish, Christian and Muslim – all of whom were identified as “Palestinian.” However, for most, their primary identity was not their nationality, but their religion.

Indeed, many Arabs bristled at being called “Palestinian,” voicing strong opposition to the label. Instead, they saw themselves first and foremost as Arabs or Muslims. Only in the mid-1960s was the word co-opted to mean Arabs.

Hence, before 1948, it would not have made sense to talk about Palestinians as opposed to Jews. The population was divided into two primary groups: Jewish and Arab.

This makes sense because a sovereign Palestinian state never existed. Therefore, there were no “Palestinian lands.” Rather, the land was part of the Mandate for Palestine, a geographical area controlled by the British after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.

From The Rohr Jewish Learning Institute:

The Palestinian peasant was indeed being dispossessed, but by his fellow-Arabs: the local sheikh and village elders, the Government tax-collector, the merchants and money-lenders; and, when he was a tenant-farmer (as was usually the case), by the absentee-owner. By the time the season’s crop had been distributed among all these, little if anything remained for him and his family, and new debts generally had to be incurred to pay off the old. Then the Bedouin came along and took their “cut”, or drove the hapless fellah off the land altogether.

This was the “normal” course of events in 19th-century Palestine. It was disrupted by the advent of the Jewish pioneering enterprise, which sounded the death-knell of this medieval feudal system. In this way the Jews played an objective revolutionary role. Small wonder that it aroused the ire and active opposition of the Arab sheikhs, absentee landowners, money-lenders and Bedouin bandits.

Comment:

. . . . Note that the local Arabs never claimed that they had a sovereign country.

. . . with

2 a humanist perspective, stripped of Eurocentric beliefs in the primacy of nationalist feelings:

[This history] refers to the groups that as a rule live outside the realm of politics and power. . . . The narrative is clear; it begins with a society in Palestine as remote as possible from politics in the late Ottoman period . . . .

They are not one mass of people. They are grouped according to choice in small social units, usually households. But, with time, they prefer to define themselves via ethnicity, gender, occupation, class or culture. They change at will, but at times are forced to, not always to their advantage. Their world is a mix of material necessity and spiritual solace. Many of them are closely connected to the land where they live or chose to settle on. They cling to the land or to their property not from a national imperative to protect the mother/fatherland, the entity, but for much more mundane and at the same time humane reasons.

These local actors are leaders as well as ordinary members of the community. They are Palestine’s women and children, peasants and workers, town dwellers and farmers. They are defined according to their religious or ethnic origins as Armenians, Druzes, Circassians, or Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews, as well as to their views on religion, whether secular, orthodox or fundamentalist. In writing about them, definitions call for a balance between their own claims and the author’s understanding of what groups them together. Feeding a family, staying on the family land or attempting to make a new life on foreign soil can be portrayed as patriotism or nationalism: for most people it is an existentialist and survivalist act. (bolding added)

So begins (pages 8-9) the history of the land by a Jewish historian:

  • Pappé, Ilan. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

(I am reminded of the way our nineteenth century ancestors (who had migrated thousands of miles from their homeland) erroneously portrayed the Australian aborigines as “nomadic”, with the implication that they had no notion of attachment to any land. It is a colonialist mind-set that has always “justified” ethnic cleansing and genocide. (I use the word “genocide” according to its meaning as defined by the originator of the word, Raphael Lemkin.)


2024-10-07

“They are Messianic Jewish supremacists, racists, of the worst kind”

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by Neil Godfrey

Ehud Barak

Former Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, speaking on Australia’s national current affairs program, 7.30, about the reason for the government of Israel refusing to declare a truce to free the hostages and for continuing the war (“if someone would have said we would still be stuck in Gaza after a year no-one would have believed it” @ 28:40) and even expanding it into the West Bank and Lebanon. The specific question Barak was responding to was whether “right wing elements within [Netanyahu’s] cabinet” ride their “successes” in the current war to continue to expand Israeli settlements in the West Bank….

Oh sure. For sure they will do it. They do it even without this. They want a settlement… And if we wait for too long they might raise some idea that we had some promise from some corner of the Bible to get some part of Lebanon. They are Messianic Jewish supremacists, racists, of the worst kind. I compare them to the Proud Boys of America, those who were behind the 6 January event. So, think of the American President, who would nominate one of these leaders from the program to be secretary of treasury with certain formal roles and the other one to be in charge of national security, of homeland security. That’s crazy but that’s exactly what Netanyahu did because he needs tight control for the survival of the government. If there is even a ceasefire, in order to exchange the hostages and a ceasefire for four months, immediately it will become a day of reckoning because people will demand to establish a national investigation, a committee led by a Supreme Court judge, to find who is responsible for the worst day in our history. (@ 26 mins 55 secs)

(Of course, Barak is introduced as “having come very close to securing peace with the Palestinians” when he was Prime Minister. We are rarely reminded that the “best deal” the Palestinians were ever offered was a “state” divided into four island-regions, each surrounded by Israeli settlements or territory. The above quotation is not meant to imply agreement with every other view Barak expressed in the 7.30 interview. — No thought, of course, that there might be “a day of reckoning” to investigate responsibility for expulsions and killings of Palestinians since 1948.)


2024-09-18

If the whitefellas had just asked

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by Neil Godfrey

I am currently reading Edenglassie, a novel by Melissa Lucashenko, because it was introduced to me at the Brisbane Writers’ Festival a few months ago and because I am always delving into historical records relating to the aboriginal people, especially those around where I live.

I recall that many years back, probably like most other white people here, occasionally noticing a few black people in a city park, assuming they were drunk and sensing them to be almost like an alien threat to decency.  Here is an excerpt from Edenglassie — an old aboriginal woman, Eddie, is in hospital telling a naive white person, Dartmouth, what it used to be like back when whites first settled here:

“And there was always blackfellas camped near the Valley [a part of the city ofBrisbane], right up till the war, they was never shifted off. A lot of that crowd ended up in Spring Hill and Paddington later on, stone’s throw from the city. The Beehives, the Johnsons and the Wallabys. You ask Aunty Deb Beehive, her old father and uncles used to all corroboree at Spring Hill in the seventies. We’d hear em often when we was over that side of the river, clapsticks and all. And card games at Victoria Park, oh my! Biggest card games all us Murries had. No, we was a part of Brisbane alright, we was always in the thick of things.’

‘And this, ah, crowd – the fringe dwellers at Spring Hill. Where were they from?’ Dartmouth asked, . . . . 

Granny Eddie peered at him. Not just an idiot, but blurry too.
‘From?’ 

‘Yes, originally. Before they were in the Valley.’

‘They weren’t from anywhere. They was always there.”

“Dartmouth adjusted his glasses, flushing. ‘Ah, yes. Of course. Of course, they were.’

‘They call us mob fringe dwellers,’ Eddie added, ‘but Goories ain’t no fringe, you whitefellas is the fringe! We always lived on our own Countries and then the dagai come and plonked themselves down next to us. Or on top of us, if they felt like it! Beehive and Wallaby mob always been in the Valley, long before John Oxley came up the damn river! Fringe dwellers my dot! That word makes me proper wild!’

Dartmouth changed tack.

‘Okay, roger that, no fringe dwellers. Do you know much about the convict era, Eddie? Or the Petrie family?’ he probed delicately. ‘They say Tom Petrie* grew up with the local tribe?’ 

‘Oh, he did, he did!’ Eddie sat up, enthused. ‘Well, he had to. He was . . . the only white jarjum here for years and years. He learnt the lingo from a baby, a few different lingos in fact. And he was the only one to ask. Ever.’ Granny’s forefinger was raised in admonition of all other colonists.

‘Ask?’ . . . .

“Yep. He was raised with the Yagara mob, so when he grew up and got married, he knew to ask where to select his land, he got permission off of Old Man Dalapai, see. Tom was a man of culture. They say he went through the Bora ceremonies and all … my grandad knew him. And Tom’s father, old Grandfather Andrew Petrie, he saved the Bunya Pines from the logging, Grandad Charlie reckoned. Cos he knew how much them trees mean to the blackfellas.’

‘So, it’s true the Petries were friendly with the Brisbane tribe?’ Dartmouth prompted, mentally deleting his stockwhips in favour of Granny’s narrative. ‘And Tom was actually initiated?’

‘Oh, yes,’ answered Granny. ‘Initiation means ya part of the tribe, well and truly,’ she said, answering the second part of Dartmouth’s question. Suddenly growing tired, she felt the nagging ache in her neck starting up again. ‘The Petries were decent people, educated people. If everyone had been like them things could have been different alright. If the whitefellas had just asked.”

Lucashenko, Melissa. Edenglassie. St Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 2023. http://www.librarything.com/work/31046772/book/265015661. (pp 80-82)

* Tom Petrie was a historical person. For a fascinating education in aboriginal life “as it really was” an absolute “must read” is Tom Petrie’s reminiscences of early Queensland. Tom Petrie as a boy mixed with the local aboriginals, learning more than one of their languages (as a rule they were multilingual), and was highly respected by them all. And when older he really did ask them for land to settle before completing legal paperwork with the white authorities.

(I was prompted to write this post when I received an email notifying me that work I had once assisted with for the preservation of aboriginal languages was cited in Australian academic libraries and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.)


2024-06-26

“Game Players” versus “Bomb Throwers” – Journalists Divided

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by Neil Godfrey

On the one hand we have warnings about what the conviction of Julian Assange (the plea bargain was of course made under extreme duress) means for press freedom ….

On the other hand we have reminders that a vast number of journalists embedded within the spectrum of the mainstream press (which includes the left wing Guardian) aspire to cosy up to power rather than expose the realities of power to the people — they will not take the warning as anything but a “see what happens if you don’t play our game” lesson:

Scroll the following video to the 3:30 point….


2024-06-25

A catch … freedom costs

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by Neil Godfrey

Long before posting the news of Julian Assange’s release I was scouring sources and waiting to see what the catch was. I only posted after feeling reasonably confident that we had the whole story. But we didn’t. Here is the part that was not known at that time:

For the “privilege” Julian Assange must pay over half a million US dollars.

Please help if you can: https://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/p/free-julian-assange

(From https://x.com/wikileaks/status/1805643584328098080 )

From the crowdfunding site

I’ve already chipped in a little.


At last . . . .

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by Neil Godfrey

It’s been a long and painful wait . . .  For posts relating to Julian Assange see https://vridar.org/tag/julian-assange/

Move the play button to 1:25 and start from there for the main 1 minute:

 


2024-06-23

The Collapse of Zionism & Hope in a New Generation

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by Neil Godfrey

* The anthropologist’s work I have just completed is fully in line with similar kinds of analyses of the causes of radicalization and extremist, even suicidal, acts of mayhem — Scott Atran, Jason Burke, Robert Pape, William McCants, Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, Bruce Hoffman, Anne Speckhard, Raffaello Pantucci, Riaz Hassan, Loretta Napoleoni, Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan (sic), Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Peter Neumann, Ghassan Hage, Thomas Hegghammer, Richard Jackson, Ed Husain, Mohammed M. Hafez,  Lorne L. Dawson, Quintan Wiktorowicz, Nate Rosenblatt — along with specialist studies of Hamas itself. The point being that the arguments are supported by mountains of research studies.

— I have posted on the research of the above (and others) on this blog. Search under the tags “radicalization” and “terrorism”.

Among the initiators of the The Palestine History and Heritage Project (PaHH) (that I spoke about recently in Imagine Palestine) was Dr Ilan Pappé. Pappé has written a sobering article in which he sees some hope for both Jews and Arabs beyond the current horrors. I’ve read in past years opinions by various hopefuls that “this time” we will see the beginning of the demise of an aggressive power only to have such thoughts wisp away into nothingness. But one thing is certainly clear as day — and this comes just after I have finished reading the latest work by a prominent anthropologist* in which he addresses the nature of “band of brothers” type bonding and willingness to sacrifice one’s life in resistance to an overwhelming force — and in that light it is clearer than ever that even if Israel manages to kill every current Hamas fighter it will inherit only more waves of like minded resistance fighters to battle.

Pappé draws comparisons with the last days of South Africa’s apartheid regime. Some of us will recall how SA’s use of horrific violence to maintain its system only convinced us that it would never change.

. . . Hamas’s assault of October 7 can be likened to an earthquake that strikes an old building. The cracks were already beginning to show, but they are now visible in its very foundations. More than 120 years since its inception, could the Zionist project in Palestine – the idea of imposing a Jewish state on an Arab, Muslim and Middle Eastern country – be facing the prospect of collapse? . . . 

. . . Here, I will argue that [the early indicators] are clearer than ever in the case of Israel. We are witnessing a historical process – or, more accurately, the beginnings of one – that is likely to culminate in the downfall of Zionism. And, if my diagnosis is correct, then we are also entering a particularly dangerous conjuncture. For once Israel realizes the magnitude of the crisis, it will unleash ferocious and uninhibited force to try to contain it, as did the South African apartheid regime during its final days.

A first indicator is the fracturing of Israeli Jewish societyAt present it is composed of two rival camps which are unable to find common ground. . . .

— Time capsule – Vridar’s 2007 post on Gaza (Watch this to understand the background to October 7): Gaza (the reality behind the myth of “God’s will” for modern Israel)

One camp can be termed the ‘State of Israel’. It comprises more secular, liberal and mostly but not exclusively middle-class European Jews and their descendants, who were instrumental in establishing the state in 1948 . . . .

The other camp is the ‘State of Judea’, which developed among the settlers of the occupied West Bank. It enjoys increasing levels of support within the country and constitutes the electoral base that secured Netanyahu’s victory . . . .

. . . . More than half a million Israelis, representing the State of Israel, have left the country since October, an indication that the country is being engulfed by the State of Judea. This is a political project that the Arab world, and perhaps even the world at large, will not tolerate in the long term.

One often hears through mainstream channels that the problem is “very complicated”. I recently listened to an academic excuse himself from commenting on the current conflict because Israel-Palestine is “not my area of expertise”. Nonsense. It is as “complicated” as the European dispossessions and ultimate genocides of the indigenous peoples in North and South America and Australia. I posted an overview of the planning and implementation of the Zionist project under Masalha: Expulsion of the Palestinians

The second indicator is Israel’s economic crisis. . . .  The conflict between the State of Israel and the State of Judea, along with the events of October 7, is meanwhile causing some of the economic and financial elite to move their capital outside the state. Those who are considering relocating their investments make up a significant part of the 20% of Israelis who pay 80% of the taxes.

The third indicator is Israel’s growing international isolation, as it gradually becomes a pariah state. This process began before October 7 but has intensified since the onset of the genocide. It is reflected by the unprecedented positions adopted by the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court. . . . 

The fourth … indicator is the sea-change among young Jews around the world. Following the events of the last nine months, many now seem willing to jettison their connection to Israel and Zionism and actively participate in the Palestinian solidarity movement. . . . 

The fifth indicator is the weakness of the Israeli army. There is no doubt that the IDF remains a powerful force with cutting-edge weaponry at its disposal. Yet its limitations were exposed on October 7. . . . 

The final indicator is the renewal of energy among the younger generation of Palestinians. It is far more united, organically connected and clear about its prospects than the Palestinian political elite. Given the population of Gaza and the West Bank is among the youngest in the world, this new cohort will have an immense influence over the course of the liberation struggle. The discussions taking place among young Palestinian groups show that they are preoccupied with establishing a genuinely democratic organization – either a renewed PLO, or a new one altogether – that will pursue a vision of emancipation which is antithetical to the Palestinian Authority’s campaign for recognition as a state. They seem to favour a one-state solution to a discredited two-state model. . . .

Pappé, Ilan. “The Collapse of Zionism.” NLR/Sidecar, June 21, 2024. https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/the-collapse-of-zionism?pc=1610.

To refer back to my latest reading, Inheritance by Harvey Whitehouse: The best we might dare hope for is the emergence of a boundary-crossing leadership, of which Nelson Mandela was a clear example. Two key works cited:

We have seen young Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians working together for justice and assistance for many years now (though their efforts have not made headlines) — so the possibility of that kind of leadership after the slaughter has ended is not out of the question. Though an acceleration of violence in the meantime seems inevitable.

 


2024-04-07

Brisbane March for Palestine

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by Neil Godfrey

Several hundred, young and old, held a public rally and march today calling for federal, state and local governments to cut direct support for Israel and businesses doing business with Israel at this time. Not many by a long shot, and of course it was ignored even by the local TV news media. Among the speakers was one from a very small number of anti-Zionist Jews. He spoke of some of his extended family refusing to have anything to do with him because of his stance. I took it as a disheartening reality check that the newly formed Jewish Council of Australia is a not a large body.

It was interesting to hear that it is worth trying to pressure even local government to take a stand. The Brisbane City Council had our Story Bridge lit up in the colours of the Israeli flag after the October 7 events (though all the emphasis in the news at the time, and the news that shocked the world, was not on the crimes that Hamas did commit but on the crimes that they did not commit). Since then, requests to light up colours in support of Gaza at this time have been flatly rejected.

There’s a long way to go yet. Something happens to you when you are involved in a rally and march like that. I have learned enough about the nature of rituals from studies of religion to recognize how this ritual works in a similar way: the bonding one feels with others, with seriousness of purpose but with good humour and camaraderie, the vicarious identification with distant people and events and the bringing of those distant people and events close to us. The drums, the applauding, the chanting, the laughter — bonding all to something bigger. Some rituals are acted out behind closed doors. Others are public and meant to be noticed. Hopefully in shorter time rather than too much longer more of those bystanders who appear to look at us as if we were strange exhibits in a circus parade (or simply as “bad protesters”) will learn more about why we are doing what we are doing and also take action in different ways. It’s happened before. But I don’t want to look back and say I did nothing. I met our local member/representative a few days ago. I will let him know what government action I believe he should be pushing for. I’d like to do a little more in cooperation with local activists to help raise public awareness — to add one more voice to those pushing back against the local impact of mainstream media and the pablum spin of politicians.

 


2024-03-27

Messiah Mode – understanding Israel today

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

by Neil Godfrey

There was a time when I felt reasonably confident that the views of the Zionist extremist Meir Kahane would never become dominant in Israel. Surely, they would always be confined to the margins. 

Then Netanyahu formed government with the religious extremists. How on earth did it turn out this way?

I failed to understand that Kahane was as much against the idea of Diaspora Jews as he was against anything else, and how propaganda and activism towards this end would play out.

David Sheen explains it well. His presentation in 2019 effectively predicted the events unfolding in Gaza and the West Bank today, including scenes captured in videos that I had naively believed the West had buried in 1945.

Sheen begins with the views that have been preached by government appointed rabbis to Israel’s military. Those views even openly align with the racist and genocidal proclamations of Hitler — with the only difference being that Hitler was mistaken in identifying the master race with the Aryans.

The video explains “the four types” of Jews as they are aligned with the Jewish sacred books, the Torah and Talmud.

Liberal
(Reformist)
Torah
=
Holy
Torah

Just
Torah laws need reform to align it with modern values.
Nationalist
(Opportunist)
Torah

Holy
Torah
=
Just
God gave Jews the land of Palestine,
therefore they have an obligation to take it.
Religious
(Supremacists)
Torah
=
Holy
Torah
=
Just
Traditionally held that God would give Jews the land
and make the gentiles willing slaves of the Jews;
not for Jews to act but to wait for God to do it.
Socialist
(Humanist)
Torah

Holy
Torah

Just

The video explains how the middle two, the nationalist and the religious (supremacist) have joined forces under Netanyahu.


2024-03-21

October 7

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

by Neil Godfrey

. . . .

The Israelis responsible even had the intelligence that the Hamas attack was imminent (they even had the Hamas plans and saw them running to the fence barrier on the morning of the 7th) but dismissed it all thinking it incredible.

The failure of the Israeli defence forces was astonishing. Hamas expected to suffer 80% casualties and that only 20% of them would return alive. In fact the figures were reversed. And it was the Israeli military posts they attacked that suffered the incredible losses. Hamas had no plans for the unexpected situation they found themselves in.

Hamas crimes, yes, but no evidence of rape, no beheaded or oven-burned babies.

The mutilated bodies, those stabbed and burned and run over, appear to have been Palestinian, not Israeli.

Israeli tanks and Apache helicopters fired into houses and cars killing Israelis as well as Hamas.

Like the propaganda following Germany’s 1914 invasion of Belgium – stories of bayoneting women and children . . . .

Like the 1939 lie by Hitler that Poland had attacked Germany . . . .

Like the Gulf of Tonkin lie to justify the Vietnam war . . . .

Like the lie of Iraqis in Kuwait throwing babies from incubators prior to the 2003 Gulf war . . . .

Like the lie of weapons of mass destruction to justify the 1993 Iraq war . . . .

. . . . The October 7 dehumanizing lies serve to justify the slaughter under way in Gaza (and of course to deflect from the utter failure of the Israeli defence force on that morning.)

A brief extract: