It might almost be better to say that I have "transcribed" the text here from the German. My initial motivation was to have a copy for personal use only. I did not expect to make it public at the time. In a strenuous effort to avoid the AI translator from its tendency for creative whims, I set the parameters so strict that the result reads more like a word-for-word transposition from German to English. This can make it a tiring read. But for what it's worth, here it is for anyone interested enough to make the effort.

– Neil Godfrey, 17th January 2026

Investigations

on the

Origin of the Fourth Gospel

by

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First Part

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To the memory

of

Carl Weizsäcker

theologian and teacher

Preface.

If we are to be put in a position to obtain, for the investigation of the origins and chronological circumstances of the Fourth Gospel, still further—and, if possible, more definite and more secure—points of orientation than those offered by the hitherto employed literary-historical and literary-critical method, in particular also through the adducing of patristic “testimonies,” then a twofold task is required. Above all, we must dig still deeper into the root system of this living organism, by gaining clarity as to which are the properly fundamental and driving ideas of that Gospel, as well as as to the relation in which these stand to one another and the connection in which they stand with the analogous ideas of the scientifically shaped world of thought not only of biblical, but also of classical and Oriental religion. The present first part of my *“Investigations”* contains an attempt in this direction. Its indispensable complement, however, must be provided by such research in that, alongside the theological point of view in the narrower sense, the more religion-historical standpoint of comparative observation is brought to bear—one which sharpens the eye for the perception of the manifold forms in which, in our author, religious thought and impulse have created for themselves a contemporary symbolic expression; for in this latter respect too the Fourth Gospel is not a monument of the earliest Christian theology, but a fully weighty testimony of the earliest Christian religion, sprung in all its parts from immediate life. Only along this path will it, in time, be possible to attain that standpoint which makes it possible to view all the details of the enigmatic literary masterpiece from the correct angle and, in the unified, all-encompassing illumination, to discern those characteristic features most significant for answering the question of tendency and date. Whether, in the process, the prospect of determining the person of the author himself also opens up, or not—I believe he wished to remain and will remain unknown—that is a question of subordinate importance. What, however, it entails to proceed instead from the authorship of a historically known personality has

recently been shown, in its own way, also by the solution-attempt to the “Johannine question” offered by Kreyenbühl in his *“Gospel of Truth”* (I, 1900).

VI

That the engagement with the literature pertaining to the problem under discussion—especially with the more remote literature—could for the most part take place only indirectly and in a thesis-like manner, if the book was to become readable; that, accordingly, non-mention signifies neither unfamiliarity nor lack of appreciation; and that, under the given circumstances, it was in particular also necessary, in general, to refrain from a polemical, detailed justification of the exegetical positions advanced on the basis of mature reflection—this will hardly require an explicit remark.

Tübingen, October 1901.

The Author.

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Addenda and Corrections XI–XII

[The following have been added to the translated text - Neil]

Addenda and Corrections

To p. 2, n. 2: Cf. also Gould, *The Alexandrian Gospel* in *Journal of Biblical Literature* XIX (1900), pp. 5–11: “Not the prologue only is Alexandrian; the statement which connects this with the Gospel, that the Logos became flesh, that is, man, leads us to anticipate, also an Alexandrian Gospel. If it is not, if the rest of the Gospel is written from another standpoint, it is the most curious piece of disjuncture in the Biblical literature” (p. 5).

To p. 4, n. 1: Cf. further Bacon, *An Introduction to the New Testament* 1900, p. 272 ff. (concerning: disorder of the constituent parts of the Fourth Gospel; — relies on Blass, *Philology of the Gospels* 1898) and by the same author: *Tatian’s Rearrangement of the Fourth Gospel* in *The American Journal of Theology* 4, 770–790, 1900.

To p. 55, 11 ff.: Cf. N. Schmidt, “the son of man” in the book of Daniel in *Journal of Biblical Literature* XIX, pp. 22–28. The author interprets, in his noteworthy article, the “one like a man” as Michael, the guardian angel of Israel, whose prototype he regards as Marduk (pp. 26–28). On Hommel’s equation of the “Son of Man” with the designation *zir amiluti*, i.e. “seed of the human race,” for Adapa, the human double of Marduk, see *Theologischer Jahresbericht* XX, p. 241.

To p. 67, n. 1: Drummond, *The Use and Meaning of the Phrase “the Son of Man” in the Synoptic Gospels* I in *Journal of Theological Studies* 1901, pp. 350–358.

To p. 106, 15: III 133 CW (to *profu.* 20); l. 19: III 132 CW (to *profu.* 19).

To p. 107, l. 13: III 132 CW (to *profu.* 19); l. 17 f.: Wendland ἐφόρμησις instead of ἀφορμ.; l. 35 f.: III 152 CW (to *profu.* 36).

To p. 166, l. 16: the second parenthesis is to be placed after λόγον.

To p. 174, l. 20 ff.: Cf. Brederik, *Remarks on the Manner of Translation in Targum Onkelos* in *Studien und Kritiken* 1901, p. 360 f.

To p. 206, n. 1: At any rate, the assumption lies closer at hand that the Λόγος, as he is combined in theology and especially in the cosmogony of Stoic-Egyptian Hellenism with the creative god of the Word (the Speech), Hermes—Thoth, and is presented as a personal principle of revelation, formed, in a certain sense, a facilitating process and a positive point of connection for the Logos-idea of the Evangelist

(cf. above p. 167). In this respect reference should be made to Reitzenstein, *Two History-of-Religion Questions on Unpublished Greek Texts of the Strasbourg Library* 1901, pp. 47–132 (“Creation Myths and the Doctrine of the Logos”; especially pp. 56, 70 ff., 80 ff., 91 f., 95 f., 100). One should note in particular, in view of the relationship between Λόγος and ἀλήθεια in the Fourth Gospel, how Thoth has from ancient times been characterized as the one “who rests upon truth” (p. 73); with which compare the attribute of the corresponding Λόγος: αἰὼν ἀληθής (p. 56).

To p. 244, l. 9 read: Tit. 1, 2 (cf. also II Tim. 1, 1).

To p. 250, l. 15 read: Matt. 18, 8 f.

To p. 254, l. 18 read: (Tit. 1, 2, according to which II Tim. 1, 1 is also to be understood).

1

The fundamental character of the Prologue.

In his incisive and stimulating essay “On the relationship of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel to the whole work”[1] Ad. Harnack has brought up for discussion a question whose answer is of the greatest importance not only for the correct apprehension of the content of thought of the Gospel “according to John,” but which also constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for every scholarly attempt to elucidate the circumstances of the origin of the Fourth Gospel. According as the ideas of the Prologue are accorded a foundational and all-controlling significance for the following presentation of the person and life of Christ, or, on the other hand, the Prologue is regarded merely as a preliminary stage of the proper evangelical proclamation, the relationship of those factors from whose interaction we have to explain to ourselves the composition of the Gospel will take shape differently. Criticism at present, in general, more or less decisively advocates the former view. It recognizes in the Logos-doctrine of the Prologue “an Alexandrianism2 modified by combination with the synoptic tradition on the one hand and with Pauline theology on the other” and treats it “as a key to the understanding of the Gospel;

1 *Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche* (edited by Gottschick) II, 189–231 (1892). Cf. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* I³, 762 f.

2 H. Holtzmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes*², p. 45.

2

it holds it to be required to understand the discourses of the Johannine Christ and the entire Christ-image also from here, resp. to explain them according to the Logos-doctrine”1. In opposition to the presuppositions operative here, however, Harnack has now sought, while giving precedence to the material relationship between Gospel and Prologue and to the question of the purpose of the one and of the other, to furnish proof that the Prologue is not a “previously sent-ahead quintessence” of the Gospel, but only an introduction for the purpose of preparing the Hellenic resp. Hellenistic readers for the latter. As thorough and worthy of consideration as the proof adduced for this is, it nevertheless cannot already for that reason appear decisive, because the investigation comes to a standstill at the question whether—and possibly to what extent and in what manner—the Logos-idea of the Prologue shows itself as the foundation for the presentation of the evangelical-historical testimony itself. According to Harnack the Evangelist in the Prologue links up with a magnitude familiar (to the Hellenistic readers), the Logos, “works it over and reshapes it—implicitly combating false Christologies—in order to substitute Jesus Christ, the μονογενὴς θεός, for it, resp. to unveil it as this Jesus Christ. From the moment this has happened, the Logos concept is dropped. The author thereafter narrates only of Jesus, in order to ground the faith that he is the Messiah, the Son of God. This faith has as its chief element the recognition that Jesus comes from God and from heaven; but the author is far removed from the view of bringing about this recognition by

cosmological-philosophical considerations. On the basis of his self-testimony and because he has brought full knowledge of God and life—purely other-worldly, divine goods—Jesus proves himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God" (pp. 191, 230)2. Even in the case that this result should be correct,

1 Harnack (for the presentation in Oscar Holtzmann and H. Holtzmann, Pfleiderer, also Weizsäcker) a. a. O. 190.

2 Cf. in this connection Kaftan, *Das Verhältnis des evangelischen Glaubens zur Logoslehre*, in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche* VII 1–27: "In the Prologue it is a matter of a loose attachment to Hellenistic wisdom, without this being granted any greater influence upon the reproduction of Christian ideas in the Gospel itself. — The apologists of the second century are the first among whom we find the Logos doctrine as a Christian doctrine; the New Testament itself does not yet reach back to it" (p. 3). See also Loisy in *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse* 1897, p. 43 ff., 141 ff., 249 ff.; Camerlynck, *De quarti evangelii auctore* 1900, II, 269 ff. Th. Zahn still more decisively denies the existence of a Logos doctrine of the fourth evangelist altogether (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, 1900, II, 538 ff., 547 ff.). Only this much must be conceded — but this is self-evident — that by a "Logos doctrine" of the evangelist one cannot mean such a thing as would make the writer into a dogmatic theologian and the author of a textbook. One may moreover compare, against attempts of the type mentioned that proceed from various roots, those from the most recent period: Baldensperger (*Der Prolog des 4. Evangeliums* 1898, p. 168 ff.), Lütgert (*Die johanneische Christologie* in Schlatter–Cremer, *Beiträge zur Förderung christl. Theologie* 1899, III, p. 115 ff.), Calmes (*Étude sur le prologue du quatrième évangile* in *Revue biblique internationale* 1900, p. 21–23), Jülicher (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, 3rd and 4th ed. 1901, p. 306), Réville, *Le quatrième évangile, son origine et sa valeur historique* 1901, p. 110 ff., 116; Belser, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* 1901, p. 353–355.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 2, n. 2: Cf. also Gould, *The Alexandrian Gospel* in *Journal of Biblical Literature* XIX (1900), pp. 5–11: "Not the prologue only is Alexandrian; the statement which connects this with the Gospel, that the Logos became flesh, that is, man, leads us to anticipate, also an Alexandrian Gospel. If it is not, if the rest of the Gospel is written from another standpoint, it is the most curious piece of disjuncture in the Biblical literature" (p. 5).

the question of the relationship of Prologue and Gospel remains undecided, because for the former the Logos concept is by no means the only essential and characteristic one1. With this, however, the point is at once indicated at which the further investigation of the relationships in question has to set in. It will scarcely escape anyone that alongside the first verse of the Prologue the testimony of the Fourth [Gospel] itself has quite outstanding significance for the Prologue itself, so much so that for the reader, almost until the conclusion of the Prologue, the

Logos-idea recedes almost completely behind the representation bound up with it of the revealed divine life and light2. From this there necessarily arises above all the task

1 Cf. H. Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie* II 399.

2 In vv. 10–13 the unmistakable relations to 3–5 show the interpenetration of the representational forms indicated first with the Logos and again with “life and light”: the expression grammatically recalls the Logos as subject (v. 10), but the train of thought itself again determines the nature and effect of his revelation under the conceptual pair life and light.

of examining more closely the relation of the value which is to be accorded to the two kinds of statements of the Prologue for the determination of the fundamental thoughts of the following evangelical narrative. In doing so we can suitably dispense with entering into the well-known exegetical controversies concerning the details of the Prologue, because the position taken in the respective cases is of no decisive importance for our question. We have simply to proceed from the indisputable fact that the Evangelist in the Prologue introduces the divine principle of revelation, which he sees incarnated in the person of Jesus whom he acknowledges as Messiah, on the one hand as the divine Logos, on the other hand represents it as life and light of the world. The question, too, in what sense more precisely the one or the other is meant can for the present be left aside. It is, however, indispensable that first the series of testimonies which the evangelical account offers concerning Jesus the Christ, partly from himself, partly from the mouth of others, be set out and that attention be paid to whether and how the fundamental chords of the Prologue resound in them[1].

The testimony (μαρτυρία) of Jesus 3:11 is introduced by the testimony of his forerunner John, announced with a citation of the Prologue 1:15 (concerning the higher salvation-historical significance and the pre-existence of Jesus), John 1:19–34:

Jesus is the Messiah 25 (cf. 20, 25); the successor of John who belongs to another world, incomparably higher

1 I remark in advance that in the question of the integrity of the fourth Gospel (apart from ch. 21) I adopt the same standpoint as Jülicher (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, 3rd and 4th ed. 1901, p. 310–314), without on that account flatly denying the possibility of isolated “disorders in the text,” and without underestimating in particular the investigations of Spitta (*Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentums* I, 1893, p. 155–204; cf. also A. Meyer in *Theol. Rundschau* II, 1899, p. 296 ff.). For more details on more recent textual criticism see A. Meyer (*Die Behandlung der johanneischen Frage im letzten Jahrzehnt* a. a. O., p. 260 ff., 337 ff.). Of the most recent attempts, that of Wendt (*Das Johannesevangelium. Eine Untersuchung seiner Entstehung und seines geschichtlichen Wertes*, 1900) deserves special mention.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 4, n. 1: Cf. further Bacon, *An Introduction to the New Testament* 1900, p. 272 ff. (concerning: disorder of the constituent parts of the Fourth Gospel; — relies on Blass, *Philology of the Gospels* 1898) and by the same author: *Tatian's Rearrangement of the Fourth Gospel* in *The American Journal of Theology* 4, 770–790, 1900.

5

26, 27, 30, 31, 33; the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world 29; the one who existed before 30, initially destined to be revealed to Israel 31; possessor and mediator of the Holy Spirit 32 f.; the "Son of God" 34.

If this testimony of the forerunner is in part directed against the skeptical attitude toward himself held by the leading circles of Jewry, it appears on the other hand, and chiefly, as a preparation for those who are destined first to enter into the following of Jesus[1]. With the calling of these, the self-testimony of Jesus begins. In the relevant utterances 1:35–51 the following indications are given:

Jesus possesses not only a supernatural knowledge that overcomes the barrier of time and space and penetrates the thoughts of human beings 42, 47, 48, but throughout his entire earthly vocational life, as "the Son of Man," stands in uninterrupted communion with God and thus in full possession and free use of all wondrous divine powers 51.

The effect of this self-introduction of Jesus is the confession of the disciples that he is the Messiah of Israel 41, 45, 49. Here we have a first approach to the self-presentation of Jesus as the Light: he is the divine spiritual light which, according to need and task, sees everything; at the same time, however, with the concluding turn there is a transition to the theme of the following self-testimony, which, with the reference to the revelation of the unique glory of Jesus in the sphere of physical life, from the very outset significantly emphasizes the reality of the saving power present in his person and illuminates the scope of its effects, ch. 2:

Jesus is able, for the purpose of his authentication in divine miraculous power, to bring forth for the enjoyment of his own something which otherwise exists only as a product of the life-forces

1 V. 35 does not say that, in contrast to what precedes, John had disciples with him on this occasion, but merely emphasizes, at the moment in question, the number two of these disciples with reference to the course of the calling narrative as he has handed it down.

6

of organic nature 7–9;

he proves this by his first "sign," the transformation of water into wine1; but the life-power manifested in this reaches further:

after a time he will himself reanimate his slain body in the shortest span of time 1:22².

That an inner relationship exists between this miracle upon his own nature, which Jesus predicts to the unbelieving crowd already at his first public appearance as the greatest "sign," and that transformation miracle accomplished within the narrower circle, already follows from v. 1: the procured wedding drink merely prefigures the enlivening enjoyment that Jesus intends to give to believers when his "hour" has come, i.e., his death and thereby his glorification3. The operative power in life and in death is one and the same."

Accordingly, the Evangelist makes the revelation of the creative principle of life personified in him the point of departure of Jesus' self-testimony, alongside the manifestation of his wondrous knowledge (cf. also 2:24–25). In the one direction as in the other, the self-testimony initially appears peripheral: it at first seeks only to draw attention, by means of surprise, to the mysterious person of the one revealing himself; it does not yet bring its specifically ethical aim into view, does not yet operate directly as a testimony to heart and conscience. Thus it is to be expected that the advancing narrative, proceeding from this foundation, is intended precisely to lead the reader to an ever higher

1 The critical challenge to 2:1–11 (4:48–54; 6:1–29, etc.) by Delff, Dräseke (most recently again in *Zur johanneischen Frage*, Prog. 1900), Fries (*Det fjärde Evangeliet och Hebreerevangeliet* 1898), etc., violates the fundamental character of the fourth Gospel, as will be shown further on.

2 With regard to the "self-resurrection" signified by ἐγερῶ αὐτόν, cf. H. Holtzmann² ad loc. ("therefore ἀναστῆναι and ἀνάστασις are to be regarded as the more correct expressions than ἠγέρθη and ἐγέρθης," where moreover the medial meaning of ἐγείρεσθαι in 11:29; 13:4; 14:31 is also to be noted).

3 See also H. Holtzmann² ad loc.

and more comprehensive knowledge of the true essence of the life and light that has appeared in Jesus and of its significance for humanity.

An immediate confirmation is provided by Jesus' teaching conversation with one who is recognized by the Jewish people as a "teacher of Israel" and who at the same time represents it both with respect to its longing for salvation and with reference to the limits of its receptivity for salvation, 3:1–21. If here, then, already in the first part of the conversation, 2–12, the question of the way of salvation is brought to the fore, there nevertheless remains no doubt that the real aim is to lead over to the question of the mediator of salvation, 13–21. The thought to be inserted between vv. 12 and 13 is this: I alone, however, as the "Son of Man" who has come down from heaven, am the one who mediates to human beings the divine life, which is to be attained through birth from above, and the knowledge of the heavenly things (the transition to the main part is formed by 10–12). There follows the instruction:

Jesus alone can impart life and knowledge of the kind named, for he has come down from heaven, 13,1 and will return to heaven by the path of exaltation required by God's will and the need of humanity (the surrender of his bodily life on the cross for the sinful world), and thereby into that state which makes possible the perfect communication of the divine saving powers, the bestowal of "eternal life" upon those human beings receptive through faith in him, 14–15.

The bestowal of eternal life, 15, and of the light, 19, is the sole mission of the Son of God to the world, for—the sole cause of his coming is the love of God for the world, which is so great that he gave up the Only-begotten for the accomplishment of the necessary act of sacrifice (ἔδωκεν:

1 The secondary ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ (absent from ℵBL) is intended to explain how the Son of Man can have come down from heaven: this man is, in contrast to others, heavenly in essence and origin. The addition disrupts the connection of vv. 13–14.

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the divine act has already taken place with the birth resp. begetting of Jesus, insofar as he unerringly proceeds toward his destiny as the Lamb of God; cf. 1 John 4:10), 16; what is effected by the Son of God is only the salvation of life, 17; remaining in (death and) darkness is solely the consequence of the refusal of faith, thus the self-judgment of the human being, 18–21."

This self-testimony of Jesus, which together with the introductory discussion (2–12) has not incorrectly been regarded as a "program of the entire theology of the Evangelist,"[1] is reinforced by the author by having it followed immediately by a final testimony of the Forerunner (3:22–36). As the representative of the faith-willing community in Israel, John now, after the public appearance of Jesus and in response to the jealousy of his own disciples,[2] confirms in a longer, almost dithyrambic discourse the all-surpassing, salvation-historically conclusive significance of Jesus. Emphasizing from the outset the contrast to his own person (27–28), he explains:

Jesus is the bridegroom of the community of the time of fulfillment (29), who must increase (30); because he comes from heaven, he proclaims what is heavenly as an eye- and ear-witness (31–32); as the one sent by God in the eminent sense, he speaks the words of God without qualification (34); as the one loved by God his Father, he has the decision over the eternal destiny of all human beings (35); for everyone who believes in him, he is deliverer from the wrath of God and giver of eternal life (36).

Deliberately, the Evangelist makes the sentence: **ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον** the concluding thought of the Johannine testimony. The further presentation of the evangelical history is meant to hold us, through the report of a longer series

1 H. Holtzmann² p. 71 (following Keim).

2 Ἰουδαίου (Ἰουδαίων) v. 25 makes the connection unclear and seems to have entered as the result of misunderstanding (under the influence of v. 26?): the questionable ζήτησις arises among the disciples of John and is brought to the master for decision.

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of discourses and deeds of Jesus, within the sphere of influence of precisely this thought: The same is, as it were, meant to form the *warp*, from which the rest stands out as *weft*. Here too, for the purpose of our investigation, the primary interest does not at first attach to the difference among the persons who confront Jesus—whose alternation, moreover, instructively characterizes new types of redemption-needing children of humanity from the Palestinian environment of the Lord according to the side of their receptivity. What concerns us is only what is set forth from case to case, continuously, as the essence and the task of Jesus, and to what extent a unified fundamental idea proves itself dominant therein. Viewed from this standpoint, it must appear significant that the concept of the communication of life immediately once again provides the main point of view of the self-testimony of Jesus at his encounter with the Samaritan population (4:1–42). On this occasion we learn:

> Although Jesus shares the generally human bodily needs (7), (yet in him spirit and vocation completely master the natural instinctual life [31–34], and) according to the spiritual side of his being he is the one in whom human beings alone and completely can satisfy their highest need: for them, insofar as they long for it, he is mediator of the highest gift of God, the wellspring of eternal life (unceasing, steady growth and blessed sufficiency in divine communion of spirit) (10, 14).
>
> He is in possession of a wondrous knowledge not merely in earthly matters (17, 18), but especially in the spiritual realm: knower (and originator) of the only true worship of God (22–24), by which he proves himself to be the Messiah (26).

Corresponding to this content of the self-attestation of Jesus is the confession of the Samaritans who have come to faith, that he is a prophet (19), indeed that he is the Messiah (29) and the Savior of the world (42).

If in this section of the narrative the divine life communicated to humanity in the person of Jesus has presented itself to us as a purely

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spiritual principle, the immediately following section ensures that, through the report of a sign of Jesus, the significance of that life-power also for the natural side of the human being is borne witness to (4:43–54): a deliverance from deadly illness accomplished through wondrous action at a distance proves

> that against the life-forces issuing from Jesus for the purpose of awakening faith—even the natural power of death, if he so wills, is unable to accomplish anything.

One should note in this healing narrative the deliberate threefold repetition: “Your son lives!” (50, 51, 53). A certain parallel between the content of the second and the fourth chapters presses itself upon us of its own accord and recalls the fact that we are continuing to move in the direction of the problems raised in the former.

The miracle narrative that follows immediately (5:1–16) once again bears witness

> to how Jesus, in the exercise of his vocation as Savior, becomes physician of the body (8, 9, 14).

Where it accords with his holy purposes, he has the power to liberate even from the physical impediments to life of a wasting illness. Alongside the acute illness of 4:47 ff. there here appears an eight-and-thirty-year paralysis. The narrative serves, on the one hand, to reinforce and expand the thought of the preceding one (common element: the impediment of the healing effect), and at the same time with it to introduce the following discourse (v. 17 ff.); on the other hand, it serves to illuminate the principled opposition of Jesus to the cultically externalized religion of the Law of the “Jews” (— the healing takes place on the Sabbath —), and thereby to introduce the portrayal of the death-bringing conflict with Judaism.

From the self-testimony of Jesus occasioned by the healing (5:17–47) we derive the following:

> By virtue of the essential connection with the Father that is given with his divine sonship, Jesus is with inner necessity—dependent and yet at the same time free

> (receiving and reproducing in knowledge and will what is “shown” by the Father)—the unceasingly active one, i.e. the life-creating one (17; 19–21, 30), who grants to human beings, where it is fitting, not merely temporal life-power through bodily healing (as in 4:47 ff.; 5:8 f.) (20), but also communicates eternal life through resurrection—both of those who are spiritually dead (24, 25) and, in time to come, of those who have died (28, 29) (24).

This life-creating activity of Jesus is his proper vocation (19, 20, 23, 30); upon it rests—because it is essentially divine—his claim to honor equal to God (23).

The ultimate explanation of this “capacity of Jesus to ζωοποιεῖν” (H. Holtzmann), and of the free fullness of power with which it occurs (21), lies in the fact that, by virtue of divine-fatherly willing action, he himself is a God-like, independent principle of life (29[1]).

In that Jesus makes alive, he becomes indirectly (cf. on 3:17–21) the judge of human beings (22, 24, 27, 29, 30), to which the Father has appointed him precisely for this reason: because he, as “the Son,” that is, the Son of God, is at the same time “Son of Man” (υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου), and as such is absolutely competent—in that his personal being contains the absolute norm for the judgment of human beings (27[2]).

1 Cf., against the attenuating interpretation of Harnack (a. a. O. 195), H. Holtzmann² ad loc. The saying perhaps already prepares, as it were underhandedly, for the greatest of all the miracles of Jesus: the resurrection as the self-revivification of the slain one (cf. 2:21; 10:17–18).

2 The idea that Jesus also shares in human weakness (Heb. 2:14 ff.) is excluded where his world-judging dignity is to be explained. The statements relevant here rather generally point to the parallel of the "one like a son of man" (ὡς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου) in Dan. 7:13, with reference to which Jesus also designates himself as ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in the fourth Gospel (even though, as will be shown, he does not remain at that). If the evangelist in the present passage lets Jesus say simply υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, where he has in mind the definite "Son of Man" who he himself is, this happens because it is to be indicated that the Son of God is empowered as judge of humanity not simply because he is the Son of Man, but rather because, precisely as Son of God, he at the same time possesses the nature of the "Son of Man." Cf. below on the "idea of the God-man in the fourth Gospel."

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His life-creating activity, which aims at the completion of the divinely planned work of salvation (36), so clearly marks him as the God-sent light of the world (36–38, 43) that he must reject any appeal to human testimony whatsoever, even to that of the light-bearer (λύχνος) John (who has fulfilled his mission [16]) (33–36); all the more so since, in addition, God himself has already borne witness to him through the writings of Moses (37–39, 45–47), and has pointed to him as possessor and giver of eternal life (39, 40).

With the following narrative of the feeding of the five thousand (6:1–13) we likewise do not depart from the previous circle of ideas:

with miraculous power Jesus multiplies, in a situation of need, what belongs to the sustenance of the believers' life.

The story is unmistakably parallel to the first sign and serves as preparation for the immediately following, content-rich discourse (v. 26 ff.). Verses 5–6 show that what in Mark 6:34 ff. is only an accompanying circumstance is here made the immediate and independent purpose of the narrative: throughout the entire course of events Jesus intends nothing other than the revelation of the wondrous life-power already manifested in the transformation of water into wine (what is produced here, as there, is something that in the natural order comes into being only by organic processes).

Into this context there is at the same time taken up in 6:14–21 the narrative of the miracle on the sea, already connected in the Synoptic tradition with the feeding story, because it points the Evangelist in the same direction: toward the divine power of the spirit of Jesus over earthly nature—here depicted with reference, on the one hand, to elemental forces of nature, and, on the other, to his own corporeality. Indeed, in this way the latter miracle forms a complement to

the former, for the purpose of instructing the believers toward a spiritual understanding of what is said in what follows about the flesh and blood of the Son of Man. If in the former case they were given to understand that Jesus possesses in himself all life-preserving powers both for the body and for the spiritual

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being of human beings (cf. Mark 6:52; John 6:27 ff.), then through the report of the walking on the water there is to be awakened in them the conception of the possibility of a spiritualization of the body of Jesus, which, if necessary, withdraws it from the law of gravity.[1]

In the instructional dialogue of the Lord that now unfolds with the Galilean representatives of Judaism (6:22–59), he brings the fundamental idea governing his previous self-testimony to further development as follows:

> Through the feeding miracle (pointing from the lower to the higher, from the external to the internal), Jesus is divinely authenticated as the one who provides human beings with a nourishment that is permanently appropriated and produces eternal life (27).
>
> Jesus himself is presented to the world by God the Father, who has sent him into the world (29; 38–40; 44; 57) from the immediate proximity and vision of God (46): as bread from heaven (manna) (32 f.; 41; 50 f.; 58); as the true bread (32); as the bread of life (35, 48), which gives life to the world (33), which satisfies forever (35) (with simultaneous resumption of the image of the drink of life, cf. 53–56), which preserves from death (maintains true life in bodily death) (50); as the living bread (having life in itself and, on that basis, being a life-giving principle for others) (51).
>
> Jesus gives to the world, as bread of life (51; cf. 27), as true food and true drink (55), his flesh and blood (51–56) (— allusion to the mystery of the Lord's Supper).[2]

1 Cf. H. Holtzmann² on v. 62. In contrast to c. 5, the new element is that of the **bread of life** (with respect to the unjustified excision of 6 1–29. 59 by Delff and others; cf. Schultzen, *Das Abendmahl im N. T.*, 1895, p. 77 f.; Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 499 and above p. 5). On the connection of the **eucharistic formulation** of the feeding miracle with that of the Synoptics cf. Holtzmann, H.-C.² I 80; *Neutest. Theol.* II 503.

2 The reference to the proximity of the Passover festival in v. 4 is to be understood as indicating that what Jesus accomplished once as **provider of nourishment and sustainer of life** by means of the feeding miracle stands as a **prelude** and as **anticipatory** in relation to the mystery of the Lord's Supper instituted by him thereafter likewise in the Passover season, which continually represents **him himself as food effecting eternal life** for those who believe in him. One should note the relationship of John 7 2 to 7 37 and of 2 13 to 2 19.

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> The communication of the power of eternal life that takes place through him has as its consequence that the recipients (those who believe in him) will, on the last day, be raised up by him from bodily death (39, 40, 44, 54; cf. 5:28 f.; 11:24).

As an afterword to this (6:60–71):

> Jesus himself will, by means of exaltation from the earthly mode of existence into the original, heavenly mode of existence, from the world of the flesh (of what is materially constituted) into the sphere of the Spirit, attain to the perfected exercise of his life-giving activity; meanwhile, even now the words that he speaks—from the very beginning of his messianic activity onward—are throughout "bearers and mediators" of his life-giving Spirit (62, 63).

This self-testimony of Jesus leads to a critical moment (the transition of the Galileans from half-belief to unbelief,[1] the falling away of many from the wider circle of disciples—on account of the incomprehensible, offensive discourse about the consumption of the flesh and blood of Jesus) and thus gives still further occasion for a manifestation of his wondrous knowledge (in the manner of 1:42; 4:7) (64, 70), but at the same time also for the attestation of the confession of faith of Peter as representative of the innermost circle of disciples:

> that the Lord, through the words of eternal life that he speaks, has shown himself to be the Holy One of God (cf. 10:36; 17:19), that is, the Son of God in the sense of the Messiah (69).

Here we stand at the close of the first part of the evangelical narrative. The further course of the self-testimony is to be explained from the situation that has arisen. After

1 Cf. H. Holtzmann² on v. 60.

the foregoing has reported not only on the varied success among the Galileans and Judeans, but also among the Samaritans, and lastly not only on a crisis within the μαθηταί in the broader sense, but also on a (still hidden) opposition among the Twelve themselves, the second part (ch. 7–12), taking up the deadly hatred that had already emerged in Judea (ch. 5) and the crisis in the discipleship, depicts the ferment that has arisen among the people in Judea and the increasing hostility of its spiritual leaders, which presses toward catastrophe. This, however, is not yet to take place before Jesus has, through a fully sufficient, irrefutable testimony to the truth, illuminated the divinity of his being and his mission, and, on the other side, the diabolical perversity of his Jewish enemies.

For connection there serves the account in 7:1–9: In contrast to the lack of clarity and indecision of his brothers (5), who (unlike their mother [2:3, 5]) in accordance with the Galilean average type cling to externals (signs), Jesus is clearly and securely conscious of his task; he may not yet bring about his "exaltation" (glorification) by accumulating and intensifying miraculous deeds that would attract attention in wider circles of disciples and of the people, thereby fanning the

fire of hatred in his enemies and thus hastening the advent of his death (his time is not yet fulfilled) (6, 8; cf. 7:30; 8:20).

Accordingly, Jesus makes use of his presence at the most splendid annual festival in Jerusalem, to which he has gone in all quietness (10, 14), for the continuation of his teaching activity (14; cf. 6:59; 7:28; 18:20). In a more extended conversation in the temple, alternating between self-defense and attack, he bears further testimony to his person and his work (7:16–39):

> Jesus is the one immediately sent by God, wholly "absorbed" in the service of God, taught by God himself, the absolutely truthful interpreter of the divine will,

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> and as such also the perfect scribe (15–18).
>
> By the healing on the Sabbath he has not come into contradiction with the Mosaic law (19–24).
>
> He stands not only in vocation, but also in origin and essence, in an immediate connection with God that is not perceptible to the eye of the crowd (25–29).
>
> The imminent killing that threatens him signifies for him the return to the one who sent him, for his enemies the permanent loss of messianic salvation, with bitter remorse following upon it (30–36).
>
> Jesus is the sole and inexhaustible source of the New-Testament holy life of the Spirit (37, 38).[1]

The effect of these utterances—the heightened attentiveness and intensified taking of sides for and against him in all strata of the population (7:40–53)—demands still sharper illumination of the situation, such as the continuation of the temple conversation indeed brings, namely with the unavoidable

> **1** The traditional interpretation of vv. 37–39 does not do justice to the context. One must proceed on the assumption that v. 38 explains the image of v. 37 (to thirst; to come to the source; to drink) by appeal to a figurative scriptural prophecy; v. 39 is then meant to explain the image of v. 38. What Jesus utters concerns in the main himself (like the preceding statements 15–36), not others; his thought is this: *If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink* — the one who believes **in me** (sc. in the "I," the one who I am), he will quench his thirst (6 35); for Scripture has indeed said (with reference to me): "Streams of living water will flow from his body" (αὐτοῦ, thus referring back to ἐμέ). To this the Evangelist adds that Jesus thereby alluded to the future reception of his Spirit mediated through faith in him. This interpretation is confirmed by the miracle-event announcing the glorification of Jesus, 19 34, where the blood and water flowing from the body of the dead one are a symbolic image of the life of the Spirit henceforth streaming from him (cf. 6 54. 63; 4 10. 14). This very passage, together with the following citation:

ὄψονται εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν (19 37), however, at the same time shows that the Evangelist has interpreted our verse as referring to Jesus and has cited it more freely as a combination of Zech. 12 10

וְהִבִּיטוּ אֵלַי אֵת אֲשֶׁר דָּקָרוּ

and Zech. 13 1

בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא יִהְיֶה מָקוֹר נִפְתָּח לְבֵית דָּוִד וּלְיוֹשְׁבֵי יְרוּשָׁלַם לְחַטָּאת וּלְנִדָּה,

and has quoted it in a freer manner (i.e. not according to the LXX; cf. H. Holtzmann² 219).

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result of increasing irritation and embitterment on the opposing side (8:12–59):

Jesus is the “light of the world,” the “light of life” for those who follow him (12), that is, as becomes evident from what follows, the highest principle of truth with respect to knowledge as well as to moral conduct, in contrast to the darkness of the lie (sin) that brings death to human beings.

The self-testimony of Jesus is true, because it issues from the supernatural knowledge of his divine being: he knows the Father, with whom he was before his mission and with whom he will be after it (14; cf. 16:28); his (mediate) judging is true, for he speaks out of uninterrupted communion of life and revelation of the Father (16); from the Father’s co-witnessing that thus takes place there follows, according to the Mosaic principle, in addition the truth (credibility) of his self-testimony (18).

Jesus radiates the light of divine salvation in bodily presence only for a span of time decisive for his surroundings (21); he goes unerringly toward his exaltation (28) into the upper world hidden from and inaccessible to the sensuous world that is sinful and subject to death (21, 23, 24; cf. 7:33, 34), to which he belongs according to essence and origin (23). The Jews who do not believe in him as the one who, in all his words addressed to them, consistently bears witness to himself as the primordial one, sent by the Father, standing in constant communion with the Father as his perfectly obedient organ of revelation, the speaker of God for the world (25 f.; 28 f.[1]),

1 The translation of *τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν* as: *“why do I speak to you at all anymore?”* seems to me—despite the reasons advanced in its favor—hardly acceptable, already because under this interpretation it fits the context only with difficulty. I can understand it only along the following line of thought: You are perishing because you do not believe me, that I am the decisive personality that I present myself to be (vv. 21. 24). I have nothing new to say to you about the nature and significance of my person: from the beginning I am what I speak to you. But if you do not believe me, because with regard to you I have so much to say by way of judgment, then you take offense precisely

at the fact that I tell you the truth; for what I speak, I speak solely as the organ of God (v. 26; cf. v. 16). One should note in particular the parallel in 10 25, as well as in 12 23 (*ἐγὼ φωνὴ βοῶντος*).

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the “all-decisive personality” (24, 28; cf. 8:58; 13:19; 18:5, e), fall into destruction.

Jesus alone, through his word (“λόγος”) (31), communicates, without qualification, the knowledge of the truth and thereby the possession of true freedom (namely from the dominion of sin) (32, 45, 46), as well as eternal filial status in the kingdom of God, and this indeed by virtue of his own divine sonship and the divine determinacy of his moral being that is given with it (sinlessness) (34–36), as well as in the power of his mission from God (38, 40, 42); more briefly stated, as follows indirectly from 44: Jesus proves himself simply as organ of the truth and mediator of life from God.

He honors only his Father (God) by what he says concerning his divine sonship and divine mission (49, 50), because he truly is what he presents himself to be (55); his Father, however, will also acknowledge him (50, 54) in the salvific efficacy of his word that abolishes the power of death (51), and thereby bring him to honor as the one who in truth is the one who stands above time (58).

That in this discussion of ch. 8 the idea of the light of the world revealed in Jesus is the fundamental thought, that he is here to be portrayed as τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν (19), is shown by the narrative linked with it of the healing of a blind man (9:1–34). It serves to confirm the preceding doctrinal self-testimony of Jesus, just as this itself has the purpose of preparing the correct understanding of the following sign. Through the unheard-of miracle performed on the Sabbath, the healing of one born blind, Jesus bears witness in a symbolically vivid way to what he at the same time expressly proclaims:

sent by God as “light of the world” (5; cf. 8:12), he must not cease, during his earthly working day, to dispense light (4), wherever and whenever the light-need of a human being,

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wrought by God (3), confronts him.

The recurrence of the motif from 5:17 (offense at the profanation of the Sabbath) is a subsidiary feature that furthers the tightening of the knot (14–16). The main point is the inwardly illuminating effect of the miracle, which brings the healed man to the recognition that Jesus must be a true prophet (17, 31, 33), and at the same time enables him to put to shame the theological spokesmen of the Jews hostile to Jesus by demonstrating their blindness (30–33).

With the faith of the healed man in his higher, divine being, brought about by a subsequently attached word-testimony of the Lord, there is proved what Jesus also expressly confirms: that through his word and his working of miracles a lasting separation is effected between human

beings receptive to the light (of divine life) and those hostile to the light—the latter being represented especially in the class of the Pharisaic leaders of Judaism (9:35–41).

Whether the Evangelist here has in mind the "Son of Man" (35—BD; ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ: AL it vul pesh) as the shepherd who separates the sheep from the goats (Matt. 25:32)? In any case, with this concluding turn he mediates the following allegorical self-testimony of Jesus, in which Jesus sets himself, under the image of the shepherd, over against those false and destructive leaders of the flock (10:1–21); this too, as v. 21 indicates, on the basis of the revelation of his being that occurred through the healing of the blind man. The self-statements of Jesus contain the following:

> In contrast to the thieving and murderous shepherds before him, Jesus is the true (2–5), the good (11, 14), the one (16) shepherd of human beings: with divine authority and on the God-ordained way he brings them into his following and care (1–4); his knowledge and solicitude extend in divinely perfect manner (15) to each individual (3, 14); according to God's will he also leads those who belong to him in foreign lands as members of the one community (flock) (16); he receives obedience, trust, and loyalty from his own

> (3, 4 f., 14, 16); he creates for them a life of blessed sufficiency (10); he gives his own life for them into death, and yet also has the power to take it again to himself of his own accord (11–13, 15, 17 f.); the voluntary surrender of his life (18) is the foremost cause of his Father's love toward him, on the one hand because it is the highest demonstration of the Son's obedience (17, 18), on the other hand because his dying is the indispensable means for obtaining that life which he must impart to his own for the completion of salvation (17); only through him (his Spirit and his authority) can there come to be rightful and faithful holders of the shepherd's office (10:7).

The question addressed to him not long after this, on another festive occasion, by the crowd divided on his account, as to whether he is the Christ, prompts Jesus to the further testimony concerning his person and his work (10:22–39):

> He gives his believers eternal life and thus makes them his possession, indestructible by any death and snatchable from him by no hostile power (cf. 8:44) (27–29).[1]
>
> In doing so he performs a divine work, by which he shows himself, more than by any other, to be the "Christ" consecrated by the Father himself and sent into the world, and at the same time the "Son of God" who is united with God not merely according to will, but also according to his very being (30; 34–38).[2]

1 The line of thought from v. 24 ff. is probably this: How am I to convince you of my messianic dignity? You allow yourselves to be brought to faith neither by my words nor by my works! If you were obediently to trust my word, you would yourselves also experience the final and highest proof of my messianic mediatorship of salvation: the impartation of eternal life (in the sense of v. 28).

2 When Harnack (a. a. O. p. 196 f.) in discussing 10 33 f. (29) arrives at the conclusion: *"One may therefore say, after this decisive passage, that a 'metaphysical divine sonship' lies in no sense within the Evangelist's horizon,"* this has become possible only because the passage has been detached from the broader context to which it belongs and which is absolutely decisive for its interpretation. According to this context—which leads from the healing of a blind man to the raising of a dead person—it cannot be doubtful that Jesus, in the works to which he appeals in 10 28. 32 ff., is thinking also of demonstrations of his divine power over nature, just as these stand fully alongside his divine workings in the ethical sphere. But to the same degree in which, where his ethical working in itself remains unsuccessful, he emphasizes the value of the accompanying physical attestation of his higher being (37. 38; 14 11), he simultaneously supplements the idea of his ethical unity with God in the direction of a "metaphysical divine sonship," even if only in the sense of the Logos idea.

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Just as this section unmistakably takes up the imagery and thought of the preceding one (27 ff.), so it no less clearly leads over to the factual self-attestation of the Lord in ch. 11, in that it prepares[1] for the demonstration of the inalienability of those who belong to Jesus (11:3, 5, 36): the raising of the dead, as an even stronger (cf. 11:37) miraculous testimony of Jesus, and in it the self-testimony of the Messiah—apart from the resurrection miracle in his own case—appears brought to completion.

If now the last utterances of Jesus on the spot have provoked renewed manifestations of an indelible, deadly hatred against the supposed blasphemer (10:31, 33, 39), then the success of the miraculous proof, expressed thereafter at some distance from the religious center ("a last gleam of light," H. Holtzmann) (10:41 f.), introduces the history of the final "sign" (11:1–44). Jesus presents himself as the one who truly has the power to call the dead (indeed, those already fallen prey to decay) back into life. This power corresponds so completely to the essence of his person and of his task that he

calls himself the resurrection and the life (25), which at the same time contains within itself the higher idea that is to be symbolized by the resurrection miracle:

> that through faith in him the human being comes into possession of a personal life that cannot in any way
>
> **1** 10 38: *ἵνα γνῶτε καὶ γινώσκητε* (Weizsäcker: *"that you may once and again come to know"*)—there is still **something further and greater** ahead!

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> be impaired or destroyed by the death of the body (25, 26).

That the Father has granted him the greatest miracle performed on Lazarus is explained by the fact

that between Son and Father there exists unity of essence and will (41, 42),

and therefore it designates him in the very highest degree as the Christ and Son of God sent into the world (27), just as precisely this miracle was intended for the glorification of God (4, 40). Incidentally, the Evangelist does not neglect to indicate that the raising of the dead was effected by the same power as the healing of the blind man, so that the wondrous communication of life is explained from the same source as the wondrous bestowal of light (37[1]).

The further self-testimony of Jesus is the consequence of the intimations and portents of his death, wrought by God in the most diverse circles of his surroundings.

That Jesus himself is destined to suffer death must prophetically be attested even by the hostile high priest before the Sanhedrin, without suspecting that the killing will turn out for the salvation of those who believe in Christ—not only within the Jewish people, but also among the Gentiles (11:45–57; cf. with this the testimony of the Baptist, 1:29). At the place of the raising of Lazarus, Mary must, with presentiment, render Jesus an act of homage that calls forth in him the thought of his impending burial, and at the same time foreshadows the consequence of his death, the spreading of his gospel in the world (12:1–11). The people who have streamed together in Jerusalem for the Passover celebration must, in accordance with ancient prophecy (12:16), inspired by the report of the raising of Lazarus, greet Jesus in festive procession as the messianic king—in anticipation of his glorification brought about through death (12:12–19).

The same sensational report of the raising of the dead (—everything points to this connection!—) must lead a number of salvation-seeking Hellenes

1 Note also the parallel between 11:9 and 9:4.

(who have come to the feast as proselytes)[1] before Jesus, to the concluding, shattering certainty on his part that the moment of his glorification mediated through death (23–25, 27) has come (12:20–36). Of his surrender and the undimmed clarity of his spirit Jesus at once bears witness with the declaration

that through death (exaltation on the cross [32] and humiliation in the grave [24]) he must be exalted to his Father in heaven (28), in order to communicate his eternal, divine life not only to the Jewish people, but to humanity (24; cf. 25, 32); in order, through victory over death as the crown of his entire life-work, to serve the glorification of the name of God (28); in order to cast out the prince of this world (the power of falsehood and death in person) (31).

Whoever, in the short time during which Jesus still shines for his surroundings as the (true) light, willfully neglects to pursue the goal shown to him and to take the light into his own being, runs the danger of being overtaken by darkness and of perishing therein (35, 36; cf. 8:21 ff.).

We have thus arrived at the conclusion of the public activity of Jesus (36). The Evangelist, however, initially feels the need, in retrospective view of the reported course of events, to set right the lamentable lack of success of Jesus among the mass of his people (12:37–50). This does not testify against Jesus, but for him! The Evangelist proves this through the instruction (37–43): the unbelief that Jesus generally encountered (42), despite his self-attestation through many and great miracles, he himself—as the pre-existent one—had foretold through Isaiah as a judgment of God (39 f.). But also from the mouth of Jesus himself it is shown—recapitulatingly[2]—that it could not have been otherwise:

1 Cf. Weizsäcker, *Das apostol. Zeitalter*[2] 523.

2 12 44: Ιησούς δέ έκραξεν καί εἶπεν: *But Jesus* (as has been shown) *spoke out fearlessly, loudly, and publicly as follows.*

Not he who has come into the world as “light” and who through his acting and speaking has to impart “eternal life” brings about, of his own accord, the blindness (hardening) of the unbelievers, as well as their condemnation on the last day, but rather the Father, who has sent him and who appears in him, who acts and speaks through him; it is precisely he whose honor is taken away by unbelief toward his envoy (44–50).

From ch. 13 onward Jesus wishes to lead the innermost circle of disciples one stage further in understanding, in preparation for his departure (suffering and death), to initiate them more deeply into the mystery of the divine communion of life founded by him. In a significantly introductory manner the Evangelist characterizes him with equal emphasis as the all-knowing one (3, 11, 18 f.) and the all-effecting one (3; cf. 3:35)—both with reference to the execution of the plan of salvation—as well as the sinlessly pure one. In this latter capacity he reveals himself to his disciples above all in that he 1. through the symbolic act of the washing of the feet brings anew to their consciousness the need for purification, and 2. removes from the circle that member whom he has recognized as irrevocably unclean (1–30).

The theme of the following discourses is contained in 13:31–35:

After the completion of the messianic life-work the glory of “the Son of Man” and, indirectly, that of God has been brought to manifestation; Jesus now stands on the threshold of entry into the glory of the purely divine mode of being in absolute unity with God, and thereby also of separation from his dearly beloved disciples. His final will is that they love one another just as intimately as they have been loved by him, and thereby manifestly distinguish themselves before all the world as his disciples.

The elaboration of this theme yields, in a series of discourse sections (13:36–17:26), which—only in part and sporadically occasioned by a remark on the part of the disciples—by

their free succession upon one another make known the mighty inner urgency of the speaker, the following thoughts:

Jesus goes into death for his own, whom he must leave behind; yet he goes to the Father, prepares a place for his disciples with him, and will come again to take them to himself (— at the death of the individual and on the last day —): thus, reunion! (13:36–14:4).

Jesus, as the one whose essence is truth and life (in the divinely perfect sense), and who through his words and works reveals nothing other than the Father, is the sole way that leads human beings to the Father (14:5–11).

After his departure Jesus (as one in unity of essence and will with the Father) will, through his believers, prove himself effective beyond the measure of his earthly activity, in that he hears every prayer offered in his name ("first consolation," with regard to the situation and task of the disciples in the world after Jesus' departure—cf. H. Holtzmann) (14:12–14).

As compensation for the deprivation of his presence, at his request the Father will grant to those who prove their love for Jesus through obedience to his commandments an inseparable inward helper (advocate, παράκλητος) in every outward and inward distress: the Spirit of truth, to whom the world is blind and unreceptive ("second consolation") (14:15–17).

After his imminent departure, which withdraws him forever from the sight of the world, those who belong to him in the love of obedience toward him and the Father—and only they (not the world)—will become aware that he is the truly living one and that they themselves partake in his life: because they are loved by his Father and by him, they will see him again, and indeed not merely in the transfigured bodily appearance of the risen one, but in that he comes with the Father to take up dwelling with them themselves, thereby making clearly conscious to them both the unity of life between the Father and the Son and that

between the Son and themselves ("third consolation") (14:18–24).

After Jesus' departure to the Father the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in his name as helper ("Paraclete"), will disclose to the disciples the depth and richness, the coherence and significance of what Jesus has said to them, and will keep it alive in their consciousness. With this gift of the Spirit he leaves them, as an effective farewell blessing, the heavenly peace of soul that is his own, as protection against fear and despondency (14:25–27).

The thought that Jesus' departure is a going to the Father who surpasses him in greatness must, if the disciples love him, prompt them to hopeful and joyful participation. Their faith, however, is to be supported at the moment of separation by Jesus' foretelling (14:28–29).

Although entirely free from sin and guilt, Jesus now willingly gives himself over to the power of death of the ruler of this world, in order through such perfected obedience in his vocation toward the world to prove his love for the Father incontrovertibly (14:30–31).

The preservation, development, and perfection of the life of the disciples that has sprung from the Spirit and word of Jesus and proceeds under the discipline of his Father—especially also the perfection of their power of prayer and their participation in the unique divine enjoyment of life (χαρά) of Jesus—is conditioned by their preserving his love and glorifying his Father through continued obedience to Jesus' commandments, emulating his example toward the Father (— allegorically developed in the image of the organic connection: the life-juice flowing from the vine into the branches) (15:1–11).

The love of Jesus for his own, to which they owe their election, their intimate friendship with him, their initiation into the entire revelation of his Father to him, their appointment to a work bearing fruit for eternal life,

and their certainty of being heard by the Father, proves itself perfect in that he gives his life for them. As such, however, it at the same time becomes an unavoidable obligation for the friends of Jesus to love one another with corresponding devotion (15:12–17).

The unavoidable consequence of the foreseen, after the incomparable self-testimony of Jesus inexcusable hatred of the world toward him and his Father is the martyrdom of the disciples chosen by him, taken out of the life-communion with the world—for the sake of his name (15:18–25).

After his departure the disciples, supported by the substitute testimony which the Spirit of truth proceeding from the Father, sent to them by Jesus as "Paraclete," will bear witness to Jesus, and in the certainty that they testify from the personal experience of the original apostles, they will all the more resolutely endure the persecution rising to fanaticism, since they have been prepared for it by Jesus himself (15:26–16:4).

Instead of giving themselves over to deep sorrow in view of the imminent separation, the disciples are rather to keep before their eyes the goal of his departure and the salvation that will arise for them from it: the coming of the "Paraclete," whom Jesus wishes to send to them, and indeed not merely so that he, as protective helper of the disciples, may convict the world of its injustice (demonstrate unbelief as sin, the departure of Jesus as proof of his righteousness and victory over the ruler of the world), but also so that he, as organ of the continuing self-revelation of the departed one (cf. 25), may lead the disciples into full understanding of the truth and, as such Spirit of truth, increasingly make them recognize the glory of the perfected communion of Jesus with the Father (16:5–15).

Because Jesus goes to the Father, there is to follow for the disciples upon the impending pain of separation an all the greater and abiding joy of reunion, a time

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of complete insight into the mystery of his person and his work and of perfect, beatifying certainty of being heard by the Father, and thereby also of perfected vocational activity—on the basis of the prayer that from then on takes place in the name of Jesus (16:16–24).

Then, in place of his previous imperfect, figurative mode of communication, there will come the unveiled, immediate proclamation of what he has to say to them from his Father, and his intercession will no longer be required—for those who ask in his name—because they, on account of their believing love for Jesus as the one who has come forth from God, are loved by the Father himself (16:25–27).

In the certainty that his departure will have as its consequence only his reunion with the Father, that for this very reason he goes into death already as the conqueror of the world, Jesus himself is able not only calmly to face the moment when, abandoned by the anxious disciples, he will have the Father alone with him, but also to give the disciples, with these his farewell words, something that will prove itself in the time of tribulation as a power of consolation and a source of inner peace for them (16:28–33).

At this point the disciples have been advanced so far that they affirm the omniscience of Jesus and confess faith in his divine origin (i.e., pre-existence) (30).

After Jesus, by virtue of the authority entrusted to him by the Father over humanity, has fulfilled his task of imparting to all those destined for it the “eternal life” that consists in knowledge of the only true God and of his envoy (— those whom the Father has given him out of the world have, through believing acceptance and preservation of the words given him by the Father, appropriated the true knowledge of God as Father and of the divine origin, mission, and revelatory activity of Jesus —), after he has thus, walking on earth, glorified his Father,

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it is his request that the Father himself glorify the Son through reunion with himself in the life-glory possessed by the latter before the world, so that the Son may then bring the work of glorifying the Father to its highest completion (17:1–8).

Appealing to the fact that his own, whom the Father has given him, by virtue of the perfect community of possession between Father and Son are likewise possessions of the Father; that he himself is glorified in them; that he already feels himself withdrawn from the world and, in coming to the Father, leaves his own behind in the world without his previous protection; that he still speaks words in the world that impart to them the fullness of his own triumphant joy in God; that they are hated by the world as non-belongers, like Jesus himself; that they are his envoys in the world, as he himself was sent into the world by the Father; that finally he consecrates himself to God for sacrificial death for them, in order through the purifying effect of his sacrifice to make them truly consecrated to God—Jesus asks for his own in the world, for the time after his departure to the Father, preservation in the unity of

> the Spirit corresponding to the revealed being of God, his holiness and love, protection from the evil one, sanctification in the truth as it has been revealed through the word of God proclaimed by Jesus (in the sense of consecration and equipping for their vocation) (17:9–19).
>
> After Jesus, as the one who in distinction from the world knows the Father, has already on his part, through communication of the life-glory given him by the Father (cf. 7, 8, 10), united his own in complete unity within the communion with himself and the Father, and through such revelation of the paternal loving essence of God to his disciples has made possible for the world the recognition of his divine mission and of the salvific possession of his own, he asks, appealing to the righteousness

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> of his Father, also for future believers perfect unity among themselves (cf. 17:11; 15:12, 17), in accordance with the unity of life between Father and Son and on the basis of their own unity of life with the Father in the Son: as proof of the truth of his divine mission for humanity accessible to faith-knowledge; and further, reunion of his own with him there where they will behold the glory which the Father, out of love, bestowed upon the Son already before the foundation of the world (17:20–26).

The passion narrative adds to these self-testimonies culminating in prayer still the confession of Jesus

> that he is king of a kingdom not of this world: the born and vocationally appearing witness of the truth (18:36–37);

and from the repeated manifestations of the risen and ascended one it is to be gathered

> that through his exaltation, completed only in the ascension, he enters into a state in which he not only can impart to the disciples the promised Holy Spirit as the indispensable equipment for their apostolic vocation, but also possesses a spiritually transfigured corporeality which, through its tangible reality, will demonstrate the identity of the glorified one with the Christ who previously appeared in the flesh (20:17, 19–27).

Corresponding to this is the confession of Thomas to the glorified one as his Lord and God (20:28), and the testimony of the Evangelist forming the conclusion of the Gospel, that his writing has as its purpose the awakening of faith in the messiahship and divine sonship of Jesus and thereby the impartation of the “life” given with the revelation of Christ (20:31).

The nearest and most eminent impression that the total testimony concerning Christ Jesus in the Fourth Gospel leaves behind *(— after this overview this requires no further elaboration —)* is that the reporting from beginning to end is governed by the thought that in the person of Jesus the life and the light of the world have appeared,

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and indeed in the sense set forth, which encompasses both moral-intellectual and physical being. The word of the Prologue: *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων*[1] does indeed resound throughout the entire evangelical narrative as a constantly, equally perceptible leitmotif. So much is this the case that at first only the question can arise whether, and to what extent, the Evangelist, in this principled conception of his historical material, also brings to expression that idea from which his presentation proceeds, namely that Jesus is the Logos become flesh. That this idea is brought into inner connection with the discussed fundamental pair of concepts is beyond doubt. Verses 3–4 of the Prologue state: everything that has come to be, all life of the beings of nature as well as of the human world, has come to be through the Logos; but this is intelligible only on the basis that he, according to his essence, is possessor and embodiment of a life which proves itself to be the only true and perfect one—this being shown chiefly in that it awakens in human beings, as a power of light, the knowledge of God and of their divine vocation, and works toward the emergence of a fruit-bearing and beatifying unity of will with God. The more clearly, therefore, the Logos is designated as that principle from which alone the true, full concept of life and of light is first to be gained, the more is it to be expected that the Evangelist will also direct his intention toward allowing the Logos-idea, in accordance with this its significance, to shimmer through as the underlying ground in the presentation of the image of Christ.

In order to gain clarity on this point, we must first investigate whether the Evangelist does not characterize the word-testimony of Jesus as such in a manner that suggests to the reader that in the speaker one is to behold the appearance of the Logos in the sense of the Prologue. In this respect

1 Against separating ὃ γέγονεν (v. 3) and attaching it to v. 4, cf. H. Holtzmann[2], *ad loc.*

one must above all recall a well-known general difference that exists between the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptics and in the Fourth Gospel. However often and however strongly the Synoptic Christ emphasizes the unique authority of his person in his discourses, nevertheless his self-proclamation is a more indirect one.[1] If his preaching is to be briefly summarized in terms of content, the narrators designate it as *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας* (Matt. 4:23; 9:35; 24:14; cf. Luke 4:43; 8:1; 16:16), *τὸν λόγον τῆς βασιλείας* (Matt. 13:19; cf. Luke 8:11), *τὸ μυστήριον τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ* (Mark 4:11; cf. Luke 8:10). By contrast, in the Fourth Gospel the content of what Jesus speaks is throughout, in its very essence, himself—namely conceived as the immediate, absolutely trustworthy, and perfect revealer of God. Under these circumstances it must arise all the more readily for the author of this Gospel to allow, in individual utterances of the Lord, some special indication of the peculiar significance of the person of the speaker to come to expression. But in the same measure in which this can be confirmed, we are also justified in presupposing, in less obvious cases as well, that the Evangelist allows the Logos to come to speech in what Jesus says, sometimes more, sometimes less consciously, in this ultimate respect.[2]

From the outset one must counter the presupposition that for our question only those passages are to be considered in which the word *λόγος* itself is used.[3] An allusion to the relation of Christ Jesus to the Logos in the sense of the Prologue is in itself conceivable, whichever of the verbal or nominal expressions for

1 Cf. moreover H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* I, 242, 259.

2 "Where, in the Synoptics, understanding of the whole is composed from a variety of disparate details, each of which must first be understood on its own, with regard to the Fourth Gospel the individual must be interpreted from the whole and remains—where the guiding idea has not been understood—the letter a hieroglyph." H. Holtzmann, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*[3], p. 432.

3 Against Harnack's exposition, *loc. cit.*, p. 207.

the concept of speaking (talking) or of what is spoken the narrator may choose.

The intention of the writer, to allow to emerge in the words of Jesus an indication of that which, for obvious reasons, he cannot let him explicitly say of himself—that the Logos speaks from him[1]—finds expression above all in a series of passages from which it is to be gathered that those words have flowed from a higher source. In 3:11–13 Jesus designates his word-testimony (*λαλοῦμεν — μαρτυροῦμεν*: with an initially less definite formulation of the subject, which immediately gives way to the definite—*εἶπον, εἴπω*) as the outflow of the immediate and absolutely certain knowledge of the heavenly things, i.e. of the eternal divine truths, realities, and goods, as they belong to the "Son of Man" as the one who has come from heaven.[2] Since, however, the "Son of Man" is one and the same as the Son of God (v. 16 ff.), comparison of 8:38; 6:46; and 1:18 leaves no doubt that in his word his Logos-consciousness comes to revelation. Jesus is thinking in this testimony of everything that he teaches for the salvation of human beings, and he presents himself quite generally as a divine teaching authority in contrast to every ordinary *διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*, even if he should be a Nicodemus. The same Jesus, teaching by vocation, assures in 7:14–17 that what he teaches he does not speak from himself, but from God who has sent him. This instruction, however, finds its completion in vv. 28–29, when Jesus, with reference to the fact that the Jews miss a mysterious higher origin in him and therefore do not believe in his messiahship (v. 27), emphasizes that they do not know the one from whom he comes; that he is not merely God's

1 Cf. the noteworthy discussion by Anathon Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der christlichen Literatur* (1899), p. 147, and Jülicher, *Einleitung in das N. T.* (1901), p. 313.

2 In the phrase οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, the thought is compressed: *no one has been up in heaven above* (— human beings would first have had to ascend there —).

envoy, but *παρ' αὐτοῦ*, i.e. according to his essence originally belonging to the divine sphere of being itself (cf. 6:46; 3:31 ff.). Manifestly, according to the conception of the reporter, Jesus speaks and teaches precisely in this capacity—as God-sent in a higher, archetypal sense; the scribe in him is explained from the highest revealer of God, the Logos, in him. As clearly as possible the allusion to the Logos manifesting himself in Jesus appears in 10:34–36. Jesus here characterizes it as absurd if the Jews interpret as blasphemy the self-designation "Son of God" by the one whom God, as his Father (*ὁ πατήρ*), has entrusted with the messianic task for the world, while in the Old Testament the word of God came to ordinary human beings: "You are gods." The Evangelist lets it clearly be seen that in this utterance of Christ he wishes the one to whom "*ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*" came in the manner of an Old-Testament individual revelation to be set over against the Logos of God incarnate in the person of Jesus, etc. The same height of contemplation is shown by the parallel statements 14:10, 24, where the individual words and commandments (*ῥήματα* or *λόγοι*) of Jesus, just as the totality of the testimony effected in them (*λόγος* v. 24), are presented as immediate—that is, in no way modified or impaired by the mediating individuality of Jesus—self-revelation of God (cf. 8:43, 47). The explanation lies in the fact that God as "the Father" is in Jesus, and indeed in such a way that whoever sees Jesus sees the Father (v. 9). We find here the Old-Testament conception of the highest, most immediate form of appearance of Yahweh, his "face" (Exod. 33:14 f.; cf. Deut. 4:37 and Isa. 63:9 according to the Masoretic text), transferred to Jesus; but this unquestionably occurs with reference to his Logos-being.[1] In the same direction it points when, according to

> **1** After Exod. 33:12 ("when you will send") compared with v. 16 ("in that you go"), Yahweh is to be represented in such a way that he is, as it were, personally present. For the text-critical treatment of Exod. 33:12 ff., the circumstance must be decisive that in vv. 20–23 (alternating with כָּבוֹד) a different concept underlies the פָּנִים of Yahweh than that in vv. 14 f. Cf. furthermore Kraetzschmar, *Die Bundesvorstellung im A. T.* 1896, p. 92 (whereby the discussion by Steuernagel in *Stud. und Krit.* 1899, p. 328, is unsatisfactory), and v. Gall, *Die Herrlichkeit Gottes* 1900, p. 15 f.

17:7 f., the words given to Jesus by the Father have awakened in the disciples the knowledge of his pre-existence (cf. 8:42; 13:3; 16:28) and consequently faith in his messiahship, and when, according to 18:37, Jesus' vocational speaking is simply testimony to the "truth," i.e. to the essence of the higher, heavenly world from which he has come, ultimately to the essence and will of God. More indirectly the reference of Jesus to his supramundane and pre-temporal being, as it is brought to expression in the Prologue, becomes noticeable when in 4:26 (*ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ λαλῶν σοι*; cf. 9:37) he confesses himself as Messiah in connection with an exposition of the nature of God and of "true" worship, which is explicable only from the source of the Logos-consciousness of 3:11–13; 3:31–34 (one should note here the repeated indication of Jesus' omniscience, 4:16–18, 39). The same applies to the testimony of Jesus reported in 4:44, that a prophet is not honored in his own country. Here we have the echo of 1:11. The thought is: the Logos become flesh himself bore witness on the basis of his experience that things stand as the Evangelist has now (in the Prologue) expressed concerning him.[1]

The saying of 6:63 determines the nature of the words—namely of the entire word-testimony—of Jesus in an analogous way. Jesus makes it clear: because, according to my primordial essence, I am spirit and life and return to the original state of purely spiritual mode of being and activity (v. 62), my words not only have essentially spiritual meaning, but are also through and through

> **1** If 5:39 refers to Deut. 18:15, then this passage of the Gospel may also be taken into consideration. Incidentally, one should recall in advance the portrayal of the Logos as προφήτης in Philo.

bearers of life-giving spiritual power. The speaker thereby appeals to his Logos-nature: just as God is *πνεῦμα* (4:24), so also the essence of the Logos is simply and absolutely pneumatic.

In other cases the same indication occurs with reference to the truth and credibility of the speech of Jesus. When it is said in 8:14: *Even if I bear witness to myself, my testimony is true* (— corresponding to reality and therefore credible), *for I know where I came from and where I am going; but you do not know where I come from or where I am going* (cf. 13:3; 16:28), then the Logos-being of Jesus appears here clearly as the foundation of his self-testimony, of his speaking: therein lies the absolute guarantee of the truth of his testimony. His eternal Logos-consciousness has not been interrupted by the mode of existence in the flesh, although from this standpoint, insofar as it is to be conceived in its full extent and energy, it presents itself to him as past and future. The temporal knowing and understanding of Jesus receives its unique content and value through its connection with his eternal knowing, grounded in the immediate essential communion with God. The same holds for the utterance of Jesus discussed above (p. 17) in the larger context, 8:23 ff. He speaks entirely in the service of the highest sender, the absolute authority (the *ἀληθής*) (26), and reveals in what he says his own supramundane being and the decisive salvific significance of his person in an adequate way (23–25): for the world (*λαλῶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, 26) everything depends on his being recognized and accepted in faith as such (23, 24 [28]). It is indeed the “Logos-Christ” who makes himself heard here. And it is precisely this one who speaks out of the speaker Jesus in 8:31 f. (*ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μείνητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταί μου ἐστε, καὶ γνώσεσθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς*; cf. 40, 45 f.), since the truth in the sense of this passage can be no other than that of 18:37 (see above). To this belongs also the characteristic ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν (σοί) of the Fourth Gospel. The repetition of *ἀμήν*

does not aim at simple intensification, but indicates that what Jesus says rests on the infallibility of divine omniscience, is a testimony issuing from this (note *ἐμαρτύρησεν καὶ εἶπεν*, 1:21; *μαρτυροῦμεν*, *μαρτυρίαν*, 3:11), and is therefore absolutely credible.[1]

Concerning the effect of the word of Jesus, there are likewise sayings that point back to Logos-consciousness. Thus 5:24: whoever hears Jesus’ *λόγος* and believes him who sent him

has eternal life and does not come into judgment. If this thought is to be grasped in the depth intended according to the context (see above, p. 11), then the explanation must, in connection with v. 26, go back to 1:1, 4: eternal life is effected by the word of the "Son of God" as the Logos become flesh, because from the beginning, in the sense of 5:26, *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*. In the light of this passage, 8:51 is also to be understood. But when it is said in 12:47–50: *"whoever does not receive my words already has his judge; the word that I have spoken will judge him on the last day; for I have not spoken from myself, but the Father who sent me"*, then on the one hand, with regard to this personification of the *λόγος* (the total proclamation) of Jesus, reference must be made to the personification of the word of Yahweh in Isa. 55:11,[2] and on the other hand the parallel passage of the Gospel, 3:18, must be adduced, which, with its context (vv. 11–13, 17), points back to 1:4, 5, 9–11.

Nor is the situation different with some utterances of Jesus concerning the purpose of his speaking. Repeatedly he draws attention to the distinction between an improper and a proper purpose, thereby, as it were, lifting

1 Cf. Rev. 3:14: τάδε λέγει ὁ Ἀμήν, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστὸς καὶ ἀληθινός, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ (Isa. 65:16; II Cor. 1:20). With regard to the use of ἀμήν in general by Jesus, reference should be made to Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu* I, 1898, p. 185 ff. On ἀμήν ἀμήν cf. also Luthardt, *Das johanneische Evangelium*², 1875, I, p. 50.

2 As an expression of power and life proceeding from God himself, the word spoken by Jesus is, as it were, conceived as having passed only through him and as operating independently of his person.

a veil that hides from natural sight the supraterrestrial glory of the speaker. Here above all ch. 4 is to be considered. Here it is indeed expressly a matter of Jesus' self-testimony as Messiah (26, 29). The thought of vv. 10, 14 also seems, despite its height, to be intelligible already from the idea of the Messiah (cf. 6:68 f.; Mark 1:8; Acts 1:5; 2:33). Yet the unmistakable contact with 7:38 f. (see above, p. 16) nevertheless, on closer inspection, leads beyond the pure messianic conception. In its full sense Jesus can grant the Samaritan woman the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* signified by the "gift of God" only when he has been glorified, that is, has returned to the mode of existence which he had with the Father before the world was (17:5). That this reflection forms the background for the Evangelist can hardly be doubted given the peculiarity of his Christ-image. "The Johannine Christ is from the outset complete, appears without childhood and youth as the ever self-identical manifestation of the divine Logos in the flesh."[1] Under these circumstances it is difficult to evade the impression that the repeated emphatic reference to the special significance of the speaker and of his speaking (*τίς ἐστιν ὁ λέγων σοί*, 4:10; *ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ λαλῶν σοί*, 4:26; *ὅτι μετὰ γυναικὸς ἐλάλει — τί λαλεῖς μετ' αὐτῆς*, 4:27; *ὃς εἶπέν μοι πάντα*, 4:29, 39; *ἐπίστευσαν διὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ*, 4:41) is not unconnected with the Logos-idea underlying the Evangelist's Messiah-concept. Nor is it to be overlooked that v. 34 (cf. 35 ff.) points precisely to the speaking of Christ (in the image: the sowing of seed) as the specific fulfillment of his divine vocation (cf. Mark 4:3, 14).[2] When now, according to 4:10, Jesus addresses a request to the

Samaritan woman, not in order to take, but to create the opportunity that he himself may give, so in the case of 11:42 he places himself, asking and giving thanks, in word and feeling, in relation to God in the role of the Messiah, despite the fact that by virtue of his Logos-consciousness,

1 H. Holtzmann, *Einleitung in das N. T.*³, p. 432.

2 To 4:26 there also corresponds 9:37 (ὁ λαλῶν μετὰ σοῦ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν).

which includes absolute certainty of being heard, he stands higher: the purpose is the strengthening of the people in faith in his messiahship. Similarly, 13:19 is a manifestation of the knowledge conditioned by Logos-being, whose ultimate purpose he himself states.

Nor are there lacking passages in which the Evangelist allows it to be testified that the impression of Jesus' speech produced in others the recognition, or at least the presentiment, of what he was by virtue of his Logos-being. This applies in particular to 3:31–34, where the Baptist says: *"He who comes from above is above all. He who is of the earth is of the earth and speaks from the earth. He who comes from heaven [is above all]; what he has seen and heard, that he testifies, and yet no one receives his testimony. Whoever has received his testimony has sealed that God is true. For he whom God has sent speaks the words of God; for God gives the Spirit without measure"* (— as is precisely the case with Christ Jesus). What Jesus speaks as Messiah is therefore pure speech of God and perfect self-expression of God. The explanation of this, however, lies not merely in the messianic endowment with the Spirit, but this itself, as not relative but perfect, points to his supraterrestrial origin, his original Logos-being, as the ultimate ground. That the Evangelist here lets the Christ-believing community bear witness through the Baptist has already been noted (p. 8). He also lets disciples from the circle of the Twelve themselves speak correspondingly. Whether in 6:68 f., when Peter confesses Jesus as Messiah, the recognition of the higher in the narrator's sense already plays a role (cf. with v. 68 what is said above on 5:24, p. 37), it is all the more certain that finally precisely the doubter Thomas, with the confession of 20:28, expresses an impression of the personality of Christ that is of the same kind as that which the Evangelist describes in the Prologue as his own. By contrast, the "Jews" in 5:18, in

the same measure in which they take offense at Jesus' claim to a unique, superhuman divine sonship (*πατέρα ἴδιον ἔλεγε τὸν θεόν*), indirectly betray the peculiarly powerful impression of the mysterious nature of this personality; while the officers of the Sanhedrin must confess in 7:46: *οὐδέποτε ἐλάλησεν οὕτως ἄνθρωπος*, and the simple "I am he!" from Jesus' mouth in the garden by the Kidron throws an armed band to the ground (18:6)1.

Thus we arrive, from the most diverse angles, at the same result. From the words of the Messiah Jesus—if they are to be understood in the spirit of the Evangelist and in accordance with the context of the entire narrative—again and again the higher voice of Logos-revelation is

to be heard. This does not mean that the Logos, who in the person of Jesus has entered the sphere of human-earthly being—so to speak, become the person of Jesus—is simply equated by the narrator with the Logos in itself. This will still require discussion; for the moment reference may be made back to the discussion of 8:14 (p. 36). Not merely for reasons of "historical decorum," but also for inner reasons, the Evangelist refrains from letting Jesus apply the Logos-name to himself. All the less, however, does anything hinder him from the completely "unprejudiced use" of the expression *λόγος*[2] as a designation for the speaking of the one whom he wishes to present as the bodily manifestation of the *λόγος* in the sense both of the principle and highest organ of creation, and of revelation (not merely of the divine "word"). Since the Logos in this sense is conceived just as much as the one to whom God speaks "from the beginning" (*ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, 1:1–2)[3] as the one through whom God speaks (reveals himself), no difficulty arises if,

1 We shall find occasion to shed light on this latter feature from another side as well.

2 See Harnack, a. a. O., p. 207, and against him H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, p. 397 f.

3 That is, standing in an "active and living communion" with God (cf. H. Holtz., ad loc.).

in passages where the Evangelist lets Jesus himself speak of the *λόγος* (sing.) of God, this expression denotes not only the communication of the divine salvific will in the sphere of Old Testament revelation (5:38; 10:35), but also that addressed to Christ himself (8:55; cf. 12:49) or effected through Christ (14:24b; 17:6, 14, 17). Indeed, under such circumstances the author had so little reason to avoid the use of the word *λόγος* in its ordinary meanings that he rather seems to employ it more often than necessary, precisely in order to achieve the intended allusion for the reflective reader.

A reinforcement of the statements considered thus far concerning the nature and significance of the word of Jesus as such is provided by the repeatedly emerging divine attributes of Christ throughout the course of the evangelical narrative. In the foreground stands eternity, which Jesus ascribes to himself in the utterances concerning his pre-existence. Attempts to eliminate the essential connection of these statements with the view of the Prologue, and thereby the independent metaphysical significance of the idea of pre-existence, cannot be regarded as successful. Even if the pre-existent Christ of 12:41, conceived as "substrate of the theophany," may in some way connect with 1 Cor. 10:4, and the pre-existence of the "Son of Man" according to 3:13; 6:62 may seem to find an explanation in a conclusion drawn by the narrator from the messiahship of Jesus—inasmuch as the Messiah, for the glorification of God and of himself, would be thought of as existing in heaven already before appearing on earth[1]—other passages, when all are duly weighed, make it impossible to remain with the notion of a merely ideal pre-existence.[1]

1 Harnack, *a. a. O.*, pp. 201 f. Cf., against this view—similarly represented by B. Weiss, Beyschlag, and others—H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, p. 401 (with the restriction on p. 403: “that for the thinking of the entire period a distinction between ideal and real pre-existence is unattainable; hence, as with the Jewish parallels, so also in John, wavering features of the image are to be expected from the outset”).

1 Cf. Harnack’s concession on pp. 202–204, which—alongside the differently constituted classification and evaluation—also grants the exegetical fact itself.

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Thus already the *πρῶτός μου ἦν* of the Baptist (1:15, 30), to which the Baptist’s word 3:31, 32 is joined (*ὁ ἄνωθεν*, respectively *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος*). The sayings of Jesus in 3:13; 6:62 visibly rest on the Prologue passage 1:18 (cf. 3:11, 12), alongside which Jesus as the bread come down from heaven (6:32 ff., especially 51, 58) corresponds more precisely to the thought of the incarnation of the Logos (1:14). More clearly, finally, than in 8:58; 17:5, the Evangelist could hardly have allowed the real, personal pre-existence of his Christ—designated by him in 1:1–2 and 1:15, 30 in various ways[2] as a fundamental fact—to be testified by Christ himself, namely out of the “constant consciousness of his pre-existence as Logos.” That the sayings of Jesus, according to which he is the one sent by God (passim), or the one who has come forth, come (8:42; 13:3; 16:27 f., 30; 17:8) and is from above, not from this world (8:23; 17:14), must not be separated from his testimony of pre-existence; that they are not understood in their full sense if interpretation on the one hand presupposes dependence on the Synoptic conception and thus remains with the broader concept of being sent from God or coming from God (1:6, 33; 3:2) in the sense of “professional appearance in the service of God,” and on the other hand merely adduces the general contrast between an origin from below (from this world) and from God (not from the world), as is characteristic of the anthropology of the Fourth Gospel (8:23; 8:47; 15:19; 17:14)—this should be evident. With good reason it has been emphasized that precisely the clearly elaborated consciousness (8:14) of a completely unique origin from God (6:46) constitutes the center of the Johannine Christ-image.[3]

The knowledge of Jesus likewise appears repeatedly in such a way that divine omniscience is unmistakable as its background.

2 1:1–2 corresponding to the highest knowledge of faith of the New Testament community; 1:15, 80 corresponding to that of the Old Testament community.

3 Cf. H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, p. 404.

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Alongside the repeatedly attested far-seeing vision (1:48, 50; 4:50, 52; 11:11–14), the Christ of our Gospel is characterized by a precise foreknowledge concerning himself and others that from the outset goes specifically beyond the Synoptic analogies and in essential points contradicts the Synoptic historical picture.[1] This demonstrably extends not only to the time of Christ’s

glorification (2:4; 13:1; 19:28), but also to everything that will yet happen to him (18:4), specifically to death on the cross and resurrection after three days (2:19–21; cf. 14), to the betrayal by Judas (6:64; *ἤδει γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, cf. 13:19),[2] to the threefold denial by Peter (13:38), but also to the fate of Peter and the other disciples at Jesus' arrest (17:12; cf. 18:9) and to the death of Peter by crucifixion (13:36; cf. 21:18 f.; also 21:22). The essential difference between the conception underlying these details of the Johannine narrative and that of the Synoptic parallels reveals itself in the fact that according to the Fourth Gospel Jesus had the foreknowledge in question "from the beginning" in the totality of its moments (note especially 2:19 ff.; 9; 3:14 in comparison with Matt. 9:15; Mark 2:20; Luke 5:35), as well as in the fact that it is understood as embracing all forthcoming individual circumstances and events (*εἰδὼς πάντα τὰ ἐπερχόμενα ἐπ' αὐτόν*; cf. also 19:28). Corresponding fully to the all-surpassing height of such a consciousness is the fact that our narrator just as decidedly ascribes to Jesus an over-humanly rapid, deep, and certain penetration of persons in the manner of the highest *καρδιογνώστης*—again something distinctive in relation to similar traits in the Synoptics.[3] Character and religious life-condition (1:42 f., 47 f.; 4:35; 2:24 f.; 16:30;

1 This above all with regard to the thought of the suffering (Mark 14:30!).

2 That in this way "the moral relationship between him and the future betrayer is destroyed in favor of the Logos doctrine" readily suggests itself (H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.*, p. 406).

3 Note above all Mark 2:8 (Matt. 9:4; Luke 5:22) as a thought-reading by Jesus characteristic of the prophet.

cf. 21:17), thoughts, intentions, and dispositions (6:61), even external life circumstances and prior history (4:16–18, 29), Jesus recognizes in everyone to whom he directs his attention immediately, by virtue of an inner sense peculiar to him, fully and clearly and comprehensively (*οἶδας πάντα*). Alongside all this it can hardly be surprising that he is recognized by the Jews as knower and interpreter of Scripture and yet is not spared the unfavorable prejudice of being *μὴ μεμαθηκώς*: he is precisely to present himself as one who was not dependent at all on the ordinary, natural means and paths of learning in order to attain a scholarship equal or rather superior to the scholastic, rabbinic-theological one. Isolated cases in which Jesus inquires about a fact or learns one from others (11:34; 18:34; 11:3, 6) are—so far as they are not to be put down to a more merely embellishing mode of presentation—to be judged analogously from the standpoint of 11:42: Jesus can intentionally seem not to know something. That, however, this higher knowledge characterizes him as the one who has come forth from God, thus (see above, p. 42) with respect to the relation of his being to the Logos, is expressly stated in 16:30. The interest here is so powerful that the Evangelist does not hesitate, when necessary, to disregard the requirement of ethical grounding of a reported fact, as in the admission of Judas—recognized from the beginning as a devil—into the circle of disciples (6:70). In this connection it must of course not be overlooked that the divine knowledge in question moves exclusively within the sphere of interest of the savior's vocation (one may also adduce more

generally framed prophecies such as 4:21; 36 f.; 10:16); just as, on the other hand, it must be recalled that in accordance with the Prologue the pre-existence attested in the Gospel itself points back to the Logos through the idea of life, and the divine knowledge of Jesus through that of light.[1]

Finally, behind the testimonies of the

1 Cf. the earlier discussion on pp. 3–31.

superhuman power of Jesus there also stands the thought of his omnipotence, rooted not merely in the idea of the highest principle of life, but ultimately in the idea of the Logos. It is possible, in this connection, to leave aside the statements touching the Synoptic tradition concerning the plenitude of salvific power and the independence of Jesus (3:35; 13:3; 17:2; 10:28 ff.; 14:13; 15:26; cf. Matt. 28:18; Luke 24:49; Mark 16:20).[1] Decisive are the deeds of power presented in the narrated miracles as factual proofs, which once again surpass the Synoptic tradition and conception, as this already becomes evident in the relative recession of the original psychological mediation—the motive of compassionate, helpful love for human beings on the part of Christ, of faith on the part of those in need of help—behind the standpoint of the self-presentation and revelation of the glory of the Son of God (the miracles begin with a "luxury miracle").[2] This latter standpoint unmistakably governs even the selection made in the reporting (20:30). For this reason there is no mention of the casting out of demons, because the frequent occurrence elsewhere of such healings did not allow the miraculous activity of Jesus in this direction to appear fully probative; perhaps even more so because "here the popular conception of the devil has been so spiritualized into the embodiment of moral and religious evil that his effects are found only in the sphere of spiritual life."[3] Of the other kinds of miracles, however, only two Synoptic examples are employed without substantial alteration (the feeding of the five thousand and the walking on the sea), by means of which the unique power of Jesus over nature and its laws is illuminated convincingly enough,

1 Attention should be drawn here especially to the stereotyped, highly significant ἐγώ εἰμι: (4:26; 6:20; 8:24. 28. 58; 13:19; 18:5. 6. 8), in comparison with Deut. 32:39; Isa. 41:4. 10; 43:10. 25; 48:12. See on this O. Holtzmann, *Johannesevangelium* (1887), pp. 102, 188.

2 Cf. moreover the apt exposition in H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, pp. 448 f.

3 O. Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristenthum* (1887), p. 749.

while two other examples (the healing of the centurion's son at Capernaum and of the paralytic) are presented with a modification by which the miracle undergoes a corresponding intensification. In addition, in progressive escalation, instead of the Synoptic cases of the

healing of the blind and the raising of the dead, one new example of each is introduced. The series of miracles, however, is opened by a demonstration of power of the most striking kind, which stands outside all Synoptic analogy. And it demands full attention when already in this significant introductory miracle, in immediate continuation of the Logos-perspective shimmering through 1:5, the revelation of the *δόξα* of the Logos become flesh of 1:14 is confirmed with an almost programmatic turn (2:11). It must further be added that the statements concerning power—its possession and its exercise—throughout relate to the sphere of the realization of the divine will of salvation.

We obtain the test of the foregoing result when finally the alternating self-designations of Jesus in our textual material as *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* and *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* or simply *ὁ υἱός* are examined with regard to their relation to the Logos of the Prologue. One readily observes that the sayings in which the designation "the Son of Man" is chosen without exception presuppose the conception of a being over-earthly in kind and origin. This is attested in two ways in the foundational passage 3:13 f.: as "the Son of Man" Jesus has come down from heaven and must be exalted (into heaven).[2] The more precise thought is this: because only the "Son of Man" was in heaven, only he can reveal the mysteries of heavenly spiritual life; and because this same Son of Man can communicate eternal life to the world only from the height of a heavenly mode of being,

[1] See above p. 7 and (with reference to 1 51) p. 5.

[2] "Incidentally, throughout the entire Gospel there is never any talk of *being exalted* except in connection with the **Son of Man**" (H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* II 456 — emphasis added by me).

he must first be restored again to that higher existence. With *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* Jesus here designates his person as one to whom, according to its original spiritual essence, pre-existence belongs and which has its proper homeland in heaven. What in him is *σάρξ* (cf. 1:14) cannot have come down from heaven. As the one originally dwelling on high (in heaven), who will return there again, Jesus appears—precisely insofar as he is "the Son of Man"—also in 6:62.[1] As is indicated here, his ascent will have the consequence that the disciples given to him by the Father, and thus receptive to what is higher, will recognize the pneumatic (heavenly; cf. v. 32 ff.) nature of his person and his words; so 8:28 makes it clear that the "exaltation" of Jesus by the Jews will, precisely because he is the Son of Man, lead them to the insight that he is the unique person he claims to be: the one *ἐκ τῶν ἄνω* (v. 23). The ground of his "exaltation" is not that the Jews merely regard him as the Son of Man, but rather that they do not recognize him as the Son of Man (the over-earthly being). The designation, therefore, is not here an expression for the humanly lowly nature of Christ. Without reference to the idea of pre-existence, Jesus as the Son of Man announces his imminent glorification in the sense of his exaltation into heaven and thus into the sphere of pure spirituality: 12:23 (cf. v. 32) and 13:31 (cf. vv. 33, 36; 14:2–3; 7:39). When he then in 6:27, insofar as he is possessor and dispenser of a nourishment for human beings that does not perish and that effects eternal life, designates himself as the Son of Man,

this occurs in order to indicate that the nature of the nourishment in question is explained by its over-earthly, heavenly origin and essence, and ultimately by the over-earthly nature of its giver. The situation is no different in the more specific

[1] The verse would have no meaning if the concept of the "Son of Man" were to include Jesus' earthly-human being, since precisely this had not existed previously — and yet it is to this that "the Son of Man" returns.

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saying 6:53: Jesus as the Son of Man, i.e. as the one who in his essence is heavenly and has come from heaven (6:32 f., 38, 41 f., 50 f.), is the one who in the Eucharist—thus under sacred symbolism—feeds and gives drink from the real source of his personality with powers of eternal life; what follows shows that the full realization of this sacramental communication of salvation is conditioned by the ascent to where the Son of Man was before (v. 62). Of outstanding significance is already the first utterance belonging here, 1:51: "Truly, truly, I say to you, you will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man." There can be no question here that for the immediate apprehension of the newly won disciples the self-designation of Jesus as the Son of Man can have no other meaning than that of *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* applied to him by Nathanael himself in v. 49, which recognizes his messianic dignity; but it does not follow from this that the Evangelist does not wish to have Jesus himself express something beyond this by the phrase *ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*—all the more since at this very moment he opens up to the disciples a prospect into a newly unfolding world of revelation precisely with reference to himself. In addition, as already shown, the context concluded by v. 51 repeatedly—and in our verse again through the formula *ἀμὴν ἀμὴν*—lets the features of the Logos-Christ shine through in the appearance of Jesus from the outset.[1] This raises "the Son of Man," in the sense of the speaker here, all the more securely above the sphere of purely messianic meaning, inasmuch as the thought itself that is expressed, both in its form (to be discussed later!) and in its content, once again places Jesus in the illumination of a heavenly glory. In and with him, for those who belong to him, heaven is manifestly on earth; or, what is the same, he is—precisely insofar as he is the Son of Man—already on earth in heaven,

[1] See above p. 43.

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in full possession and undiminished exercise of the heavenly attributes and powers that belong to him in himself, insofar as the purposes of his salvific mission during his earthly existence require it. In the ascending and descending angels (heavenly powers and intelligences) there is outwardly represented what inwardly, considered in itself, is already immediately given in the processes of Jesus' vocational consciousness and activity. Only indirectly, in the mouth of the crowd, which in connection with what has been heard refers back to an earlier saying of Jesus (8:28), does his self-designation *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* appear in 12:34, where once again the announcement of his exaltation in the sense of his return to heaven (3:13–14) is at issue. That as the Son of Man he has heaven as his proper sphere of dominion, in contrast to the "ruler of

this world," follows from v. 31. In the same direction points the figurative self-designation *τὸ φῶς*, which Jesus without further qualification substitutes for *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* in v. 35, referring back to 8:12; 9:5: the home of light is heaven. To this group also belongs, according to several of the oldest codices (see above, p. 19), 9:35. Although the context after vv. 29–33 most naturally leads one to expect in the self-designation of Jesus an explicit emphasis on his relation to God, and although it has been stressed that the following *προσκυνεῖν* in v. 38 according to the usage of the Fourth Gospel signifies divine worship, nevertheless, in light of what has already been set forth, it is not impossible that the Evangelist here had in mind the "Son of Man" of Matt. 25:31; the connection with what follows points in this direction. If this is the case, then the presupposition is the same as in 1:51: the Son of Man then means, in the sense of Jesus, more than the one addressed initially grasps when he finds the Messiah designated by it. Also in 9:35 Christ is on the point of presenting himself as the light of the world (vv. 39–41), and the conception of an originally heavenly being is here just as unavoidable for the Son of Man as in 12:34–35.[1] The deeper significance that the

[1] On υἱός ἀνθ-ρώπου (without the article) in 5 27, see above p. 11. Nestle's question concerning the *Ecce homo* passage 19 5: "…whether ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθ-ρωπος — B omits ὁ — is not to be traced back to בר נש" (*Introduction to the Greek New Testament*[2], p. 237 f.), deserves attention, since it seems to have arisen from a correct intuition. The preceding as well as the following features of the character portrayal of Pilate show most clearly the high degree to which the Evangelist is concerned to suggest the irresistible, deep impression that Jesus made upon the Roman official, and to depict the inner struggle into which Pilate is drawn. The latter thus becomes, in a certain sense, a counterpart to the Ἕλληνες of 12 20; the feeling of the marvellous is what, in the narrator's view, informs Pilate, makes him uncertain, pressing, and uneasy, and is proclaimed in the form of the interrogative exclamation of amazement. If one now compares the significant concurrence of ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθ-ρωπος (v. 5) and σταύρωσον σταύρωσον (v. 6) with the discussed fundamental passage concerning the υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου of the Fourth Evangelist (3 13. 14), with the "ὑψωθῆναι δεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου," then it becomes in fact more than probable that the Evangelist has allowed an intuition in the direction of the "Son of Man," as the Evangelist himself conceives him, to dawn upon the Roman representative of the pagan world, in that he has made Pilate, in a manner similar to Caiaphas earlier (11 49–52), "prophesy." From Mark 2 27–28 (cf. Nestle) one may abstract here (see below).

designation *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* has in the Fourth Gospel will become clear only later—when the idea of incarnation is discussed—to which explicit reference is made here.

If, then, the relation of the idea determined in the expression *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* to the Logos-idea of the Prologue is to be more precisely defined, the investigation can all the less evade the task of a more exact discussion of the acknowledged[1] Old-Testament foundational passage Dan. 7:13, inasmuch as on the one hand the problem already present here appears particularly difficult, and on the other hand the state of affairs concerning the meaning of that

self-designation of Christ among the Synoptics is disputed. At that Daniel passage we are first confronted with an exegetical controversy. According to some, the being introduced by the expression כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ represents a collective personality, namely the people of God (among modern scholars: Hitzig, Hofmann, Meinhold, Marti, Bevan, Duhm, Prince, Driver, etc.); according to others, it is the appearance of the Messiah (already so in the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch; the majority of Jewish and Christian exegetes). The former

[1] H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* I, p. 247.

view has recently found confident representatives in wider circles as well. Is it sufficiently grounded?[1] That some weighty considerations can be adduced in its favor must certainly be conceded. Above all it carries weight that the eternal world-dominion which according to v. 14 comes to the "one like a son of man" is given according to v. 27 (cf. vv. 18, 22) to the "people of the holy ones of the Most High." Since further the beasts of the vision correspond to collectives of world-empires (cf. v. 23), the reader, when thinking of the "one like a son of man," who forms the contrast to them, is naturally inclined likewise to think of a collective. Occasionally elsewhere Israel is also designated with terms such as אִישׁ and אָדָם (Ps. 80:18).[2] Moreover, the figure of the Messiah otherwise does not appear in the book of Daniel, and with its absence the writing does not become fragmentary or unintelligible. To all this, however, there stand opposed no less considerable reasons. Above all it must be emphasized that the appearance of the "one like a son of man" does not accord with the characterization of the people of God. For (1) he is of purely heavenly origin (see below), which certainly cannot be said of the people of the holy ones, characterized as in need of severe purification (11:35); note how the world powers explicitly rise from the sea (7:3; according to 4 Ezra 13:3 the one like a son of man himself!) or ascend from the earth (7:17); (2) the "one like a son of man" stands at the head of an army of subordinate, ministering spirits, with whom he makes his entry before the Most High like a triumphant ruler (הַקְרִיבוּהִי—with regard to the subject cf. the parallel in v. 10);[3] (3) the character of the heavenly

1 According to Marti (*The Book of Daniel Explained*, 1901, p. 52), "according to the authentic interpretation in vv. 18, 22, 27 it is impossible, with regard to the one who was like a human being, to think of anything other than the people of the saints of the Most High, i.e. the faithful Jews." Things are not so simple!

2 On the perhaps pre-Christian interpretation of v. 18 (and of the probably secondary v. 6) as referring to the Messiah in the LXX and the Targum, cf. Nestle in *The Expository Times* XI, 238 (Febr. 1900).

3 What is meant is neither a movement from heaven to earth, nor (Holsten, Appel) one from earth to heaven; but certainly just as little the idea that "the Son of Man is borne on the clouds of heaven from some remote heavenly region, where he had hitherto led a latent existence together with the other pre-existent entities of Jewish theology, into the presence of God, in order thereupon immediately to enter into action" (following Brandt);

H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* I, p. 311. That in the judgment of the nations God is to be thought of not as being on the earth itself (Dalman), but enthroned on high (מרום), is shown clearly enough by Ps. 7 8 and is already betrayed by the allusion—given together with the wheels of the judgment throne (Dan. 7)—to the chariot of the clouds (cf. Ezek. 1). That, and how, under this presupposition, a locally determined relation of the presence and activity of God is not excluded for Old Testament conception, Hupfeld–Nowack have shown aptly with reference to the psalm passage mentioned. Emphasized in Dan. 7 13 is the immediate nearness of God into which the "one like a son of man" is placed: לְזָקְנָא and קֳדָמוֹהִי. For comparison one may cite Ps. 110 1 and the passage based upon it, Jer. 30 21, which guarantees the vocational, immediate nearness to God of the (Davidic) Messiah—i.e. here according to his priestly character—(probably not before the last third of the second century, thus after Daniel). It is an interpolation when the "one like a son of man" is conceived, over against the dreadful beasts, as "defenceless and harmless, incapable of mastering the world by his own power" (Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, p. 198 f.). Rather, underlying the כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ on the human side of his being lies the idea of Ps. 8 6–9 (cf. also 1 Cor. 15 27; Jas. 3 7).

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"one like a son of man" is sheer majesty; nothing points to the contrast of a previous state of suffering, whereas the people of the holy ones according to 7:25; 12:1 must undergo a tribulation such as has never been. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the designation כְּבַר is analogous to that in 8:15, where not a collective but an individual being, namely the angel Gabriel, is designated, as well as to those in 10:16 and 10:18, where likewise an angel (Gabriel?) is meant. In addition, it is to be noted that in various passages of the book the conception of the people (kingdom) and of its ruler (in the image of the beast and its horn) passes over into one another.[1] While according to 7:23 the beast corresponds to the kingdom, in 7:17 the four beasts correspond to four kings; in 8:20 an animal with two horns signifies two kings, and in 8:21 an animal signifies kings

1 Cf. Dillmann, *Handbuch der alttestamentlichen Theologie*, p. 523; Behrmann, *The Book of Daniel*, 1894, p. 48.

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(the Greco-Macedonian dynasty) and its horn the first king (Alexander the Great); while further in 7:7, 24 ten horns represent ten kings, in 8:8 the four horns represent four kingdoms (cf. also 2:37, 43; 7:11, 12). Nor is it to be overlooked that the beings standing over against the "one like a son of man" are not designated as animal-like, but simply as animals, whereby even formally the presupposition that on both sides the relation of image and reality is the same loses its footing (the animal is a proper image, the man an improper one). Should the similarity in כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ indicate something general as opposed to the individual (Marti), then this would also have had to be expressed with the animals, since these likewise are not meant to represent individual beings, but collectives that represent the contrast to the people of the holy ones. The interpretation of the "one like a son of man" as the holy people thus proves to be untenable: it

does not satisfy all the conditions. Is the mysterious figure perhaps after all the Messiah? One may appeal to the fact that what is attributed to the "one like a son of man" coincides temporally and materially with what applies to the Messiah (end of the age; eternal world-dominion). It is also conceivable that the author had in view the *ʾēl gibbōr* of Isa. 9:5, as well as Mic. 5:1 (*וּמוֹצָאֹתָיו*), the latter on the basis of a later transcendental reinterpretation. But the already mentioned circumstance that the messianic idea otherwise does not appear in the book must give pause all the more, since even in the oldest part of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch (from the last third of the second century) only "relatively little that is messianic" is found. Moreover, the Messiah elsewhere in the Old Testament is consistently a Davidide.[1] The designation *כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ*, however, unmistakably indicates that a human being is not meant, just as certainly as, beyond that, a heavenly provenance is implied (*אֶתָא עִם־עֲנָנֵי שְׁמַיָּא* betrays a conception entirely analogous

1 That nowhere is there any question of a Maccabean Messiah or the like will have to be demonstrated elsewhere.

to theophanies),[1] but rather only a being like a human being, which otherwise (cf. above the parallel designations) belongs to a higher class of beings: the world of angels.

We are compelled to construe the enigmatic being in some way as an angel. But in what sense? The context allows the "one like a human being" to be recognized as organ and representative of the consummation of salvation. This, however, presupposes a closer relation to the "people of the holy ones of the Most High" grounded in the very being of that figure. This relation indeed emerges clearly from the connection between vv. 14 and 27: one and the same dominion is given once to the "one like a human being," and once to the people of God.[2] The assumption

1 Cf. the ἄγγελον περιβεβλημένον νεφέλην of Apoc. 10:1. Dalman, appealing to Nestle (Margin. und Mater. I 40), holds עַל־עֲנָנִים (LXX: ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν, against Theod.: μετὰ τ. ν.) to be the original reading and conjectures that a later hand, "in the endeavour to diminish the divine appearance of the one like a son of man, may have changed עַל into עִם," and remarks: "But even if one reads עִם, the fact remains that the future holder of world-sovereignty does not come from the earth, let alone from the sea, but comes down from heaven. He is a God-near greatness, well suited to represent the people of the saints of God." "It is God alone to whom it belongs to ride upon the clouds, cf. Isa. 19:1; Ps. 104:3" (a. a. O. p. 198). Even if one were to assume that the one like a son of man does not prophetically represent the real "people of the saints," but only that people as an ideal greatness, his coming with the clouds of heaven would remain unintelligible—already for the reason that the apocalyptist in 7:13–14 clearly has before his eyes the immediate recipient of eternal world-sovereignty by God's grace: but this is not the people of God as such, rather that personality which, in distinction from God himself, forms its summit and as such stands over against the rulers of the world-empires. It is a distinctive act of investiture which the author has envisaged and

wishes to describe. If this is misunderstood, the entire dream-image of the seer is blurred.

2 Cf. also Kamphausen, *Das Buch Daniel und die neuere Geschichtsforschung* (1893), p. 6 ("—the dominion passes over to 'one like a son of man' or to the saints of the Most High," note: this "or" is for me equivalent to "and"). One should recall Luke 22:29, according to which the Messiah hands over to his own the dominion entrusted to him by God (διατίθεσθαι, Aram. מסר), and Luke 12:32, where the giving (διδόναι, Aram. יהב) of the dominion to the little flock is probably meant just as originally. This line of thought clearly connects with Dan. 7:14, 27, where the "dominion" (מַלְכוּ) is first given to the one like a son of man, then to the saints of the Most High (Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, p. 109, 101).

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of this relation is all the more well founded since it has its analogy within the book itself: the peoples of the earth have their representatives in the spirit world, their guardian angels, whose mutual confrontations, conflicts, etc., are decisive for the fate of their peoples (10:13).[1] That the struggles of the people of Israel likewise have their counterpart in the higher realm is all the more probable, since Michael of our book is expressly portrayed as the guardian angel of the Jewish people (10:13, 21; 12:1). The designation of Michael as "one of the chief princes" (השר) and as "the great prince" (הגדיל) moreover places him in the closest proximity to God.[2] [line 11] Thus the question could even arise whether the "one like a human being" and Michael coincide; the same one who, according to 12:1, rescues the people of the holy ones through the last and most severe distress would in the vision of chap. 7 already have been foreseen as the one who appears as victor before the throne of the Most High. I do not venture to assert the identity: the absence of a name seems, in keeping with the peculiarly significant character of the passage, rather to aim at a highest intensification, similar to that of Gen. 32:30–31 (cf. 25; Hos. 12:4–5). In any case, not too much depends on the decision of this question. For in any event, kinship with the archangel Michael on the one hand and the essential relation to the people of God on the other lead to the idea that the "one like a human being" is at once the highest personal mediating being between God and the world and the transcendent archetype of the humanity pleasing to God that is ultimately realized in the "people of the holy ones."[3] If this is so, then in the image of the exalted

1 One should note how, in popular belief, a deceptive similarity of face and form was then assumed with respect to the guardian angels of individual human beings: Acts 12:10.

2 On the later rabbinic identification of Michael and the Shekhinah cf. Oehler, *Theologie des A. T.* § 199; Lueken, *Michael* (1898), p. 42 f. In Germany St Michael took the place of Wodan and Ziu.

3 On the question of the origin of this heavenly figure "of the Man" cf. the hint by Gunkel in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1899, p. 588 ff.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 55, l. 11 ff.: Cf. N. Schmidt, “the son of man” in the book of Daniel in *Journal of Biblical Literature* XIX, pp. 22–28. The author interprets, in his noteworthy article, the “one like a man” as Michael, the guardian angel of Israel, whose prototype he regards as Marduk (pp. 26–28). On Hommel’s equation of the “Son of Man” with the designation *zir amiluti*, i.e. “seed of the human race,” for Adapa, the human double of Marduk, see *Theologischer Jahresbericht* XX, p. 241.

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unnamed figure of Daniel’s vision there is reflected the human-likeness of the ancient *malʾakh YHWH* of the Yahwistic and Elohistic traditions—that pronounced anthropomorphic form of the divine appearance in which, at the same time, the independent significance of the angel is most completely relinquished.[1] A noteworthy development is shown by the Danielic conception insofar as, instead of the mere *prosōpon* of God, a proper personal hypostasis is envisaged. Elsewhere it can be observed how the personal being of the human-likeness of the *malʾakh YHWH* was further elaborated by later writers also in the direction that he appeared equally as bearer and organ of Yahweh’s moral consciousness as of his power (Isa. 63:9–10),[2] and indeed with reference to Yahweh’s relation to Israel as the holy people; accordingly, the “angel of the covenant” of Mal. 3:1 seems to come into comparison (as a divine mediating hypostasis that represents and sustains the covenantal, salvation-historical relationship between Yahweh and Israel).[3] Such a further development of the idea of the human-likeness of the divine being (revealed in the angel)—note especially Ezek. 1:26—was supported by the complementary idea of the God-likeness of the human being (Gen. 1:27); and it is possible that the expression of the Daniel passage alludes to the *ben-ʾādām* of Ps. 8:5 (144:3), according to which the human being falls but little short of *ʾĕlōhîm*, that is, of God himself.[4] From the entire investigation, however, it emerges that the “one like a human being” of Dan. 7 does not prefigure the Messiah in the historically given, ordinary sense in

1 The angel of Yahweh is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, not a personal individual being, but the most immediate self-manifestation of God.

2 The correction of the passage recommended by some modern scholars on the basis of the LXX is not to be approved: the reading of the latter aims at the removal of an anthropopathic expression.

3 Cf. Dillmann, *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, p. 350, 521. The interpretation in the sense of the guardian angel of the community (Kraetzschmar; Nowack) does not do justice to the context.

4 It scarcely needs to be recalled that a later, messianic interpretation of this very passage (Heb. 2:6 ff.) emerged.

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a visionary form, but that at most one might speak of a transcendent Messiah, a Messiah of a higher order, a counterpart of the actual Messiah—in the angelic world. This conception is, after

all, explicable from a time in which historical experience since the Exile impelled a break with the traditional messianic expectation and a search for a surrogate: instead of in the Davidic line, whose remnants had increasingly disappeared, one sought the organ of the consummation of salvation in the supraterrestrial sphere (even if this break was not universal, as the book of Sirach already shows).[1]

We have gained the indispensable point of departure for understanding the self-designation of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, "Son of Man." In order to reach the goal, we must attend to the intermediate links, which here need only be sketched. It may first of all be regarded as sufficiently demonstrated that, according to the conception and presentation of the Synoptists[2], Jesus, where he uses of himself the designation "the Son of Man," generally presents himself as the Messiah,

> **1** It might be asked whether, in the probably under John Hyrcanus (in the last third of the 2nd century) composed messianic Psalm 2, the "one like a human being" has not already been transformed into the earthly human Messiah (v. 12: בַּר־נָשָׁא); the need for a textual emendation—cf. further Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu* 1898, p. 40—falls away if one assumes a literary allusion; the Danielic prophecy 7 13–14 had by the time of the psalmist already attained too great a significance, and indeed also beyond the circle of the pious within which it arose. One may compare, moreover, that the Messiah of Isa. 9 6 in the LXX is reinterpreted, receiving a share of the functions that Jewish theology abstracts from the older history from מלאך יהוה (Duhm); they translate אל גבור with μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελος.
>
> **2** From a detailed discussion of the question whether Jesus himself in fact designated himself as the Son of Man—which, in my view, is to be answered in the affirmative—and of the further question whether he used this designation from the beginning—which I believe must be denied (cf. also Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* 1901, p. 33)—we may here refrain. Cf. further H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I 248, 251, 259 f. With good reason Kose emphasizes the inner connection that exists in Jesus between the self-designation υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and the likewise Danielic basic idea of the βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ: with the latter the former was given for him (*Revue biblique internationale* IX, 1900, p. 178 f.; cf. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, p. 110).

that is, as the bringer and representative of the kingdom of God, thus placing into it a so-called theocratic "official" sense. Without doubt, this more precise determination of the expression finds formal support in the oldest apocalyptist, Ezekiel, who, in his capacity as prophet, is addressed by Yahweh in this way; likewise in Dan. 8:17, where the author has the angel Gabriel address Daniel with the same form of address as the recipient of prophetic revelation. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in this way a material explanation of the application of this designation to Christ Jesus is not given in the same measure, since in the latter case it is not, as with an Ezekiel or a Daniel, a matter of emphasizing the contrast between human lowliness and weakness and the holy exaltedness of God.[1]. What is decisive rather is that the function which belongs to Jesus as

the Son of Man, in accordance with the conception contained in the apocalyptic foundational passage Dan. 7, essentially includes end-historical, kingdom-consummating activity. “Jesus is and is called Son of Man on the one hand everywhere where he proclaims, spreads, represents the kingdom of God, forgiving and healing, teaching and suffering; on the other hand, however, and above all there where he consummates it by coming on the clouds of heaven. No passage withdraws itself entirely from this interpretation. Each individual one offers, in its own way, proof thereof.”[2] Even where it is not the triumphant but the suffering Messiah that is spoken of, the designation “the Son of Man” almost throughout does not fail to allow the at least indirectly given reference to that (contrasting) apocalyptic idea to be recognized[3] . If

1 Matt. 8 20 = Luke 9 58 also characterizes the lowliness of the “Son of Man” only as a contrast to the unique height that belongs to his true being. H. Holtzmann, a. a. O. p. 250 f., 255.

2 H. Holtzmann p. 253.

3 H. Holtzmann p. 249. I add the following remark: the image of the ruling and judging power of the exalted Messiah—taken from the Daniel passage (similarly as in the parabolic discourses of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch, chs. 37–71)—has, in Jesus’ own consideration, apparently already been supplemented by the feature, gained from the messianically interpreted prophecy of Isa. 53 (note especially v. 3), of the willingly suffering lowliness of the Messiah on earth, and this since the thought of deathlessness had taken firm hold in him. Cf. also Holtzmann I 289 f.

now Jesus, where his words come into immediate contact with Dan. 7, always speaks of his future coming, never of his having come, this does not prove that he drew from the Daniel passage an instruction exclusively concerning what awaited him in his post-existence, concerning his return[1]. The manner of his entry into human existence and his earthly life as a path of suffering absolutely precluded a combination with that prophecy. It would, however, be psychologically difficult to understand if the messianic self-consciousness of Jesus, which as it seems increasingly received stimulus from apocalyptic thought, had not awakened in him a vivid interest in that mysterious vision also in the direction that it gave him impulse to gain clarity concerning the real presuppositions of his messianic existence.How highly developed his sense for questions of religious world-view reaching into the metaphysical was, despite the central significance and gravity of his original ethical world of thought, would already be shown by the role which he assigns to the angels in a series of sayings. As he places these divine mediating organs to the most extensive degree into the service of the kingdom of God founded by him[2], so he also assigns them the corresponding position in relation to his own person. Such traits of the individuality of Jesus make it more than probable that he also, in his engagement with the vision of Daniel, which was so significant precisely for him, did not evade a contemplation that in a certain sense was metaphysically oriented and naturally suggested itself. What we can recognize with certainty is first of all this, that in the Daniel passage in question he finds described a process

1 For the exposition see H. Holtzmann, a. a. O. I 312.

2 One should note especially the emergence of the idea of the guardian angel.

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in the higher world seen by the prophet, which constitutes a pre-presentation of his own reappearance. Whether he conceived that process more as an imaginary one or as an objective one, in any case for his conception there stood behind that visionary appearance of the “one like a son of man” a real magnitude — of what kind, indeed, has been shown above (p. 55). With this higher being he brings his own person into the closest connection when he speaks of the coming of the Son of Man on the clouds of heaven, in the glory of his Father, with his angels (Mark 14:62; Matt. 26:64 [cf. in the “little apocalypse”: Mark 13:26; Matt. 24:30; Luke 21:27]; Mark 8:38; Matt. 16:27; 25:31; Luke 9:26). That he indeed thought of identity of person, and thus grounded on the prophetic piece the conception of his pre-existence, we are neither compelled nor entitled to assume[1]. The Christ-image preserved in the sacred tradition, closest to historical reality, does not set us the insoluble task of bringing such an assumption into harmony with the demand for strict, natural unity of the self-consciousness of Jesus. The correct path will here too be found only by the one who seeks the deepest roots of the world of thought that arose with Christ in the soil of the Old Testament world of ideas. But in our case the guide will be Christ’s own forerunner. If one brings to mind the incisive significance which the encounter with the person of the Baptist had for the messianic self-consciousness of Jesus[2], one will recognize in the saying attributed to the latter in Matt. 11:14 concerning John — “if you are willing to accept it, he is Elijah who is to come” — no thought that could not be understood from the historical consciousness of Jesus himself.

1 Cf. the finely sensitive psychological discussion by Joh. Weiss (*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, 2nd ed., pp. 165 ff., 175).

2 This much will remain, however one may restrict the significance of Jesus’ baptism and baptismal vision (cf., in this direction, Holsten in *ZWTh.* 1891, pp. 56 f., 394, 419 f.; Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum* 1892, p. 118 f.; Wernle, a. a. O., p. 27 f.).

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The same holds true, however, of the more precise explanation of the personal relationship between Elijah and John which the angel Gabriel gives in Luke 1:17: *he himself will go before him in the spirit and power of Elijah*. The wording first of all recalls the request of Elisha in 2 Kings 2:9 (“let a double portion of your spirit come upon me”), where we are clearly dealing with the conception of a transfer of power, a real spiritual bequeathal of Elijah to his immediate successor (cf. Num. 11:25). If now we note what is of essential importance in our case, that Elijah does not die but is withdrawn from the sphere of the generally human fate by being bodily taken up into heaven, in order henceforth to belong in immediate proximity to God to the world of spiritual beings, then the comparison of a series of passages in which the concepts *spirit* and

power occur in analogous combination leads us beyond the idea of a “kinship of spirit” between two persons in the sense familiar to us moderns of a similarity in disposition and feeling, outlook and striving. Both in the passages referring to the spiritual being of the Messiah Jesus (Luke 1:35; 4:14; Acts 10:38), and in the self-characterization of the apostle (1 Cor. 2:4 [cf. v. 12; 2 Cor. 3:17]), a real impartation of power from above (from God to Jesus, from Christ to the apostle) is meant. We would have reason to hesitate to transfer this conception to the relationship between Elijah and the Baptist if the former were to be considered merely as a human child who, just as through his consummate piety, so also by this exception, stands out in that he escaped death and Sheol. With this presupposition, however, it will never succeed in grasping the deeper nature of this peculiar, wondrous phenomenon[1]. Whoever looks more closely convinces himself easily that the accumulated mysterious traits of the same

1 What we have here in view is the ideal Elijah, whose glory has already flowed over into the ancient narrative about the Elijah of history. Cf. in general Ewald, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, 3rd ed., III, pp. 573 ff., 584 ff.

announce a being of a higher kind revealing itself in him. It has rightly been emphasized that, according to the tradition of the Old Testament itself, in distinction from later legend, the ascension of Elijah is an honor that befell no human being — not even the covenant mediator Moses — apart from the antediluvian Enoch[1]. This circumstance admits of no other explanation than that precisely that Elijah who ascended into heaven belonged from the outset to heaven (cf. John 3:13: no one, i.e. no human being, has ascended into heaven except the one who descended from heaven, the Son of Man). It is no coincidence that Elijah introduces himself with a prophecy that refers to a plague from heaven, that the “Spirit of Yahweh” filling and driving him again and again snatches him away through the air (1 Kings 18:12; 2 Kings 2:16), that he repeatedly calls down the “fire of Yahweh” from heaven, that he appears *without father, without mother, without genealogy* like a Melchizedek (“*subito de coelis*,” one might say)[2]. If under these circumstances we arrive at the conception of an angelic being who proves himself as the representative of Yahweh zealous for his covenant rights and covenant honor and has created for himself a human organ in the prophet Elijah (1 Kings 19:10), then the judgment of Jesus concerning the Baptist is understood in such a way that thereby one and the same God-related spiritual potency, with which fundamentally only the being of Yahweh himself is objectified in a particular direction, is thought to be specifically effective now in the forerunner of Christ, just as once already in Elijah. Already in the later prophecy explaining Mal. 3:1, v. 23, which according to the synoptic report was decisive for Jesus’ evaluation of the Baptist (Matt. 11:10; Luke 7:27), the prophet announced as forerunner of the day of Yahweh is conceived as an organ of that same higher being (*malʾāḵ*, v. 1a) which had manifested itself in the Elijah of the past[3].

1 Dillmann, *Old Testament Theology*, p. 397.

2 1 Kings 17[1] changes nothing here; the meaning of הַשְּׁבִי remains obscure.

3 That 3[1]) מַלְאָךְ) in the sense of Malachi means an angel, and not already the prophetic forerunner of the End (v. 23), is also indicated by the fundamental passage Isa. 40[3], which Duhm has in any case—at least in the main point—quite correctly understood.

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Certainly we must now apprehend the relation into which, according to the Synoptics, Jesus himself placed himself with respect to the "*one like a son of man*" of Dan. 7, as far as the question of identity or difference of person is concerned, under no other point of view. Ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is not one and the same with the one who appeared to Daniel "*as a son of man*." The former is a proper, real human being. He is distinguished, however, from other human beings by the fact that he stands in a dynamic-real, pneumatic relationship of essence with the "*one like a son of man*" seen by Daniel—that is (see above p. 55), with the highest angel-like hypostasis of the self-revealing God himself—a relationship which makes him the absolutely unique, most immediate kinsman of God, the perfect organ of the divine Spirit, and the bearer of the highest God-bestowed dignity. It must of course remain unexamined in what progression and up to what degree of clarity the recognition of this relationship, with its individual moments, was worked out in the messianic self-consciousness of Jesus. We cannot lift the veil of this mystery of inner becoming, nor need we attempt to unveil it. It suffices to have shown the historically given line of direction. As far, however, as the origin of this consciousness is concerned, it can in no case be derived merely from an immersion in the prophecy of Daniel.[1] The indispensable presupposition is formed by the inner experience at the baptism by John, in connection with the preceding spiritual and moral development. The feeling of intimacy with God, at once overwhelming and continuous, and of the surpassing fullness of endowment with power for service to the kingdom of God (cf. Mic. 3 8), as it was

1 The answering of the question whether Jesus attached himself to the designation of the heavenly Messiah as the "Son of Man" in Enoch 37–71 is, for our purpose, of no further importance.

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unquestionably present in Jesus from the baptism onward,[1] alone could raise him to that height of inner vision from which Dan. 7 13–14 acquired this significance for him. This will become still clearer if, following upon what has been set forth, we attempt to determine the difference between the nature of the endowment of Christ and that of Elijah–John, as it emerges synoptically as a presupposition for the consciousness of Jesus. On the one hand, it lies in the fact that in the forerunner (or already in Elijah) a principle in God becomes operative which constitutes only one side of the being of Yahweh: the punitive, zealously jealous holiness of the covenant-God. More strongly than it is done in the profound narrative of 1 Kings 19 11 ff., Old Testament prophecy itself could hardly have expressed the one-sidedness and insufficiency of the spirit at work here. By contrast, the point of departure for the life pulsating in and streaming forth from the Messiah Jesus is the highest principle of revelation, in other words that (as said, still to be conceived as angel-like) hypostasis which mediates within itself the totality of the spiritual powers and the content of consciousness of God, the purest, most perfect mirror-image

of the divine being. Corresponding to this, on the other hand, are the manner and measure of the communication of the Spirit to Christ Jesus. Even if the synoptic narrative still occasionally reminds us of the intermittent influence of the Spirit of Yahweh upon prophets and "men of God" of the old covenant (Mark 1 12; Matt. 4 1; Luke 4 1), this feature nevertheless recedes behind the general impression of a continuous mediation and of the out-flowing of the spiritual impulses of revelation from the very center of the personality of Jesus himself. This is essentially connected with the fact that his spiritual unity of life with God, although it does not abolish the consciousness of dependence and subordination, nevertheless, as a perfect unity, excludes the feeling of a determinate measure and thus of a limit and a gulf.

> **1** Cf. with regard to the "*pneumatiker*" Jesus the discussion by Joh. Weiss (*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*², p. 54 — following Weinei).

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In this respect the thought of John 3 34—*οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μέτρου δίδωσιν τὸ πνεῦμα*—does in fact correspond to a fact of consciousness of the historical Christ of the Synoptics.

One might now be tempted to find, in the synoptic "*Son of Man*," also the other moment of the idea of the "one like a son of man" of Dan. 7 reproduced, according to which the latter at the same time has an archetypal relation to humanity, insofar as humanity becomes God-pleasing in the type of the "*people of the saints*." Modern theology has, as is well known, often seen in the sayings Mark 2 10 and 2 28 a testimony that Jesus was conscious of his messiahship on the basis of the realization of the idea of the God-likeness of humanity in his person. But the first question is whether those passages really apply to the specific being of Jesus. This question must be answered in the negative. The thought of Mark 2 10 (— Matt. 9 6; Luke 5 24) is this: "*that I, although I am not God but a human being, have the right and authority to forgive what has been sinned by any human being, you shall recognize from the fact that, in connection with the authority I ascribe to myself, I demonstrably also have received the power to heal any bodily ailment miraculously.*" The former, like the latter, is a capacity that can already be explained in general from the prophetic equipment of Jesus' calling. It lies within the sphere of the task of the prophet both to obtain forgiveness through intercession and to proclaim divine forgiveness, and indeed not only to the community as a whole (Isa. 40 1 ff.), but also to the individual: 2 Sam. 12 13; 24 10 ff.; 17 ff.; Isa. 38 5 (cf. Gen. 20 7).[1] The saying of Jesus thus fully explains itself from his (distinctively heightened) prophetic consciousness of power and dignity, which he finds himself compelled to assert against the insinuation of the shallow critics who misunderstand him.

> **1** That and why, for the prophet of the new covenant, the individual *as such* comes into consideration, and not only insofar as he is, by virtue of his public position, a representative of the totality (as the king is), cannot be discussed more closely here.

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The more definitely, however, the appeal of Jesus to this consciousness finds expression in the reference to his manifest "working of miracles," the less need there is of a self-designation of his person that would point precisely to this. As original wording one must assume: ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας. If now the tradition already reproduced by Mark has replaced this ἐγώ with ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, then this is certainly not a recourse to the Ezekielian–Danielic אָדָם, which indeed indicates the humanly lowly nature of the prophet over against God (see above p. 58); otherwise, at the very point where it first appears, a sense fundamentally different from the subsequent and prevailing one would have been attached to the designation ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Rather, the υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is anticipated by the narrator in the discussed apocalyptic sense, on the basis of an interpretation of the word of the Lord which emphasizes, at the expense of the intrinsically general thought (the dignity of the human organ of revelation), the subordinate element demanded by the context (the messianic height of his prophetic character). The contradiction thus produced is still clearly betrayed by Matt. 9 8: καὶ ἐδόξασαν τὸν θεὸν τὸν δόντα ἐξουσίαν τοιαύτην τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Possibly the appended ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς also entered the tradition together with this modification. Something similar holds for Mark 2 28 (= Matt. 12 8; Luke 6 5). The sense of the saying is: the institution of Sabbath observance is, according to God's intention, a means for securing the physical and spiritual well-being of the human being; insofar as it does not serve this purpose, hinders the human being from doing what the preservation of life ordinarily requires, it loses the character of a divine ordinance. This consideration is meant to justify not Jesus alone, but him together with his disciples, who have caused offense. With the expression ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, therefore, a collective subject is presented; it signifies the human being in general, as he has been created by God and as he ought to be constituted according to his idea. Ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ

ἀνθρώπου has thus already, in the oldest synoptic tradition, displaced the original wording demanded by the context: ὁ ἄνθρωπος; and by the anticipatory insertion of the special, apocalyptic-messianic conception of the being of the speaker, the original breadth of the thought and its compelling force have been taken away from the discussion. An intrusion of the messianic interpretation of Ps. 85–7 does not seem excluded (cf. 1 Cor. 15 27; Eph. 1 22).[1]

Although in Paul the designation of Christ

1 Cf. further, together with the brief exposition above on Mark 2^{10} and 2^{28}, the treatment by Joh. Weiss (*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*[2], pp. 203–208); concerning also the text-critical question that enters in at 2^{27}–28, see Fiebig (*Der Menschensohn*, 1901, pp. 65 f.). Matt. 12^{32} and Luke 12^{10} may be left out of consideration in view of the formulation of the saying in Mark 3^{28}. With regard to the sense of the Son of Man in Luke 6^{22} and 7^{34} on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the factual situation in Matthew's Gospel that deviates from Mark and Luke in general, cf. H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* I, pp. 251 f., 257–260.

For an illumination of the details of the controversy concerning the synoptic "Son of Man" in the very lively discussions of recent years, this is not the place. Reference should be

made especially to: Arn. Meyer (*Jesu Muttersprache*, 1896, pp. 91–101, 140–149), Lietzmann (*Der Menschensohn*, 1896), Appel (*Die Selbstbezeichnung Jesu: der Sohn des Menschen*, 1896), Nath. Schmidt (in *Journal of Biblical Literature* XV, 1896, pp. 36–53); Hilgenfeld (in *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, 1897, issue 49), Krop (*La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume de Dieu d'après les évangiles synoptiques avec un appendice sur la question du "fils de l'homme"*, 1897, pp. 118–132); Schmiedel (in *Protestantische Monatshefte* II, 1898, pp. 252–267, 291–308), Hilgenfeld (*ZWTh.* 1898, p. 498 f.), Dalman (*Die Worte Jesu*, 1898, pp. 191 ff.), Lietzmann (in *Theologische Arbeiten aus dem Rheinisch-wissenschaftlichen Predigerverein*, 1898, issue 2, pp. 1–14); Hilgenfeld (*ZWTh.* 1899, pp. 149 ff.), Wellhausen (in *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten* VI, 1899, pp. 187–215), Schürer (in *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1899, col. 365), Clemen (*Th. Lit. Z.* 1899, col. 488 f.), Klöpper (*ZWTh.* 1899, pp. 161–186), Gunkel ("from Wellhausen's most recent apocalyptic researches" in *ZWTh.* 1899, pp. 581–590), Joh. Weiss (in *Theologische Rundschau* 1899, pp. 150–152; *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reich Gottes*², 1900, pp. 159 ff.); Hommel ("The apocalyptic origin of the Son of Man" in *The Expository Times*, May 1900), Rose ("*Fils de l'homme et fils de Dieu*" in *Revue biblique internationale*, 1900, pp. 169–199); Fiebig, *Der Menschensohn*, 1901; Osk. Holtzmann (*Leben Jesu*, 1901, pp. 128 ff.).

"The most recent research on the Son of Man" has been reviewed by Baldensperger in *Theologische Rundschau* III, pp. 201–210, 243–255.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 67, n. 1: Drummond, *The Use and Meaning of the Phrase "the Son of Man" in the Synoptic Gospels* I in *Journal of Theological Studies* 1901, pp. 350–358.

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as the Son of Man does not occur,[1] his christological statements nevertheless form, insofar, a noteworthy link in the series of relevant testimonies, in that for him a distinctive conception attains outstanding importance which takes the place of the synoptically presupposed "one like a son of man" of Dan. 7. It is the idea of the ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος, respectively ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (1 Cor. 15 48. 47). The being of this "heavenly human" is pure spirituality (cf. the statements grounded on this: ἐγένετο ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, 1 Cor. 15 45; and 2 Cor. 3 17: ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν), and indeed in contrast not only to all earthly, material being, which as such bears the character of weakness and transitoriness, but also to all creaturely being insofar as it, in selfish willing, renounces the primal source of spirit and life[2]—both moments taken together[3] as πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης (Rom. 1 4; cf. what is to be remarked further below on ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ). Nowhere in apostolic reflection is this higher being considered purely in itself, or in such a way that it would be set in relation to the "one like a son of man" of the Daniel passage and the thought would remain at that transcendence which characterizes the Danielic conception. Everything that Paul knows to say about the existence and being of the "heavenly human" is rather indissolubly bound up with the fact that he has come to know the appearance of the same in Christ Jesus as the δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος. And what he then sets forth concerning the higher being of this historical appearance runs parallel to

the synoptic-apocalyptic presentation of the Messiah Jesus as the Son of Man. A comparative consideration yields, briefly summarized, the following. That which makes the true, real

1 Acts 7^{56}; Rev. 1^{13}; 14^{14} — the only further attestations in the New Testament apart from the Fourth Gospel — align themselves with the synoptic material (cf. incidentally on the latter two passages Baldensperger, *a. a. O.*, p. 248).

2 See H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.*, II, pp. 16, 93.

3 "ἐν δυνάμει" does not conceal its connection with the Old Testament concept of holiness.

human Jesus the Christ is, according to the synoptic testimony as well as according to Paul, the real relation to a supramundane personal being which for its part stands in the closest relation to God.[1] Whereas, however, the synoptic Jesus of history is connected with the higher being only by a dynamic, albeit in its kind absolutely perfect, relation, according to Paul's view the latter as such, following the divine will as well as its own impulse, for a time relinquished its transcendence and supersensory mode of appearance and entered into lasting union with the human Jesus in such a way that it became the spiritually all-determining and "person-forming" principle in him; this to such an extent that the apostle can speak of the Jesus who has become Christ as acting subject where in reality only the higher self united with him, considered in its pre-existence, comes into question (2 Cor. 8 9; Phil. 2 5 ff.; cf. Col. 1 16. 17), so that the unity of the human and the superhuman person which came to be in time is regarded as pre-temporal identity. As with the synoptic Jesus, so also with the Pauline Jesus, the transcendent principle of messiahship has, on the other side, an essential and original relation to humanity. Whereas, however, according to the synoptic statements in immediate connection with Dan. 7 13–14 a being is presented which is only human-like, but otherwise, according to Old Testament presuppositions, falls under the concept of the angel as a divine mediating hypostasis, even if it is a matter of the highest possible intensification thereof, the pre-existent Christ of Paul is, according to idea and being, already himself human, and the all-surpassing position of this "heavenly human" is explained conversely from his God-likeness, because he archetypally represents the image of God already given in the concept

1 This remains the case, however the question of the relationship of the synoptic conception to the creatureliness (*Geschöpflichkeit*) thought by Paul (1 Cor. 15^{45}) and to the cosmic mediatorial role (1 Cor. 8^{6}; 11^{3}) may be answered. For the Pauline conception cf. H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* II, pp. 77, 83 f.

of the human being (2 Cor. 4 4; cf. Col. 1 15). One may ask wherein this shift of the highest points of view is grounded. If the displacement of the human-likeness (human form of appearance) of the divine being by the God-likeness of the human being is initially the consequence of a return to a well-known, prophetically rooted, later idea of the Old Testament

(Gen. 1 26. 27; Ps. 85. 7), we shall nevertheless not be far wrong if we regard this very return itself, in connection with the displacement of the angel by the human being, as an expression of a Hellenistically determined need of thought on the part of the apostle. The gods of the Hellenes had been potentiated human beings; their conception was gained from that of the human being.[1] Whereas later Palestinian-Jewish theology lets Adam be created only according to the image of the angels,[2] the Hellenistic conception finds no difficulty in placing a pre-existent primal human in the sphere of divine being, as also the ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος (ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος) of Philo shows, who is identical with his Logos.[3] More difficult appears the question how, synoptically on the one hand and Paulinely on the other, the post-temporal being and existence of Christ Jesus relates to the preceding stages. Decisive for the

1 Cf. Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* II, § 273.

2 Weber, *Altsynagogale palästinische Theologie*², pp. 155, 209.

3 Whether, however, the explanation has thereby reached its goal would still have to be investigated. A more far-reaching connection could easily come into consideration, an influence of other Oriental ideas. It is natural to think of the later Iranian *fravashi* conception (cf. on this Cheyne, *Origin of the Psalter*, 1891, pp. 420 f., 449 f.), and it might be asked whether perhaps already in Daniel 7 this element plays a subordinate role. On Philo see *Leg. allegor.* I 12 (Cohn and Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera*, 1896, I, p. 69); *De confusione linguarum* 28 (II, p. 257); Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, 1875, p. 227. Cf. especially also H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* II, pp. 55 f., 84, and Schiele ("Parallels to 1 Cor. 15:45–50" in *Hilgenfelds Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 20 ff.): "The passage 1 Cor. 15:45–50 has no rabbinic parallels, nor any material ones. Thus in 1 Cor. 15 Paul will be indebted to the Greeks" (— through Gamaliel's mediation? p. 31).

determination of both conceptions is the fact of the bodily resurrection of Christ, attested with equal emphasis. How this is to be conceived more precisely is, admittedly, not immediately clear.[1] Closer investigation leads to the recognition that

1 I cannot regard it as proven that Paul allows the earthly corporeality of Jesus — as certainly as it falls under the concept of σάρξ — to fall prey to decay with death (cf. against H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* I, pp. 308 f.; II, p. 78, and Holsten, *Das Evangelium des Paulus* II, 1898, p. 40; Titius, *Der Paulinismus unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit*, 1900, p. 68; Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*, pp. 173, 175). This does not necessarily follow from the generally formulated statements in 1 Cor. 15[42]–43, 50; nor from 1 Cor. 15[4], where only the burial of Christ is attested. Rather, the immediate continuation — *καὶ ὅτι ἐγήγερται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς* — must awaken the thought that, in the case of this dead one, the ordinary process of decay did not occur, and this all the more since the apostle, in appealing to "the Scriptures," evidently has Ps. 16[10] in view alongside Hos. 6[2]: *οὐδὲ δώσεις τὸν ὅσιόν σου ἰδεῖν διαφθοράν*. No

contradiction arises for the Pauline overall conception of the transition into the mode of existence of glory if the basic idea is assumed that what constitutes ensouled materiality in the human being (σάρξ καὶ αἷμα) cannot remain. The only question is in what sense this holds. The coming-into-being of the resurrection body is not conditioned by pure negation of natural corporeality, but by a simultaneously negative and positive process of transformation of it. For this, however, Paul knows two forms: decay and transformation (1 Cor. 15[42], 51, 52; 1 Thess. 4[17] — the interpretation of the latter passage by Teichmann, *Die paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und Gericht*, 1896, pp. 35 f., requires an unworkable conception). In the one case, as in the other, the newly formative pneumatic life-power is operative, which is of heavenly origin (1 Cor. 15[44]–49; cf. 2 Cor. 5[1]–5) and dwells in the Christ-believer from the beginning (cf. Rom. 8[11]). Whereas in the former case the emergence of the new is bound up with a natural elimination, in the latter case it takes place in such a way that the natural body is "swallowed up" by the suddenly intensified pneumatic life-principle, thereby altered in its essence and in this way transferred into a higher form of existence (1 Cor. 15[53]–54; 2 Cor. 5[4]). Whether such a conception can be maintained scientifically is not a decisive question (cf. also Schmiedel in *Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*[2] II, p. 201 f.). If now Christ, according to Paul, rose on the third day, then it is accordingly presupposed that his dead body — sanctified throughout life by the Spirit and not defiled by any sin — did not undergo decay in the grave, but experienced a transformation: a process through which the transformation of the bodies of living believers at the Parousia has been prepared. We are led also by inference to the assumption of a real connection between the earthly-psychical body and the resurrection body of Christ, and this both on the basis of the conception already attested in 1 Thess. 5[23] (*ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα — τηρηθείη*), and in accordance with the hope still expressed in the Epistle to the Philippians (3[21]: *ὃς μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*). Corporeality thus appears as an integrating element in the concept of the human individual, which is why the identity of the person before and after the resurrection (or transfiguration) is co-determined by a connection between the natural and the pneumatic body. Under these circumstances there can be no talk of a principled opposition between the Pauline conception of the fate of Christ's slain body and that of the synoptic writers (Mark 16[6]; Matt. 28[6]; Luke 24[3]–6; Acts 2[27], 31; 13[35]–37). With regard to Luke 24[30], 39–43; Acts 10[41] cf. Gen. 18[8]. Concerning the presuppositions given for the synoptic-primitive Christian mode of representation cf. H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* I, pp. 307, 359 f.

here as there the being and life of Christ after death are conceived in continuity with the totality of the factors given on earth in the person of the Messiah Jesus, that in the post-existent state, bodily as well as spiritually, the full human being of history has attained the higher mode of existence. Whereas, however, the assumption of the concretely realized human personal life, mediated in earthly history, into the sphere and mode of being of the self-revealing God himself constitutes, according to the synoptic conception, something absolutely new, according to the Pauline presuppositions one can speak of such only relatively, insofar namely as in the risen

and exalted one it is the ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, the heavenly, God-like primal human, who has permanently appropriated the factor of earthly-human being by the path of spiritualization. One will not say too much if one allows the image of the post-existent Christ, in comparison with that of the pre-existent one, to have "experienced an inestimable enrichment through the traits of the human Jesus."[1] If, however, in that metamorphosis into pure spirituality one thinks only of the definitive removal of the character of "nationality and legality," and sets the post-existent Christ over against the pre-existent one, as a mere representative of the "idea of humanity of God in general (ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος) and

1 H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* II, p. 87.

of the plan of salvation in particular (Christ, 1 Cor. 10 4)," in such a way that the former "at the same time takes up the yield of a human life through which he has passed into the image of his existence, which thereby becomes truly personal," that he thus "becomes the ancestor of the humanity of the Spirit that has entered into history,"[1] then, in view of what has been shown, the connection between the being of the post-existent one and the bodily aspect of the being of the historical Christ is not accorded that degree of reality which it possesses in the conception of the apostle. It is not probable that the same one who so strongly emphasizes the conservative moment of somatology with regard to the glorified body of believers in Christ should have assigned to this moment a lesser significance with regard to the Redeemer himself.[2]

If now, with the fourth Evangelist, Jesus bears witness to himself as ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (see above pp. 46–50), then it cannot be doubtful that the identically worded synoptic designation is taken up and its idea incorporated into the new circle of thought. Of the world-judge in the synoptic *Son of Man* (Mark 8 38; 13 26; 14 62; Matt. 10 23; 13 41; 16 27–28; 19 28; 24 27, 30, 37, 39, 44; 25 13, 31; 26 64; Luke 9 26; 11 30; 12 8, 40; 17 24, 26, 30; 18 8; 21 27, 36; 22 69) there is recalled, according to what has been set forth, John 9 35 and indirectly 5 27[3]. But if thereby the danielic-apocalyptic foundation of the synoptic designation is gone back to, this nevertheless occurs only because from here a bridge could be struck to a higher standpoint of contemplation. The "Son of Man" is,

1 H. Holtzmann II, 78; 86 f.

2 That, despite 2 Cor. 5:16, he repeatedly recalls the natural descent of Christ as a salvation-historically important presupposition (Rom. 1:3; 9:5), and that he hopes for a transfiguring transformation of the whole creation analogous to the bodily redemption of the children of God, from its nature subject to transience into spiritual being (Rom. 8:19–28), should at least be touched upon. One may also compare the significance which even Philo ascribed to the body for the development of human spiritual life. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, p. 236.

3 Cf. also H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* II, 428.

according to the evidence of the discussed passages, with the author of the Fourth Gospel the one who, originally spiritually pre-existent in heaven, as the light of human beings (12 34–36), has come down from heaven for the revelation of the mysteries of life of the kingdom of God and returns there for the purpose of completing the communication of eternal life to the world and of demonstrating his pneumatic-supra-earthly being as the source of life. With the idea here given of descent and becoming-human — as will be shown more closely later — we obtain a thought that shows similarity with the Indian Avatāra-conception. The “Son of Man” who has truly become human in Jesus is, according to the fourth Evangelist, originally neither a human-like angelic being (Daniel; Synoptics), nor a heavenly (god-like) primal human (Paul), briefly said: no intermediate being, but a human-like divine being; ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is, in other words, here a designation of the second person in God (of the “θεός” who from the beginning was πρὸς τὸν θεόν, 1 1), — a designation that meaningfully expresses the relation of this person to creation and revelation, especially also to redemption (on this later!).

If, however, accordingly, Jesus as “the Son of Man” is now no longer to be brought, whether into dynamic or into personal unity, with a highest created mediating being, but rather in his person God himself presents his bodily humanized being without intermediary, then an outlook has been reached that coincides only with that of the Prologue, whose Logos become flesh in Jesus is not, like the Logos of Philo, an intermediate being, but from the beginning God (divine being, “second mode of the being of God”[1] one might say, if the notion of person allowed this) with God: ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. How strongly, however, on the other hand, the Evangelist, corresponding to the designation ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,

1 Cf. H. Holtzmann II, 465.

at the same time brings into force in the person of the historical Christ the full, real humanity of Jesus, how decisively he therefore grasps the concept of the God-man, although he does not yet express it with a special word, this too is shown here by what is reported concerning the appearance of the post-existent and glorified one. Chapter 20, which presents to us the risen one (vv. 14–18) and the glorified one (v. 19 ff.), confirms not only the pneumatocentric basic conception of the entire Gospel (through the emphatically concluding demand for a Christ-faith independent of sensory proofs, vv. 17, 29)[1], but on the other side just as much preserves the physical moment of the human personality. Although it cannot be something indispensable for the faith of the disciples, if it is of the right kind, it nevertheless becomes for them comfort and joy that they may convince themselves not merely of the bodily resurrection of their Lord in general, but of the continuation of his slain body itself evidently given in and with the glorification (v. 20, to be compared with Luke 24 39: ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει καθὼς ἐμὲ θεωρεῖτε ἔχοντα; and Matt. 28 9). Reference is to be made back to the fact that the Evangelist conceives the resurrection of Christ as self-revivification and precisely in the restoration of the temple of the body by the slain one himself sees the climax and all-decisive conclusion of his self-testimony through wonders (see above pp. 6, 11). If therefore for this narrator the glory of the “Son of Man” in post-existence is insofar the same as that in

pre-existence, in that already the pre-existent as Logos is θεός[2], yet, insofar as the post-existent remains God-man in the full extent of the concept (i.e. even including the factor of corporeality), something new also enters here,

1 H. Holtzmann II, 490.

2 “In contrast to Phil. 2:9; Heb. 2:7–9; 12:2, however, this glory does not now appear as a new one; it is brought not so much under the aspect of enhancement as rather under that of restoration.” H. Holtzmann II, 455.

and thereby the truly historical character of the revelation is honored and firmly maintained[1]. With this final opposition to docetic presuppositions, despite all contrary appearance in detail, the Fourth Gospel too is secured the significance of a pure and normative testimony of primitive Christianity (in the broader sense).[2]

Not essentially different from what precedes is also the result of the examination of the sense in which Jesus calls himself “the Son of God” or simply “the Son.” To be sure, everywhere the fundamental idea is retained, attaching itself to the Old Testament concept of the Son of God, that he is the Messiah. In this historically given sense he is designated already at the first encounter also by Nathanael (1:49), later by Martha (11:27), as the υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. Here too the author of the Fourth Gospel stands on the shoulders of the synoptic narrators. “The Son of God” is for him throughout the envoy of God[3]: just as the prophets, just as the Baptist (1:6, 3:28) as divine envoys to Israel, so he, by divine commission and divine authority, is to turn to the world with his professional activity. That, however, even with this classification in the category of envoys, that is, of servants of God, “the Son of God” is not to be assigned to a sphere different from that of “the Son of Man,” is shown immediately by the first passage in which

1 Against the docetizing presentation of Reville (*Le quatrième évangile*, p. 294 f.) and others.

2 It rests on a misunderstanding of this character of our Gospel when Fries (*Det fjärde Evangeliet och Hebreerevangeliet*, 1898) adds to Delff’s excisions also those of 20:19–29, because the purely bodily character of the resurrection that is supposed to emerge here contradicts the spirit of the Gospel. Cf. on this A. Meyer in *Theologische Rundschau* II, p. 337.

3 On the “sending” of the Messiah as the “Son,” i.e. as the one uniquely beloved by God, who is made both executor and sovereign participant in the plan of salvation, cf. Mark 12:6; Matt. 21:37; Luke 20:13. Otherwise, the Messiah sent (coming) by God is characterized synoptically as the prophet, but also as the king.

we encounter that designation in the mouth of Jesus himself: 3:16–18, by virtue of its connection with vv. 13–15. The peculiar significance of υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ lies not merely in his being sent by God, whose purpose is the salvation of the world, but ultimately in his special relation of essence to God; in the fact that he is the μονογενής of God. With this conception one is immediately and explicitly referred back to the exposition of the Prologue (1:14, 18; cf. 1 John 4:9). If the Christ Jesus who has come from God is the "only" Son of God, then he is to be defined more precisely as the "begotten" one; that is to say: he stands, according to his essence, uniquely close to God and is accordingly loved and valued by God in a unique way[1]; only as such can he be that revealer of the divine essence of love as which he confesses himself in 3:16 (cf. 1:14; 16–18). It is clear that this formulation of the relation of essence includes the idea of the super-earthly, heavenly, eternal, which we have gained with the parallel designation ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. In the context of 3:13–18, in statements of like content, the one designation replaces the other. The μονογενὴς θεός of 1:18[2], however, leaves no doubt that "the Son of God" is conceived by the Evangelist himself as a "divine being." Only it does not follow from this that the notion of being begotten is applied to the higher being of Christ Jesus as such[3]. Prior to the fact that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, the Evangelist has no occasion

1 On μονογενής = *unique* in Parmenides (of being), Plato, and Cornutus (of the world), see Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos*, 1872, p. 67; Anathon Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der christlichen Litteratur*, 1899, p. 120 f.

2 On the reading as well as the sense cf. H. Holtzmann, *Comm.*², p. 39 f.; Harnack in *ZThK* II, pp. 215–217; B. Weiss (*Komm.* 1893), p. 75 f.

3 One should note how Wisdom 7:22 attributes to the essence (more precisely: the πνεῦμα) of Wisdom, as the principle of creation and redemption, the predicate μονογενές ("which will thus essentially mean: unique"; Zöckler, *Die Apokryphen des A. T.*, 1891, p. 373). Cf. also Baidensperger, *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, 1898, p. 33, n. 5.

to speak of a begotten one from the Father[1]. The mystery of the higher origin of Jesus lies in the divine personal being which he determines as the Logos. With the concept of λόγος (that is, of the self-revealing God) and the formal temporal determination ἐν ἀρχῇ (1:1–2), which makes the being in question god-like eternal, the "pre-existent Christ" is on the one hand brought into dependence on God (πρὸς τὸν θεόν), while on the other hand he is lifted absolutely above the entire realm of what has come to be, thus also of what is begotten, as the one who is with God from the beginning (cf. ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, 1 John 1:1). No different state of affairs results from the expression: God has "given" or "sent" his only-begotten Son (3:16, 17; cf. 1 John 4:9, 10, 11)[2]. Just as the Logos in himself is not Son, so in himself he is also not capable of suffering and dying, and does not move within finite forms of intuition (conceptions of time and space, etc.): of both one can speak only indirectly, that is, on the basis of the incarnation. Important in this respect is also the reference to the merely simile-value of the expression μονογενής in its application to the incarnate Logos (1:14: ὡς μονογενοῦς: as of an only-begotten one). The same

two-sidedness of the concept, as it is presented in 3:16–18, we observe in the remaining cases in which Jesus designates himself as the Son of God or the Son. From the unity with God given with the Logos-being it is explained, according to 5:19–26 alone, that “the Son” has been sent into the world with the professional task and dignity proper to him as Messiah, and that he shows himself, in his salvific activity encompassing not only the spiritual but also the bodily side of human nature, as well as in his indirectly judicial function, as an independent source of life for humanity. Precisely upon the fact that he is already in himself, by virtue of his essential connection with God, an independent source of life, is also founded the assurance in

1 Cf. Th. Zahn, *Einleitung in das N. T.*² II, pp. 536 f.

2 See also H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* II, pp. 440 f.

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6:40 that “the Son” has been sent into the world as mediator of eternal (spiritual and bodily) life for human beings (as the bread from heaven, vv. 32, 35, 41, 42). In agreement with this, 8:35–36 also teaches: the power of the “Son” that forever frees human beings (initially members of the Old Testament theocracy) from the slavery of sinful perversity of will and knowledge is not to be understood simply from the fact that he, as Messiah (7:40 ff.), is an envoy of God (8:23, 26, 29, 42), but ultimately only from the fact of the unity of the pre-existent one with God in essence and will (v. 42), by which at the same time eternal duration is guaranteed to the salvific efficacy proceeding from the “Son.” When then in 10:36 Jesus, in order to justify his claim to the name Son of God, expressly brings out the difference between himself and the prophets, the circumstance that he has been sanctified and sent into the world by God as his Father[1], thus in a unique way, he thereby does not intend merely the confirmation of his messiahship (v. 24), but, as the reference in this context to the life-giving power exercised by him also shows (vv. 27–30), at the same time the attestation of the unity of his essence with that of God. Also in 11:4 Jesus calls himself, as Messiah, the Son of God, as the parallel 9:3–4 (τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντος ἡμᾶς, respectively πέμψαντός με) makes clear, but he remains distinctly on the expounded, all-surpassing height of self-consciousness when, being on the point of acting as organ (v. 41) of the life-creating (death-overcoming) omnipotence of God, he presents himself as mediator and bearer of the divine glory and includes his own glorification in the ultimate purpose of the world (cf. 5:23). After all this, however, it is also the Messiah who, as the “Son,” according to 14:13, with the exaltation enters into the position of power and dignity corresponding to his essential and original unity with God, and who, as the “Son” of his heavenly Father[2], according to 17:1, knows that he was with God before the world and before time

1 On ὁ πατήρ and ὁ πατήρ μου cf. H. Holtzmann II, 434.

2 With *ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* cf. 11:41; 6:32.

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and returns after death into the state and possession of his supra-worldly glory. In the same sense as Jesus himself the Evangelist lets the Baptist speak of the “Son of God.” The statement

of the latter in 1:34 can be correctly understood only in connection with vv. 26–33 (cf. 3:31). According to this, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ is the Messiah who suffers (for the world) and who (primarily) renews Israel with the Holy Spirit, who according to his essence is supra-worldly, eternally pre-existent[1]. If, however, according to 3:35–36, the Son distinguishes himself from all other envoys of God (v. 34) by the fact that he is, in an absolute sense, the object of divine love and the free and all-decisive organ of the divine work of salvation, then comparison with 1:33 shows that at the same time his Logos-being comes into play. Also in the understanding of the Jews the self-designation in question of Jesus has the meaning of the messiah who is god-like in the metaphysical sense (as in 5:18; 10:33), when they base upon it in 19:7 the accusation of blasphemy. Finally, however, the Evangelist himself assures in 20:31 that the Messiah (ὁ Χριστός) Jesus has convincingly shown himself to those willing to believe as the "Son of God" in the sense of 3:16; 5:26; 6:40.

An intermediate stage between the synoptic concept of the Son of God as the one to whom the messianic royal dignity belongs—just as certainly as he is reliably conscious that in him, as the sole member of the people of God, the revelationally religious-ethical ideal of life, the perfect communion with God (loving obedience toward God and God's good pleasure), and thereby the idea of revelation itself, is realized from the beginning[2]—and the sonship of God of Jesus according to the Fourth Gospel is first formed by the Pauline formulation. According to this, the sonship of God of Christ,

1 Cf., however, the reading ὁ ἐκλεκτός (instead of ὁ υἱός) according to א Syr. Cur.: (Th. Zahn and) Nestle (*Einführung in das griechische N. T.*², p. 235).

2 Proof by detailed exegetical discussion does not appear indispensable here. On the significance that the saying Matt. 11:25–27 = Luke 10:21–22 has for the concept in question, see H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* I, pp. 272 ff.

which has reached its completed realization with the resurrection, is already given in principle before the world, in that the ground of his being is the πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης (Rom. 1:4). As this conception, by reverting to the idea of the heavenly spirit-man as highest intermediate being (see above, p. 68), points beyond the theocratic concept, so also with the moment of ἁγιωσύνη: to the "Son of God" there is thereby attributed—in the highest possible intensification of the concept—the same essence according to which, in later times, the angels were named (the קדושים, ἅγιοι simply, Job 5:1; 15:15; Zech. 14:5; Ps. 89:6, 8; Dan. 4:14; Tob. 8:15; Sir. 45:2). If Paul otherwise adheres to the messianic-historical concept of sonship, to the idea that the Son of God is the Davidide announced by prophecy (Rom. 1:2–3; 9; 2 Cor. 1:19–20; Gal. 1:6), he nevertheless remains mindful that the Son of God born of a woman was, in his σάρξ, burdened with an alien factor of being that had to be overcome. On the other hand, the designated original, holy-spiritual essence of the heavenly man likewise provides a final explanatory ground both for the sonship of God of the Messiah Jesus in general and for the unique relation of love of God to this his "own" Son in particular, conditioned by absolute valuation (cf. Rom. 8:3; 5:8, 10; 8:32). Still further than Paul goes the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. In him the idea of

the “Son” of God shows itself in immediate transition from the conception of the intermediate being to that of the divine being. Christ Jesus is the Son of God already in his pre-temporal (2:10) and pre-worldly (personal, 10:5) pre-existence. He is the “first-born” (πρωτότοκος, 1:6), that is, he has existence through God prior to all that is created. Yet he not only precedes all that has come to be as the Eternal (cf. 7:3), and indeed as an eternal spiritual being (9:14), but he also at the same time represents a highest cosmic principle; he is the personal mediating cause both of creation (2:10) and of the preservation of the world (1:3), the one through whom God has made the “world-ages” (1:2), just as to him, as the highest organ of revelation, from eternity there belongs a

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high-priestly mediating determination for humanity (7:3). In figurative language he is therefore designated as the radiance of the glory and the imprint of the being of God[1] 1 3. In accordance with the idea of the firstborn, however, he is also ascribed, together with the determination to rule over all things, a specific exaltedness over the angels, who are entirely in a position of service, 1 2. 28. 1 4 ff. 1 4 (cf. 5 8). Thus even the address as “God,” as the author assumes it in Ps. 45 7, can take place, and indeed legitimately on the basis of Old Testament revelation itself 1 8 [2]. Nor does the statement mean anything else than that God has begotten this divine being as his Son 1 5. The υἱός μου εἶ, like the ἐγώ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε, is merely the expression of the thought that here the conditions of existence are essentially different from those of human beings and angels (as of the totality of created beings): God has finally spoken to his people through one who is “Son” (ἐν υἱῷ 1 2)[3]. “Son” and “begetting” are indispensable images that come closest to the matter itself, where full identity of being, together with the dependence of the existence of one person upon that of another, is to be indicated. Through the nature of the conditioning party (God), under this presupposition the creaturely–temporal moment that inherently lies in the concept of being begotten is negated on the side of the “Son,” according to which the σήμερον is to be understood *sub specie aeternitatis*. Despite everything, it cannot be overlooked that even here the concept of divine being is not yet worked out as definitively as in the Logos-Christ of the Fourth Gospel, although both the mode of expression and the overall conception of the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews are likewise unquestionably connected with Philo’s Logos doctrine.[4] Of particular significance

1 On the expressions ἀπαύγασμα (*radiance?*) and χαρακτήρ (*impressing instrument?*) cf. H. Holtzmann II, 294.

2 No essential restriction of the thought is to be inferred from v. 9 (*ὁ θεός σου*), as comparison of John 20:17 (*θεόν μου*) with 1:1; 20:28 shows.

3 *τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν* (v. 32) does not designate him as a creature.

4 For further detail reference may be made to H. Holtzmann II, 294 f.

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in this respect in particular is that the Son of God Jesus Christ, who after the assumption of a fleshly nature similar to the human (2:14) and the sacrifice of his unblemished bodily life (4:15; 9:14) has become κύριος ἡμῶν (13:20; cf. 2:3; 7:14), although exalted to the right hand of God and become higher than the heavens (7:26), nevertheless does not appear as the judge of the world (cf. rather 10:30–31; 12:23; 13:4), and even more, that he does not rise again by himself (despite his πνεῦμα αἰώνιον, 9:14), but is led up by God from the realm of the dead (13:20). The difference from the Christ of the Fourth Gospel here clearly comes to light (see above, p. 11 on John 5:26), while the repeated inclusion with believers as his brothers in relation to God (2:11, 17; cf. 2:10; 12:5, 7, 8), in view of John 20:17, does not constitute an instance in this direction. Beyond the line of Hebrews, however, strictly speaking the "Deutero-Pauline" theology also does not go, even in the christological statement of Col. 1:13 ff. If here again the view into the essence of the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God becomes a metaphysical contemplation and recognizes in him the image existing before all creation, the alter ego of God, the mediator not only of the creation of the entire visible and invisible world, but also the immanent ground of its existence and development and the highest revealer of the invisible God, indeed also the one upon whom from the beginning the whole creation and revelation are directed, then it indeed gives the appearance that only the name of the Logos is still lacking[1]. With justice the close contact with Philonic conception and manner of speech has also been emphasized here. Yet even if the designation of the risen Son of God as πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν (1:18; cf. Rom. 8:29) leads one to derive from the expression πρωτότοκος only the concept of the first of a

> **1** "The Logos is not yet named." H. Holtzmann II, 245. "In Colossians there is transferred to him what Rom. 11:36 (*ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα*) says of God; but thereby the subordination-relationship of the Son to the Father underlying the whole of Paulinism is displaced and abolished." II, 246.

series (ἀρχή, πρωτεύων), there can hardly be doubt that the same word in the phrase πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως (1:15) is chosen for the same reasons as in Heb. 1:6, that there too a contrast of the ground of existence of the "Son" of God with that of the entire creation is indicated (see above), whereby in all circumstances the thought of a being conditioned by God himself and derived from him remains. That, however, there is indeed contained in this a restriction by which a halt is made before the idea of a divine being after the manner of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel, is proven also here by the explicit tracing back of the resurrection of Christ to an act of the miraculous power of God (Col. 2:12; cf. Eph. 1:20; 2:5–6); in contrast to this, in the Fourth Evangelist's conception of the resurrection as a self-animation (see above, p. 75) lies precisely the decisive proof that he has taken with complete seriousness the concept of the divine being that carries the ground of its life in itself (John 5:26)[1].

The result is that the sense attached in the Fourth Gospel to the designation of Jesus as the υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ (or simply the υἱός) is in the main intelligible only from the conceptions of the Prologue and, in accordance with the overall character of that Gospel, serves solely the purpose of the elaborative confirmation of the thoughts of the Prologue. The principled significance of this idea, to be drawn from the entire preceding investigation into the

Logos idea of the Fourth Evangelist for his presentation of the life of Jesus, is at the same time of such a kind that it also coexists with the consistently expressed conception of the dependence of Christ Jesus on God the Father and his subordination to Him—at least for the writer's own consciousness. It need not be set out here in detail, but rather only recalled, how the Evangelist has precisely in the filial relationship of

> **1** That the conception of the Epistle to the Ephesians rests essentially on the same presuppositions as that of the Epistle to the Colossians need not be further expounded here.

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Jesus to God most closely interwoven the two moments of full identity of essence and the subordination of the former.[1] One has rightly emphasized in this respect the significant concurrence with the saying Matt. 11:27—Luke 10:22.[2] But here, as in other cases, it cannot be a matter of a merely external occasion, of an adaptation of one's own image of Christ to a synoptic datum for the sake of outward harmonization of the evangelical proclamation, however naturally the Fourth Gospel also in this point "does not wish to proclaim another Christ than the earlier Evangelists" and "with awareness aligns itself as closely as possible with the synoptic type." Still less is the relation of subordination predicated of the historical Christ to be regarded as the ground and chief thought of the doctrine of sonship of the Fourth Gospel as such, so that the side of identity of essence would be added merely externally as theological speculation. Rather, the narrator throughout allows to be mirrored in the consciousness of the historical Christ only that relation which, from the beginning, is set in God with his Logos idea.[3] With the relatedness of the Logos–God-being to (πρός) God (τὸν θεόν) indicated in 1:1, a relation of superordination and subordination is already given in itself.

> **1** On the equality of Father and Son (apart from the passages discussed under "Son of God"): 10:30; 17:22 (unity); 10:38; 14:11; 17:21 (mutual indwelling); 10:28–29; 16:10; 17:10 (complete community of possession); on the dependence and subordination of the Son (apart from the large number of passages that designate the Father as sender, giver of commission and authority, and protector of the Son): 20:17 (the Father his God); 14:28 (the Father the greater; cf. 10:29); 26:5 f.; 6:57 (the Father the life-source of the Son); 7:18; 8:49; 11:4; 13:31; 14:13 (the Father as the one to be glorified through the Son); 11:41; 4:34; 5:30, 43; 8:29, 49, 55; 10:17; 18:11; 14:13, 31; 15:10; 18:11 (the Son's voluntary obedience in faith, love, and grateful reverence).
>
> **2** H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.* I, pp. 275 f.; II, 444.
>
> **3** "Just as in the Prologue the Logos is on the one hand himself God, on the other hand God's organ, and just as the Logos concept already earlier in Philo and later in Justin exhibits an equally contradictory duality, so the Johannine Christ appears on the one hand as one with God, on the other hand as subordinate to him." H. Holtzmann II, 435.

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While this relation as such is conceived beyond all real oppositions of finitude and thus beyond all possibility of contradiction, with the entry of the Logos into the sphere of human life and consciousness a differentiation necessarily takes place, according to which the one become flesh must also be, and will to be, what he is according to his divine essence, must affirm through the ethical act of his free will the primordial and fundamentally essential relation of subordination to God and thereby prove himself as the one who he is and ought to be. It is noteworthy how in 17:24, from the consciousness of the historical Christ, the preexistent Christ and thereby indirectly the eternal Logos-being itself is placed in ethical illumination.[1] For the instinctively taut synthesis of opposites, however, which is characteristic of the Evangelist, for his seeing-together of the metaphysical and the ethical side of the relation of essence of the two in themselves absolute (5:26), utterly united persons,[2] it is characteristic that what is valued to the highest degree as the ethical act of will of the Son on the one side presents itself just as decidedly on the other side as inner necessity, as an inability to do otherwise (5:19: οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδέν; 30: οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ ποιεῖν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδέν). How little for the Evangelist a speculative problem arises from this is shown by the circumstance that he evidently strives precisely in the characterization of the filial relation again to set forth the truly human in the essence of his Christ and is convinced that he has illuminated it,[3] just as, on the other hand, no less characteristically, with the distinction of the testimony of the Father from that of the Son (5:32, 37; 8:18; cf. also the "drawing"

> **1** The Son is the one already loved by the Father before time — and this consequence presses itself upon us — and the one who reciprocates this love.
>
> **2** Thus the imitation of the Father's activity that is everywhere carried out in the Son's activity (5:17, 19, 30; 8:28, 38; 14:24) appears as the natural parallel to the complete mirroring of the Father's content of consciousness in that of the Son (1:18; 5:20; 6:46; 7:29; 8:55; 10:15).
>
> **3** The essence and origin of Christ can be recognized only through moral mediation (one's own genuinely human experience) (7:16–18, 28–29); the unity of the Son with the Father is analogous to that which binds believers with him, as with God and with one another (14:20; 17:11, 21–23).

of the Father to the Son 6:44, 45), he maintains the "immediate working of the Father in the world alongside the working of the Son,"[1]—both doubtless not without regard to the opposing consequences of his fundamental conception, as they elsewhere inevitably assert themselves.[2]

If, then, according to what has been shown, the entire Fourth Gospel stands in inner relation to the Logos idea of the Prologue and is governed by it, despite individual features inevitably resulting from the relation of the historical and the theological features that impair the unity of the overall conception[3], is governed by it[4], so in conclusion it is only to be noted that thereby the first result of the investigation, according to which the concepts Life and Light are the hinge-points around which the historical presentation moves, is not nullified but confirmed,

because precisely the common bearer on which these hinge-points hang and around which ultimately everything turns is the concept of the Logos. The proof has already been given with the foregoing discussion.[5] But with this the riddle of the peculiar character of the Fourth Gospel is by no means solved; rather, only the key has been found which, if rightly handled, opens up the required deeper insight into the conditions and facts underlying the origin of this Gospel. The next investigation necessarily concerns the Prologue itself and has to ascertain wherein the basic concepts established therein are rooted, in order thereby to make possible a more exact, historically determined judgment of its nature and its significance.

1 Harnack, *a. a. O.*, p. 209.

2 Corresponding to the sonship-relation grounded in the Logos position is the absence of an inner grounding of Christ's prayer, the pedagogical-demonstrative character of it determined by the purpose of salvation (11:41; cf. 6:11, 23; 9:31; 12:27, 28, 30; 17:13); and corresponding to the moral blamelessness grounded in essential equality with God is the absence of the temptation reported by the Synoptics and of the struggle in Gethsemane. Cf. also H. Holtzmann, *Einleitung in das N. T.*³, p. 444.

3 On the individual points cf. H. Holtzmann, *a. a. O.*, p. 445.

4 That thereby the doubt cast upon the originality of the Prologue — at least in general — proves groundless scarcely needs to be remarked. In view of the confidence with which the excision of the Prologue is occasionally advocated (see e.g. again Soltau in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 1900, p. 248; 1901, pp. 140–149), one should compare Holtzmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes*², p. 27.

5 Cf. Weizsäcker, *Das apostolische Zeitalter*², p. 533; H. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie* II, pp. 399 ff. At the expense of the Logos concept, Immer (*Theologie des N. T.*, 1877, pp. 502 ff.) has treated the concepts of light and life as the main viewpoints of the entire testimony concerning Jesus the Son of God in the Fourth Gospel. H. Köhler (*Von der Welt zum Himmelreich*, 1892) extends the significance of these latter two concepts (together with that of truth) to the actual testimony of the Christ of the Synoptics.

The diversity of the elements in the theological basic conception of the Prologue and their historical presuppositions.

As in the presentation of the fourth Gospel the saving revelation of God in Christ is essentially the self-revelation of Jesus (2 n), so it directs attention in a general introduction, the so-called Prologue1, above all to the explanatory fundamental fact that this personality encloses within itself an incomparable mystery. If the reader is to be able to grasp what is to be narrated in what follows concerning Jesus and his life-work, he must first be made to understand that the hero of the narrative is a being unique of its kind, fundamentally different from all human mediators of the preceding divine history of salvation (cf. 117). Not as though real, genuine human nature were to be denied to him from the outset (8 40); this rather appears as an indispensable factor of the consummating mediatorship of salvation exercised by Jesus (114). But the deepest ground of his being and the ultimate explanation of his existence and activity do not lie in that nature by virtue of which he is related to us; rather he is “God by nature”, before he became the man Jesus and the Christ, and thus from the very beginning stands not merely over against humanity, but also over against all “intermediate beings” between God and man,

> **1** The same holds for the critical objection to the Prologue (elimination of its main part vv. 1–8; 9–18 in Delff and others) as was remarked above, p. 6, with respect to the criticism of 2:1–11, etc.

as absolutely higher. Thus whoever wishes to illuminate the history of the world-redeemer and lead to full faith in him must reach back into prehistory, indeed into eternity. This is done in 11—18, and indeed in such a way that one begins directly with that which was ἐν ἀρχῇ, and the reader is set, in a natural sequence of stages, through the primeval past into the present, from which the Evangelist reports, on the basis of his own experience, concerning the appearance of salvation. The manner of expression and the course of thought in detail, however, are such that the investigation must begin already here.

The Prologue divides into the two unequal parts V. 1—5 and 6—18, of which the former deals with that which preceded the appearance of the revelatory principle in question in the historical person of Christ Jesus. With reference to the exposition given in the Gospel itself we may speak of the pre-existent Christ; for the original being whose revelation in Jesus has come to consummation, the Prologue has only the designation: ὁ λόγος, from a more precise interpretation of which we for the present refrain. The first statements: V. 1. 2 grasp this being initially as it is in itself as a transcendent one. In that pre-worldly eternity, primordial originariness, is ascribed to the Logos (ἐν ἀρχῇ)1, there results first of all so much, that God is

absolutely not to be conceived without the Logos. But when it is at once indicated that it is not a matter of an external relation, a side-by-side, but of an inner belonging together grounded in the essence of both, of a principial and all-sided, living relatedness of the Logos to God himself (πρὸς τὸν θεόν), this further presses toward the explanatory assurance of the third statement, that under the Logos a being of the same kind as God, thus itself a divine being (θεός), is to be conceived. The following evangelical narrative leaves, as has been shown,

> **1** At first, quite simply, *pre-worldliness* is meant (on account of the unmistakable reference to Gen. 1:1, to be compared with Prov. 8:23: *πρὸ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι*); in the background, however, stands the idea of eternity as such, as it is given with the concept of divinity.

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no doubt that this is to be understood in the sense of an actual, independent personal being. The by no means tautological second verse emphatically confirms the indicated relation of the statements of the first; it emphasizes: only as such a divine being could the Logos be from the beginning, and indeed, with God1. To this determination of essence V. 3—5 attach an instruction concerning the pre-Christian activity and the mediate appearance given therein (φαίνει V. 5) of the Logos, and indeed in such a way that thereby further light falls upon the essence itself. It is established in the first place that the existence of the world in all its parts is to be explained from the activity of the Logos. With the additional negative turn, that not even one of the things that have come into being has any other originator than the Logos2, every dualism of a world-explanation which sets any creative intermediate being (angel, demiurge) over against the Logos3 is expressly rejected, while the thought of an eternal matter appears already disposed of by the demonstrated fundamental presupposition of the concluding series in V. 1. 2 4. From creation the consideration immediately passes over to revelation, in that at the same time a renewed glance into the essence of the Logos itself serves to make known the manner of his activity in general and the inner connection of the twofold activity.

> **1** Weizsäcker: “And the Word was God; in such a way it was in the beginning with God.”

> **2** A “non-thought” arises with the reading — *ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν ὃ γέγονεν* — only if one construes the words in the way still most recently done by Hilgenfeld (*Zeitschr.* 1899, p. 634). Against the separation of the words (also demanded by Loisy in the *Revue d’histoire et de littérature religieuses* 1897) cf. Holtzmann² *z. St.*

> **3** Cf. Siegfried, *Philo v. Alex.*, p. 342. Baidensperger (*Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums* 1898, p. 8) in particular still assumes a relation to the Baptist as an alleged “direct emanation of God — *δύναμις θεοῦ*” (cf. v. 8).

> **4** A conclusion drawn from the expression *ἐγένετο* (Reville, *La doctrine du Logos dans le quatrième évangile* 1881, pp. 65, 72 f.) is not justified (cf. e.g. Heb. 1:18, but especially John 17:24: *καταβολῆς κόσμου* — this also against Reville’s inference from the choice of the expression *κόσμος*, *a. a. O.*). H. Holtzmann judges more cautiously in the

Commentary and *Neutest. Theol.* II, p. 381. Cf. also O. Holtzmann, *Das Johannesevangelium*, p. 81.

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In the Logos, says the author, “was life, and the life was the light of men”. The backward reference to what immediately precedes is unmistakable: if there were not “life” in the Logos himself, how could he be the one through whom the world was created, with which after all a sum of living beings is given? But the Evangelist does not remain at this thought. Rather, the concept of life in its mysterious depth and fullness becomes for him the means of introducing the reader into the actual sanctuary of the Logos’ activity, into the realm of the revelation which sets human beings into conscious, living connection with God. Given the unsurpassable compactness and brevity of the expression, we must more divine and guess the individual members of the chain of thought of the 4th verse; in the main, however, the determination of the intended sense will hardly encounter any insurmountable difficulty. The words will say something like the following (cf. above p. 31): this creative Logos was not only, according to his entire being, the possessor of an inexhaustible fullness of power of self-preservation and self-communication (cf. 5 26), but also, by virtue of his self-communicating activity, the highest and most universal cause of the preservation, the development, and the growth of the individual beings created by him and of their kinds. In the capacity of such a continually life-creating (life-preserving and awakening) power, the Logos appears as a cosmic source of light (as world-sun; cf. as counterpart the christological statements 8 12. 9 5. 12 46) 1. The life-power radiating from him, however, reveals its essence most perfectly in the human world. It proves itself to be the light of men in the highest sense, inasmuch as it discloses to human beings their essence and their destiny, as well as the means and the way to the attainment of the goal, and at the same time grants them, with the stimulation and enabling for the knowledge of divine truth,

1 This general thought forms the not explicitly emerging foundation of the more specific one of v. 4b. One should note the significance already accorded in Gen. 1, at creation, to the light first brought forth by the creative word for the emergence of life.

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also impulse and power for the moral appropriation of the same. A moral-religious illumination of this kind took place in the pre-Christian period: the imperfect ἦν reaches back to the beginnings of humanity and comprehends the entire Old Testament history of revelation within itself; law and prophecy in Israel were Logos-revelation (cf. 117; 12 38 and above p. 23), the effect of the Logos-light showed itself in fathers of primeval time and patriarchs, in the pious among the seed of Abraham (cf. 8 33 ff.), but also in God-seeking, God-fearing Gentiles and proselytes (cf. 12 20 ff.) 1. If now this light of Logos-revelation had been a perfect one, if it had been the “true” one, there would have been no need of that which dawned upon the world in Christ Jesus. The inadequacy of that revelation explains itself on the one hand from its mediate character and the resulting dimming of the light, and on the other hand from the circumstance highlighted in the concluding 5th verse: from the historically arisen, but from earliest time existing condition of

humanity. This is designated as darkness (σκοτία) in a double sense: partly it was from the beginning difficult for human beings to open themselves to the light of divine truth (cf. I John 2 8: ἡ σκοτία παράγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει:) 2, partly the human will, in its bondage to nature, has often and much offered an insuperable resistance to the higher principle. As he expresses this thought, a natural parallel obtrudes itself involuntarily upon the Evangelist. In nature the light does not appear without the opposition of darkness (καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει) 3. As here the sunlight

1 A kind of gnostic parallel is offered especially by the Valentinian doctrine of the Pneumatics. Cf. Moeller, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*², p. 157. See, however, below!

2 The *σκοτία* recedes in the measure in which, according to John 3:21, those who “do the truth” “come to the light”; *ἀλήθεια* is here, of course, relative (in contrast to *φῶς*). Human beings oriented toward the truth — living, as it were, in twilight — are inclined to let themselves be illumined by the full truth (in Christ) and in this light to examine themselves.

3 When Reville (*a. a. O.* p. 69) finds in this sentence “*une vérité générale de l’ordre spéculatif*,” this stands in connection with his Philonizing interpretation of v. 3 (see above).

has to struggle with the darkness of night, so from of old the light of the Logos has had to struggle with the darkening of estrangement from God, of sin (cf. 8 12. 21) in human beings; as daylight, after it has penetrated into the nocturnal darkness, is again and again driven out by it, so sinful humanity in general has from of old again and again withdrawn its inner being from the rays of Logos-revelation. ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν: the darkened human beings were (in their generality) neither willing nor able (cf. still later the exception of the granting of authority by Christ — ἐξουσία — V. 12) to seize and hold fast that light, i.e. to take it into themselves and allow it to work in them permanently and thoroughly 1. The mystical viewing-together in this connection of thoughts receives its correction in the Gospel itself: it cannot be the intention of the writer to comprehend the opposition of spiritual darkness and illumination in an all-dominating natural causal nexus. That for him natural darkness, just like natural light, is a work of the Logos, is beyond doubt (already in view of Gen. 1 2. 3. Isa. 45 7). But expressly, in contrast to this, the spiritual hostility to light of human beings is explained as a god-opposing self-assertion carried out by virtue of their freedom (3 19. 20) 2. Alongside this, the category of those who are “from God” (8 47; cf. 1 13 2), insofar as they have not destroyed their moral ground of being, the original kinship with God and the natural sense of obligation toward God, and are therefore inclined to follow divine impulses, also bears indirect witness, even for the stage of pre-Christian revelation, to the effectiveness of individual freedom 3.

1 According to Baidensperger (*a. a. O.* p. 12), one should “not think of unbelieving human beings in *σκοτία*, but of the satanic, God-hostile world. There is an allusion to a

theologoumenon taken over from Judaism concerning the struggle of the Messiah (Logos) with Satan."

2 This fact of freedom and guilt (cf. v. 18) is not altered even by the demonological background shown in 8:44.

3 That *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι* is an ethical concept, a designation of direction of will, is shown by the equivalent *ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι* (18:37) and *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* (3:21). That, however, the human will by itself does not suffice for appropriation of salvation, that the final condition and decisive cause is to be seen in the drawing power of divine influence, is the other side of the Evangelist's conception (cf. 6:44 f.). However much this seems to lie in the direction of "determinism" (H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, p. 491 ff.), on closer inspection there exists only the complementary relation of the correlate: according to 18:37, everyone who is of the truth hears the voice of Christ (in the sense of believing perception, as 5:25; 6:60; 8:43, 47; 10:16, 27), is therefore, precisely as such, drawn by the Father. Even the determinism of 12:39 transcends itself in the same proportion in which the thought includes a reproach against those who have fallen into unbelief (vv. 37, 38).

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But insofar as indeed, in the present mystical parallel, the appearance of a certain approximation to the presuppositions of a metaphysical-ethical dualism is hardly to be overlooked1, it should not be overlooked how easily and involuntarily in fact the darkness in question of the human spiritual world, in its total effect, produces the impression of a power of nature 2.

With the thought of the 5th verse, there is now already also a transition to the main consideration as offered by the more extensive second part of the Prologue. Everything so far is to serve to prepare the understanding of the essence and the necessity of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. From V. 6 onward the discussion turns to this. The statement about the condition and behavior of human beings receives at first a confirmation through what is said by way of introduction in 6—8 about John 3. The more glorious, decisive, and indispensable the new, immediate appearance of the "light" was, the more powerful on the other hand

1 O. Pfleiderer (*Das Urchristenthum* 1887, pp. 751 f.) seems to me to strain the polarity too strongly; likewise Reville (*Le quatrième évangile*, pp. 202 f.). From the findings in Philo and the Gnostics no decisive conclusion can be drawn.

2 Cf. also v. Schrenck, *Die johanneische Anschauung vom "Leben"* 1898, pp. 126–129.

3 Worth noting is the illumination of the relationship of the Baptist to the Logos in Baidensperger (*Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*). The conclusion regarding the polemical-apologetic purpose of the Evangelist can only be examined in a later investigation. For the present I refer to the relevant statement of Titius (*Die johanneische Anschauung unter dem Gesichtspunkte der Seligkeit* 1900, p. VI) and to Wrede in *Gott.*

G.A. 1900, pp. 1–26 (also A. Meyer in *Theol. Rundschau* 1899, p. 339, and Reville in *Revue de l'histoire des religions* XI [1899], p. 137 f., and *Le quatrième évangile* 1901, p. 112).

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the resistance of spiritual darkness in the human world, which experience allowed precisely now to be expected, the more easily is understood the divine arrangement of the appearance of a special forerunner and witness of the "light" in the person of John. He was to counteract from the outset the inattentiveness of dullness, prejudice, and the slanderous inclination of the multitude, and to work toward the goal that as many as possible might come to faith in the light. It was an unhappy error when he was himself held by some for the light, in whose service he stood, when the mere human being (V. 6) was confused with the one who is essentially God (V. 1). At the point of time immediately before his "coming", the pair of verses 9.10 now introduces this latter, in order, with the history of his entrance into the circle of humanity, to demonstrate once again and yet more emphatically the truth of the picture drawn of it (V. 5). At precisely the same time in which John bore his prophetic "testimony to the light", the true light (τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν cf. I John 2 8), i.e. the Logos in his consummate revelation (in contrast to the imperfect one of the entire preceding world-age), — the light which alone and exclusively truly and genuinely enlightens every human being ("whoever at all is enlightened") (spoken from the standpoint of the Evangelist's present) —, was already also in the process of coming into the world (namely the human world cf. V. 10), i.e. of appearing among human beings in accordance with his mission 1. He, the Logos in person, was already present

1 "In any case, *ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* always refers to the appearance of the latter (the Messiah) on the earthly stage, in the human world, not to the human birth, which rather appears independently alongside (18:37)." H. Holtzmann *z. St.* Cf. B. Weiss. Baidensperger (*a. a. O.* p. 10) most recently again refers *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* to the activity of the Logos from creation up to the incarnation; *ἦν* (v. 10) is also to refer to this. Against this (apart from the Evangelist's usage) speaks especially the fact that v. 9 would then be basically only a repetition of v. 4b (and similarly v. 10 in relation to v. 5).

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in the human world1; but although this indeed owes its existence to him himself, it nevertheless did not in fact recognize him — not even on the testimony of John: ἐγὼ βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι· μέσος ὑμῶν στήκει, ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε, ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος (1 26. 27). The tragic fate, heavily burdening humanity, of misrecognition and rejection which struck the Logos who had entered into its sphere of life from the very first moment, generates the one fundamental tone of the following evangelical narrative; with the lament over this fact there begins at once the next Prologue section (11—13), which advances to the illumination of the epoch opened with the messianic appearance of the Logos and thereby to the positive side of the overall consideration, to the other evangelical fundamental tone, the jubilant praise of the grace of God. "Into his own possession he came, and his own did not receive him"; the coming (ἦλθε) corresponds to the coming, i.e. vocational appearance, of the forerunner (ἦλθεν V. 7); the non-reception signifies

non-recognition as Logos-Messiah, as Lord (owner) and Redeemer; with the conception of the relation of ownership the behavior of the world is characterized as denial of the true natural right and sense of piety 2. Passing from the generality hereupon (V. 12) to the exceptions (ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν), the Evangelist designates, concisely, the work of salvation accomplished by the one who appeared, according to the testimony of experience3, in individual human beings, as a transfer into

1 The subject of *ἦν* in v. 10 receives its closer determination through the following masculine *αὐτόν*.

2 For the correctness of the interpretation of *τὰ ἴδια* as "the personal creature, the human world," H. Holtzmann has also spoken out (contrary to the more recent customary reference to the Jewish people) in the second edition of his Commentary. Cf. especially also Weizsäcker, *Apostolisches Zeitalter*², p. 520. Particular attention should be drawn to 10:16 (*καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα ἔχω, ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς αὐλῆς ταύτης*).

3 *ἔλαβον* in the same aoristic sense as the preceding *παρέλαβον*.

the status of divine sonship, not without expressly emphasizing the condition on the side of the recipients of salvation. Faith in the name of the one who appeared is that by means of which the reception of the latter is effected; the same faith is thus the indispensable presupposition for the transition into divine sonship 1. It applies to the person in his expressly vocational character, to the divine commission and the divine dignity which the person in question claims for himself and with regard to which he legitimates himself (2 23) 2. This condition of salvation, however, at the same time casts light upon the good of salvation itself, upon the essence of the divine sonship in question — a point which in the following verse likewise receives its subsequent elucidation. In contrast to the act of natural procreation conditioned by the material nature of human sensory and instinctual life, it is a matter of the bringing forth of spiritual life in the human being through a (free) act of God (as counterpart to a human begetter — ἀνδρός 13). A new ethical principle of life is released in the human being. Thereby precisely the effect of the true light already indicated in V. 9 comes to consummation: the τέκνα θεοῦ are υἱοὶ φωτός (12 36). The more exclusively, however, in that image of begetting by God (cf. I Pet. 1 3. 23) the divine causality comes to the fore in relation to the human being, the more important becomes the supplementary turn in V. 12, according to which by the one in whom the true light has appeared the believing ones are granted the "authority" to enter into the status of children toward God. By this ἐξουσία, according to the consistent usage of language in the Gospel, is meant equally the authorization (the valid claim) and the power for the appropriation of the named privilege. As certainly now, however, as the one moment of this conception recalls the juridical concept of adoptio in Paul (Rom. 8 15. Gal. 4 5), so certainly does the other favor

1 The present *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν* stands because faith is conceived as continuing beyond the moment of receiving (*ἔλαβον*).

2 This *ὄνομα* is only hinted at, not concluded, in the designation Jesus Christ (1:17). The Logos-name (O. Holtzmann) is not meant, because reference is made to the revelation in Jesus.

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more the mystical mode of conception. The power to obtain with God the right of sonship in his house (cf. 8 35 f.) accrues to the believing ones insofar as they take into themselves the one who presents himself as the Son of God without qualification, and indeed in such a way that they are spiritually united with him (cf. 6 47 f. 56. 14 20. 15 4. 17 23). The immediate consequence of this real being-one-with is the altered position toward God, which is meant by the designation τέκνα θεοῦ 1. From this it further follows that the ὄνομα of the mediator essentially has his divine sonship as its content, thus that which is immediately highlighted — 14 — and discloses the ultimate explanatory ground for the salvation in Christ described in the final section of the Prologue (cf. 3 18. 20 31) 2.

1 It presses itself upon us that divine sonship, in the sense of the Evangelist, designates a relationship not attainable prior to the appearance of Christ, thus not attainable within Old Testament revelation in general. The Old Testament pious stand under the *νόμος* (v. 17); the pre-Mosaic ones do not come particularly into consideration: that they represent the oldest stage of the *νόμος* is shown explicitly by 7:22; in the person of Jesus Christ a specifically higher principle of light and life is revealed. In 11:52 the expression *τέκνα θεοῦ* is proleptic.

2 As with vv. 9, 10, so also with vv. 11–13 Baidensperger's interpretation (pp. 13 ff.) must be rejected for linguistic and material reasons. It is not possible here to go into every detail. V. 11 is supposed to be a résumé of all individual conceptions of the continual coming and going of the invisible Messiah, the *Logos ἄσαρκος*, in the history of the patriarchs and of Israel. The Prologue, however, knows rather only of *one* coming of the Logos as the "true light" (in comparison with which even the revelatory light given in the Baptist was not yet the right one, v. 8), namely that which is initiated with the *sarkosis* (vv. 9, 14). Before this the Logos is with God (v. 2) and from there shares his life as principle of light (v. 4). Nor does the following Gospel itself yield any other presupposition. Still less than with *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* (v. 9) is it permissible with *ἦλθεν* to think of repeated past action: the *ἦλθεν* of the Baptist (v. 7), thus a once-for-all event, is the parallel. Against this, all the allegory and typology of Old Testament Scripture- and history-interpretation found in Paul and elsewhere cannot prevail, however much the Fourth Evangelist may otherwise have been initiated into it. In v. 12 *ἔλαβον αὐτόν* is to refer to the God-trust of the pious of earlier times turning toward the Logos, and specifically to the hospitable reception of the Messiah by Abraham (Gen. 18). By receiving the Logos, those mentioned became *τέκνα θεοῦ*, insofar as the patriarchs (— only these are spoken of here —) stood in an intimate, mystical relationship to the Messiah, so that in their actions and words they were recognized as his organs. This is said to be the case to such a degree that their individualities at times appeared, as it were, merely as transparencies of the pre-existent one. "Therefore," however, the divine

sonship of these Old Testament pious ones is “no personal achievement,” but in fact a pure gift of the Logos (*ἔδωκεν — ἐξουσίαν*), as v. 13 of the Prologue moreover also indicates that the divine sonship of the patriarchs was already grounded with their birth, insofar as “the whole natural process of generation in those birth narratives of the Old Testament is, according to our author, an empty, powerless schema, the Logos being the only effective power.” “It is at least not excluded that the Evangelist, as with Isaac, so also with the birth of the other patriarchs believed in a similar mediation of the Logos” (pp. 23 ff.). The questionable nature of the generalizing application of isolated features of the Abraham narrative to “the other patriarchs,” or to the pious fathers of the people, as well as the fatal lack of clarity of the concept of divine sonship as the Evangelist is supposed to have it, needs no emphasis.

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After 11—13 have now reported on the reversal brought about with the “coming” of the Logos despite the resistance of a world opposed to God, on the emergence of a humanity united with God in its innermost essence, the section 14—18 instructs, in conclusion, concerning the more precise circumstances, as well as concerning the essence and value of this Logos-revelation: the becoming-flesh of the Logos, the unique divine sonship of Christ Jesus in whom he appeared, and the grace and truth of God radiating from him are the principal moments. Verse 14 first brings out, by way of explanation (καί = and indeed cf. V. 16), the mediation of the ἦν of V. 10 and the ἦλθε of V. 11. Precisely because the human being by nature fleshly (sensuous) in constitution (V. 13) was to be transformed into a divine spiritual being, the Logos himself had to “become flesh,” i.e. to enter into the sensibly perceptible, bodily mode of existence of a human personal life1. In this sense he made flesh his temporary dwelling (ἐσκήνωσεν —

1 The anti-docetic thought is even more sharply expressed with the phrase *σὰρξ ἐγένετο* than with *ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα* (1 John 4:2; *ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί* 2 John 7). That with the *sarkosis* one is not thinking merely of the birth itself is rightly emphasized by Baidensperger.

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with a clear, already phonetically emerging allusion to the name and conception of the Old Testament dwelling of God and probably also to the שכינה of Jewish theology: note the immediate emphasis on the δόξα; otherwise cf. 2 19 and Wis. 9 15. II Cor. 5 1. II Pet. 1 13, as well as what is remarked above p. 75 on John 20 20) and thus dwelt among us (ἡμῖν: the Evangelist together with the readers, or with the totality of those who have come to faith — cf. 16 — taken together; not to be interpreted exclusively of eyewitnesses). Only as the one present in the flesh could the Logos bring the life from God to representation with that vividness (ἐθεασάμεθα) of which the humanity situated in darkness stood in need if it was to be won for the truth. The beholding, moreover, is not given with sensuous perception as such1, but with the apprehension of the spiritual processes in the sensuous world, wherein among extraordinary moments not merely the miracle-works come into consideration (cf. 2 23. 4 48 et al.), but in

particular also the suffering of death, which was possible only through the assumption of flesh (6 51): it was not merely at all an ἄνθρωπος that the Logos, whose essence is ζωή, had to become, but a suffering-capable, mortal ἄνθρωπος2. The same σάρξ, which at first appears as covering and hindrance, served to an all the more convincing, because more evident and fully human, effectuation of the supramundane, spiritual principle of salvation. This latter is described in such a way that above all the essence of the mediator is yet more deeply disclosed. As object of the beholding the Evangelist designates the δόξα of the one become flesh. This, according to the context, is to be referred back to the concepts ζωή and φῶς and accordingly to be determined as the manifest possession in fullness of the life and light of God (cf. I John 1 2.

1 *ἐθεασάμεθα* applies to some directly (as eyewitnesses), to others indirectly.

2 In the overcoming of death — as an ethical and physiological power at once — lies, negatively conceived, the total purpose of the Logos-revelation in Christ; the incarnation was the indispensable means thereto. Cf. also 1 John 1:2; 4:9; 3:5, 8 with John 8:44.

John 3 19. 8 12. 9 5. 12 35 f. 46). Only from the perfection of what is given here does the perceived incomparable splendor explain itself. This, however, can be fully understood only if the Logos—God-being also in his becoming-human is the unique object of the love of God, to whom as such, in distinction from all created things, the unrestricted self-communication of God and the absolute likeness to God belong. Thus the author speaks of a δόξα ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός — “as one has who is an only-begotten from the Father” (cf. above p. 78). But just as the human analogy of sonship applied here opens a perspective in the direction of the sonship discussed in V. 12. 13 (over against the τέκνα stands the υἱός), so what follows (to be compared with 3 16) bears witness that in the unfathomable and incomparable love of God for the world1 itself the ultimate ground of the appearance of the (figuratively speaking) only-begotten of God, and in the revelation of that love the ultimate purpose of this appearance, is to be recognized. The δόξα of the personal appearance of the Logos flowed essentially from the fullness (πλήρης; cf. πληρώματος 16) of the demonstration of God’s love, which for the world meant χάρις and ἀλήθεια, i.e. most perfect revelation of the ζωή on the one hand, of the φῶς on the other. The χάρις accordingly includes within itself liberation from sin (as guilt: 1 29. 5 14. 9 41. 11 50. 19 11. 20 23; cf. I John 2 2. 4 10; John 17 19; as impure trait of being: 13 8—10. 15 2; cf. I John 1 7. 9; as enslaving power: 8 36), as well as from death and the devil (3 16. 5 24. 6 39. 50. 8 21. 24. 51 f. 10 28. 11 25 f.; 12 31. 16 11), as the powers hindering and destroying life2, but also manifests itself in particular through enhancement of vital power and performance (4 14. 6 27. 14 12. 15 2), as well as of the joy of life of human beings (3 29. 4 36. 14 27 f. 15 11. 16 20—22. 24. 20 20). Therewith precisely the divine love in the Logos become flesh becomes a revelation

1 On *κόσμος* 3:16 cf. O. Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum*, p. 746.

2 Concerning the difficulty of an “organic incorporation” of the concept of reconciliation into the total conception corresponding to the Prologue, cf. H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II, pp. 474 ff.

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which brings human beings to adequate knowledge of the true essence of God and of his will with the world, to the experience of truth in the highest and most comprehensive sense1. The facts set forth in V. 14 have first received their attestation through the one himself who announced the appearance of the “true light” (7—8) before the bearer of light was personally known to him: what was at that time foretold for the characterization of the coming one, absolutely superior to him in essence and rank, John has expressly and solemnly confirmed with reference to the person of Jesus signified in V. 14 15 (οὗτος ἦν ὃν εἶπον —), and indeed repeatedly (1 26 f. 29 f.; cf. 3 27 ff.) and with appeal to the vision of the δόξα of Jesus corresponding to his own need at the baptism (1 32—34) 2. But just as John

1 It lay in itself close at hand, with the word combination χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας, to think of the Old Testament חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת, and especially to compare the appearance of Yahweh that fell to Moses’ share on Sinai in Ex. 34 (on account of 34 6 and the δόξα of 33 18. 22). But the contrast in v. 17 of the Prologue precisely does not favor this latter combination. Moreover, linguistic usage stands in the way. חֶסֶד is rendered by the LXX not with χάρις, but (almost exclusively) with ἔλεος. The presupposition of a guilt contained in the concept of the showing of mercy is, however, in our passage all the less the main point, since the Evangelist wishes to describe the δόξα of the Logos who has become flesh, that is, of the Logos who has descended to the lowest stage of human existence. Rather, the word χάρις is intentionally used, because it designates the disposition and manner of action of the one who reveals himself as such that produces joy (χαρά) (cf. χαρίζομαι, χαρίεις and Philo *de ebriet.* 36; see also Teichmüller, *Gesch. des Begriffs der Parusie* 1873, pp. 27–29). Significantly enough, the narrator opens the series of Christ’s “signs” with a miracle serving to heighten human festive joy, not with a healing of the sick! אֱמֶת moreover says, in its connection with חֶסֶד: faithfulness (for חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת, LXX: ἔλεος καὶ ἀλήθεια), whereas the meaning “truthfulness” decisively recedes (cf. Dillmann, *altt. Theol.* p. 270). The Evangelist, by contrast, connects ἀλήθεια here (as elsewhere) with the concept of the alone essential and archetypal Being of the heavenly spiritual world of God. That this concept, however, is not taken from the Old Testament is obvious. Cf. O. Holtzmann a. a. O. p. 85.

2 According to Baidensperger, ἐμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν should lie “entirely in the temporal sphere” (pp. 42 ff.), referring to the activity of the Logos in the history of the Old Testament covenant people. Rather, the close connection of 1 27 and 30 already shows clearly enough that what is at issue is a difference with respect to the being and worth of the personality.

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already recognized and bore witness to the unique divine glory of the Logos become flesh, so the Evangelist together with all who have come to faith since John confesses that through him they have come into the enjoyment of an inexhaustible fullness of grace 16, and thereby into the possession of a salvation infinitely higher and more valuable than the Old Testament one mediated by Moses: for over against the law given through the latter, whose essence is divine demand upon the human being on the basis of an imperfect revelation of the essence of God bound to the earthly (cf. 4 21. 23), stands the revelation of grace that has come through Jesus Christ (personally mediated and realized) as divine gift on the basis of perfect disclosure of the essence of God (ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια 17) 1. But just as surely as Jesus Christ has opened to humanity the view into the innermost essence of the invisible God, just so surely must he in the indicated sense be θεός (V. 1) and μονογενής (V. 14): God-being (alter ego of God) and uniquely beloved of God2, for only as such can he also be the unique knower of God, the intimate of God (ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός3; — cf., with the child whom the father presses to his heart, more remotely: the table-companion who lies at the bosom — ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ — of the other: 13 23. 25. 21 20), the one who has expounded (ἐξηγήσατο), as mystagogue made known, what is in God (18).

1 The rendering among “older witnesses”: “its (the law’s) truth has come through Jesus” (cf. e.g. Nestle, *Einführung in das griech. N. T.*² p. 234 f.) rests on an old misunderstanding. When Baidensperger (pp. 48 ff.) draws the νόμος of Moses itself into the revelation of χάρις—contrary to the illumination of the νόμος of the Jews throughout the entire Gospel (one may simply refer here to H. Holtzmann, *N. Th.* II 362 ff. 367. 388)—there results here a fatal consequence of the misunderstanding of vv. 9 ff. (of the alleged translation of the patriarchs, etc., into sonship of God through the Logos asarkos) and of the corresponding interpretation of πλήρης v. 14 and πλήρωμα v. 16.

2 More still than the good manuscript attestation (cf. Zahn, *Einleitung in das N. T.*² II 546), the overall line of thought of the Prologue speaks for the reading μονογενὴς θεός.

3 H. Holtzmann: “The divine being that has returned into the bosom of the Father and abides there” (cf. Harnack a. a. O. p. 215); probably more correct is Baidensperger p. 54 f.

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That now the individual constituent elements of the conceptual world of this introduction to the evangelical narrative are not throughout of the same origin has in general long since been recognized and demonstrated more or less convincingly. If this view is confirmed, then, given the fundamental significance of the Prologue, conclusions naturally result which are of importance for answering the question concerning the origin of the entire Gospel. Understandably, investigation has hitherto directed itself quite predominantly to the basic concept characteristic of the Prologue, that of the Logos. It cannot escape the reader that the writer himself, when he speaks of the Logos, begins with a theological conceptual term that according to his own presupposition is in some way already familiar, and no doubt can prevail that such familiarity was present in anyone who had occupied himself to some extent with the teaching and writings of the Alexandrian Philo. This above all suggests the question whether the Evangelist composed his Prologue with any relation to the distinctive and significant Logos-speculation of this Jewish philosopher of religion, and, if this is to be affirmed, in what manner he appropriated his views. In order to gain clarity on this matter, we shall do well first to obtain a general orientation by means of an overview of the principal Philonic "parallels" to the entire fourth Gospel. Even in this broadening of the horizon, given the state of affairs, the Logos-doctrine of the Alexandrian will come into consideration quite predominantly. For the present, a definition of the Philonic Logos is to be set aside. Given the difference between this Logos and the evangelical one, it follows of itself that the concept of parallels must be conceived with considerable breadth 1.

> **1** I give what pressed itself upon me in the reading of Philo; the lack of a concordance I felt painfully. The delimitation of the material to be drawn upon naturally remains in many respects subjectively conditioned. One may also compare Reville, *Le Logos d'après Philon d'Alexandrie* 1877; *La doctrine du Logos dans le quatrième évangile et dans les œuvres de Philon* 1881; and *Le quatrième évangile, son origine et sa valeur historique* 1901, p. 84 ff.

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Philonic Parallels to the Prologue.

v. 1:
ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος·

We find in Philo that the Logos is quite straightforwardly called ἀρχή: καὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὄνομα θεοῦ καὶ λόγος — προσαγορεύεται (conf. lingu. 28. II 257 CW)1. But even if he is the beginning, he is nevertheless not the primordial beginning, not ἀρχή absolutely, because he himself has his origin in God: God is ἡ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου λόγου πηγή (qu. det. pot. ins. 22. I 277 CW). The meaning of ἀρχή belongs to the Logos in relation to the world; thus the τέλειος λόγος is expressly designated as ἀρχὴ γενέσεως τοῦ τε κατὰ τὰς ἰδέας νοῦ τεταγμένου καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς ἰδέας τεταγμένης νοητῆς — αἰσθήσεως (leg. alleg. I 8. I 65 f. CW). As such he is called ὁ

πρεσβύτατος τοῦ ὄντος (sc. God's) λόγος (profu. 20. I 562 M) and is more closely characterized as ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν γένεσιν εἰληφότων (migr. Abr. 1. II 269 CW), who is ὑπεράνω παντὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πρεσβύτατος (leg. alleg. III 61. I 151 CW) [line 15] and thus in particular also τῶν νοητῶν ἅπαξαπάντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος (profu. 19. I 561 M), respectively ἀγγέλων πρεσβύτατος (conf. lingu. 28. II 257 CW). But with respect to the entire world he not only has the [line 19] greater primordiality that conditions the existence of the latter in advance, but also differs from it through another kind of becoming, which corresponds to his differently constituted essence: οὔτε ἀγένητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὤν, οὔτε γενητὸς ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων (qu. rer. div. h. 42. III 47 CW)2. In this sense he is the πρωτόγονος of God: ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτοῦ θεῖος λόγος

1 I cite according to the edition of Cohn and Wendland (CW)—so far as it has appeared; otherwise according to Mangey (M).

2 Cf. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* III, 2[3], pp. 371, 374.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 106, l. 15: III 133 CW (to *profu.* 20); l. 19: III 132 CW (to *profu.* 19).

(somn. I 37. III 251 CW; conf. lingu. 28. II 257 CW; agric. 12. II 106 CW); τοῦτον μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτατον υἱὸν ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἀνέτειλε πατήρ, ὃν ἑτέρῳ-θι πρωτόγονον ὠνόμασε (conf. lingu. 14. II 241 CW)1. The more unproblematically, to be sure, the attribute of the Logos used with preference, πρεσβύτατος, is also applied to the two fundamental powers of the being of the Godhead2, insofar as the notion of time recedes behind that of the degree of perfection, the more understandable it is that the Logos, despite his having come into being, is nevertheless also called ἀΐδιος: λόγος δὲ ὁ ἀΐδιος θεοῦ τοῦ αἰωνίου τὸ ὀχυρώτατον καὶ βεβαιότατον ἔρεισμα τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν (plant. 2. II 135 CW; ibid. 5. II 137 CW)3.

ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν·

[line 13] The principal passage for the comparison is profu. 19 (I 561 M): ὁ δ' ὑπεράνω τούτων λόγος θεῖος εἰς ὁρατὴν οὐκ ἦλθεν ἰδέαν, ἅτε μηδενὶ τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν ἐμφερὴς ὤν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς εἰκὼν ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, τῶν νοητῶν ἅπαξαπάντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος, ὁ ἐγγυτάτω, [line 17] μηδενὸς ὄντος μεθορίου διαστήματος, τοῦ μόνου ὃ ἐστιν ἀψευδῶς ἀφιδρυμένος. With the essence of the Logos as the most spiritual it is accordingly given that he is the image of God and as such stands closest to God. In the concept of εἰκών there thus lies essentially the moment of the immediacy of the relationship to God, of the closest belonging together with him4. In the

1 Cf. also Drummond, *Philo Judaeus* 1888, II 185 f., and Zeller p. 374: "Son of God" alone would not yet contain this distinction, since God is the Father of all, and all human beings are to be sons of God; Philo therefore calls the L. the elder, the world the younger "Son of God." On the νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ as the κόσμος αἰσθητός in contrast to the κόσμος νοητός (= Logos), see *qu.* D. s. imm. 6, II 63 CW. More precisely, moreover, it is not stated how the peculiar coming-into-being of the Logos is to be conceived.

2 *Abrah.* 24, II 19 M.: αἱ πρεσβύταται καὶ ἐγγύτατα!, τοῦ ὄντος δυνάμεις (cf. ὑπὸ δυεῖν τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων, *sacrific.* Ab. 15, I 225 f. CW); of God himself—figuratively—said: παντὸς ἑτέρου φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀρχετύπου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀνώτερον (*somn.* I 13, III 221 CW); οὐκοῦν ὁ θεὸς [line 35] ἐστὶν ἡ πρεσβυτάτη [πηγή]·—τὸν γὰρ ξύμπαντα τοῦτον κόσμον ὥμβρησε (*profu.* 36, I 575 M).

3 *Conf. lingu.* 28 Wendland reads τῆς ἀειδοῦς (not ἀϊδίου) εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ (II 257). Cf., apart from this, Zeller a. a. O. p. 374, n. 1.

4 The Logos is “the one immediate expression of the divine nature, not of course an adequate expression, but one which leaves no higher term to mediate between it and God. All other things are an expression of Thought, but Thought is an expression of God alone.—God can have no nearer resemblance than the Thought, which is the direct offspring of his causality and embraces the entire scheme of things” (Drummond a. a. O. II 189).

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 107, l. 13: III 132 CW (to *profu.* 19); l. 17 f.: Wendland ἐφόρμησις instead of ἀφορμ.; l. 35 f.: III 152 CW (to *profu.* 36).

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property thereby signified of the most immediate and most perfect self-representation of the being of God, the Logos is, however, already conceived as the originating cause of the world and as the principle of revelation: λόγος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ, δι’ οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο (monar. II 5. II 225 M); — δύο λόγους, ἕνα μὲν ἀρχέτυπον —<τὸν>— ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ἕτερον δὲ μίμημα τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχοντα* καλεῖ δὲ Μωυσῆς τὸν μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰκόνα θεοῦ, τὸν δὲ καθ’ ἡμᾶς τῆς εἰκόνος ἐκμαγεῖον (qu. rer. div. h. 48. III 52 CW)1; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήπω ἱκανοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες νομίζεσθαι γεγόναμεν, ἀλλὰ τοι τῆς ἀειδοῦς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, λόγου τοῦ ἱερωτάτου· θεοῦ γὰρ εἰκὼν λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτατος (conf. lingu. 28. II 257 CW); καθάπερ γὰρ τὴν ἀνθήλιον αὐγὴν ὡς ἥλιον οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν ὁρῶσιν — , οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα, τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὡς αὐτὸν κατανοοῦσιν (somn. I 41. III 255 f. CW). If in the latter passage the Logos is more precisely conceived, in comparison with the Godhead itself, as the reflected radiance of the sun, which is not as dazzling as the sun itself, this comes into contact with the image used elsewhere of the shadow2: σκιά θεοῦ δὲ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει· αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκιά καὶ τὸ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον (leg. alleg. III 31. I 134 CW)3.

θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (cf. 10:34—36 and see above p. 20 f.).

On Gen. 31:13 (“ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθείς σοί ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ”) Philo remarks: ὁ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν, οἱ δ’ ἐν καταχρήσει λεγόμενοι πλείους· διὸ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος ἐν τῷ παρόντι τὸν μὲν ἀληθεία

1 Similarly the νοῦς, in the sense of the Logos, is called an ἀπεικόνισμα of God (*qu. rer. div. h.* a. a. O.); cf. τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον (as ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα of the human νοῦς, *spec. leg.* III 37, II 333 M).

2 Drummond: “the same idea (as εἰκών θεοῦ) under another figure” (II 190).

3 Cf. Hatch, *Griechentum und Christentum* 1892, p. 186.

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θεὸν τοῦ ἄρθρου μεμήνυκεν εἰπών “ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεός”, τὸν δ’ ἐν καταχρήσει χωρὶς ἄρθρου φάσκων “ὁ ὀφθείς σοί ἐν τόπῳ”, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ μόνον “θεοῦ”, καλεῖ δὲ θεὸν τὸν πρεσβύτατον αὐτοῦ νῦν· λόγον — (somn. I 39. III 253 f. CW). That, according to this interpretation grounded in Scripture, the designation of the Logos as θεός (without article!), indeed incompatible with the unity of God and therefore improper, is a makeshift serving the imperfection of common human knowledge, is shown by a discussion on Deut. 6:13: (those who say that they swear by God must be regarded as godless, since they cannot have discriminating knowledge concerning the divine nature) ἀλλ’ ἀγαπητόν, ἐὰν -<κατά>- τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ δυνηθῶμεν (namely, to swear), ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ ἑρμηνέως λόγου· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν ἀτελῶν ἂν εἴη θεός, τῶν δὲ σοφῶν καὶ τελείων ὁ πρῶτος (leg. alleg. III 73. I 159 CW)1. Thus the expression saying the same thing is intelligible in the words referring to Gen. 1:27 (“ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ”): θνητὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεόν, ὅς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος (fragm. [ex Euseb. praep. ev. VII 13] II 625 M). At bottom, to be sure, the statement: ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπεράνω παντός ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ γενικότατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε (leg. alleg. III 61. I 151 CW) comes out to the same thought, in such a way, indeed, that at the same time the character of the intermediate being comes more distinctly into play. This intermediate position is repeatedly expressly attested: τῷ — πρεσβυτάτῳ λόγῳ δωρεὰν ἔδωκεν ἑξαίρετον ὁ τὰ ὅλα γεννήσας πατήρ, ἵνα μεθόριος στὰς τὸ γενόμενον διακρίνῃ τοῦ πεποιηκότος (qu. rer. div. h. 42. III 47 CW); the πατήρ λόγων ἱερῶν, i.e. the Logos symbolized by the high priest2, is μεθόριός τις θεοῦ -<καὶ ἀνθρώπου>-

1 “The Logos may be spoken of as ‘a God in relation to our inferior perceptions. Philo however very rarely avails himself of this privilege, and never without Scriptural warrant’” (Drummond II 195 f.). On ὁ πρῶτος (God himself) cf.: ὁ κόσμος οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ πρῶτος θεός, ἀλλ’ ἔργον τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμπάντων πατρός (*Abrah.* 16, II 12 M).

2 Cf. Drummond II 217.

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φύσις, τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττων, ἀνθρώπου δὲ κρείττων (somn. II 28. III 289 CW).

v. 3:

πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν

The Logos is the instrument of God’s creation of the world (on monar. II 5; leg. alleg. III 31 see above): ὁ θεὸς αἴτιον, οὐκ ὄργανον, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον δι’ ὀργάνου μὲν, ὑπὸ δὲ αἰτίου, πάντως γίνεται· — εὑρήσεις γὰρ αἴτιον μὲν αὐτοῦ (of the κόσμος) τὸν θεὸν ὑφ’ οὗ γέγονεν, ὕλην δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν συνεκράθη, ὄργανον δὲ λόγον θεοῦ δι’ οὗ κατεσκευάσθη (Cherub. 35. I

199–200 CW); ἐκοσμοπλάστει χρησάμενος ὀργάνῳ τούτῳ (migr. Abr. 1. II 269 CW; cf. qu. D. s. imm. 12. II 69 CW: ᾧ καὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰργάζετο; leg. alleg. I 9. I 66 CW, etc.).

v. 4:

ἐν αὐτῷ ζωή ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωή ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων

See here (as also on v. 9) the exposition on the concepts ζωή and φῶς in Philo further below1.

1 In v. 5 (cf. the parallel v. 10) what is said of the darkness has wrongly been interpreted as referring to matter and its resistance (see especially Reville, *la doctrine du Logos dans le 4. évang.* p. 69 ff.). Philo does indeed also conceive the state of matter, among other things, as darkness: τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας, καὶ ἐξ ἀποίων ποιότητας, καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ὁμοιότητας, καὶ ἐξ ἑτεροτήτων αὐτότητας, καὶ ἐξ ἀκοινώνητων καὶ ἀναρμόστων κοινωνίας καὶ ἁρμονίας, καὶ ἐκ μὲν ἀνισότητος ἰσότητα, ἐκ δὲ σκότους φῶς ἐργασάμενος (*creat. princ.* 7, II 367 M). But there was no actual struggle of matter as the “principe opposé à Dieu et au Logos” (as indeed Reville p. 71 f. offers no proof). One should recall the significant description in *opif. mund.* 9 (I 10 f. CW): μετὰ δὲ τὴν νοητοῦ φωτὸς ἀνάλαμψιν, ὃ πρὸ ἡλίου γέγονεν, ὑπεχώρει τὸ ἀντίπαλον σκότος, διατειχίζοντος ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ καὶ διεστάντος θεοῦ τοῦ τὰς ἐναντιότητας εὖ εἰδότος καὶ τὴν ἐκ φύσεως αὐτῶν διαμάχην. Whereas the Evangelist thinks of active resistance (see above p. 93 f.), Philonic matter, as the παθητικόν αἴτιον, offers only passive resistance. Added to this is that in the Prologue verse in question it is a dark principle in the world, not before the coming-into-being of the world, and chiefly a principle of an ethical kind, not a physical one (the σκοτία rules the κόσμος, i.e. the human world, of v. 10): both exclude bringing in Philonic matter. That, moreover, the assumption of eternal matter in particular is already opposed by the thought in John 1:2, see above on v. 3 (p. 91).

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v. 11:

εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν·

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν οἰκειοῦται (is related) θείῳ Λόγῳ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς (opif. mu. 51. I 51 CW; cf. the exposition on the Logos as the μέσος τύπος between God and man, man as μίμημα of this τύπος, in qu. rer. div. h. 48. III 52 CW; and on the visits of angels, i.e. divine thoughts — λόγοι θεῖοι —, which also come to those still corrupted, defiled, in spirit, somn. 23. III 236 CW).

καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον·

Μένει μὲν· γάρ ἐστιν ὅτε, καταμένει δ’ οὐκ εἰσάπαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῖν1. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἄλογος ἢ ἄψυχός ἐστιν, ὡς μηδέποτε ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀρίστου μήθ’ ἑκὼν μήτ’ ἄκων λαβεῖν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἐξαγίστοις ἐπιποτάται πολλάκις αἰφνίδιος ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασία, συλλαβεῖν δ’ αὐτὴν καὶ φυλάξαι παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἀδυνατοῦσιν (gigant. 5. II 45 f. CW).

v. 12:

ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν

Philo speaks of two opposed classes of men: the souls of those who have philosophized truly (ἀνόθως φιλοσοφησάντων), who swim out of the stream into which they have been placed through bodily life and soar up to their place of origin — heaven —, and the souls of other men, ὅσοι σοφίας ἠλόγησαν, ἐκδόντες ἀστάτοις καὶ τυχηροῖς πράγμασιν ἑαυτούς, who are swallowed by the stream (gigant. 3. II 44 CW). That the θεῖος λόγος is effective in this is shown by the related passage qu. D. s. imm. 37 (II 93 CW): the contrast of the classes of men is here represented on the one hand in the γήινος Ἐδώμ and in Balaam as γῆς θρέμμα, οὐκ οὐρανοῦ βλάστημα, on the other hand in those who ascend on the οὐράνιος καὶ βασιλικὴ ὁδός, οἷς ἔθος συνομαρτεῖν ὀρθῷ καὶ πεπηγότι δρῷ καὶ λόγῳ.

> 1 What is meant is the πνεῦμα of God. On the relation of the Spirit to the Logos, however, cf. Drummond II 216 f. (“that the Spirit is here ontologically the same as the Logos”).

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The latter the θεῖος λόγος promotes; to the former he stands in the way as a hindrance1. This already also leads to the parallels for

ἐδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι·

The Logos makes the spiritual (as the physical) being of man receptive to life-giving stimulation: ὁ γὰρ σκοτεινὸς μήτραν ἑκάστων, τοῦ μὲν νοῦ πρὸς τὰς νοητὰς καταλήψεις (etc.), ἀόρατος καὶ σπερματικός καὶ τεχνικός καὶ θεῖός ἐστι λόγος (qu. rer. div. h. 24. III 28 CW); he is the author of moral fruitfulness: ὁ σπερματικός καὶ γεννητικός τῶν καλῶν λόγος ὀρθός (leg. alleg. III 51. I 146 CW)2. The concept of sonship of God, despite the strong emphasis on the kinship with God grounded in the spiritual being of natural man, under the influence of the Old Testament conception, is applied only to those who are truly pious and righteous. Noteworthy above all is the exposition connected with Deut. 14:1; 32:18; 6: καν μὴδέπω μέντοι τυγχάνῃ τις ἀξιόχρεως ὢν υἱὸς θεοῦ προσαγορεύεσθαι, σπουδαζέτω κοσμεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν πρωτόγονον αὐτοῦ λόγον —· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήπω ἱκανοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες νομίζεσθαι γεγόναμεν, ἀλλὰ τοι τῆς ἀειδοῦς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, λόγου τοῦ ἱερωτάτου (conf. lingu. 28. II 257 CW). Those who know God as the one Creator and Father of the universe are υἱοὶ θεοῦ προσαγορεύονται δεόντως (ibid. p. 256 CW). Whoever, like the wise Abraham, is God’s friend, he alone is εὐγενής, as an adopted son of God: ἅτε θεὸν ἐπιγεγραμμένον πατέρα καὶ γεγονὼς εἰσποιητὸς αὐτῷ μόνος υἱός (sobr. 11. II 226 CW). The moment of special divine regard in the sonship in question is emphasized

> **1** More precisely, the Logos is conceived as working negatively here: freeing from evil, God himself positively (cf. *leg. alleg.* III 62–63, I 152 f. CW). The adducing of the διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη from *leg. alleg.* I 12 (I 69 CW) by Aall (*Geschichte der Logosidee in der christl. Litteratur* 1899, p. 118) is misleading, because the οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος there is the human being in the primal state (Zeller III²³ p. 397).

2 That the Logos in this respect is only the organ of God is shown by other statements; thus *leg. alleg.* I 63 (I 153 CW):—θεοῦ τοῦ μόνου δυναμένου τὰς ψυχῶν μήτρας ἀνοίγνυναι καὶ σπείρειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀρετάς καὶ ποιεῖν ἐγκύμονας καὶ τικτούσας τὰ καλά, and I 13 (I 69 CW).

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when, with reference to Deut. 14:1, it is said: οἱ τὸ ἀρεστόν τῇ φύσει (what is pleasing to nature) δρώντες καὶ τὸ καλὸν υἱοί εἰσι τοῦ θεοῦ, δηλονότι προνοίας καὶ κηδεμονίας ἀξιωθησόμενοι τῆς ὡς ἐκ πατρός (sacrificant. 11. II 260 M).

v. 14:

Concerning ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο in relation to the Philonic doctrine of the Logos and concerning μονογενής see below (in the discussion of the concept of incarnation). Parallels to πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας see below (end of the first part); likewise to ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ v. 16.

v. 16:
καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος

Διὰ τὰς πρώτας αἰεὶ χάριτας, πρὶν κορεσθέντας ἐξυβρίσαι τοὺς λαχόντας, ἐπισχὼν καὶ ταμιευσάμενος εἰσαῦθις ἑτέρας ἀντ’ ἐκείνων καὶ τρίτας ἀντὶ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ ἀεὶ νέας ἀντὶ παλαιοτέρων, τότε μὲν διαφερούσας, τότε δ’ αὐτὰς τὰς αὐτάς, ἐπιδίδωσι (namely, God; poster. Cain 43. II 32 CW).

v. 17:
ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωυσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο·

The substance of the Mosaic law, as the sum of the divine natural and moral law, is the Logos: νόμος δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα ἢ λόγος θεῖος προστάττων ἃ δεῖ καὶ ἀπαγορεύων ἃ μὴ χρὴ (Deut. 33:3 r); εἰ τοίνυν λόγος μὲν ἐστὶ θεῖος ὁ νόμος, ποιεῖ δ’ ὁ ἀστεῖος τὸν νόμον, ποιεῖ πάντως καὶ τὸν λόγον (migr. Abr. 23. II 293 CW); τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν νόμιμον εὐθὺς ἐστὶν αἰώνιον, ἐπεί καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὃς δὴ νόμος ἐστίν, οὐ φθαρτός (ebriet. 35. II 197 CW); ὅσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμου ζῶσιν, ἐλεύθεροι (νόμος δὲ ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος — ὑπ’ ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἄφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθείς (qu. omn. pr. lib. 7. II 452 M)1.

The mediator of that law is a type of the Logos. In Deut. 5:5 the Logos speaks through Moses, as mediator between Creator

1 Cf. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria* 1875, pp. 156, 158 f., 163. Drummond a. a. O. II 165–168, 200, 307–309. Concerning the relation of the positive and the negative valuation of the Law in Philo on the one hand and in the Evangelist on the other, see below (conclusion of the first part).

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and creature and as guarantor of preserving grace: τῷ δὲ ἀρχαγγέλῳ καὶ πρεσβυτάτῳ λόγῳ δωρεὰν ἔδωκεν ὁ τὰ ὅλα γεννήσας πατήρ, ἵνα μεθόριος στὰς τὸ γενόμενον διακρίνῃ τοῦ πεποιηκότος. — ἀγάλλεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ δωρεᾷ καὶ σεμνυνόμενος αὐτὴν ἐκδιηγείται φάσκων “κἀγὼ εἱστήκειν ἀνὰ μέσον κυρίου καὶ ὑμῶν — οὔτε ἀγένητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὤν οὔτε γενητὸς ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων, παρὰ μὲν τῷ φυτεύσαντι πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ μὴ σύμπαν ἀφηνιάσαι ποτέ καὶ ἀποστῆναι τὸ γεγονὸς ἀκοσμίαν ἀντὶ κόσμου ἐλόμενον, παρὰ δὲ τῷ φύντι πρὸς εὐελπιστίαν τοῦ μήποτε τὸν ἴλεω θεὸν περιιδεῖν τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον” (qu. rer. div. h. 42. III 47 CW); as prophetic admonisher, who reminds us of our divine guidances, the Logos speaks through Moses, Deut. 8:2–3: ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ εἰκότως ἐπισεμνυνόμενος ὁ προφήτης λόγος, ὄνομα Μωυσῆς, ἐρεῖ· “μνησθήσῃ πᾶσαν τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν ἤγαγέ σε κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἐρήμῳ —” (congr. erud. gr. 30. III 107 CW; cf. ibid. 24. III 99 CW) 1.

v. 18:

θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε·

For to no one has he shown his nature, but has made it invisible to every kind of being (leg. alleg. III 73. I 159 CW).

ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός·

Cf. the Philonic expressions ὁ ἐγγυτάτω and εἰκὼν θεοῦ discussed above on v. 1.

ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο

The Logos is repeatedly portrayed as interpreter of the divine mystery of being and will: εἰκότως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὀμνύσι κατ’ αὐτοῦ (by God), since one cannot discern anything concerning his nature; but it is acceptable, if we are able -<κατά>- his name (namely, to swear), which is the work of the interpreting Logos; for he would be god for us imperfect beings, but for the wise and perfect the First (leg. alleg. III 73. I 159 CW; see above on θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος v. 1); in order that the soul may hate and turn away from the one, but follow those to which the interpreting Logos of God and prophet leads (qu. D. s. imm. 29. II 86 CW); “ἐγώ εἰμι θεός σου” (Gen. 17!) — for of whom,

1 Cf. Siegfried a. a. O. pp. 194, 264 f.; Drummond I 15 f., II 191 ff., 227 f., 268; Hausrath, *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*² 1875, II 155–166.

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I ask, are you not god (namely, God), of all these things that have come into being? But the prophetic Logos will teach me that he is now not speaking about the world, but about human souls (mut. nom. 3. III 160 CW).

Philonic parallels to the Gospel,
a. concerning Philo’s Logos.

The self-statements of Jesus as well as other utterances about him in the Gospel also touch, in a greater number, more or less closely upon statements of Philo concerning the Logos. They are to be recorded below in a series arranged according to subject-matter points of view.

Jesus, or respectively the Logos of Philo, appears as:

1. heavenly being: 3[13] ("No one has ascended into heaven except the one who descended from heaven"):
and the Logos of God is above the whole world, *leg. alleg.* III 61 (I 151 CW).

2. revealer of the name of God and image of God: 17[6].[26] ("I have manifested your name to the people whom you gave me out of the world — and I made known to them your name and will make it known"); 14[9] ("Whoever has seen me has seen the Father"):
for both beginning and name of God and Logos and the man according to the image and the one who sees, Israel, are designated, *conf. lingu.* 28 (II 257 CW);
"it is acceptable, if we are able to swear by his name," (sc. swear), which was the function of the interpretive Logos, *leg. alleg.* III 73 (I 159 CW).

Concerning the **image of God**, see the parallels to the Prologue v. 1.

3. all-knowing: 1[48] ("before Philip called you, when you were under the fig tree, I saw you"); 2[24] f. ("because he knew all people,

1 τὸ ὄνομα: the fatherly character of God (see Holtzmann, *Hand-Comm.* ad loc.).

2 ὄνομα θεοῦ: the one in whom the essence of God comes to most immediate revelation.

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and because he had no need that anyone should bear witness concerning a human being"); cf. also above p. 43 f.:

thus also the Logos of God is most sharp-sighted, so that he is capable of overseeing all things, *leg. alleg.* III 59 (I 150 CW).

4. all-powerful: 3[35] ("the Father — has given everything into his hand"); cf. 13[3], 17[2] and above p. 45 f.:

— having appointed his upright Logos and first-begotten Son, who will assume the care of this sacred flock (namely, the totality of beings in the world) as a governor acting on behalf of a great king, *agric.* 12 (II 106 CW).

5. unceasingly active (absolute energy): 5[16].[17] ("and for this reason the Jews were persecuting Jesus, because he was doing these things on the Sabbath; but he answered them: 'My Father is working until now, and I also am working'").

The resting from his works spoken of by God in Gen. 2² on the seventh day indicates, according to Philo, only that alongside the activity by which he forms mortal things (τὰ θνητὰ γένη), there stands a higher activity, through which divine things and what is related to the nature of the number seven[1] (ἑβδομάδος φύσει οἰκεῖα) are created (*leg. alleg.* I 6, I 64 CW), from which it follows that there is therefore no pause in divine activity: "God does not cease when he ceases from making, but begins another kind of generation" (*leg. alleg.* I 7, p. 65); "for God never ceases from making" (ibid. I 3, p. 62)[2].

> **1** The number seven is an image of God and signifies in the intelligible world the immutable divine being (τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀπαθές), wherefore God himself is called ὁ ἑστώς (*opif. mund.* 33, 34, I 34 CW; *poster. Cain* 6, II 5 CW; *leg. alleg.* III 12, I 121 CW). Cf. Drummond II 230 ff.
>
> **2** Yet corresponding to the unceasing activity there is an unceasing perfect rest of God, because his being is immutable, neither moving nor moved: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ "σάββατον"—ἑρμηνεύεται δ' ἀνάπαυσις—"θεοῦ" φησὶν εἶναι Μωυσῆς πολλαχοῦ τῆς νομοθεσίας, οὐχὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἁπτόμενος φυσιολογίας ἀναγκαίας—τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀναπαυόμενον, εἰ δεῖ τἀληθές εἰπεῖν, ἔν ἐστιν ὁ θεός—ἀνάπαυλαν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀπραξίαν καλῶν, ἐπειδὴ φύσει δραστήριον τὸ τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον παύλαν οὐδέποτε ἴσχον τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ κάλλιστα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄνευ κακοπαθείας μετὰ πολλῆς εὐμαρείας ἀπονωτάτην ἐνέργειαν·—ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν τρεπόμενα καμάτῳ πέφυκε μεταβάλλειν, ἄτρεπτος δὲ καὶ ἀμετάβλητος ὁ θεός, ἀκμῆς ἂν εἴη φύσει· τὸ δ' ἀσθενείας ἀμέτοχον, κἂν πάντα ποιῇ, δι' αἰῶνος ἀναπαυόμενον οὔποτε λήξει· ὥστε οἰκειότατον μόνῳ θεῷ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι (*Cherub.* 26, I 191 f. CW).

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Thus the conclusion presses itself upon us of its own accord that the same must apply to the Logos, insofar as he corresponds to the idea of the sacred number seven and moves "in accordance with this idea": "Thus he rested on the seventh day from all his works which he had made" (Gen. 2²). "This means the following: God ceases from forming mortal kinds when he begins to make divine things and things proper to the nature of the number seven. And the moral interpretation is this: when the holy Logos according to the number seven comes upon the soul, the six days and whatever mortal things it seems to be doing come to a halt" (*leg. alleg.* I 6, I 64 f. CW).

"This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth, when it came to be" (Gen. 2⁴). "This Logos, moving according to the number seven, is the perfect beginning of generation, both of that intellect ordered according to the ideas (interpretation of 'heaven') and of that intelligible sense ordered according to the ideas, if one may say so (interpretation of 'earth')" (*leg. alleg.* I 8, I 65 f. CW); cf. "the Logos of the number seven," *opif. mu.* 40 (I 41 CW).

Accordingly, Philo finds in Gen. 2⁴ precisely the Logos as the highest principle of creative divine activity signified by the seventh day, the Sabbath[3].

6. eternal: 17[5] (“glorify me — with the glory which I had before the world existed with you”); cf. also p. 41 f.:

The rational soul of the human being is, according to Moses, evidently made the seal of God, whose χαρακτήρ is the eternal Logos, *plant.* 5 (II 137 CW);

and since he is the eternal Logos, he himself is necessarily also imperishable, *conf. lingu.* 11 (II 237 CW); cf. *ebriet.* 35 (II 197 CW).

7. instrument (servant) of God: 12[49] (“the Father himself who sent me has given me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak”); cf. 5[30]; 6[38]; 7[16] f.; 8[28].[38]; 10[18]:

but Jacob calls the angel the servant of God’s Logos (sc. he named him thus), *mut. nom.* 13 (III 173 CW);

1 Cohn: “τουτί corruptum; perhaps ταύτη (scil. τῇ ἐξάδι), τουτί om. Arm., ταυτί Gelenius, τοῦ τι ποιεῖν ⟨παύειν⟩ δοκεῖ (sc. ὁ λόγος) Diels, τοῦ τι ποιεῖν δοκεῖ Wendl.”

2 βιβλίον δὲ εἴρηκε τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐγγράφεσθαι καὶ ἐγχαράττεσθαι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συστάσεις (*leg. alleg.* I 8, I 66 CW).

3 Cf. Siegfried a. a. O. p. 225.

for he receives nothing from anyone (sc. God), but gives, making use of the Logos as a servant of gifts, through whom he also fashioned the world, *qu. D. s. imm.* 12 (II 69 CW).

8. imitator of God: 5[19] (“The Son can do nothing from himself unless he sees the Father doing something”):

“For this one the Father of all caused to rise as his eldest Son, whom elsewhere he named first-begotten, and the one who was begotten, however, imitating the ways of the Father, looking toward those archetypal paradigms, shaped the forms” *conf. lingu.* 14 (II 241 CW).

9. sinless, holy: 8[16] (“Which of you convicts me concerning sin?”; cf. 14[30]; 10[36]; 17[19]):

“For we say that the high priest is not a human being, but a divine Logos, partaking neither in voluntary nor in involuntary injustices” *profu.* 20 (III 133 CW);

“For he is by nature free from and incapable of accepting any sin (the most sacred Logos)” *ibid.* 21 (III 135 CW).

10. having come down from heaven: 3[13] (“— the one who descended from heaven”):

“Since earthly things are dependent upon heavenly things according to a certain natural sympathy, the Logos of the number seven, having begun from above, descended also toward us, making his visitation among mortal kinds” *opif. mu.* 40 (I 41 CW).

11. exclusively author of salvation: 3[17] (“For God did not send the Son into the world in order that he might judge the world, but in order that the world might be saved through him”); cf. 12[47]:

“The logoi of God that descend into the soul of the human being draw it upward with themselves in their ascent, but do not drag it downward in their descent; for neither God nor the divine Logos is a cause of harm. The logoi that come down to human beings stand only in the service of the philanthropy and mercy of God, for the purpose of assistance and alliance, in order that they may restore the soul to life” *somn.* I 23 (III 236 CW); cf. with *profu.* 13 (III 124 CW); *conf. lingu.* 34 (II 262 CW).

12. instructive: 3[2] (“We know that you have come from God as a

teacher”); 13[13] (“You call me the teacher and the lord, and you speak rightly, for I am”); cf. 1[38]; 11[28]; 13[14]; 20[16]; 6[59]; 7[14.28.35]; 8[28]; 14[26]; 18[20].

“For the guardian or father or teacher (sc. the divine Logos, prefigured by the priest in Lev. 14[35]), or whatever one should call the priest, from whom alone it is possible to be admonished and disciplined, has withdrawn far away” *qu. D. s. imm.* 28 (II 84 f. CW);

“And the ascetic (Jacob), ‘having come upon the place’ (Gen. 28[11]) — upon the divine Logos in the middle, who guides to the best things and teaches anew what is appropriate to the circumstances” *somn.* I 12 (III 219 CW).

13. dwelling within human souls: 14[23] (“If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him”):

“So that for those in whom the life of the soul has been held in honor[1], the divine Logos dwells within and walks about” *poster. Cain* 35 (II 27 CW);

“For as long as the divine Logos has not come into our soul as into a kind of hearth, all its deeds are without blame” *qu. D. s. imm.* 28 (II 84 CW);

“For as long as this most sacred Logos lives and is present within the soul, it is impossible for an involuntary turning to descend into it” *profu.* 21 (III 135 CW).

14. punishing by way of conviction, purifying and admonishing, and in this sense judging: 16[8.13] (“And when that one comes, he will convict the world concerning sin and concerning righteousness and concerning judgment — he will guide you into all the truth”); 15[3] (“You are already clean because of the word that I have spoken to you”; cf. 13[10]); 5[22] (“He has

given all judgment to the Son"; cf. 3[17] f.):

"But when the priest truly enters (sc. the divine Logos)[3], conviction

1 What is meant are the ὅσιοι οἳ ζῶσιν ἀψευδῶς (*qu. rer. div. h.* 42, III 46 CW).

2 Here in the first instance of the Spirit representing Christ (v. 7: πέμψω αὐτὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς; v. 14: ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται); but cf. on the relation between the Logos and θεοῦ πνεῦμα in Philo: Drummond II 214–217.

3 The Logos is here, with reference to Lev. 14:30 f., compared to the priest who examines a house for leprosy.

comes upon us like a most pure ray of light; at that moment we recognize the counsels lying within us that are not acceptable to the soul, and the reprehensible and culpable deeds to which we had committed ourselves through ignorance of what is beneficial. All these, therefore, the consecrated conviction commands to be removed as defilements and stripped away, so that it may behold the dwelling of the soul pure, and, if any diseases have arisen within it, may heal them" *qu. D. s. imm.* 28 (II 85 CW);

"For then truly the ailments of the soul become not merely difficult to cure, but completely incurable, when, upon the arrival of conviction — and the Logos is divine, an angel who guides the feet and lifts what lies in the way so that we may walk without stumbling along the broad road — we place our unexamined judgments before the guidance of that Logos, which he is accustomed continually to exercise for admonition and discipline and for the correction of the whole of life" *qu. D. s. imm.* 37 (II 93 CW);

"And punishing with moderation and gentleness, since he is benevolent (sc. God), he will correct sins by sending into the mind the disciplinary conviction, his own Logos, through which, having reproved and rebuked it concerning the things in which it had erred, he will heal it" *qu. det. pot. ins.* 40 (I 291 CW);

"Therefore it is worthy to pray that the high priest may live within the soul at the same time as king, a judging conviction (sc. the most sacred Logos)" *profu.* 21 (III 135 CW).

Cf. "toward those (sc. those who have banished law and justice), he would never come at all, were it not for the sake of convicting those who choose shameful things instead of noble ones" *gigant.* 5 (II 46 CW).

"It is commanded to the priest and prophet Logos to 'set the soul before God,' with head uncovered (Num. 5[18]), that is, stripped bare in its principal doctrine and with the opinion it has employed laid bare, so that, judged by the most exact sight of the impartial God, either the puffed-up irony, a counterfeit coin, may be convicted, or, being free from all evil, it may wash

away the accusations against itself, having made use of the only witness able to see the naked soul" *Cherub.* 5 (I 174 CW).

1 The subject here is τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεῦμα.

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15. high-priestly mediator: 17[19] ("and for their sake I sanctify myself"):[1]

"For there are, as it seems, two sanctuaries of God: one is this world, in which the high priest is his first-begotten divine Logos; the other is the rational soul, of which the priest is the human being who is truly so,[2] not a perceptible imitation, but one who performs the ancestral prayers and sacrifices" *somn.* I 37 (III 251 CW);

"Who then is the cup-bearer of God? The libation-bearer, the truly great high priest, who, having received the outpourings of the everlasting graces, pours them back in return" *somn.* II 27 (III 288 CW; cf. II 37. III 298);

"But Melchizedek, instead of water, brings wine and gives drink and makes souls drunk, in order that they may become possessed by divine intoxication — more sober than sobriety itself; for priest is Logos, and he is priest of the Most High — moving the notion of the Most High to think not humbly and meanly, but in an exceedingly great and transcendent and lofty way about God" *leg. alleg.* III 26 (I 131 CW);

"And this same one (sc. the eldest Logos) is both suppliant of the mortal that is always perishing toward the incorruptible, and ambassador of the ruler toward the subject — acting as hostage for both: with the planter, as assurance that what has come to be will never wholly rebel and fall away; and with what has grown, as good hope that it will never behold its gracious God abandoning his own work" (*s. o. Parall. zum Prolog* v. 17) *qu. rer. div. h.* 42 (III 47 CW)[3].

16. effecting unity [4]**:** 17[11.21—23] ("— that they may be one, just as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected into one"); 19[23] f. ("Now the tunic was seamless, woven from above throughout. They said therefore to one another: Let us not tear it"):
"He told me that, according to the one truly existing God, the two highest

1 Cf. Holtzmann, *Neutestl. Theol.* II 476 f., 479.

2 Cf. ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος and ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ (*conf. lingu.* 28 and 11, II 257, 237 CW).

3 See Drummond II 236 f., and cf. on no. 17.

4 Grossmann: *semper enim communionis est causa et pacificum* (*quaestiones Philoneae* 1829, p. 44).

5 “Thus a noble garment, such as the high priest wore, Jos. *Ant.* III 7,4” (Holtzmann ad loc.).

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and first powers are goodness and authority, — and that a third, uniting both and standing between them, is Logos” *Cherub.* 9 (I 176 CW);

“For this one is glue and bond (sc. the divine Logos), having filled all things of being; and the one who bound and wove together each thing, being himself full of himself, properly needs nothing else whatsoever” *qu. rer. div. h.* 38 (III 43 CW);

“The high priest bears on the breast-plate (‘logion’ [λογεῖον LXX]) the imitation of the Logos who holds together and governs the whole” *vit. Mos.* III 14 (II 155 M); cf. below p. 135:

“And the eldest Logos of the existent puts on the world as a garment — for earth and water and air and fire and what arises from these he clothes himself with; — nor will he tear even the garments themselves (Lev. 21[10]); for the Logos of the existent, being the bond of all things, as has been said, both holds together all the parts and binds them tightly, preventing them from being dissolved and torn apart” *profu.* 20 (III 133 f. CW)[1];

cf. also *migr. Abr.* 18: “If, however, you examine the high priest Logos, you will find him thinking in harmony and his sacred garment variegated from both intelligible and perceptible powers” (II 288 CW).

17. originator of joy and peace: 15[11] (“These things I have spoken to you, so that my joy may be in you and your joy may be fulfilled”); cf. 3[29]; 16[20].[22].[24]; 17[13]; 14[27] (“Peace I leave with you —”); 16[33] (“so that in me you may have peace”):

“For coming is voluntary, but encountering is often involuntary — so that the divine Logos, suddenly appearing, may offer an unexpected joy greater than hope, being about to journey together with a desolate soul”

1 Accordingly the high priest himself, in his official vestment—inasmuch as no tear may be made in it—appears as an image of the Logos, who has clothed himself in the world as in a variegated garment woven together from the various powers and elements of being, whose untearability (indissolubility) he himself effects: it is not the official garment of the high priest that is the symbol of the Logos (Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum* p. 736; Holtzmann on John 19:23), but “the dress of the highpriest symbolized the several constituents of the universe; the highpriest himself is the Logos, the bearer of the powers” (Drummond II 228).

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(to Gen. 18[33]) *somn.* I 12 (III 220 CW);

"For in truth the rush of the divine Logos — pours through all things and gladdens them; — being himself unmixed, he is the seasoning, the sweetness, the outpouring, the cheerfulness, the ambrosial drug of joy and gladness" *somn.* II 37 (III 298 CW);

"Let therefore the right Logos be called leader of peace" (to Gen. 14[18]) *leg. alleg.* III 25 (I 130 CW);

"But those — honoring the right Logos as one father, marveling at the well-fitted and wholly musical harmony of the virtues, live a serene and calm life — not, however, an idle or ignoble one, but a very manly one" *conf. lingu.* 11 (II 237 CW).

18. imparting eternal life: 14[6] ("I am the way and the truth and the life"); 4[14] ("the water that I will give him will become in him a spring of water leaping up to eternal life"); 5[40] ("and you are not willing to come to me, that you may have life"), etc. (cf. further below the discussion of the concept of ζωή in the Fourth Gospel):

see the passages below (on the concept of life in Philo)[1].

In other cases, the parallels emphasize more the imagery of the presentation: thus Jesus, respectively Philo's Logos, appears as

19. light: 8[12] (3[19]—[21]; 9[5]; 12[35].[36].[46]):

see the evidence below (on "light" and "life" in Philo)[2].

1 Only in passing should attention finally also be drawn, with reference to 6:16 (ἀνεχώρησεν πάλιν εἰς τὸ ὄρος αὐτὸς μόνος), to the λόγος φιλέρημος καὶ μονωτικός ἄνω φοιτᾶν εἰθισμένος of *qu. rer. div. h.* 48 (III 53 CW), since it indeed appears doubtful whether a theological idea is involved here (cf. Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* 1901, p. 182).

2 More remotely, but still worth mentioning, is a parallel that arises from the image of the temple: the application of this image to the body of Jesus, 2:19, 21 (λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον—ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἔλεγεν περὶ τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ), with which cf. 10:38; 14:10; 17:21 ("thus the body of a personality in whom πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς dwells, Col. 2:9, could fittingly be designated as a temple," Holtzmann), recalls the transfer to the Logos himself in Philo: μή θαυμάσῃς δέ, εἰ νοῦ τὸν λόγον (speech, language) ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κέκληκεν οἶκον· καὶ γὰρ τὸν τῶν ὅλων νοῦν, τὸν θεόν, οἶκον ἔχειν φησὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον (on Gen. 28:17), *migr. Abr.* 1 (II 269 CW).

20. bridegroom or husband: 3[29] ("He who has the bride is the bridegroom"):
"The right Logos of nature has the power of father (and also of husband), since he casts the seed of virtues, as into good soil, into the soul; and the mind was likened at one time to a virgin, at another to a woman, either widowed or still joined to a husband — to a virgin, preserving herself pure and undefiled; — but to the noble woman living with the noble Logos according to virtue, this same Logos promises care, sowing thoughts in the manner of a husband" *spec. leg.* II 7 (II 275 M); cf. No. 21.

21. father: 13[33] ("Children, I am still with you a little while"); 14[18] ("I will not leave you orphans"):

"The right Logos of nature has the power of father (and also of husband), because he is naturally disposed to beget good counsels and noble and earnest deeds, and, having begotten them, nourishes them with drinkable doctrines that supply education and wisdom; — but the soul that is orphaned also of the generation according to prudence and of the marriage according to the right Logos, being widowed of the most beautiful things and bereft of wisdom, choosing a culpable life, is liable for what it has resolved against itself, having no healer of sins (neither as husband-companion nor as father-begetter) — namely, the Logos according to wisdom" *spec. leg.* II 7 (II 275 M);

"For the guardian or father (sc. the divine Logos), by whom alone it is possible to be admonished and disciplined, has withdrawn far away" *qu. D. s. imm.* 28 (II 85 CW); cf. No. 12;

"But those — honoring the right Logos as one father — live a serene and calm life" *conf. lingu.* 11 (II 237 CW); cf. No. 17.

22. guide (way-leader): 14[5] f. ("— how do we know the way? — I am the way —"):

"For as long as the one following God has not been perfected, he uses the divine Logos as guide of the way" (to Gen. 18[16]; Ex. 23[20].[21]) *migr. Abr.* 31 (II 302 CW)[1].

1 Cf. *poster. Cain* 30 (II 22 CW): τὴν βασιλικὴν ταύτην ὁδόν, ἣν ἀληθῆ καὶ γνήσιον ἔφαμεν εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν, ὁ νόμος καλεῖ θεοῦ ῥῆμα καὶ λόγον (and on this Drummond II 178 f.), and *qu. D. s. imm.* 37 (II 93 CW).

23. helmsman: 6[21] ("They were willing therefore to take him into the boat, and immediately the boat was at the land to which they were going"):

"It is not chance that is the cause of participation in goods or evils, but the lookout (or helmsman) and pilot of the whole is the divine Logos" *Cherub.* 11 (I 179 CW); cf. *migr. Abr.* 1: "Who then would be the house of God except the Logos, elder of those that have come into being, who, like a rudder held fast, pilots all things as the helmsman of the whole?" (II 269 CW);
"The right Logos gives such commands, through which, as through a ship, the living being will

make good passage in the conduct of life, being steered by the good [and skilled] pilot" *leg. alleg.* III 25 (I 130 CW).

24. shepherd: 10[11] ("I am the good shepherd"):

"For just as a certain flock — earth and water and air and fire and what grows and lives in them, and moreover the nature of heaven — God, the shepherd and king, leads according to justice and law, having appointed his right Logos and first-begotten Son, who will take over the care of this sacred flock like a lieutenant of a great king" *agric.* 12 (II 105 f. CW);

"For whenever the protector or guardian or father, or whatever one wishes to call the composition of us — the right Logos — departs, leaving the flock within us neglected, it perishes, and great loss befalls the master; and the irrational and unprotected herd, bereft of the shepherd who would admonish and educate it, is removed far from rational and immortal life" *poster. Cain* 19 (II 15 CW);

"Therefore rightly will the mind, using the divine Logos as shepherd and king, seek information concerning his seven daughters" (to Ex. 2[16]) *mut. nom.* 20 (III 176 CW).

25. nourisher and food: 6[27] ("Work for the food that remains unto eternal life, which the Son of Man will give you"); 6[48]—[50] ("I am the bread of life; your fathers ate the manna in the wilderness and died; this is the bread that comes down from heaven, so that one may eat of it and not die"):

"Thus then the heavenly food — which is wisdom — of the soul, which he calls manna, the divine Logos distributes equally to all who will use it, having care for equality that differs in distribution" (to Ex. 16[18]) *qu. rer. div. h.* 39 (III 44 CW);

"Do you see what kind of food of the soul it is? A continuous Logos of God, like dew" (to Ex. 16[13] ff.) *leg. alleg.* III 59 (I 150 CW; cf. ibid. III 61: "For he nourishes us with his most generic Logos; for manna is interpreted as 'what,' that is, the most generic of beings," I 151 CW);

"And having been given drink, the souls are filled with manna, the most generic — for manna is called 'what,' which is the genus of all things — and the most generic is God, and second is the Logos of God" *leg. alleg.* II 21 (I 107 CW); cf. also *qu. det. pot. ins.* 31 (I 285 CW);

"For the one who lifts his gaze toward the aether and the circuits of heaven has also been trained to look toward the manna, the divine Logos, the heavenly and imperishable nourishment of the God-loving soul" *qu. rer. div. h.* 15 (III 19 CW);

"And having sought what it is that nourishes the soul, they found, upon learning, the word of God and the divine Logos, from which all disciplines and wisdoms flow eternally. This is the heavenly food, and it is indicated in the sacred records by the cause speaking in person: 'Behold, I rain bread for you from heaven'" (to Ex. 16[4]) *profu.* 25 (III 139 CW)[1].

26. cup-bearer: 4[10] (“If you knew the gift of God and who it is who says to you, ‘Give me to drink,’ you would have asked him, and he would have given you living water”); cf. 2[7]—[10]:

“Who pours the sacred cups of true gladness, if not the cup-bearer of God and master of the banquet, the Logos?”

> **1** Mangey remarks on this passage: *Eadem fere scribuntur* John VI 32–51. *Philo λόγον esse docet coeleste alimentum, Dominus Noster seipsum; eundem mysticum sensum ex mannae manducatione uterque deducit. Scilicet pro more, transeundo a sensibilibus ad spiritualia, manducatio cibi pro perceptione doctrinae, Maimonide teste, apud Iudaeos posita est. Percrebuerat haec sententia apud eos, quos alloquitur Dominus Noster, quorum parti cordatiori et mysticis sensibus magis assuetae, nec mira nec nova visa est ista de pane coelesti doctrina. –*

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somn. II 37 (III 298 CW; cf. ‘Who then is the cup-bearer of God?’ II 27. III 288 CW);

While the Logos of Philo, prefigured by Melchizedek, offers “wine instead of water”: “But Melchizedek, instead of water, brings wine and gives drink and makes souls drunk, so that they may become possessed by divine intoxication — for priest is Logos, and he is priest of the Most High” *leg. alleg.* III 26 (I 131 CW), the Logos-Christ of the Gospel, by contrast, transforms water into wine (this too, ultimately, to be understood spiritually).

27. source or stream: 7[38] (“Rivers of living water will flow from his belly”)[1]:

“The Logos of God waters the virtues; for he is the beginning and source of noble deeds. And these (sc. virtues), as though from a single root, have sprung from the divine Logos, whom he likens to a river because of the eternal and continuous flow of nourishing words and doctrines, with which he feeds and fosters the God-loving souls” *poster. Cain* 37 (II 28 CW); cf. ibid. 45 (II 34 CW); further passages see below (on the relation of Logos and Sophia in Philo).

28. physician: 12[40] (“and I will heal them” — applied to Jesus):

“Jacob considers God to be the nourisher, not the Logos, but the angel, who is Logos, as physician of evils — most naturally; for it pleases him to give the primary goods himself in person, but the secondary goods through his angels and Logoi; and secondary are those things that involve release from evils” (to Gen. 48[15] f.) *leg. alleg.* III 62 (I 152 CW)[2];

The Logos proceeds with the soul as priestly conviction in the way required, ‘so that, if any diseases have arisen within it, he may heal them’ (to Lev. 14[34]—[36]) *qu. D. s. imm.* 28 (II 85 CW); on *spec. leg.* II 7 (II 275 M) see above No. 21.

29. sealed / seal: 6[27] (“for him God the Father has sealed”):

1 See the explanation of this passage above, p. 16.

2 Cf. also the ἴασις τοῦ πάθους through the Logos manifesting himself in σωφροσύνη, whose type is Moses' bronze serpent, *leg. alleg.* II 20 (I 106 CW) and Drummond II 255 f.

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In Philo, the Logos appears not as the object of authentication but as the instrument of it (through the Logos God has impressed upon the world, above all upon the soul of the human being, the stamp of divine causality, and has made it an imprint of his essence).

"It is clear, then, that even the archetypal seal, which we say is the intelligible world, would itself be the Logos of God." *opif. mu.* 6 (I 8 CW);

"Being without form, he gave form to the substance of all things, and being without imprint he impressed it, and being without quality he gave it shape; and having brought the whole world to completion, he sealed it with image and idea, by means of his own Logos." *somn.* II 6 (III 266 OW);

"The Logos of the one who makes is itself the seal by which each of the things that are has been formed." *profu.* 2 (III 112 CW);

"And the great Moses — said that it (sc. the rational soul) is a tested coin of that divine and invisible Spirit, marked and stamped with the seal of God, whose impression is the eternal Logos." *plant.* 5 (II 137 CW)[1].

b. general.

1[51] ("You will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man"):

"But others (sc. souls) are most pure and best, having obtained loftier and more divine dispositions, never at all having reached out for any of the earthly things, but being attendants of the all-ruling one, like the ears and eyes of a great king, overseeing all things and hearing all things. These the other philosophers are accustomed to call *daimones*, but the sacred Word is accustomed to call them *angels*, using a more fitting name; for they both report the commands of the Father to his offspring and the needs of the offspring to the Father. Therefore he introduced them as ascending and descending, not because God, who has already reached everywhere, has need of messengers, but because it was advantageous for us mortals to make use of mediating and arbitrating logoi." (on Gen. 28:12–13) *somn.* I 22 (III 235 CW)[2].

1 Cf. *migr. Abr.* 18: ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ σφραγίς (Ex. 28:36) ἰδέα ἐστὶν ἰδεῶν, sc. the ἀρχιερεύς λόγος (II 288 CW). See also Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der christlichen Litteratur*, pp. 100–102.

2 Cf. also *somn.* I 19 (III 229 CW) and on this Drummond II 257.

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From the evangelist, the general conception of Philo concerning the mediatorial service (ascending and descending) of the purest and best ensouled beings populating the entire air-space (called *angels* and *logoi*), which applies to humanity in general, is particularized and heightened in relation to that human being in whom the Logos has become flesh. That the inner revelatory relationship between God and the Son of Man, symbolically indicated by the externally foretold activity of the angels, stands in the foreground for the evangelist has already been shown (see above p. 48 f.). Philo himself sets over against the ladder spoken of symbolically in the cosmos that which is among human beings, namely the soul: “upward and downward through its whole extent the logoi of God move continuously without interval” — *somn.* I 23 (III 236 CW).

As in what precedes, so here and in the following “parallels” the fundamental difference asserts itself between the revelatory-historical element in the evangelist and the natural-rational element in Philo.

3³ (“Unless someone is born from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God”):

“But indeed even of the soul, the unmixed and pure part is the most pure intellect, which, breathed down from heaven, when it is preserved from disease and harm, is fittingly returned entirely, transformed into a sacred libation, to the one who breathed it in and preserved it untouched by every evil” — *qu. rer. div. h.* 38 (III 42 CW).

3¹² (“If I told you earthly things and you do not believe, how will you believe if I tell you heavenly things?”); cf. 8²³ (“You are from below, I am from above; you are from this world, I am not from this world”); cf. also below on 8⁴⁷.

The contrast between the earthly and the heavenly orientation of thought, between sensuousness and spirituality, the fact that the wise man (*σοφός* and philosopher), the virtuous and the pious person, is at home in the upper world, forms a favourite theme of Philo, corresponding to which is his favourite expression *μετεωροπολεῖν* (to occupy oneself with what is above the earth).[1]

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“Of divine knowledge it is characteristic, like a bird, always to soar aloft” — *qu. rer. div. h.* 26 (III 30 CW);

He adds: “‘But the birds he did not divide’ (Gen. 15:10), calling *birds* the two logoi which are winged and by nature soar aloft (namely, the divine Logos and the human one, the intellect)” — *ibid.* 48 (III 52 CW);

“For when the intellect does not rule the soul like a master but governs it like a father, granting not what is pleasant but what is beneficial, and in general withdraws from low things that draw toward mortal matters, and soars aloft and spends time with contemplations concerning the cosmos and its parts, and still more, ascending further, investigates the divine and its nature through an insatiable love of knowledge, it is unable to remain in its original doctrines but seeks migration, being improved toward what is better” — *leg. alleg.* III 27 (I 131 CW);

“For when the intellect soars aloft and is initiated into the mysteries of the Lord, it judges the body to be wicked and hostile” — *leg. alleg.* III 22 (I 128 CW);

“All those for whom toil on behalf of the acquisition of virtue has been expended have learned to soar aloft, having abandoned the earthly region and dragging along none of the bodily weights” — *qu. det. pot. ins.* 9 (I 264 CW);

“These things (on Lev. 11:21) are symbols of souls which, having been rooted like creeping creatures in the earthly body, once purified are able to soar aloft, having exchanged earth and corruption for heaven and immortality” — *qu. rer. div. h.* 49 (III 54 CW)[3];

> **1** Cf. the contrast between τοῖς γηΐνοις (Mangey: *terrenis cibis*) and ταῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐπιστήμαις (*leg. alleg.* III 58, I 150 CW).
>
> **2** Allusion to the name Abram: for Abram is interpreted “lofty father.”
>
> **3** To be compared: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φιλοθέου ψυχὴ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἄνω πρὸς οὐρανὸν πηδᾷ, καὶ πτερωθεῖσα μετεωροπορεῖ συντάττεσθαι γλιχομένη καὶ συγχορεύειν ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων ἱερωτάτῃ καὶ παναρμονίῳ στρατιᾷ (*anim. sacr. id.* 6, II 242 M); ἀρετὴ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν ὠνομάσθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἄρσιν—αἴρεται γὰρ καὶ μετεωρίζεται διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ τῶν ὀλυμπίων ἐρᾶν (*qu. rer. div. h.* I 49, III 54 CW); also the ἄνω περιπολεῖν, *somn.* I 19 (III 230 CW).

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while others (sc. some of the souls) — “called the body a prison and a tomb, but fleeing upward, having been lifted on light wings toward the aether, soar aloft through eternity” — *somn.* I 22 (III 235 CW).

3[34] (“For the one whom God has sent speaks the words of God, for he does not give the Spirit by measure”):[1]

“ ‘I will take from the Spirit that is upon you and place it upon the seventy elders’ (Num. 11:17). But do not think that such a taking away happens by cutting off and separation; rather, as might happen from fire, which even if it lights countless torches remains no lessened in any respect. — If therefore Moses’ own spirit, or that of any other created being, were to be distributed among so great a multitude of acquaintances, it would be diminished if fragmented into so many

parts. But now the Spirit upon him is the wise one, the divine one, the indivisible, the undivided, the noble one, completely filling all things through all things; which, when benefiting, is not harmed, nor when shared with others, nor when added does it diminish understanding and knowledge and wisdom" — *gigant.* 6 (II 46 f. CW).

8[47] ("For this reason you do not hear, because you are not from God"; cf. v. 23):

"For it is impossible for one who does not use the lofty and boundary-marking ways to renounce mortal things and turn aside and migrate toward the imperishable; — for this one (sc. Balaam) is a creature of earth, not a shoot of heaven" — *qu. D. s. imm.* 37 (II 93 CW); cf. above on **3**[12].

9[41] ("If you were blind, you would not have sin; but now you say, 'We see'; your sin remains"):

" 'Look up,' he says (sc. on Gen. 15:5), for the refutation of the blindness of the herd-like race of human beings, which seems to see but is blinded. For how is it not blinded, when it chooses evils instead of goods, shameful things instead of noble ones, unjust instead of just, passions

1 The impartation of the Spirit of God does not mean for God the loss of a part of his Spirit; hence Jesus is possessor of the entire fullness of the Spirit of God.

2 Not "filling all things through all," but "everywhere entirely filled up" (Drummond II 216).

3 Cod. Petropol.: δρικαῖς; cf. *quaest. in Gen.* p. 284 (Auch.): *impotens montosam (lernahin) ac caelestem agere viam*.

instead of good affections, mortal instead of immortal things, and flees admonition and discipline and reproof, but welcomes flatterers and discourses aimed at pleasure, producers of idleness and ignorance and luxury? The noble person alone therefore sees" — *qu. rer. div. h.* 15 (III 18 CW).

12[25] ("He who hates his soul in this world will preserve it for eternal life"):

"For he taught me that some, while living, have died, and some who have died live; — for he knows only those who are refugees and suppliants of God to be living, but the others to be dead. This is the most beautiful boundary of immortal life: to be seized by love and friendship for God, bodiless and incorporeal" — *profu.* 10–11 (III 122 CW);

"But doctrinally he presented the noble person not as dying but as departing, so that the kind of the thoroughly purified soul might be shown to be unextinguishable and immortal, using departure from here toward heaven, not dissolution and corruption, which death seems to bring about" — *qu. rer. div. h.* 56 (III 63 CW).

14[1], 28 (“Let not your heart be troubled… if you loved me, you would rejoice that I am going to the Father”); **15[11]** (“These things I have spoken to you so that my joy may be in you and your joy may be fulfilled”):

“What could one conceive to be more beneficial or more venerable than believing in God and rejoicing throughout one’s entire life and always beholding the One who is? — But the one to whom it has fallen to disregard all bodies, both embodied and incorporeal, and to lean and rest upon God alone with firm reasoning and unwavering and most secure faith — this one is truly happy and thrice-blessed. After faith there is set before the one who preserves virtue, by nature dust-free and victorious, joy as the prize — and joy has turned out to be the best and fairest of good emotions, by which the whole soul is filled throughout with cheerfulness, rejoicing in the Father and maker of all things, God, and rejoicing also in things seen that are free from evil, even if they are not pleasant, because they have come about well, and in the preservation of the whole” — *praem. et poen.* 4–5 (II 412 f. M).

14[2] (“In my Father’s house are many dwellings”):

“For in this way you will be able (namely, the soul) to return also into the paternal

house, having escaped the long and futile storm upon foreign soil” — *somn.* I 43 (III 258 CW).

14[16] (“And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete”):

Contrary to the usual view,[1] Drummond[2] has shown that in Philo the Paraclete is not to be interpreted as the Logos, but as the universe, the *cosmos*. The passage in question is *vit. Mos.* III 14 (II 155 M). Here the high priest appears symbolically in his multicoloured official vestment as clothed with the totality of the world created by God, which contains the most diverse components within itself and as such is something complete (cf. *opif. mu.* 3, I 4 CW: “for it was necessary that the world, being the most perfect of created things, should be constituted according to a perfect number, the six”),[3] and thus understood acquires mediating significance for the individual which does not correspond to the idea. On the basis of this conception it is explained in the passage in question:

“Thus adorned in this manner, the high priest is sent to the sacred rites, so that whenever he enters to perform the ancestral prayers and sacrifices, the entire cosmos enters together with him. — For it was necessary that the one being consecrated should make use of the most perfect Paraclete, the son in virtue, of the Father of the cosmos, for the forgiveness of sins and the granting of the most abundant goods.”

That the *son* in this passage is indeed to be understood as the *cosmos* is also supported by the immediate continuation, with the exposition that just as the high priest outwardly represents the cosmos in his official garment, so inwardly (in his mind) he too should be the counterpart of the cosmos, a *micro-cosmos*, and should strive, if not to be capable of being a maker of the

cosmos, at least to be continuously worthy of the cosmos, in a manner adapted from a human being toward the nature of the cosmos.

1 Cf. Gfrörer, *Geschichte des Urchristenthums* 18¹, I 277 ff.; Zeller III, 23, p. 372; Reville, *la doctrine du Logos* p. 145.

2 In agreement with Keferstein, *Philos Lehre von den göttlichen Mittelwesen* 1846, p. 104 f.; see Drummond II 237–239.

3 Cf. Drummond I 289 f.

With full justification Drummond says: “The union of the high priest with the cosmos, not with the Logos, is evidently the point which is here insisted on.”

Still less room for doubt is left by the parallel statement:

> “For he wishes the high priest first to have about himself a visible image of the whole, so that from the continual contemplation he may present his own life as worthy of the nature of the whole (as a model as perfect as possible for the *living according to nature*; cf. *migr. Abr.* 23. II 293 CW); then, in order that in the sacred services the whole cosmos may minister together with him. For it is most fitting that the one who is consecrated to the Father of the cosmos should also bring along the Son for the service of the begetter.”
> *monar.* II 6 (II 227 M)¹.

One sees that Philo’s thought comes closer to this: the reconciling and blessing-producing mediatorship of the humanly imperfect but striving toward perfection high priest attains its comprehensive meaning and full power only through the fact that, as its symbolized higher counterpart, there corresponds to it the representation of the imperfect individual within the world by the perfect world-whole itself, as the “Son of God.” In this sense, in the passage first cited (*vit. Mos.* III 14), the *cosmos* is called the Paraclete (advocate, helper)² of the high priest. Accordingly it is unjust that it has recently again been asserted: “It must be the Logos that is meant by this Paraclete. The Logos is the logical object which the thought retains from what precedes.”³ Even if immediately before (at the conclusion of

1 The indicated idea of the κόσμος is no longer strictly maintained when, according to what follows, the high-priestly vestment is in a third line also supposed to indicate that the bearer (in contrast to other priests) intercedes and gives thanks not merely for his fellow countrymen, but both for the whole human race and for all parts of nature, inasmuch as, in accordance with the truth, he regards the entire world as his fatherland.

2 Cf. *opif. mund.* 6 (I 7 CW): οὐδὲν δὲ παρακλήτῳ—τίς γὰρ ἦν ἕτερος;—μόνῳ δὲ αὐτῷ χρησάμενος ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω δεῖν εὐεργετεῖν—τὴν φύσιν (at the creation).

3 Anathon Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der griech. Philosophie* 1896, p. 202.

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the enumeration of the symbolic garments) the Logos is mentioned as that which is signified by the breastpiece (*λόγιον*), “the universe of the Logos that holds together and governs all things” (*τοῦ συνέχοντος καὶ διοικοῦντος λόγου τὸ σύμπαν*), this Logos nevertheless appears only as one of the many factors of the *cosmos*, albeit as the most distinguished. Precisely the emphatic highlighting of different components of the material world (air, earth, water, etc.) clearly shows that in this context Philo has the Logos in view only in and with the *κόσμος αἰσθητός* (cf. *ebriet.* 8. II 176 CW: “the only and beloved perceptible son, this cosmos”), that is, he understands the *cosmos* as a unified whole in the most comprehensive sense.

Only on this basis can the question of the *ἄλλος παράκλητος* of the Evangelist be reckoned with—although the direct and exclusive interpretation of Philo’s Paraclete as the Logos itself was from the beginning all the more easily possible insofar as the latter is elsewhere equally presented or designated as *cosmos* as well as *Son of God*: *cosmos*, to be sure, in the sense of the *νοητός* (cf. *opif. mu.* 6.9.10. I 7.11 CW; more precisely the *τόπος* of the world constituted from ideas),[1] and *son* in the sense of the *πρωτόγονος* (see above), just as he is also conceived as high priest (see above).[2] That, however, the Evangelist has in fact carried out the reinterpretation of Philo’s *Paraclete* in reference to the Logos becomes a scarcely deniable assumption from the fact that the functions attributed to the evangelical Paraclete have parallels precisely in Philo’s statements about the Logos: the Logos

1 Zeller a. a. O. p. 371; Drummond II 162.

2 Cf. also Heinze (*Die Lehre vom Logos in der griech. Philosophie* 1872, p. 283): “Whether the Logos is called παράκλητος is doubtful to me. At least, in the passage where one wishes to infer this, *Vit. Mos.* III 2, 155, it seems to me that the world can just as well be understood thereby. To be sure, there is also nothing particular against interpreting it as the Logos, so that one must refrain from a decided judgment on this passage.” Incidentally, with regard to the concept of the Paraclete in the Gospel (especially 16:7; cf. 1 John 2:1), it also deserves notice that παράκλητος is repeatedly used by Philo in occurrences of ordinary life as well in the sense of advocate (*adv. Flacc.* II 520 M; *Joseph.* II 75 M).

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teaches what is good and useful (*somn.* I 12; see above on no. 12), supports and protects the virtuous and those inclined toward virtue:

> “For the Logos of God, when it comes to our earthly constitution, aids and helps those who are akin to virtue and incline toward it, providing them complete refuge and salvation; but upon its adversaries it sends destruction and incurable ruin.” *somn.* I 14 (III 223 CW),

convicts and judges (see above on no. 14 and cf. the passage on conscience—*ἔλεγχος—dec. orac.* 17. II 195 M¹).

That to these testimonies parallel statements about the Spirit of God are added has rightly been emphasized (cf., with the passage cited under no. 14, *gigant.* 5, the one echoing John 16:13):

> "For the mind would not have aimed so accurately, if the divine Spirit had not been the guide leading it to truth."
> *vit. Mos.* III 36. II 176 M².

14:23 ("and we shall make our dwelling with him") compared with vv. 16–17 ("he will give you another Paraclete, that he may be with you forever, the Spirit of truth—because he remains with you and is in you")[3]:

1 Cf. Drummond II 295 f.

2 Cf. Reville a. a. O. p. 146 f.

3 What is meant is the μονήν ποιεῖσθαι (to take up one's dwelling; cf. above p. 25; cf. Gen. 18, ff., as also the meaning ascribed by Philo to this narrative in *Abr.* 24, 25; II 18–20 M [Drummond II 90–93. 133–138], and to ἐάν τις ἀγαπᾷ με τὸν λόγον μου τηρήσει: Gen. 18 19; Isa. 41 8 "אֲשֶׁר" LXX ὃν ἠγάπησα; II Chron. 20 7; Jas. 2 23 φίλος θεοῦ of Abraham), the objectively conditioned, through the abiding reception of the "other" Paraclete, with the operation of that πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας not identical, in individual cases occurring and ever anew establishing itself, sensation of the personal presence of grace of the Father and of the Son themselves. It is, in this connection, to be thought of as the inner experience of the individual believer as such (wherefore Apoc. 21 3; Matt. 18 20; 28 20 are not to be adduced). But that the lodging of the Father and of the Son παρ' αὐτῷ is in reality a lodging in him is shown clearly enough by the parallel statement about the Spirit of truth, παρ' ὑμῖν μένει καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται v. 17 (as to the reading μένει and ἔσται see the commentaries ad loc.); and likewise it is evident that the conception—one not denying its typically allegorical background—of the visiting sojourn of the Father and of the Son with the believer would not correspond to the mystical depth of the Evangelist as soon as one were to abstract from the habitual indwelling of the Spirit of truth as its presupposition. A unified consideration of the Evangelist's statements in question therefore leads under all circumstances to the fundamental conception of the divine indwelling in believers.

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> "Since, therefore, it invisibly penetrates into the region of the soul, let us prepare that place as beautifully as possible, so that it may become a worthy dwelling of God. A worthy house, indeed, is a fitting soul. Thus, calling the invisible soul an earthly house of the invisible God, we shall speak justly and according to law."
> *Cherub.* 29–30 (I 194 CW);

> “For what house apart from generation could be found more fitting for God than a soul perfectly purified?—Let everyone pray to God to obtain as inhabitant the all-ruling one, who, lifting this small building, the mind, up from the earth, joins it to the bounds of heaven.”
> *sobr.* 13 (II 227 CW);
>
> “Strive, therefore, O soul, to become a house of God, a holy sanctuary.”
> *somn.* I 23 (III 237 CW)[1].

15:14–15 (“You are my friends if you do what I command you… I no longer call you servants…”):

> “Do not suppose that this was said for the degradation of the all-wise one (Deut. 34:4); for it would be foolish to think that the realm of virtue is apportioned by God to slaves before friends. Rather, he first wishes to make this clear to you, that there is one realm for infants and another for the perfect. To see the most beautiful things in nature, those allotted a more divine portion, is not impossible, but it is not for all; it belongs only to the purest and most sharp-sighted kind, to whom the Father of all things, displaying his own works, grants the greatest of all gifts.”
> *migr. Abr.* 9 (II 277 CW).

16:23; (“In that day you will ask me nothing) ; **26–27**… the Father himself loves you…”):

> (On that day you will ask in my name, and I do not say to you that I will ask the Father concerning you; for the Father himself loves you, because you have loved me and have believed that I came forth from the Father):
>
> **1** One may compare in particular still *somn.* II 38 (III 298 f. CW): ἐπεὶ καὶ τίνα σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον εὕροι τις ἂν οἶκον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θεῷ ἢ φιλοθέαμον διάνοιαν (ἐν ψυχῇ ἀπολέμῳ καὶ εὐδρομοῦσῃ <τέλος> προτεθειμένη τὸν θεωρητικὸν καὶ εἰρηναῖον βίον).

> “But the one who follows God necessarily makes use of accompanying guides, his attendant logoi, whom it is customary to call angels. As long as he is not perfected, he uses the divine Logos as guide of the road; but when he arrives at supreme knowledge, he runs vigorously and keeps pace with the former guide of the road. For thus both become attendants of the all-ruling God.”
> *migr. Abr.* 31 (II 302 CW).

17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they may know you…”):

> “No soul, fashioned for the body, was capable by itself of seeing the maker; but he reasoned that the creature would gain great benefit if it received a conception of its creator—for this is the boundary of happiness and blessedness—and from above

he breathed into it something of his own divinity." — *qu. det. pot. ins.* 24 (I 277–78 CW)[1]; cf. also *qu. D. s. imm.* 30 (II 86 CW): "All flesh corrupted the perfect way of the eternal and incorruptible one, which leads to God. Know that this is wisdom; for through it the mind, being guided, reaches the goal by a straight and broad road—and the goal of the road is knowledge and understanding of God."

If the Philonic parallels adduced for the Prologue were not already sufficient to prove that the Evangelist refers to the conception and language of the Alexandrian religious philosopher,[2] then the quantity and variety of Philonic echoes distributed throughout the entire Gospel would be decisive in that direction.[3]

1 Cf. Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 732: "According to Philo as well, the knowledge of the Creator of the world, whom he likewise often designates as the true one God, is 'the summit of happiness and blessedness'."

2 With good reason An. Aall says: "In the question of the Evangelist's literary school-relationship to the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos, this section has an eminent significance" (*Geschichte der Logosidee in der christl. Litt.* 1899, p. 110).

3 An exhaustive discussion and a definitive answer to the question of dependence cannot be entered into here. A judgment on this matter, insofar as it is required by the present purpose, will emerge in the course of the investigation at all points that come into consideration here with sufficient definiteness. In general, for example, reference may be made to Aall a. a. O. pp. 75–108, 130–146, where (alongside individual missteps) many correct observations are to be found.

The fact that the parallels in the Gospel itself for the most part correspond to Philonic statements about the Logos confirms, on the one hand, the result of the first investigation, according to which the Evangelist in the self-testimony of Jesus as Son of Man or Son of God continually keeps the Logos of the Prologue in view, and, on the other hand, speaks in favor of the conclusion that even in cases where a saying of Christ has Old Testament grounding, the Evangelist's use of it has often been decisively determined by consideration of a Philonic model.

Striking as this entire parallel relationship is, it can scarcely escape even superficial observation that throughout a fundamentally essential difference in the Logos-idea given by the two writers makes itself felt. This calls for a more exact determination of the relationship, which necessarily leads to an investigation of the sources. We must first consider the roots of the Philonic Logos-idea. But this must proceed from an explanation concerning the nature of this idea itself, from an answer to the much-debated question into which category—whether of religious representations or of philosophical concepts—the Logos of Philo is to be assigned; more precisely, whether we are dealing with a mere abstraction or with a being that exists in some way in its own right. Heinze still decided firmly in favor of the view that Philo conceived the Logos etc. as a personal, that is, self-conscious being. If this does not emerge indubitably from

the numerous passages in which the latter is called *creator*, *servant*, *cupbearer*, *priest*, *ambassador*, *suppliant*, or appears as standing midway between God and humans, or is called either *man of God* or *second God*, it nevertheless follows compellingly, he argues, from *somn.* I 21 (on Gen. 28:11):

> "It is now fitting to know that the divine place and the sacred region are full of incorporeal logoi—and these logoi are immortal souls. Of these logoi, taking one (sc. Jacob), choosing the best, the highest,

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> as it were united with a body[1], he establishes it near his own mind, in order to rest upon the divine Logos."

Here, therefore, the logoi, and also the highest Logos, are reckoned among souls, and with the soul personality seems in this case also unquestionably connected. Once we have found this, nothing stands in the way of ascribing personality to the Logos, indeed even to the powers, at other passages that appear to point in that direction.[2]

Against this, recent research has increasingly come into agreement with the conclusion that Philo's Logos is not, or at any rate not clearly and properly, conceived as a personality. In general it is emphasized that Philo appears not to have posed to himself at all the question whether the Logos possesses a special personality distinct from God; we therefore have no right "either simply to affirm or simply to deny" that question. The determinations which, according to the presuppositions of our thinking, would demand the personality of the Logos intersect in Philo with those that make it impossible, and the peculiarity of his mode of representation consists precisely in the fact that he does not notice the contradiction between the two, that the concept of the Logos hovers unclearly between personal and impersonal being.[3] With good reason, however,

1 Different reading in Heinze.

2 Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos* pp. 291–294. Cf., however, Ueberweg–Heinze, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philosophie*[6] 1880, I p. 278 f.

3 Zeller a. a. O. p. 378 (what he remarked there in general about the personality of the divine powers also finds application here). Cf., following Zeller: Soulier, *La doctrine du Logos* 1876, p. 162 f.; Reville, *La doctrine du Logos* 1881, pp. 26, 29; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*[3] III 556. An. Aall also remarks: "We admit that Philo himself refuses to give an answer as to whether his Logos is a personality or not. He himself will not have reflected on this. He felt the need for an all-embracing, historically living power, and a corresponding world-form offered itself to him in the concept of the Logos. — On the other hand, when we bring in our concept of personality and measure the Logos by it, we will probably end by recognizing that the latter is not to be counted under such a category. — And with the personality of the Logos also falls the personality

of the intermediate potencies, the divine powers" (— against Dähne). *Geschichte der Logosidee in der griech. Philosophie* 1896, p. 217.

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it seems to me that Drummond has proceeded to greater definiteness in denying the question:

"Nevertheless we ought not to thrust this inconsistency upon him unless we are constrained to do so by a faithful exegesis. In this exegesis we have only to estimate the value of single passages and single expressions, and are not driven by the demands of the philosophy itself now to volatilize the Logos into a divine attribute and again to condense it into a person standing between God and man. In this our position differs from Zeller's. According to him the confused changes of meaning belong to the very essence of the philosophy, and he is therefore less ready to admit the plea of poetical personification in particular instances. But according to our view the separate personality of the Logos would be a purely disturbing element, and introduce a quite needless perplexity into an otherwise coherent system, and therefore we shall be inclined to make a large allowance for Philo's bold and figurative style"[1].

For reasons of brevity, reference must be made to the detailed and careful discussion to which Drummond has subjected all the relevant passages, in particular also the exposition in *somn.* I 21, advanced by Heinze (cf. also Zeller, *a. a. O.*, p. 379) in support of the personal interpretation[2]. He arrives at the result:

"From first

1 A. a. O. II 223.

2 II 223–273; see especially 256–260. With regard to the alleged proof-text *somn.* I 21 (III 232 CW), in which Gen. 28^{11} is treated in connection with 32^{25} ff., I myself have the following further remark to make. The λόγος θεῖος (the ἀνωτάτω λόγος) does not come into consideration as a self-conscious being, but as the highest power of divine-rational thinking: only to this does the expression fit that Jacob "sets him as a pillar, forming his own thought," which says that he makes this spiritual faculty the support of his entire life. When the same Logos later gives Jacob the name Israel after his successful struggle, it is to be noted that it is not he with whom Jacob wrestles: through the Logos, which in the parallel passage *sobr.* 13 (II 228 CW) dissolves into an indeterminate plurality of λόγοι, Jacob is merely driven and directed to the right struggle; this struggle, however, applies to the power of the πάθη and the λογισμοί striving against the soul, as the parallel passages *mut. nom.* 12 (III 171 CW) and *sobr.* 13 show. Insofar as the Logos in question *somn.* I 21 is placed in the class of the ψυχαὶ ἀθάνατοι, he appears in *mut. nom.* 13 (III 172 CW) as ἄγγελος (ὑπηρέτης τοῦ θεοῦ). From this it already follows that nothing is intended to be given with the concept ψυχή that would go beyond that of ἄγγελος. That ἄγγελος can simply be a designation of an idea or ratio manifesting itself as a power can also otherwise be sufficiently

shown (cf. regarding the Logos as angel with Hagar in *Cherub.* 1–3 Drummond a. a. O. p. 243 f.: “it is evident, that it would be a complete departure from its method, instead of volatilizing the angel into universal Reason, to solidify Reason into a visible angel”; likewise *profu.* 1. 37, 38 Drummond 244: “here the angel signifies indifferently divine Reason or conscience, that messenger of God which reminds us of our duty”; regarding the Logos-angel with Abraham *migr. Abr.* 31 Drummond 250 f.: “there is surely nothing here to imply any real identity between the Logoi and personal angels, — the angels in question are higher thoughts, higher powers of the mind”; regarding the Logos-angel with Jacob [or the Logos-angel in general] *leg. alleg.* III 62 Drummond 255 f.: “the context makes it abundantly clear, that the Logoi have nothing personal about them, and that therefore ‘angels’ must be understood in a purely figurative sense, — as heavenly sciences, words, precepts or admonitions”; likewise *somn.* I 11–13, 19 Drummond 257 f.; *somn.* I 22, 23 Drummond 260–262: “it seems quite clear, that Philo is referring in this passage to divine thoughts which visit and purify the mind”; *somn.* I 39–41 Drummond 246–250; regarding the two Logos-angels with Lot in *conf. lingu.* 8 Drummond 264 f.; regarding the Logos-archangel in *qu. rer. div. h.* 42 and *conf. lingu.* 28 Drummond 267–269, 270 f.: “there is nothing to indicate that by angel he means, in this passage, a particular order of being, personal souls in the air who acted as agents of the divine Will”; regarding the Logos-angel with Balaam in *qu. D. s. imm.* 37 Drummond 269 f.: “das Gewissen bedeutend”; likewise *agric.* 12 Drummond 270: — the divine Reason as principle of the preservation of the world and providence; regarding the Logos-angel in *poster. Cain* 25, 26 [Deuter. 32^{7}–^{9} LXX] Drummond 272 f.: “it is evident that the Logoi are here regarded as the logical subdivisions of the universal Logos or Reason, regarded in its moral aspect as ‘right reason.’ — Can we seriously suppose that Philo looked upon these ethical laws, these ancient expressions of God’s eternal Reason, as persons, real angels flitting to and fro in the air?”). As regards *vit. Mos.* I 12 (II 91 M), see further below (in the discussion of *Sap.* 7^{22}). Properly considered, the ψυχαί in Philo in the highest and most general sense of the word are nothing more than really conceived ideas: spiritual monads, potential consciousness- and rational powers, which in different forms and gradations may come to effect and representation, just as Philo in parallel fashion designates angels on the one hand as ἀσωμάτους ψυχάς, on the other as ὅλας δὲ ὅλων νοερὰς, λογισμοὺς ἀκραφεῖς, μονάδι ὁμοιουμένους (*monar.* II 1, II 222 M), and attributes to the κόσμος νοητός, i.e. the Logos, consisting of ideas, the μοναδικὴ φύσις of the ideas (*opif. mu.* 4, 6, 9, I 10 f. CW). And thus the Logos too is clearly conceived as the world-soul in *profu.* 20 (III 133 f. CW) and *qu. rer. div. h.* 48 (III 52 CW) (cf. Zeller a. a. O. p. 377, 6; Drummond II 169).

to last the Logos is the Thought of God, dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, planted out and made objective in the uni-

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> verse. The cosmos is a tissue of rational force, which images the beauty, the power, the goodness of its primeval fountain. The reason of man is the same rational force entering into consciousness, and held by each in proportion to the truth and variety of his thoughts; and to follow it is the law of righteous living. Each form which we can differentiate as a distinct species, each rule of conduct which we can treat as an injunction of reason, is itself a Logos, one of those innumerable thoughts or laws into which the universal Thought may, through self reflection, be resolved"[1].

If the essence of the Philonic Logos is to be expressed briefly, with consideration of all relevant factors, positive and negative alike, something like the following definition may be given:

The Logos of Philo is the summation and essential unity of all forces proceeding from God and from there acting independently and rationally, that is, acting purely in accordance with the essence, thought, and will of God, world-forming and world-preserving, operative in the macrocosm as well as in the microcosm.

Insofar as it is summation, unity, it is abstraction; insofar as what is summed up consists of real forces[2] that have arisen from divine thoughts (ideas), that have become God himself objectified, it is hypostasis[3]. And just as certainly as, on the one side, it is abstraction, the most general idea[4], just as certainly

1 A. a. O. II 273.

2 ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὃν ἐκπεπλήρωκεν ὅλον δι' ὅλων ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός *somn.* I 11 (III 218 CW).

3 Cf. for the grounding of the necessity of the hypostatic conception Zeller a. a. O. p. 380.

4 *migr. Abr.* 18 (II 288 CW): ἰδέα ἰδεῶν, καθ' ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐτύπωσε τὸν κόσμον (cf. on this passage Drummond II 229); *spec. leg.* 36 (II 333 M): θεοειδὴς ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον ἰδέαν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον τυπωθείς; cf. *opif. mu.* 6: ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν (?) I 8 CW; *leg. alleg.* III 31 (I 134 CW): ἀπεικόνισμα (sc. θεοῦ) ἑτέρων ἀρχέτυπον — ἄλλων παράδειγμα; *leg. alleg.* II 82 (I 107 CW): τὸ γενικώτατον; *leg. alleg.* III 121 (I 151 CW): γενικώτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε.

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he cannot be a personal being, but rather every personification that arises in individual cases is to be regarded as figurative, occasioned in various ways, in particular by Old Testament–religious points of contact[1].

A forceful confirmation of this view is provided by the investigation of the historical presuppositions of the Philonic conception.

It lay close at hand to seek the deepest roots of the Logos-theory of the Jewish writer in the Old Testament.

The double meaning of the Greek word λόγος: reason and speech (word) had to lead to the bringing in of the Old Testament doctrine of the divine Word: it was in itself conceivable that Philo's reason-logos had arisen out of his word-logos, that, in other words, his Logos-philosophy had developed out of his Logos-theology.[2] And indeed, in the Old Testament the notion repeatedly confronts us of the word of Yahweh as a power mediating the revelation of the divine thought (knowledge, cognition) and the realization of the divine will.[3] The divine word proves itself as such a power in prophecy: Num. 11:23. Isa. 55:10–11 (here LXX: ῥῆμα). Hos. 6:5; Isa. 9:7; 11:4; cf. Ezek. 12:21 ff.; Hab. 2:3–5; likewise in

1 Cf. Drummond II 225.

2 On the different meanings of the word **λόγος** in Philo's linguistic usage see Drummond II 156–158.

3 In this connection it must be taken into account that **דָּבָר** is frequently rendered **ῥῆμα** by the LXX, but in the passages of greatest significance for our present purpose it is translated **λόγος**; Drummond I 137.

4 "Yahweh's word of judgment, which the prophets proclaim, counts as a real power, which effects that for which Yahweh sends it"; Nowack ad loc.

5 "Whether Isaiah carries the Word itself to Northern Israel, or whether in this passage he will send it there, or whether he rather means that the Word revealed to him operates immediately like an objective power and, as it were, brings about the plagues described in what follows, as in the Apocalypse the opening of the book—unfortunately one cannot determine from these few words; the latter seems to me the simplest assumption"; Duhm on Isa. 9 7. Cf. also Drummond I 188 f.

creation, as in the preservation and governance of the world: Gen. 1; Ps. 33 (LXX 32):6, 9; Ps. 147:15, 18 (in v. 18 parallel with the real רוּחַ, i.e. wind, breath from the mouth of God); Ps. 107:20[1]. The notion of reality intensifies in the vivid imagination from time to time so far that almost the appearance of an independent activity of the word in the service of the highest being arises.[2]

But to an actual hypostasis the Old Testament Word of God has nevertheless not been elevated.[3] Thus, at any rate with regard to this fundamental element, a difference in degree results between the Old Testament and the Philonic conception.[4] But of still greater significance is the fact that what in the

1 “Such a phrase prepares the way for the Targum use of ‘מֵימְרָא דַיוי’, ‘the Word of the Lord’ for ‘יהוה’”; Cheyne ad loc.

2 Cf. the fine observations of Smend in *Lehrbuch der alttestl. Religionsgeschichte* p. 87, 464 (2 p. 85 f., 445 f.) and Cheyne: “They (sc. the psalmists) appear to have conceived of God in a way at once profound and popular, as surrounded by a number of ideas and ideals of plans for the race, for the nation, and even for individuals, and of forces both natural and spiritual, some of which they personalized, not arbitrarily, but on the basis of primitive beliefs, and some they did not. God’s words, for instance, they imagined as standing near Him, ready to express and carry out His thoughts or ideas” (*Origin and religious contents of the Psalter* 1891, p. 321).

3 “It is however impossible to discover any tendency to regard the Word as a distinct hypostasis”; Drummond I 139.

4 Beyond the Old Testament conception of a power proceeding from God, as it were self-acting (creative, preserving, destroying, restoring), the Word does not go in the theology of the Apocrypha in general either (Sir. 39 17 [22], 42 15, 43 26 [28], Sap. 9 1, 12 9, 16 12, 26— in the last verse **ῥῆμα**; cf. also Siegfried ad loc. in Kautzsch, *Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des A. T.* 1900, I 503). Attention is due, however, to the fact that the Alexandrian Book of Wisdom, in a strongly poetically elaborated section, differentiates the Word of God that brings destruction upon the Egyptians into its ἐπιταγή and the executing παντοδύναμος λόγος conceived as an angel (18 15.16: ὁ παντοδ. λόγος σου ἀπ’ οὐρανῶν ἐκ θρόνων βασιλείων ἀπότομος πολεμιστὴς εἰς μέσον τῆς ὀλεθρίας ἤλατο γῆς, ξίφος ὀξὺ τὴν ἀνυπόκριτον ἐπιταγήν σου φέρων — οὐρανοῦ μὲν ἥπτετο, βέβηκε δ’ ἐπὶ γῆς — cf. Ex. 12 23; I Chron. 21 16). Here the power proceeding from God, rationally operative (λόγος), begins to develop into a personal hypostasis. The interpretation and use of the passage by Calmes (*Étude sur le prologue du quatrième évangile* in *Revue biblique internationale* 1900, p. 19) is untenable. Cf. moreover Heinze a. a. O. pp. 200–202.

Old Testament is more poetic and improper, and what is in Philo properly hypostasized, on closer examination proves to be essentially different.

Philo’s Logos takes on the meaning of the divine Word (ῥῆμα) only incidentally and in a non-essential way, namely insofar as reference to the Old Testament suggests or requires it;[1] its general and essential meaning is reason. For this question, the passage *vit. Mos.* III 13 (II 154 M)[2] is of primary importance and has been variously interpreted. Philo speaks there, in several senses, of a twofold Logos: the double Logos of God is an inner discourse and an outer one proceeding from it into the universe; the double Logos of the human being is thought and the word that proceeds from it. The wording is:

“For the Logos is twofold both in the universe and in human nature.
In the universe, one is that concerned with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas, from which the intelligible world was brought into being, and the other is that concerned with the visible things, which are indeed imitations and images of those ideas, from which this perceptible world was completed.
In the human being, one Logos is internal, the other uttered; and the one is, as it were, a source, the other a stream flowing from it.
The place of the former is the ruling faculty, while that of the latter, according to utterance, is the tongue and mouth and the entire instrumental apparatus of voice.
And the craftsman assigned a square shape to the breastplate,[3] most aptly hinting that

1 *sacrific. Ab.* 3 on Deut. 34 5 (I 205 CW); *leg. alleg.* III 60.61 on Ex. 16 14 ff.; Deut. 8 3: the **ῥῆμα** a part of the **λόγος** (I 151 f. CW); cf. *leg. alleg.* I 9: **λόγῳ ῥήματι** UFL, *profug.* 25 (III 139 CW), also *somn.* II 36.37 and on *sacrific. Ab.* 26 and *poster. Cain* 30; Drummond II 178 f.

2 On the disputed question cf. especially Heinze a. a. O. pp. 231–235, Soulier a. a. O. pp. 86–97, Zeller pp. 375–377, Aall (*Geschichte der Logosidee in der griech. Philos.*) p. 197 f., Drummond II 171–182.

3 The adduction of this allegory (of the high-priestly breastplate) does not contribute to an increase in clarity: how does the **λόγος τῆς φύσεως** relate to the twofold **λόγος ἐν τῷ παντί** of our context?

both the Logos of nature and that of the human being must advance firmly on all sides and not be shaken in any respect.
Accordingly, he also allotted to it the two aforementioned virtues, manifestation and truth.
For the Logos of nature is truthful and declarative of all things, and the Logos of the wise person, imitating it, must appropriately be entirely truthful, honoring truth and obscuring nothing through envy, the disclosure of which will benefit those who are instructed.
Yet further, he assigned to the two Logoi present in each of us—the uttered and the internal—two corresponding virtues: to the uttered Logos, manifestation; to the one according to thought, truth.
For it is fitting that the intellect admit nothing false, and that expression obstruct nothing that contributes to the most exact manifestation.”

From this discussion, in agreement with the other relevant statements, the following emerges. Philo retains unchanged the Stoic technical term *λόγος προφορικός*,[1] current in his time, with its meaning of the spoken human word as an organically and phonetically mediated expression of thought. On the basis of the distinction between the being-in-itself of the divine Logos in the

intelligible world (*νοητὸς κόσμος*) and its manifestation of power in the perceptible world (*κόσμος αἰσθητός*),[2] he places this Logos, insofar as it gives expression to itself in the visible world, in parallel with human thinking insofar as it makes itself known in spoken speech.[3] However, the transfer of the designation *λόγος προφορικός* to the divine Logos as it reveals itself in the sensible world was already prevented by the essential difference between what is effected by the latter and the word spoken by a human being. The human word is something that arises and perishes in the same instant and contains merely an indication of the thought

1 Zeller III³, 1 p. 67.

2 From the fact that a causal relationship between the forms of existence of the ὀρθὸς λόγος in the universe is conceived, there follows indirectly the emphasis on the causal relationship between the double Logos in the human being.

3 Cf. *migr. Abr.* 1 (II 269 CW); see above, Logos-parallels to the Gospel no. 19, ann.).

that caused it. By contrast, what is produced by the divine Logos is a totality of independent real entities—not only spiritual but also material.[1] Furthermore, designating the Logos concerned with visible things (*ὁ περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν λόγος*) as *λόγος προφορικός* would entail designating the Logos concerned with incorporeal things (*ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων λόγος*—from which the intelligible world came into being) as *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*. But this too does not fully correspond to the fundamental presuppositions: according to these, the Logos present in the intelligible world is already the Logos of God engaged in world-creation (*λόγος θεοῦ κοσμοποιοῦντος*, *opif. mu.* 6, I 7 CW),[2] and thus already stands, as the beginning of creation, over against God who is purely immanent and identical with his pure being (*opif. mu.* 2), as an outwardly operative force.[3] Finally, it follows that the conception and designation of the Logos in general as the Word (= ῥῆμα) of God had to appear inadequate to Philo, and therefore unsuitable, insofar as his

1 Corresponding to this is also the exposition of the manner of divine speaking (as distinct from its content) in *qu. D. s. imm.* 18 (on Ps. 61 11 LXX): μονάδας μὲν οὖν ἀκράτους ὁ θεὸς λαλεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ γεγονὼς ἀέρος πλήξις ἀναμιγνυμένη ἄλλῳ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ ἀσώματός τε καὶ γυμνός, ἀδιαφόρων μονάδος (II 75 CW). Similarly *migr. Abr.* 9 (on Ex. 20 18; Deut. 4 12): τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ συνόλως τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη τεμνομένην ἀκουστὴν εἰκότως εἶπεν — ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀκοῆς δοκιμάζεται —, τὴν δὲ μὴ βημάτων μηδ’ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ θεοῦ φωνήν, ὁρωμένην τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμματι, ὁρατὴν δεόντως εἰσάγει (II 277 f. CW); *dec. orac.* 11 (on Ex. 20 18): ὅσα ἂν λέγῃ ὁ θεὸς οὐ βήματά ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἔργα, ἅπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ πρὸ τῶν ὤτων δικάζουσι (II 188 M); *somn.* I 31: ἔργων γὰρ ἀδιαφοροῦσιν αὐτοῦ οἱ λόγοι — on Gen. 28 10, specifically with reference to the power of self-realization of the divine word of promise (III 244 CW); *sacrif. Ab.* 18: ὁ γὰρ θεὸς λέγων ἅμα ἐποίει, μηδὲν μεταξύ ἀμφοῖν τιθείς· εἰ δὲ χρὴ δόγμα κινεῖν ἀληθέστερον, ὁ λόγος ἔργον ἦν αὐτοῦ (I 228 f. CW).

2 This statement serves for the closer elucidation and modification of *qu. D. s. imm.* 6 (II 63 CW): τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον (sc. κόσμον) — νοητὸς δ' ἐκεῖνος — πρεσβειῶν ἀξιώσας παρ' ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διενοήθη; cf. §§ 4 and 5).

3 The comparison added by Philo loc. cit. of this Logos with the planning thought of the architect is, upon closer consideration, inadequate, because in contrast to such artistic thinking the divine thinking already produces a structured whole of real forces. In *mut. nom.* 23 (III 179 CW) ὁ ἐνδιάθετος υἱὸς θεοῦ (τοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸν μείλιγμα καὶ εὐθυμίαν εἰρηνικωτάταις ψυχαῖς) is the γέλως, i.e. the ἀρίστη τῶν εὐπαθειῶν χαρά.

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concept of "word" remained determined and limited by the notion of human speech.[1]

Thus, however certain it is that the Philonic Logos, strictly speaking, is nothing other than an expression for the absolute idea of reason, there can be no doubt that the Jewish religious philosopher borrowed both term and concept from Greek philosophy and only connected them with Old Testament–Jewish modes of thought and expression insofar as was necessary and possible. This fact requires no further proof in the former direction after the detailed and comprehensive recent investigations of the relationships of affinity between the Philonic doctrine of the Logos and that of the Stoics (indirectly Heraclitus), as well as with the Platonic doctrine of the *voῦς*, the world-soul, and the world of ideas.[2] It does, however, appear expedient, following what has been said about the relationship of the Philonic Logos to the Old Testament "Word" of God, to devote particular attention to the relationship of Philo's Logos-idea to the Jewish doctrine of God and world as it took shape under the influence of Hellenistic speculation in extracanonical and post-canonical literature. It is characteristic of the nature and origin of the Philonic theory that, in connection with the Logos, divine Wisdom plays a role that presses the question whether the latter is a mediating being analogous and closely related to the Logos, or whether fundamentally the two coincide.[3]

For the identity of Wisdom and Logos there already speaks the fact that the equation is explicitly found: *"The river is the generic*

1 Cf. Drummond II 173: "As the words stand, we can only conclude that he wished to carry up the human distinction into the nature of God, but, owing to some perceived failure in the analogy, did not choose to describe it by the same language".

2 For further details, besides Heinze reference may be made especially to Zeller (in particular III³, 2, pp. 381–386) and Drummond (I 27–129). On Aall cf. Wendland in *Theol. Lit. Z.* 1897, col. 401 ff.

3 On the contrast with the older views (Dähne–Baur) cf. Drummond II 201; against Baur in particular also Zeller p. 373.

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virtue, goodness; it issues forth from Eden, the Wisdom of God; and this is the Logos of God; for according to this the generic virtue has been fashioned" (on Gen. 2:10–14), *leg. alleg.* I 19 (I 78 CW)[1]; the same result emerges from the specific statements concerning the meaning of Eden: *"He calls the Wisdom of the Existing One 'Eden'" somn.* II 37 (III 297 CW); *"symbolically, however, Eden is the upright and divine Logos" poster. Cain.* 10 (II 8 CW). To this are added indirect testimonies, such as may be drawn from the characterization of Wisdom: some of the most characteristic traits of the Logos are transferred to Wisdom. Wisdom is the highest divine power that is active in the world: *"For the rock cut at the summit (on Deut. 8:15–16) is the Wisdom of God, which he cut off as the highest and first from his own powers, from which he waters the God-loving souls" leg. alleg.* II 21 (I 107 CW); with which is to be compared: *"Elsewhere, using a synonymous expression, he calls this rock 'manna', the most ancient of beings, the divine Logos" qu. det. pot. ins.* 31 (I 285 CW). Wisdom (ἐπιστήμη—σοφία) is an organ of creation: *"Accordingly, we shall at once rightly say that the creator who fashioned this entire universe is both creator and father of what has come into being, and mother the knowledge of the maker[2], with which God, not as a human being, sowed generation. And she, having received the seeds of God, with fruitful pangs gave birth to this only and beloved perceptible son, this world. Accordingly Wisdom is introduced by one of the divine chorus speaking about herself in the following manner: 'God acquired me as the first of his works and before the age he founded me' (Prov. 8:22); for it was necessary that the mother and nurse of all things that came into generation be younger" ebriet.* 8 (II 176 CW); *"but if you deem worthy of honor the father who begot the world and the mother Wisdom, through whom the whole was completed, you will yourself persuade rightly" qu. det. pot. ins.* 16 (I 270 CW); — *"the world created by divine Wisdom" qu. rer. div. h.* 41

1 Drummond's interpretation, deviating from the traditional view (Gfrörer, Heinze, Zeller et al.), according to which the Logos here would be identified not with Wisdom but with *generic goodness*, is not convincing.

2 The change in expression already in itself betrays the personification of something general.

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(III 45 CW)[1]; cf. *profu.* 35 (III 152 CW): *"the Wisdom of God is holy — and judgment of all things, by which all oppositions are separated"*; cf. the *λόγος τομεύς* (principle of division, i.e. of the formation of the world) in *qu. rer. div. h.* 26 ff. 48 (III 30 ff. 53 CW)[2]. Wisdom is original and archetypal divine revelation: *"He has made known the exalted and heavenly Wisdom, being many-named, by many names; for he has called her 'beginning' and 'image' and 'vision of God'. And of her, as of an archetype, he now presents the earthly wisdom as a copy"* (on Gen. 2:8) *leg. alleg.* I 14 (I 71 CW), with which the statement concerning the Logos is to be compared: *"his firstborn Logos — being many-named; for he is called beginning and name of God and Logos and the man according to the image and the one who sees, Israel" conf. lingu.* (II 257 CW); *"this (i.e. Wisdom) is the archetypal radiance of God [of the sun], of which the sun is the copy and image" migr. Abr.* 8 (II 276 CAV), with which compare the conception of the Logos as the primal sun: *"he calls the divine Logos 'sun', the paradigm of the one that courses in heaven" somn.* I 15

(III 223 CW); *“and whenever the source of Wisdom, God, hands over the sciences to the mortal race, he hands them over timelessly” sacrif. Ab.* 17 (I 228 CW), to which cf. *“God, the source of the most ancient Logos” qu. det. pot. ins.* 22 (I 277 CW); *“Wisdom is the court and the palace of the supreme ruler and sole absolute king; the intelligible house is this, while the perceptible is the world” congr. erud. g.* 21 (III 95 f. CW), with which cf. *“he says that God has as his house his own Logos” migr. Abr.* 1 (II 269 CW); **furthermore, ‘turtledove and pigeon’ are the divine and the human Wisdom — differing from one another as genus differs from species or copy from archetype; for divine Wisdom is solitude-loving because of the one God, whose possession it is, loving solitude”* (on Gen. 15:9) *qu. rer. div. h.* 25 (III 30 CW), with which cf.: *“the pigeon is likened to our mind — and to its paradigm*

1 ἕνεκα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν αὕτη δουλωθῇ, καταλείπει καὶ τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων θεὸν καὶ τὴν μητέρα τῶν συμπάντων τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν θεοῦ (on Gen. 2 24), *leg. alleg.* II 14 (I 100 CW); ὁ θεός — τῶν συμπάντων πατήρ (sc. ἐστίν), ἅτε γεγεννηκὼς αὐτά, καὶ σοφίας ἀνήρ, *Cherub.* 14 (I 182 CW); cf. Drummond II 206.

2 Drummond II 168. 207.

the turtledove; for the Logos of God is solitude-loving and solitary” (on Gen. 15:10) *ibid.* 48 (III 52 f. CW). Wisdom is the highest ethical principle for human beings: *“Thus the soul, as it appears, when it is watered with the drinkable stream of Wisdom, both sprouts and advances toward the better”* (on Gen. 4:25) *poster. Cain.* (II 27 CW), with which cf.: *“thus indeed the Logos of God also waters the virtues; for he is the beginning and source of good deeds” ibid.* 37 (II 28 CW); *“for from where is it likely that the understanding thirsty for prudence be filled, except from the Wisdom of God, the unfailing source, into which descending it ascends according to a certain kinship of the zealous learner”* (on Gen. 24:15–16) *poster. Cain.* 41 (II 29 CW), to which cf.: *“the sacred Logos who waters the sciences” ibid.* 45 (II 34 CW)[1].

Only apparently does there stand opposed to the equation of σοφία and λόγος, which emerges from all these statements, the fact that according to some passages the Logos is said to have proceeded from Wisdom: *“he obtained parents incorruptible and most pure (i.e. the divine Logos), a father God, who is also the father of all things, and a mother Wisdom, through whom all things came into being”* (on Lev. 21:11) *profu.* 20 (III 133 CW)[2]; *“and the divine Logos descends, as it were, from the source of Wisdom like a river, in order to irrigate and water the Olympian and heavenly shoots of virtue-loving souls”* (on Gen. 2:10)[4]; — *“he presents the divine Logos as full of the stream of Wisdom” somn.* II 36–37 (III 297 CW); *“one must migrate to the ancestral land of the sacred Logos — and this is Wisdom, the best dwelling-place of virtue-loving souls” migr. Abr.* 6 (II 274 CW)[5].

1 Drummond II 202.

2 What we have here, upon closer consideration, is only a figurative expression of the thought that Wisdom constitutes the essence of the Logos; from this conception arises

that of origin from Wisdom, of Wisdom as the mother of the Logos. “Wisdom and the Logos are, under the pressure of allegorical interpretation, distinguished from one another”. Drummond II 207.

3 This Logos is according to *leg. alleg.* I 19 (see above) essentially the γενικὴ ἀρετή, which there itself appears as an efflux of the Logos.

4 On the designation of the ἄνωτάτω λόγος θεῖος as σοφίας πηγή (*profu.* 18, III 130 f. CW) cf. Zeller p. 374, 2 (the σοφία here is the human, not the world-creating).

5 πατρίφαν γῆν: fatherland, i.e. that in which the essence of the Logos is to be sought.

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More or less indeterminate is the relationship as it appears in *leg. alleg.* II 21 (I 107 CW): “but once they have been watered” (namely the souls from the wisdom of God) “they are also filled with the manna of the most universal — and the most universal is God, and second the Logos of God” (on Deut. 8:15–16)[1]; likewise in *somn.* I 11 (III 219 CW): “he who is guided by wisdom arrives at the former place, having found the head and goal of good pleasure, namely the divine Logos” (on Gen. 22:4)[2], compared with *profu.* 25 (III 139 CW): “having sought also what it is that nourishes the soul — they found, having learned, the word of God and the divine Logos, from which all disciplines and wisdoms flow eternally — for in truth God sprinkles the ethereal wisdom from above upon gifted and God-loving minds” (on Ex. 16:17.4)[3]. A symbolic difference is expressed in the number ten characteristic of the revelation of Wisdom, as opposed to the number seven of the Logos (see above p. 116 f.)[4].

The result is that those traits in the characterization of Wisdom which might suggest a distinct hypostasis, upon closer inspection prove to be mere appearance to the same extent that Philo, as has been shown, is instead concerned to identify Wisdom with the Logos. The unmistakable difficulty of the combination and the residue of obscurity that has not been overcome, however, allow one to surmise that the Philonic attempt to incorporate the principle of Wisdom into the nexus of Logos-conceptions was prompted by consideration of another sphere of intuition and the conceptual material developed there. For the Jewish

1 The division into σοφία and λόγος is here clearly conditioned by the need for allegorical interpretation.

2 The Logos is here (in what precedes) expressly characterized as the cosmic one; the σοφία, by contrast, is that which is gained through correct philosophy (I 10: φιλοσόφησον ἀναγκαιοτάτην καὶ πρεπωδεστάτην φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπῳ); cf. the σοφίαι of the following passage!

3 The λόγος θεῖος is here on the one hand coordinated with the divine word (ῥῆμα), on the other hand corresponds to it the αἰθέριος Wisdom conceived as a cosmic principle.

4 τὸ γὰρ τῆς ὕλης πῆγμα σοφίας ἀριθμὸν τέλειον εἴληχε, δεκάδα, *congr. erud. gr.* 21 (III 95 CW); on the δεκάς as the παντελὴς ἀριθμός cf. Wendland, *Neuentdeckte Fragmente Philos* 1891, p. 8.

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religious philosopher it was a matter of establishing a mediation between his Hellenistic and his Old Testament–grounded Jewish-theosophical lines of thought. There existed a doctrine of Wisdom that was originally practical, arising from teleological, religious–ethical need, and which over time passed into the speculative, and this could not be disregarded[1]. Already Old Testament Chokmah literature advances[2] beyond the concept of divine wisdom as a moral-intellectual attribute alongside other attributes (Job 28:12–28; cf. 15:8, further developed in the main section Prov. 8:22–36) to the idea of the highest mediating principle of creation and of all revelation in the governance of the world (nature and humanity), and indeed in such a way that in poetic hyperbole "the will and thought of God are conceived as a self-active personal power proceeding from God, or at least as striving toward personal embodiment"[3]. It lies in the nature of the matter that Wisdom thus conceived pushes the divine word (the spoken word) into the background among the

1 Already Plato designates the highest reason (νοῦς) conceived as the principle of the coming-to-be and preservation of the world and at the same time as the cause of its purposiveness, side by side as λόγος and as σοφία. According to *Sophist.* 265 C everything is produced through an αἰτία μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένη (cf. *Timaeus* 38 C: ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας —). According to *Phileb.* 30 C f. that principle is as σοφία καὶ νοῦς become immanent in the world (sc. the αἰτία) most rightly so called. And thus also the λόγος which the *Epinomis* (pseudoplatonic; belonging to the older Academy) characterizes with the words: κόσμον, ὃν ἔταξε λόγος ὁ πάντων θειότατος, δρατόν, is conceived as a world-ensouling principle that brings about φορά καὶ κίνησις ἐπὶ τ' ἀγαθόν, and thus is related to Wisdom. Cf. Heinze loc. cit. p. 66; Zeller II⁴, 1 p. 1042.

2 Reminiscent of Persian theology; but whether dependent upon the latter? Cf. Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum* 1898, p. 205 f.; Wildeboer, *Die Sprüche* 1897, p. XXIII; Cheyne, *Origin and Contents of the Psalter* p. 322; Beer in *Th. Lit. Z.* 1899, col. 330.

3 Dillmann, *Alttest. Theologie* pp. 294, 347; idem, *Hiob* 1891 on Job 28 26 f.: "The personification of חכמה is conditioned by the entire structure of the piece; otherwise, however, the statement scarcely goes beyond Prov. 3 19 f.; of the fact that God brought forth חכמה and that she worked for him as an artificer (Prov. 8 22 ff.) there is here (as yet) no mention". Imitations of Prov. 8 are offered by Sir. 1 1 ff.; ch. 24; Bar. 3 14–38; with which passages of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch are also to be compared (42 1–2; 48 1, 7; 49 1–3; 91 10).

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Old Testament teachers of Wisdom[1]. Extra-canonical development, however, corresponding to the intensifying conception of the transcendence of God (cf. moreover Zeller, *a. a. O.*, p. 271[3]), increasingly manifests the need for hypostatizing formulation and, in order to provide this with a firmer foundation, combines divine Wisdom not so much with the Word as with the Spirit of God. An improper identification with both — Word and Spirit — at once seems to be present in Sir. 24:3: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and like a mist I covered the earth," which clearly alludes to Gen. 1:3,2[2]. By contrast, the Book of Wisdom places the creative Logos (as spoken) and the creative σοφία side by side and otherwise refers to the λόγος only sporadically and in such a way that the relationship of the latter to σοφία is not explicitly addressed[3]. All the more clearly does the essential affinity of Wisdom with the divine Spirit emerge here. This Spirit, in the capacity of the spirit of wisdom (πνεῦμα σοφίας Sap. 1:6; 7:7, 22; also 9:17), is conceived as the principle of all revelation, as the producer of all theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as of all moral-religious excellence in receptive, i.e.

1 "The concept of having-been-spoken, i.e. of passivity, always adheres to the word; if one removes this element, what remains as the essential is 'the thought and will of God', and this, personified or conceived as self-power, is nothing other than Wisdom (but always represented as feminine). In the Greek λόγος, because it denotes not merely word but also reason, both דבר and חכמה are united". Dillmann, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 348.

2 Gen. 12 perhaps combined with 2 6 (cf. Ryssel in *Apokr. u. Ps.* I 352)?

3 According to Dillmann, in *Sap.* "the Word as word of revelation (concept of revelation)" — in distinction from the "word of omnipotence" — "is throughout identified with Wisdom" (loc. cit. p. 349). In this connection it is not observed that the identification in question is not explicitly carried out, and that this omission in any case is connected with the author's principled endeavor to replace the divine potency of the Word by that of Wisdom as the higher principle; — certainly in conscious approximation to the λόγος of Hellenic philosophy.

simple-minded, humans[1]. Unmistakably underlying this is the philosophical thought that wisdom is something real, the highest divine power: the same Spirit of the Lord which presents itself as the spirit of wisdom is also again "that which holds all things together" (τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα Sap. 1:7). That precisely πνεῦμα is employed to denote the concept of power (cf. also the personification of πνεῦμα as creative potency in Judith 16:14) is grounded as much in Old Testament religious intuition and expression as in the well-known definitions of Stoic physics. From this one sees that the hypostatization of the principle in question increasingly passes from a poetically improper into a philosophically-dogmatic one. As confirmation it serves that Philo, too, could not carry out his Logos-doctrine without engaging with the biblical and philosophical concept of the divine πνεῦμα. When he designates the essence (τὸ τί ἐστι) of the divine πνεῦμα that has entered into human beings as pure σοφία (ἐπιστήμη, σύνεσις), describes the divine Spirit in itself as the all-wise Spirit (πάνσοφον πνεῦμα; *gigant.* 5–6, II 46 CW), and on the other hand wishes to recognize in the rational spiritual being of the human a certain type and imprint

of divine power, which Moses by its proper name calls image, that is to say, in other words, a self-manifestation of the divine Logos (*qu. det. pot. ins.* 23, I 277 CW), it is obvious that biblical statements have been decisive (Ex. 31:2–3; Num. 11:17; Gen. 6:3; 2:7), and the difficulty and obscurity of the integration into the system of the Logos-idea becomes even more palpable in the case of πνεῦμα than in that of Wisdom. The explanation of this circumstance lies in the fact that in reality neither the Old Testament nor the Stoic concept of Spirit could be reconciled[3] with Philo's dualistic concept of the being of God (his absolute opposition to everything corporeal and material)[2]. The author of the Alexandrian

1 On the reading ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη πνεῦμα (7 22) cf. especially Aall, *Gesch. d. Logosidee in d. griech. Phil.* p. 176, and Siegfried in *Apokr. u. Ps.* I 490.

2 See Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria* p. 200.

3 Cf. also Drummond I 325 ff.

Book of Wisdom, moreover, was not prevented by the combination of Old Testament and Stoic conceptions, which here assigned to the divine Spirit the significance of a highest principle, from endowing divine Wisdom with attributes that make it — at least indirectly — appear essentially identical with the Hellenistic-Alexandrian Logos[1]. What is chiefly at issue is the much-discussed section Sap. 7:22–31, which presents increased difficulty for individual interpretation through the unmethodical and disorderly nature of the enumeration. With regard to the contact of Alexandrian Logos-doctrine with the statements found here, note especially the following. Wisdom is, as a spiritual being, according to 7:22 λεπτόν ("subtle"; cf. v. 23: καθαρῶν λεπτότατων); so Philo says of the Logos: "and it is subtle both to conceive and to be conceived, and exceedingly transparent and pure to behold" (*leg. alleg.* III 59, I 150 CW). The wisdom-spirit is further εὐκίνητον ("highly mobile"); Philo says: "for the Logos is most swift-moving and warm, and especially that of the cause" (*Cherub.* 9, I 177 CW)[2]. It is ἀπήμαντον ("without suffering," Grimm); compare the Logos passage *vit. Mos.* I 12 (II 91 M). Philo remarks on the burning bush: what appears in the fire is an image of being and a most God-like statue, with a brilliance of appearance and a beauty of form such as nothing visible displays; it is designated (according to the Exodus passage) as an angel because it (almost?) silently proclaimed what was to come; this proclamation, however, occurs not in a sensibly perceptible manner, but only in that the inwardly perceived event at the thorn bush — the burning and not being consumed — is a symbol, — with

1 Note also the sevenfold number characteristic of the Logos in the 21 properties of the spirit of Wisdom according to 7 22.23. That, in spite of individual divergences (cod. C; Euseb.; Ar.; Vulg.; Syr.), the number 21 is to be maintained, see Grimm, *Exeg. Handb. z. d. Apokr. d. A. T.* 1860, VI 156 f. (less decisively: Menzel, *Der griech. Einfluss auf Prediger u. Weish. Sal.* 1889, p. 63).

2 With respect to the attributes τρανόν and σαφές (v. 22) one may at any rate recall *dec. orac.* 9 (II 185 M): ψυχήν (ἠχήν M) λογικὴν ἀνάπλεω σαφηνείας καὶ τρανότητος.

3 See the remark of Mangey, who translates "*tacito*".

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a silence that speaks more clearly than a voice (τρανοτέρα φωνῆς ἡσυχία). What Moses perceives in the vision is therefore not a real, personal intermediate being (angel), but only a symbol of the highest bearer of revelation, the Logos[1]. This is indicated unmistakably not only by the expressions cited from Philo, but also by the notion that what Moses perceived in the burning bush bestowed sustaining power upon the fire and thus granted the bush an impassible essence (ἀπαθὴς οὐσία), as well as by the suggestion that this corresponded to divine providence (πρόνοια). Here the allusion to the Stoic Logos as the active (in contrast to the passive) and at the same time fire-like principle on the one hand, and as providence on the other, clearly comes to light. The attributes of the wisdom-spirit ὀξύ and ἀκώλυτον ("penetrating, not to be hindered," Siegfried; cf. for ὀξύ Heb. 4:12: διϊκνούμενος)[2] recall Philo's λόγος τομεύς ("cutting Logos") — "with his all-cutting Logos, which, sharpened to the keenest edge, divides and never ceases" (*qu. rer. div. h.* 26, III 30 CW) — all the more so when Philo himself ascribes "the function of the Logos the cutter to Wisdom" (*profu.* 35, III 152 CW: "the wisdom of God is holy and bears nothing earthly, and is the judgment of all things, by which all oppositions are separated")[3]. To 7:23 πανεπίσκοπον corresponds the statement: "thus also the Logos of God is most sharp-sighted, so as to be capable of overseeing all things" (*leg. alleg.* III 59, I 150 CW), while the immediately preceding παντοδύναμον recalls the παντοδύναμος λόγος of 18:15 (see above p. 145). For Wisdom as "the effulgence of eternal light" (ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου 7:26), reference may be made back to the Philonic Logos as image, likeness, and shadow of God (see above p. 107 f.). When σοφία according to 8:1 "reaches from end to end," one is reminded in Philo of the application of τείνω (and its compounds) to the

1 Against the forced explanation of Drummond II 265–267.

2 Cf. on ἀκώλυτον v. 24: πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία, διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα, and already in addition Anaxag. frg. 8 (6) on νοῦς: εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεφ καὶ ἐκώλυεν ἂν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατέειν ὁμοίως —.

3 Drummond II 168. 207.

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divine powers, among whose highest (ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρῶται δυνάμεις) the Logos belongs as the mediating gatherer (*Cherub.* 9): "for stretching his powers through all things to the ends, he wove each to each according to the principles of harmony" (*poster. Cain.* II 4 CW)[1]. The σοφία τεχνῖτις of 7:21 may be set alongside the τεχνικός θεῖος λόγος in *qu. rer. div. h.* 24 (III 28 CW)[2]. The closer relation between the picture of σοφία given in Sap. 7:22–31 and the Hellenistic-Alexandrian Logos-idea is also confirmed by the other statements of the section,

according to which Wisdom is God's confidant and counsellor (μύστις τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἱρετίς τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ 8:4), his companion on the throne (τὴν τῶν σῶν θρόνων πάρεδρον 9:4), and his inseparable beloved (8:3), the witness and mediator of creation (9:9–2), the organ of world-preservation (8:3.6), and in particular also of revelation to Israel (people: 10:1–11; individuals: 9:8–11)[3].

While, therefore, in the *Sapientia Salomonis*, which is governed by Old Testament conceptual development, Wisdom quite directly takes the place of the emerging Logos of Alexandrian religious philosophy as its equivalent[4], Philo thereafter elevated this Logos itself to the supreme concept of the doctrine of revelation

1 Further Philonic passages see Drummond II 112.

2 That the entire section 7 22–30, insofar as it (apart from the Stoic κοινὸς λόγος) points back to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras and ultimately to the λόγος ξυνός of Heraclitus, rests on knowledge of the Platonic passage *Cratyl.* 412 D–413 D, has been rendered quite probable by Edm. Pfleiderer through comparison of λεπτόν (v. 22), διὰ πάντων χωροῦν λεπτότατων (v. 23), διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα (v. 24), πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία (v. 24), ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής· διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτὴν παρεμπίπτει (v. 25), ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη εὐπρεπεστέρα ἡλίου — τοῦτο γὰρ διαδέχεται νύξ — (vv. 29.30) (*Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterienidee* 1886, pp. 298–301). Cf. also Menzel loc. cit. p. 61.

3 Cf. the Philonic Logos passages: *conf. lingu.* 14; *fragm.* Eus. *pr. ev.* VII 13 (H 625 M); *migr. Abr.* 1; *leg. alleg.* III 31; *vit. Mos.* I 12; *qu. rer. div. h.* 42 (Drumm. II 267 f.); *poster. Cain* 35; *qu. D. s. imm.* 28, etc.

4 On the limited significance which the hypostatizing formulation of the Wisdom idea has in the whole of Scripture cf. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volks*[3] III 380.

and carried the idea of Wisdom along only insofar as the historical need for mediation of his Jewish-religious consciousness required it[1]. It must furthermore not be forgotten, with regard to the preliminary stage of Philonic Logos-speculation provided by Old Testament and apocryphal Wisdom doctrine, that Hebrew created no expression for the concept of reason[2], and that from this side as well a consideration passing over into the philosophical was available only through the related but narrower concept of Wisdom and the corresponding word חכמה.

As regards, finally, the hypostatization of the concept in the Philonic Logos in particular, it also has, outside the related field of religious literature, on explicitly philosophical ground, at least indirect antecedents that deserve mention. Already the Alexandrian-Jewish religious philosopher Aristobulus, a Peripatetic of eclectic, in particular Stoicizing orientation (ca. 150 BC)[3], seeks from his standpoint of transcendence to secure the living relation of God to the

world by positing, in distinction from God himself, the divine power (δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ, θεία δύναμις) as omnipresent and all-governing in the universe[4]. Upon closer inspection, this

1 We are unfortunately unable to trace the λόγος τῆς σοφίας which, in the Neopythagorean writing (Perictione [Zeller: *Periktione*]) *περὶ σοφίας*, is identified with the λόγος τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως (and the φρόνησις τῶν ἐόντων) (Stob. *flor.* I, 62). Heinze (loc. cit. p. 182) is of the opinion that the objective reason in the world must have appeared to the author (or authoress) of the fragment as something extraordinarily important, since he gives it three different designations in three different lines. — The Logos of Wisdom would be nothing other than Wisdom itself, yet perhaps already shading over into Jewish doctrine.

2 Siegfried–Stade give in the German–Hebrew lexicon for "reason": לב, שכל, תבונה, תושיה. The inadequacy of all such expressions is evident to everyone.

3 See especially Schürer loc. cit. p. 387 ff.

4 *Euseb. pr. ev.* XIII 12, 666 d; 664 c. A παρὰ θεοῦ δυναμικόν is present in fire, when it does not act by its nature as all-consuming (Euseb. loc. cit. VIII 10, 377 d). Related appears the theological hypostatization of the concept of power in Ps.-Aristeas: ἔτι μόνος θεός ἐστι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ φανερὰ γίνεται, πεπληρωμένου τοῦ παντὸς τόπου τῆς δυναστείας — τὸ γὰρ καθόλου πάντα πρὸς τὸ φυσικὸν λόγον ὁμοίως καθέστηκεν ὑπὸ μιᾶς δυνάμεως οἰκονομούμενα (Joseph. II, 2, 116 Haverk). According to An. Aall, the author knows the Stoic φυσικὸς λόγος; but he subordinates it to the more significant term δύναμις. — A favorite conception of the author is "the divine dynasty" (loc. cit. p. 174). Also II Macc. 3 38 is to be adduced here (εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ἀληθῶς ἐν τῷ θεῷ δύναμιν). How matters stand with τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως Sap. 7 25 remains doubtful. Cf. the δύναμις ὑψίστου Luke 1 35 and ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ καλουμένη Μεγάλη Acts 8 10. As to the emergence of the more abstract concept of δύναμις as a "speculative equivalent for our concept of the Logos", cf. Aall p. 172.

all-encompassing mediating potency breaks down for him into an opposition of forces, as is stated, in connection with the wording of an Orphic saying and at the same time in contradiction to the thought of the latter, in the following three hexameters:

αὐτὸς δ' ἐξ ἀγαθῶν θνητοῖς κακὸν οὐκ ἐπιτέλλει
ἀνθρώποις· αὐτῷ δὲ χάρις καὶ μῖσος ὀπηδεῖ
καὶ πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἴδ' ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα[1].

Here "between God and the world forces are interposed, not merely harmful ones, but also benevolent ones, as a kind of intermediate stages, which here are even separated in essence from God, since he is directly opposed to them as αὐτός, and they are supposed to bring about effects that do not proceed immediately from God"[2]. If a comparison with the essence and

function of the δυνάμεις in the later system of Philo suggests itself almost involuntarily, the Aristobulean ὀπηδεῖ in particular recalls on the one hand the Philonic passage *qu. rer. div. h.* 48 (III 53 CW): “the Logos of God — accustomed always to ascend above and to be an attendant of the one alone”[3], and on the other hand *somn.* I 33 (III 246 CW): “— through his interpreters and attendant angels, who have been deemed worthy by the begetting Father of a divine and blessed portion”[4].

1 *Euseb. pr. ev.* XIII 12, 665 a.

2 Heinze loc. cit. p. 188 f. On the question whether divine σοφία (as also χάρις) is to be counted among these powers, see ibid. p. 190 f.

3 Cf. *migr. Abr.* 31 (II 302 CW).

4 The related Philonic conception and designation: ὁμοούσιαι δυνάμεις scarcely needs to be recalled.

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That there is no question of the Logos in the Greek sense in Aristobulus[1] cannot be conceded without further ado. The question is what significance the repeatedly mentioned ἕβδομος λόγος has. It might seem that Aristobulus thereby distinguishes in the human being a particular psychic faculty (λόγος) as seventh and thus highest among other, lower ones (λόγοις), and proceeds from the presupposition that one and the same universal rational principle presents itself at different levels in the various psychic faculties of the human being. In this view one would have to recognize one of the Stoicizing elements of Aristobulus’ philosophy. But precisely Stoic psychology, which distinguishes eight psychic faculties (“parts of the soul”)[2], does not favor this interpretation. Nor does it accord with Aristotelian doctrine, which designates the highest intellectual faculty, by means of which ultimate causes and ends are grasped immediately (θεωρεῖν), as νοῦς and subordinates λόγος to it as the faculty of discursive cognition[3]. Nor, likewise, could a Platonic basis be involved. In this situation, the interpretation of the ἕβδομος λόγος as the seventh rational faculty in the human being appears inadmissible, and with it also the conclusion that the highest cosmic principle of Aristobulus, the δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ, corresponds as divine Logos to the ἕβδομος λόγος of the human being. Rather, decisive for the explanation of the “seventh Logos” is the relation into which it is brought, on the basis of the biblical narrative, with the Sabbath and the creation of the world. The seventh Logos is not as such a rational psychic faculty of the human being; it signifies a divine word that, as seventh, is emphatically set over against others: namely, the already presupposed words of creation[4]. But just as certainly as Aristobulus connects the expression λόγος with the concept of

1 Heinze p. 191.

2 Zeller III³, 1, p. 198.

3 Heinze p. 74 f.

4 διὰ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἡμῖν ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου θεοῦ λόγους εἴρηκεν ὁ Μωσῆς, *Euseb. pr. ev.* XIII 12, 664 b.

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word (not reason), so he also does not wish the divine words to be understood merely as the sounding of a divine voice, but in the sense of creative production itself[1]. When now "Moses" reports a sequence of six λόγοι θεοῦ, that is, works of creation, and joins to these as a seventh moment the rest of God, this means for Aristobulus just as little a temporal succession of creative acts as a contrast between divine activity and inactivity[2]. The Sabbath celebration of God, who is absolute causality, pure activity, is to be understood in the sense of consummating creative activity; it becomes a "seventh word" of God (Gen. 2:2–3), which manifests itself as a real production in that faculty of the human being by means of which he (analogous to the Creator's survey of creation in Gen. 1:31) comes to know himself and the world according to the interconnection of divine causes and ends, that is, attains knowledge of truth as such, and indeed theoretically and practically at once[3]. On the basis of this combination Aristobulus perceives in the divine Sabbath institution a continually renewed reference (σημέρον) to the Creator's concluding work, the ἕβδομος λόγος, that is, according to what has been shown, to the spiritual creation of light accomplished through the highest rational endowment of the human being[4]. Nor does he fail to derive the light of spirit accruing to the human being by virtue of the ἕβδομος λόγος, the Sabbath light, from eternal divine Wisdom

1 δεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνειν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν οὐ ῥητὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἔργων κατασκευὰς, ibid.

2 Cf. Schlatter, the glossator of the Greek Sirach, in *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie* I, 1897, pp. 171–174, 130 (ἀειγενὴς κτίσις).

3 *Euseb. pr. ev.* XIII 12, 667 c: — τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἑβδόμου λόγου καθεστῶτος, ἐν ᾧ γνῶσιν ἔχομεν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ θείων πραγμάτων (the expression γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνθρ. κ. θεῖ. πραγμ. is a Stoic formula: see Zeller III³, 2, p. 264); ibid. 668 a: ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν λήθης καὶ κακίας ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἑβδόμῳ λόγῳ — γνῶσιν ἀληθείας λαμβάνομεν.

4 The seventh day given by God to humankind for rest can allegorically also be called the first, as φωτὸς γένεσις ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα συνθεωρεῖται; *Euseb. pr. ev.* XIII 12, 667 a.

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as effect and participation[1]. The relation of this σοφία to the general "δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ," however, is no more worked out than that of the speaking (word) of God[2].

If, therefore, we do not yet have the rational concept of the Logos of Philonic theology in Aristobulus, it is nevertheless not to be overlooked how here the word of God, insofar as it is "ἕβδομος λόγος," receives an interpretation that was suited to prepare the way for the Philonic shift in meaning of the θεῖος λόγος as such[3].

1 μεταφέρειτο δ’ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σοφίας· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν φῶς ἐστιν ἐξ αὐτῆς· καί τινες εἴρηκασι τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἱρέσεως ὄντες τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου, λαμπρὸς αὐτὴν ἔχειν τάξιν· ἀκολουθοῦντες γὰρ αὐτῇ συνεχῶς ἀτάραχοι καταστήσονται δι’ ὅλου τοῦ βίου. σαφέστερον δὲ καὶ κάλλιον τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων τις εἶπε Σολομὼν αὐτὴν πρὸ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς ὑπάρχειν, ibid. a, b (cf. Clem. Alex. *strom.* VI, 16, 138).

2 With regard to the question whether the addition to Sir. 17 4 (248): ἔλαβον χρῆσιν τῶν πέντε τοῦ κυρίου ἐνεργημάτων, ἕκτον δὲ νοῦν αὐτοῖς ἐδωρήσατο μερίζων, καὶ τὸν ἕβδομον λόγον ἑρμηνέα τῶν ἐνεργημάτων αὐτοῦ stands in relation to the ἕβδομος λόγος of Aristobulus (cf., over against Schlatter, Smend in *Th. Lit. Z.* 1900, col. 390), this can be disregarded already in view of the uncertainty of the interpretation here. If, moreover, the expanded Sirach text (248, 253, 70, 106 L) presents at 1 4 the λόγος θεοῦ ἐν ὑψίστοις as the source of Wisdom, if at 1 7 (L) it has Wisdom created by God in spiritu sancto, and at 24 3 causes through Wisdom an inextinguishable light to rise in the heavens (Schlatter loc. cit. p. 135 f.), then it aligns itself, in the poetically personifying form of representation, with the Old Testament writers. Wisdom is the comprehensive concept of purposive divine thinking contained in divine speech (λόγος), which through this speech attains objective substantiality in the coming-to-be and preservation of the world and in particular of humankind. Thus she appears at one time as God’s creature, at another as an efflux of the divine Logos; and since with the speaking of God the conception of the divine breath is connected (Ps. 32 [33] 6: τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν), there naturally resulted the variation which places the bringing forth of Wisdom as mediated by the πνεῦμα ἅγιον. If σοφία was thereby presented as the first creature preceding the whole creation (L: *primogenita ante omnem creaturam*), then personification could also proceed to grasp her as the mediating principle of the cosmic creation of light.

3 When Schlatter (p. 166) refers to Philo *leg. alleg.* I 46 (ὅταν ἐπιγίνηται τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ κατὰ ἑβδομάδα ἅγιος λόγος, ἐπέχεται ἡ ἕξις) and remarks: “Here too the ‘seventh’ Logos appears again”, he posits an equation which does not correspond to reality. Philo does not have Aristobulus’ “seventh Logos”. The Logos which he designates as ὁ κατὰ ἑβδομάδα λόγος or ὁ τῆς ἑβδομάδος λόγος (*opif. mund.* 40) or ὁ κατὰ ἑβδομάδα κινούμενος τέλειος λόγος (*leg. alleg.* I 8) corresponds much more, as most general highest principle, to the absolute divine rational power, to that which Aristobulus designates still more abstractly than δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ simpliciter, and which this latter also, in Pythagorizing fashion, represents as a potency that manifests itself efficaciously in the whole cosmos according to the law of the number seven, in a seven-stage mode of revelation.

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Even more distinctly than in Aristobulus, we see within Hellenistic philosophy itself the opposition between the essence of God and his power, and thereby the hypostatizing formulation of the latter, emerge in individual statements of the eclectic author of the

pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *περὶ κόσμου* (probably in the second half of the last century BC). God is, according to his οὐσία, absolutely transcendent, “so that, like the Persian king, he does not concern himself at all with the individual.” The origin, preservation, and governance of the world are the work of the (divine) power that pervades the entire cosmos (διά τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διήκουσα δύναμις)[1]. When, in this connection, God is, in Stoic fashion, called the νόμος ἰσοκλινής of the world[2], according to which it differentiates into the various genera and species of beings by means of its own peculiar seeds (διά τῶν οἰκείων σπερμάτων)[3], the inner relationship between the author’s θεία δύναμις and the λόγος σπερματικός, the substantial world-reason of the Stoic system, becomes evident of itself.

Immediately, the θεῖος λόγος which a Jewish-Hellenistic poet, the tragedian Ezekiel (2nd cent. BC?), lets shine forth toward Moses from the fiery bush[4], seems related to the conceptual world of Philo[5]. But the points of reference for a more precise historical and

1 c. 5 (396 b); c. 6 (397 b); c. 6 (398 b). The Stoic element in the author’s outlook has prevented a consistent carrying through of the opposition in question (Heinze loc. cit. p. 175).

2 c. 6 (400 b, 28).

3 Cf. also Zeller III³, 1, p. 640. Attention is also due to the definition of πνεῦμα as ἡ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία (c. 4, 394 b, 9).

4 ὁ δ’ ἐκ βάτου σοι θεῖος ἐκλάμπει λόγος, *Euseb. pr. ev.* IX 29, 441 a.

5 *vit. Mos.* I 12 (see above, the discussion on ἀπήμαντον Sap. 7 22, p. 157).

conceptual determination are lacking.

However that may be, after what has been said there can hardly be any doubt that Philo himself, on the basis of Alexandrian religio-philosophical doctrine and literature, had already found the speculative (theosophical) concept of the Logos somehow formulated — and indeed in multiple ways, or respectively in different stages of hypostatization. Nor is there any lack of indications of his own. Thus Philo says *somn.* I 19 (III 230 CW) on Gen. 28.11 (“ἀπήντησε τόπῳ· εἶδε γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος”): ἔγνω δὲ ἥλιον μὲν ὑποστατήσαντες εἰργάσθαι νοῦν συμβολικῶς αἰσθητόν τε καὶ νοῦν, τὰ γινόμενα καλὰ ἢ μᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι κριτήρια, τόπον δὲ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, οὕτως ἐξεδέξαντο· ἀπήντησεν ὁ ἀσκητὴς λόγῳ θεῷ δόντος τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου φέγγους. To this is added *somn.* II 37 (III 298 CW): <μᾶλλον> δέ, ὡς εἰπέ τις[1], ὅλον δὲ ὅλων ἀναχεόμενον [line 16] καὶ αἰρόμενον εἰς ὕψος (sc. τὸν θεῖον λόγον διασυνίστησι).

As for the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, then, it cannot be in doubt, on the basis of what has preceded, that the Evangelist, both in the choice of the designation of the highest organ of revelation and in the exposition of its essence and function, has attached himself to the Alexandrian-Philonic Logos doctrine[2]. Determinative for him could only have been the judgment

1 Unless, with Mangey, ὡς ἄν εἴποι τις is to be taken into account as the original wording.

2 A “direct and conscious reminiscence of the conceptually powerful Proemium” of Heraclitus in John 1:1, such as Norden assumes (*Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrh. v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* 1898, II 473), cannot be demonstrated. Cf. also Wendland, *Ein Wort des Heraklit im N. T. (Jakobusbrief)* in *Sitzungsber. d. K. Pr. Ak. d. Wiss.* 1898, p. 794. As regards the “relationship between the Johannine and Philonic doctrine of the Logos”, one may even today refer to the apt words of Weizsäcker: “There is indeed nothing easier than to show the great difference between the two doctrines, to demonstrate that they rest upon different fundamental conceptions. And far be it indeed to wish to misconceive the thoroughly original Johannine formation. But this certainly does not exclude that it was stimulated by familiar concepts that came from there or at least from related domains. — One may perhaps go even further and not merely say that John did not adopt the Philonic Logos, but that his doctrine stands in downright opposition to it. But precisely then we shall be all the more entitled not merely calmly to acknowledge the points of contact—such as, to mention only this, in the relation of ὁ θεός and θεός and the concept of φῶς in the Prologue—but also obliged to acknowledge them. The creative character of the primitive Christian spirit does not prove itself in that it would have passed through time as if freely floating, but in that, living within it, it has towered high above it and overcome it” (*Die johanneische Logoslehre*, with special consideration of the writing *Der johanneische Lehrbegriff*, by Dr. B. Weiss, in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* VII, 1862, p. 708).

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 166, l. 16: the second parenthesis is to be placed after λόγον.

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that the outlook of Hellenistic religious philosophy, in its wondrous mixture of biblical and philosophical ideas, contained a kernel of truth in which a God-wrought presentiment of the revelation in Christ was to be recognized. From the seriousness of this positive appreciation is explained the extent of the consideration that the Evangelist accorded to the body of ideas offered from that quarter[1]. But the utilization of this rich material

1 “This philosophy is not merely like a cloak hung over history and faith, but it determines the concepts throughout” (Weizsäcker, *Das apostolische Zeitalter*[2] p. 533). Cf. especially Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* p. 308 ff. Lütgert, who concedes that the Evangelist made contact with an already existing doctrine of the Logos (— he thinks both of the Alexandrian and of the Palestinian-synagogal and speaks of “direct” points of contact in the Palestinian synagogue —), derives (following Schlatter, *Der Glaube*[2] p. 147) the choice of the designation of Jesus as the Logos, i.e. the Word, from the endeavor—also manifest in the determination of the value-relation of Jesus’ word and “work” (i.e. signs)—to ward off the widespread christological view which sees in the “natural” miraculous works the most adequate expression of the spiritual nature of Christ:

"by calling that which is generated from the Spirit the Word, a naturalization of the concept of Spirit, and thus a flattening of Christology, is to be prevented"; "not natural effects, but the doing of the will of God is the goal of Jesus and of the Spirit" (*Beiträge zur Förderung christl. Theologie* III, 1899, p. 124). This combination, as everyone sees, leaves the obvious and far-reaching kinship of the Evangelist's Logos doctrine with that of Philo completely unexplained and accordingly misconceives the fundamental theological side of the Logos idea in the Gospel. Jesus is proclaimed as the Logos so that he may be recognized as **θεός**. He is Logos, is "Word" in a higher sense, already before the origin of the world, already before he has spoken in the world and to the world (see on this Lütgert's own exposition p. 125). If, however, his revelation to the world is likewise determined and in principle conceived under the standpoint of Logos-activity, then the repeated emphasis on the word (and faith in the word) over against the miraculous work (and faith in miracles) is simply to be understood as a consequence and confirmation of the latter conception. That the Evangelist went so far as generally and fundamentally to divert the interest of faith from Jesus' miracle-working and for this purpose chose precisely the designation of Christ as the Logos = Word, will scarcely be found credible if one keeps in view how precisely this Evangelist rather raises Jesus' miracle-working to the highest degree and at the same time most strongly emphasizes its significance for Jesus' self-revelation, in that he depicts it (in distinction from the Synoptics) solely as a means for this purpose (cf. Holtzmann, *N. Theol.* II 447–451). Alongside the special, higher standpoint of John 20:29, that of 20:30–31 remains in full force for the Fourth Gospel in general. Cf. also Keppler, *Die Composition des Johannes-Evangeliums* 1884, pp. 6 f., 96–98.

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could be accomplished by the writer of salvation history only in such a way that he replaced the prevailing concepts, with their abstract generality, by corresponding concrete representations of religious, biblically grounded consciousness, and gave these latter as content to the expressions of the religious-philosophical school that were retained as far as possible. By this is determined above all that the Evangelist, abandoning the un-Hebraic (see above) and unbiblical Philonic concept of reason, gives his λόγος the meaning "word"[1]. With this, immediate connection was established with the suggestive biblical expression "word of God," and at the same time it became possible to illuminate the essence of the Logos, which was first to be more precisely determined, from purely salvation-historical premises. Without constraint, from this point of view, the Old Testament word of God in its all-encompassing, revelation- and salvation-mediating significance could be regarded

1 The turn of phrase: "Jesus is the incarnate 'Word', the world-reason existing with God from eternity" (Jülicher, *Einleitung in das N. T.* 1901, p. 304) fails to recognize this principled transformation of the concept of the Logos in the Evangelist. A curious contribution to our question is given by A. N. Jannaris (*St. John's Gospel and the Logos* in Preuschen's *Zeitschr. f. d. neutest. Wiss.* 1901, II 13–25).

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as a preparatory prefiguration of the Logos who appeared in the person of Jesus (cf. John 12:40 f.)[1]. The word of God, the λόγος κυρίου (θεοῦ), attested by the Old Testament, points back to something higher. Even before God spoke through creation and revelation in such a way that a creaturely God-consciousness arose, he had, outside of time and in accordance with his most proper essence, spoken himself within himself, had become objective to himself in the λόγος κατ' ἐξ. By that very fact he also created the real presupposition of his speaking outwardly. Alongside this, for the Evangelist the designation "word of God," or simply ὁ λόγος, transferred by the New Testament community to the evangelical proclamation (Mark 2:2; 4:14 ff., 33; 8:32; 16:20; Luke 1:2; Acts 6:4; 8:4; 11:19; 14:25; 16:6; 17:11; James 1:21; 1 Peter 2:8; Gal. 6:6; Col. 4:3; 1 Thess. 1:6; 2 Tim. 4:2; Titus 1:9) could acquire special significance only in the light of his own Logos idea, insofar as it might count as consequence and confirmation of it. That occasionally the already discussed more poetically hypostatizing (personifying) conception of the divine word in the Old Testament also passed over into the New Testament doctrine of the "word of God" is shown, with unmistakable allusion to the Philonic λόγος (τομεύς and ὀξυδερκέστατος; see above pp. 116, 158), by Heb. 4:12 f. (cf. Acts 20:32; James 1:21). It scarcely requires remark that even in this turn a moment lay which favored the advance toward the Logos idea of the Evangelist[2]; whereas the inference from Rev. 19:13 (ὁ Λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ = the Word of God), "that even before the Fourth Gospel the Logos name found application, or at least usage, in Christian doctrinal language"[3], remains uncertain, since in any case the possibility

1 See above on Philo and cf. Dillmann, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 345 f. ("What is said about the Word does not yet involve a self-distinction in God, but it does involve the indispensability of the Word for the whole revelation, and to this then attaches the N.T. λόγος as the mediator of all creation- and salvation-revelation").

2 See also H. Holtzmann, *Neutestl. Theol.* II 295.

3 Holtzmann, loc. cit. II 372.

of a later addition is at play[1]. It must further not be overlooked that the opposition into which the Evangelist enters with Philo through the transformation of the rational Logos into the word Logos recurs in the relation of the Gospel to Gnosticism. In Basilides, the sequence Πατήρ, Νοῦς, Λόγος, Φρόνησις, Σοφία[2] shows that in the Logos the immanent rational faculty of the absolute being is named (thinking as principle of revelation, not yet word)[3]. Similarly, the Barbelo-Gnosis represents the rational Logos when it derives, from the primal syzygy, in the first instance the syzygy Ennoia and Logos[4]. In Valentinus, however, the parallel of the two highest pairs of the begotten Aeons, Πατήρ and Ἀλήθεια, Λόγος and Ζωή, makes it all the more certain that the Logos is meant as the divine rational principle, since the Valentinian Ptolemy expressly declares the Νοῦς to be the father of the Λόγος (of Valentinus' Πατήρ), and since, moreover, the feminine principle of the primal being (Valentinus' Σιγή) is already characterized as Ἔννοια[5]. The Logos-Ophis of the Peratae also seems to be conceived as an "aggregate of ideas"[6], while

alongside this the Logos of the Sethians, as the counterpart of the human νοῦς, by whom the latter is liberated, likewise leads to the concept of reason[7].

Just as in the Fourth Gospel's return to the divine word that mediates all revelation, so the principled opposition of its purely religious, biblically determined outlook to the Alexandrian-philosophical one manifests itself in the further fact that the Logos no longer appears half as abstraction, half as hypostasis (with improper personification), as does the rational Logos of Philo (see above pp. 143 f.), but becomes the concrete representation of the rational spiritual being of

1 Holtzmann loc. cit. I 471.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 24.

3 Hippol. *synt.* in Epiphan. *haer.* 24, 1. 3. Here it is the **Νοῦς** which appeared in Jesus as Christ.

4 Iren. *haer.* I, 29, 1. 2.

5 Iren. *haer.* I, 11, 1. 1.

6 Hippol. *phil.* V, 16. 17. Cf. Moeller, *Lehrb. d. Kirchengesch.*[*1] I 144 ([2] I 154).

7 Hippol. *phil.* V, 19.

God and thereby a personal spiritual potency. This development had been specifically prepared in part precisely through those personifying statements about the word of God in Old and New Testament literature. But the impulse resulting from this could become all the more forceful, since in the Evangelist's consciousness that personifying-dynamic conception of the word of God was accompanied by the analogous biblical and Jewish-theological notion of real higher (purely spiritual) personal beings as mediators of divine activity outwardly, as they are given first of all in the angelic world. To what extent, in this direction, the self-testimony of Jesus already provided points of reference in the Synoptics is evident from our first investigation (see above p. 59). But it must here be expressly recalled that in the New Testament and elsewhere (in Josephus [*Ant.* XV, 5, 3] and otherwise)[1] the angels are designated, in various perspectives, as mediators of the Sinaitic revelation (ὁ νόμος — διαταγεὶς δι' ἀγγέλων Gal. 3:19; ὁ δι' ἀγγέλων λαληθεὶς λόγος Heb. 2:2; τοῦ ἀγγέλου τοῦ λαλοῦντος αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄρει Σινᾷ Acts 7:38; ἐλάβετε τὸν νόμον εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων v. 53; cf. LXX to Deut. 33:2), and that already in the Old Testament a special relation of the מַלְאָךְ to word-revelation in general, its function as messenger, emerges repeatedly (1 Kings 13:18; Job 33:23, etc., "to which then is joined the fact that the angels in later prophetic books and apocalypses step directly into the place of the prophetic spirit — Ezekiel, Zechariah, Daniel")[2]. That this parallel between word of God and angel, which presented itself to the Evangelist on a biblical basis, already in itself constituted an

opposition to the Philonic combination of ideas and general rational powers (λόγοι) with the ἄγγελοι, is obvious.

Of greater importance, however, is the fact that the Evangelist, by ascribing to the word-Logos as the one, highest organ of the

1 Cf. Holtzmann loc. cit. I 52.

2 Dillmann loc. cit. p. 324. Note also the ἄγγελος αὐτῷ λελάληκεν John 12:29.

entire creative and revelatory activity of God the essence of a real personality, does not remain, with Philo, at the conception of a mediating being and thus at the Old Testament category of the angel, but, as has been shown in the first investigation, carries through the thought of the actual divine essence: his Logos is "God" with God. In so doing he has just as decisively overcome the presuppositions of the rigidly monotheistic Jewish concept of God. The Hellenistic (Philonic) as well as the Jewish doctrine of God is dominated by the standpoint of transcendence, of opposition to nature and to anthropopathism. From this standpoint the concept of God inevitably becomes lifeless, both inwardly and outwardly. The matter comes to sharper expression in the speculation of Philo, which works with philosophical concepts. For him the essence of God is pure being, an abstraction that goes beyond the concept of personality. Nor is the personality of God preserved by the fact that God is conceived as absolute energy and in this sense as free, because every distinction of qualities and every change, every alteration of self-determination, every opposition of spontaneous and receptive behavior, of activity and passivity, is excluded from him (cf. above on John 5:17, pp. 116 f.). The appeal to the personal God of the Old Testament as the absolutely existent one (יהוה) is therefore irrelevant in this respect. With this formulation of the absolute being, such an opposition arose between the deity and the world of finite and material being that the idea of an immediate relation of causality became unworkable. The real ground of the world was displaced from God and, insofar as it was not given with the dualistic presupposition of an eternal matter (the παθητὸν αἴτιον), was recognized in the mediating being of the Logos. It is easy to show that Jewish theology had long since been moving along a parallel path. The increasing emphasis on transcendence emerges already in the post-exilic period in the manner of designation

of the God of Israel (אלהים and אל in the sense of otherworldliness and absoluteness and in this way synonymous and interchangeable with עליונים or "God of heaven," also even simply "heaven" — as it seems already Dan. 4:23; likewise the elevation of the tetragrammaton יהוה to mystery and ἄρρητον). Still more loudly does the all-dominating sense of the immeasurable chasm between God and world testify in the demonstrable formation, from the beginning of post-exilic development, of the doctrine of mediating beings: the angels. It is noteworthy how, toward the end of the sixth century, the practical interests of the pre-exilic past and the theological needs of the new age were still in conflict with one another. Approximately

contemporaneous with the emergence of an already fairly articulated angelic world in the prophecy of Zechariah is the complete silence about angels in the author of the so-called Priestly Writing. To connect this latter fact with the transcendence standpoint of P[1] is mistaken. The rejecting attitude toward belief in angels in P, in significant continuity with Deuteronomy, which likewise characteristically avoids speaking of angels, is conditioned by the cultic-religious effort to keep at a distance whatever might loosen the gradually attained strictly monotheistic concept of God and lead anew to aberrations of a paganly shaped worship (cf. also Col. 2:18; Rev. 19:10; 22:9, the warning against worship of an angel)[2].

1 Cf. e.g. Holzinger, *Einleitung in den Hexateuch* 1893, p. 379: "Further, in P's conceptions of revelation, the care with which the transcendence of God is preserved is characteristic. Theophanies were unavoidable, but with P they have something alien, abstract. — Angels and dreams do not occur."

2 "The absence of any polemic against the worship of foreign gods, which at the time of the origin of the Priestly Code thus no longer harbored the danger of seduction" (Stade, *Gesch. d. V. Isr.*[1] II 184; cf. incidentally Holzinger p. 376), must therefore be correctly understood: P strikes higher! Cf. moreover, concerning "Jewish angel-worship" (with reference in the *kerygma Petri* according to Clem. Alex. *strom.* VI, 5, 41; Orig., *in ev. Joan.*, tom. XIII, 17; Orig., *c. Cels.* I, 26; V, 6; Hieron., *ad Algasiam* quaest. 10; *comm. Matth.* 5, 34 ff.; Talm. tr. *Berakhoth* IX, fol. 13a; *Mechilta* on Ex. 20:20; *Targ. Jerusch.* on Ex. 20:23) Lueken, *Michael* 1898, p. 4 ff.

The transcendence of the idea of God in P is not shown in the displacement of the notion of mediating beings such as angels, but in the characteristically different form of representation of Yahweh's presence, as it is expressed in the fire-glory and light-appearance of the כבוד יהוה[1]. The more the cultic-practical points of view determining the theology of Deuteronomy and the Priestly Writing lost their significance for the nomism of Judaism in later times, the more strongly — partly, no doubt, as a result of the stimulus given by contact with foreign religious systems — the need made itself felt here for the most multifaceted and complete elaboration of angelology. But it is characteristic that alongside this expansion of the world of cosmic mediating beings there also continues everywhere the effort to conceive the essence and activity of God himself — in thought and manner of speech — in such a way that the notion of an immediacy contradicting absolute transcendence is consistently kept at bay. In this respect as well, the "word" of God seemed to present itself as the most suitable concept and expression. [line 20] Thus arose the well-known peculiar usage of מימר and subsequently דבר (substantive) or דבור in the Targumic statements about God. That this מימרא is to be regarded as a "mediating hypostasis"[2] has quite rightly been emphasized in recent times[3]. Precisely in contrast to the notion of a mediating being, the Targum designates with the Memar of Yahweh God himself, but not in himself and absolutely, rather exclusively with respect to the side of his self-revealing essence, and indeed in the widest scope.

1 “This appearance is of an entirely different kind from the theophanies in JE: Yahweh does not here confront as a person, but as an uncanny, almost impersonal power, and the effect of this appearance is not trust, but fear and terror.” — Holzinger loc. cit.

2 Weber, *Altsynagogale palästin. Theologie* § 36.

3 Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu* 1898, p. 187 ff. Cf. also Luthardt, *Das johanneische Evangelium*² I 272 f.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 174, l. 20 ff.: Cf. Brederik, *Remarks on the Manner of Translation in Targum Onkelos* in *Studien und Kritiken* 1901, p. 360 f.

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The “word of Yahweh” is the speaking, that is, the self-revealing Yahweh: speaking enters in this mode of designation as the *pars potior* for revelation as such.

Just as the idea of God in Philo, so also that of the Evangelist of the Fourth Gospel certainly does not lack a speculative element, as already emerges from the fundamental Logos theory of the Prologue. But in that the Evangelist, in continuity with the representatives of the older prophetism, holds fast to the presupposition of a real, full personal life of God, also in feeling and willing (cf. especially Hosea and Jeremiah), he arrives at a conclusion that gives his Logos a meaning thoroughly different from the essence of the Philonic Logos. If God is personality, then he cannot be conceived without an object of his thinking and willing, of his knowledge and of his love. If he is absolute being, then this object must be given together with him himself and cannot first be added as something external. But if the objective in God is to be an adequate object of his receptive and spontaneous activity, then it must itself possess just as much the character of the absolute as of the personal. “Just as the Father has life in himself, so he has also given to the Son (— insofar as he is precisely the Logos who appeared in the flesh —) to have life in himself.” The one, absolute being thus appears as subject–object, but not in a logical–abstract sense, rather, as it were, polarized in the real relation of person to person. In this way, indeed, the idea of God has reached the highest possible degree of vitality, and the Logos is lifted beyond the level of a mediating being. Nevertheless, no need for a substitute arises: to the same degree in which seriousness is made of the notion of the personality of the divine being, the fundamental presupposition of the immediacy of his relation to the world, of his activity in creation and revelation, is given. In place of an external, essentially physically conceived transcendence, the inward, purely spiritual and ethically conditioned opposition between God and world — which does not exclude an entering into

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nature in different forms and gradations — becomes the principle of the Evangelist’s contemplation.

Particular attention, however, is now further demanded by the position that the Fourth Gospel adopts with respect to the Old Testament and Alexandrian theologoumenon of the wisdom of

God (see above pp. 149–160). The more deeply this Gospel is rooted in the Old Testament, and the more it simultaneously attaches itself to Philo, the more striking it is that it is silent about that theologoumenon which stands in close relation with the doctrine of the Word of God and the Logos doctrine. To be sure, it cannot be denied — and follows from the nature of the matter — that the Logos of the Evangelist in multiple respects displays the traits of that related principle[1]: in both theologoumena the religious drive for knowledge is in essence grappling with the same problem. But on the other hand there also lies the fact that in the Fourth Gospel (as also in the "Johannine" Epistles) the word σοφία, together with related terms (σοφός and others), is not found a single time. This circumstance is all the more difficult to explain, the more decisively precisely the world of ideas of that Gospel would lead one to expect consideration and utilization of the concept and expression in question[2]. This concern, however, is further intensified by the significance that that concept has in the rest of New Testament literature. A glance at the more specific state of affairs in this respect is indispensable.

From the Synoptic standpoint, it first comes into consideration that Jesus is praised as the possessor of an extraordinary wisdom in the sense of knowledge of the divine content of Scripture (Mark 6:2;

> **1** With good reason Norden notes, on John 1:1 "the Logos was with God", Theophilus' reference (*ad Autol.* II 10. 22) to Prov. 8:27 (συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ) and Sap. 9:4 (πάρεδρον) (*Die antike Kunstprosa* II 474). From interpreting John 1:11 (εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν) in the sense of Sir. 24:7–12 (— ὁ κτίσας με κατέπαυσεν τὴν σκηνήν μου καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐν Ἰακὼβ κατασκήνωσον καὶ ἐν Ἰσραὴλ κατακληρονομήθητι —) one must refrain, in view of what has been noted above.
>
> **2** Cf., for example, Augustine's exposition on John 1:3–4 (*tract.* I, 16): *Quod factum est, in illo vita est. Quid est hoc? Facta est terra, sed ipsa terra, quae facta est, non est vita: est autem in ipsa Sapientia spiritualiter ratio quaedam, qua terra facta est; hoc vita est.*

Matt. 13:54). An extraordinary drive toward knowledge of divine truth and complete immersion in it is the σοφία which, according to Luke 2:40, 52, constitutes a striking feature of the earliest development of Jesus. Not immediately clear is the saying about wisdom from the mouth of Jesus himself: Matt. 11:19; what is decisive above all is the context and the guiding thought. Jesus is painfully moved by the misrecognition on the part of the greatest representative of the Old Covenant (vv. 2–6), on the part of the great mass of his Jewish contemporaries (vv. 7–19), and in particular on the part of his fellow countrymen (vv. 20–24); but he is also overwhelmed by joy over the God-wrought recognition of his person and dignity in a truly salvation-seeking minority (vv. 25–30). The purpose of the section vv. 7–19 is not a relative vindication or even glorification of the Baptist, but a deepening of the generalizing reflection on the times with respect to the misrecognition of Jesus through a melancholy reference to the tragic fact that among the contemporaries of Jesus even the one who is to be acknowledged as the last and highest organ of revelation of the Old Covenant has not overcome the stage of doubt (v. 11). Through this context, in v. 19 the reference of σοφία also to the peculiar spiritual constitution of

John — in other words, the assumption of a subsumption of the Baptist and Jesus under one and the same concept of the wise man — is excluded. The representative of wisdom can only be (in the closest connection with Jesus' statement about himself in v. 19, toward which the entire section is directed) Jesus himself. The σοφία is here conceived as the view of life and conduct of life corresponding to the divine determination of the human being and therefore also beneficial to the common good. More specifically, however, what enters into the judgment of Jesus by his fellow countrymen is the question whether he might not be a prophetic personality preparing the appearance of the Messiah (cf. Mark 6:15; Matt. 16:14). From this point of view, Jesus' manner of life appears doubly offensive to the strict segment of the people (the Pharisaic direction). The conclusion that

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he rests on reprehensible principles and an impure, misguided striving is, however, false; and Jesus does not lack a probative justification of his σοφία; it is to be gained (and has already been gained by some) ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς[1]. What is meant are the same ἔργα of Jesus to which he had pointed John in the preceding passage (vv. 4, 5): manifest miracles of compassionate love for humanity, as they appear in the healing of the sick, but above all in the raising up and moral renewal of "poor" people through the message of divine grace. In the light of this activity, which announces a new time of salvation, his contested freedom in eating and drinking and in social interaction must also be recognized as the conduct of a wise man. It gives the impression that Matthew here has placed an originally proverbial turn of phrase (mashal) in the mouth of the Redeemer; possibly it is precisely from this that the introduction of the concept of wisdom into the present context is to be explained. Certainly, however, underlying the Evangelist's rendering of Jesus' speech is the thought that Jesus is purely and simply the representative and unique, highest organ of revelation of divine wisdom as the principle of human salvation. This is confirmed by Matt. 12:42 (Luke 11:31), where Jesus ascribes to himself, in comparison with a Solomon, a σοφία of a higher kind and significance. The same emerges indirectly from Matt. 23:34; Luke 21:15 (cf. Acts 6:10 and — emphasis on the practical side — v. 3); alongside which Matt. 11:25 (Luke 10:21) indicates the contrast between the wisdom that Jesus possesses and imparts and that which does not flow from revelation, but is gained only by means of natural intellectual endowment and training (also specifically theological learning).

> **1** τέκνων has come over from the parallel passage Luke 7:35, where the word is original: the decision given by the context on both sides—note especially the addition πάντων in Luke 7:35 compared with πᾶς 7:29—is so weighty that even the reading of Syr. Sin. cannot prevail against it. This also against Jülicher's exposition in *Gleichnisreden Jesu* 1899, II 33 f.

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As principle of scriptural revelation, the "Wisdom of God," that is, the perfect intelligence of God which purposefully brings about the salvation of humanity, is conceived in Luke 11:49: *διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ εἶπεν· ἀποστελῶ εἰς αὐτοὺς προφήτας καὶ ἀποστόλους* —. The passage

can be explained only by comparison with the parallel in Matthew 23:34, upon which it rests. The train of thought in Matthew 23:32–36 is briefly as follows: you sons of the murderers of the prophets shall and must, through the murder of prophets, load upon yourselves the same measure of guilt as your fathers (v. 32); you shall not escape punishment (v. 33); therefore I on my part shall provoke your lust for murder and thereby bring upon you the deserved severe judgment (v. 34 f.); yes, it will strike your own generation (v. 36). From this it follows that *διὰ τοῦτο ἐγώ* (v. 34) corresponds exactly to the well-known formula of threat of punishment: **לכן הנה** 1) Kings 14:10; [Jer. 16:21]; Ezek. 16:37; 22:19; 25:4, 9; 28:7; Hos. 2:8; respectively **לכן הנה אנכי** Hos. 2:16), with the following participle. This excludes the assumption that the words *ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω* up to the end of v. 35 were placed into Jesus' mouth as a quotation, so that *διὰ τοῦτο* would stand by itself and a verb would have to be supplied. This is also supported by the clear and close relationship of the objects *προφήτας καὶ σοφοὺς καὶ γραμματεῖς* to the addressed *γραμματεῖς καὶ Φαρισαῖοι*. Not only are prophets of the Old Testament to follow the prophets sent by Jesus (cf. Matt. 10:41), but also — as a heightened challenge — witnesses of the truth who confronted the Jewish scribes as scribes in the sense of Jesus (cf. Matt. 13:52; Luke 21:15; Acts 6:10; 7:2–53; 18:24, 28; 22:3; 2 Tim. 3:15). If Luke 11:49 now stamps the saying of the Matthaean passage (23:34 f.) as a quotation, this is not in itself so striking as the fact that *ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ* is given as the source. The strange supposition that the speaker is citing himself, whereby the designation of Jesus as the Wisdom of

> **1** γραμματεύς (סופר) indicates whence the σοφός (חכם) has his knowledge. Josephus occasionally uses the Greek σοφισταί. Cf. Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüdischen Volks*³ II 314.

God would recall the related conception of the *λόγος*, cannot be entertained. Rather, with many modern scholars one might think of a post-exilic, or respectively late-Jewish book which, in imitation of Proverbs 8 and 9 (Sirach 24), introduced the Wisdom of God as speaking (possibly even bore that title). This explanation, however, remains bold and uncertain, all the more so since in Matthew the presupposition of a quotation is lacking. A more exact comparison with Matthew 23:34 leads to a different result. The same third evangelist, who here (we initially think of the relevant Matthaean source) read *διὰ τοῦτο ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω πρὸς ὑμᾶς προφήτας καὶ σοφοὺς καὶ γραμματεῖς*, found in Matthew 11:10 (or in the source) the words referring to the greatest prophet, the immediate forerunner of Jesus: *οὗτός γάρ ἐστι περὶ οὗ γέγραπται· ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω τὸν ἄγγελόν μου πρὸ προσώπου σου* (Luke 7:27). In connection with this, he interpreted *διὰ τοῦτο* in 23:34 in the sense of *διὰ τοῦτο γέγραπται*, while at the same time understanding *προφήτας* as prophets of the Old Covenant. If, however, instead of an indefinite (and unknown?) *γραφή* he lets the Wisdom of God speak, he thereby provides a certain substitute for the *σοφοὶ καὶ γραμματεῖς* of his Vorlage, whom he replaces with *ἀποστόλους*[1] [2]. The question will naturally suggest itself further on whether, in the Lukan concept of wisdom, a Pauline fundamental idea is not at work[3].

In the conception of Paul the contrast between a false and a true wisdom comes strongly to the fore. The former is sometimes characterized as human (I Cor. 2 5.13.

1 According to 1 Thess. 2:15 (H. Holtzmann). Not “messengers,” as Marx would have it (*Die kanonischen Evangelien nach ihrem ältesten bekannten Text* 1897, p. 243).

2 Cf. the attempt by Köstlin (*Ursprung und Komposition der synoptischen Evangelien* 1853, p. 163), in which precisely the designation of the divine instance as σοφία remains unexplained.

3 According to Baldensperger, Luke here has the historical Christ appeal to the pre-existent Christ speaking in the presumed Apocryphon (σοφία, “according to a mode of conception quite familiar to primitive Christianity”) (*Der Prolog des 4. Evangeliums* 1898, p. 19).

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1 25; I Cor. 1 19. Rom. 1 22. I Cor. 2 4), sometimes as worldly (I Cor. .12 1 (ɔ f. 27. 2 6. 3 18–20), sometimes as fleshly (I Cor. 1 26. II Cor. 1 20). It is a wisdom that is gained through the training of the natural faculty of thought and issues in words (art of speech and disputation) (I Cor. 1 17–20. 22. 21. 4. 13). It does not mediate knowledge of God in his wisdom (I Cor. 1 21); divine wisdom appears to it as folly (I Cor. 1 25); thus it also does not promote the calling to messianic salvation (I Cor. 1 27). It counts before God as folly and is shown by him to be such (I Cor. 1 19 f. 27. 3 19 f. Rom. 1 22). It must be recognized as folly if one wishes to become truly wise (I Cor. 3 18). The true wisdom is the wisdom of God (I Cor. 1 21)[2]. God alone is wise (Rom. 16 27). His wisdom shows itself in the salvation-historical governance of the world as unfathomably deep and immeasurably rich (Rom. 11 33). Through a free act of divine will from eternity it has directed its purpose toward the elevation of human beings to glory (I Cor. 2 7). It is in itself hidden and remains, even in the evangelical proclamation, a mystery to the worldly mind (I Cor. 2 7. 8); it also becomes accessible in its depth and fullness to the one who opens himself to Christian revelation only after the attainment of a certain degree of perfection (maturity) of the activity of knowledge (I Cor. 2 6), and then, according to circumstances, becomes specific content of charismatic word-testimony (I Cor. 12 8)[3]. Under divine authorship it has appeared personified in Christ as the principle of salvation and through him attains complete realization (I Cor. 1 24. 30). On the basis of its revelation through Christ, Christians are to present themselves theoretically and practically at the same time as the true wise ones (Rom. 16 19. I Cor. 3 18. 10). More than

1 σοφός denotes, in contrast to the uneducated, Rom. 1:14; σοφός is said of the judicial activity in the community, 1 Cor. 6:5.

2 The concept is soteriologically the same as in Luke 11:49, but it also refers to natural revelation.

3 The λόγος σοφίας, in distinction from the λ. γνώσεως, on which cf. Heinrici (Meyer’s *Komm.*[6]) ad loc.; H. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 144.

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once the conception of the true σοφία as power (δύναμις I Cor. 1 18; cf. with v. 24 f. 25 f.) and as spirit (I Cor. 2 13. 10. 12 8) also comes into view.

Among the representatives of "Deuteropaulinism" the Epistle to the Ephesians and the Epistle to the Colossians come chiefly into consideration[1]. In the execution of his eternal comprehensive plan of salvation, which overcomes all obstacles in the earthly and the invisible world, God reveals his πολυποίκιλος σοφία (Eph. 3 10). The mystery of God in Christ with reference to the salvation of the world, or rather Christ himself, contains within himself all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge for human beings (Eph. 2 3). Wisdom is the form in which the content of divine saving grace communicates itself to human beings: a knowledge and understanding referring to the world-embracing salvation in Christ (Eph. 1 8). The spirit of such wisdom[2] is above all a gift of God to be earnestly sought by Christians (Eph. 1 17). The same, however, also holds for wisdom insofar as it is a purely practical principle, an effective knowledge of the divine will (Col. 1 9. Eph. 5 15. Col. 4 5; with particular emphasis on the passive achievement in the life of the wise person: Jas. 1 5. 3 13. 17)[3]. In the all-sided possession of wisdom (ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ), gained through theoretical and practical training by the apostolic proclamation, consists indispensable Christian perfection (Col. 1 28. 3 16). The believing Christian study of Holy Scripture brings about that wisdom (σοφίσαι) which leads to salvation (II Tim. 3 15). The opposite is formed by a human semblance-wisdom, a "philosophy" of false teachers, which is presented as a higher stage of Christian knowledge and derives from fantastical speculation about God

1 For characterization cf. Holtzmann loc. cit. II 236: "The ever-recurring concept μυστήριον points to how very much Christianity here has become content and object of knowledge, of Gnosis. — Therefore, among the attributes of God the intellectual ones also stand at the top, and everything in general runs beyond knowledge, insight, understanding, and comprehension."

2 Cf. the σοφία II Pet. 3:15, specially praised by Paul with reference to the doctrine of the Parousia, in contrast to the spurious wisdom of gnostic myths, "σεσοφισμένος μῦθος" 1:16.

3 On the Hellenistic origin of the concept in James cf. Spitta, *Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentums* 1896, II 20.

and world prescriptions for conduct of life and cult that suppress the freedom and inwardness of the Christian spiritual essence through arbitrary external constraint, as a result of false valuation of sensuous things, and thereby bind human beings fast in natural and fleshly ways of thinking (Col. 2 8. 23). Likewise every disposition of mind and view of life that does not lead to the peace of the community is an ungodly σοφία: earthly (not coming down from above), psychical (not pneumatic), demonic (hellish, of devilish origin; Jas. 3 15; cf. 3 6. 4 7). In the Apocalypse σοφία belongs to the doxological attributes of God (7 12) and of Jesus Christ (the "slaughtered Lamb"

5 12). Wisdom is required for the solution of apocalyptic riddles (13 18. 17 9). Both features do not exclude contact with the Pauline conception.

That now the Logos-Gospel does not in any way participate in the New Testament development of the doctrine of divine σοφία will no one who keeps in view the sharply defined individuality of this Gospel want to explain by the working of chance. “As in Eph and Col, so here too ‘knowing’, ‘knowledge’ finds the highest valuation (I John alone has γινώσκειν 25 times). In addition, truth appears as its object.”[1] If now the Logos who has become flesh directly designates himself as “the truth” (14 6), the question presses itself upon us why he does not also present himself as wisdom in person, and whether perhaps the latter concept is deliberately avoided and exchanged for the former. We must further point out here that in the Gospel and the letters of “John” the word γνώσις appears just as little as σοφία. If, however, it must be conceded that on both sides “the false gnosis that dissolves the Christian common faith is to be led back to its content of truth”[2], why is true Christian knowledge not expressly called γνώσις — in material agreement

1 Holtzmann loc. cit. II 378.

2 Holtzmann loc. cit. II 386.

with the characteristic verbal favorite term γινώσκειν? This becomes intelligible only if the word γνώσις had become a name upon which, in the consciousness of the Evangelist, a strong odium rested. This, however, presupposes a point in time at which heretical Gnosticism had already passed through a longer stage of development. This, however, presupposes a point in time at which heretical Gnosticism had already passed through a longer stage of development. This in turn compels us to give careful consideration to the role that divine σοφία came to play within Gnosticism.

The primal form of gnostic Sophia is that designated by Simon Magus with the name Ennoia[1], the prima mentis conceptio of God the primal father, the mater omnium, “through whom in the beginning he conceived in his mind to make angels and archangels. For this Ennoia, having leapt forth from him, knowing what the father wished, descended to the lower regions and generated angels and powers, by whom also he said this world was made; but after she had generated them, she was detained by them out of envy, because they did not wish to be considered offspring of some other. — And having suffered every insult from them, so that she could not return upward to her father, to such an extent that she was even enclosed in a human body and through ages

1 Justin, *apol.* I 26: καὶ Ἑλένην τινὰ — τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔννοιαν πρώτην γενομένην λέγουσι. Accordingly Clement, *recogn.* 2, 12 (Lunan [sc. Helenam] vero, quae suum est, esse de superioribus coelis deductam, eandemque cunctorum genetricem adserit esse sapientiam) is to be judged. ἔννοια (idea, thought, thinking) corresponds, strictly taken, more to λόγος than to sapientia; it is in principle nothing other than a feminine

expression for the concept of the Logos, as required by the idea of the syzygy. The Greek ἔννοια is most probably a translation of מחשבה (the biblical term, often said of Yahweh's מחשבה: Jer. 18:11; 29:11; 49:20; 50:45; 51:29; Isa. 55:8 f.; Mic. 4:12; Ps. 33:11; 40:6; 92:6; in its application to human beings designating also artistic thinking). Simon conceives the deity as νοῦς, νοερόν, in dependence on the Greek philosophers (Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics), with which is to be compared Philo's definition: ὁ τῶν ὅλων (or τοῦ παντός) νοῦς (Drummond II 15). The subsequent adaptation of Gnosis to biblical concept and expression leads to the distinction of the higher principle: the ἔννοια (cf. also Barbelo, "Gnostic" of Irenaeus and Ptolemaeus) and the lower: the σοφία (which in Valentinianism itself was again differentiated).

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migrated, as it were from vessel to vessel, into other female bodies."[1] The Ennoia that, after a long wandering from body to body (μετενσωμάτωσις), entered into Simon's companion Helena, the representative of the reason that sprang from God in the human being, is redeemed by the divine primal father who appeared in Simon, whereby at the same time the ἐπίγνωσις of the latter among human beings and thus their redemption is effected[2]. The Ennoia, the thinking of God, is thus at the same time the real principle of the finite. In that it becomes active, it is depotentiated. Its descent, or rather its fall, is, however, conceived only as transition into a state of suffering. The moment of guilt, the conception of a moral fall, is not present. Evil has its source rather solely in the material factor of being of the finite.

The σοφία of God in the gnostic sense, given in germ with this Simonian Ennoia (and with the corresponding Ennoia of Menander: Irenae. haer. I, 23, 5), appears as such already in full determinacy in Basilides, who 'extends the purport of his doctrine to an immense degree, showing that first there was born from the unborn Father a Nous, from this a Logos, then from the Logos Phronesis, and from Phronesis Sophia and Dynamis[3], and from Dynamis and Sophia virtues and principalities and angels, whom he also calls the first, and from these the first heaven was made.'[4] Wisdom here enters into view as a process of unfolding that takes place within the sphere of the divine being and essence itself (of the πατήρ ἀγένητος).[5] But however certain it is that those named—νοῦς,

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 23, 2.

2 Hippol. *phil.* 6, 19.

3 Hippol. *syntag.* (according to Ps.-Tertullian *adv.* 4), and following him Philaster (*haer.* 32) and Epiphanius (*haer.* 24, 1), have the sequence: *Virtutem et Sapientiam*.

4 Iren. *haer.* I, 24, 3.

5 Whereas Philaster of Brescia, like Irenaeus, lets the νοῦς, etc., be born *de deo*, and the *principatus*, *potestates* and *angeli* be made *de virtute et sapientia*, the presentation in Hippol. *syntag.* replaces *natum* with *creatam* (sc. *mentem* = νοῦν); Epiphanius,

however, designates the mode of origin of the ἀρχαί (ἐξουσίαι and ἄγγελοι) as identical with that of the powers of the highest order (προβεβληται).

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λόγος, φρόνησις, and δύναμις—are 'purely immanent potencies,' the process nevertheless aims at 'the transition of the Godhead from absolute rest, through thinking, to action.'[1] All the more significant, then, is the fact that it is precisely σοφία which, through its connection with the principle of the real (δύναμις), provides the immediate ground of origin for the world. This would admittedly not be the case if the fragmentary remark of Clement of Alexandria: Βασιλείδης δὲ ὑποστάτας[2] δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτῆς τὴν εἰρήνην ὑπολαμβάνει ἐν ὀγδοάδι μένειν ἐνδιατεταγμένας (strom. IV, 162) were to supply "the two missing links" of a "highest Ogdoad" belonging to the primal father of light, if therefore the supra-worldly, inner-divine aeon-series (contrary to the report of Irenaeus as well as Hippolytus in the Syntagma and his successors) were to conclude with δικαιοσύνη and εἰρήνη[3]. Alone, this combination, as convenient as it appears at first glance, is unjustified. To be sure, according to more recent source-critical investigations[4], it can even less be a matter of relating the statement of Clement to the Basilides of Hippolytus' *Philosophumena* and accordingly interpreting it in the sense of VII, 27 (p. 376), "that even the great Archon and all creations subject to him will be seized by Agnoia, that nothing strives after what is contrary to nature (δικαιοσύνη!), and nothing is drawn into suffering (εἰρήνη)"[5]. But insofar as this attempt at explanation does not understand the ὀγδοάς mentioned by Clement as a designation of the Godhead according to the number of its supra-worldly emanations, but as a cosmic magnitude, and insofar as it assigns to the δικαιοσύνη in question the sense of natural conformity,

1 Moeller, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*[1] I 147.

2 Not ὑποστάτας, as Dindorf reads.

3 Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums* 1884, p. 219; Krüger in Herzog's *Realencykl.* f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche[3] H 433; v. Schubert in Moeller, *Kirchengesch.*[*2] I 148.

4 G. Salmon, *The cross-references in the Philosophumena* (*Hermathena* 1885, pp. 389–402; cf. Harnack in *Th. L. Z.* 1885, col. 506 f.); Stähelin, *Die gnostischen Quellen Hippolyts* (*Texte u. Unters.* VI, 3. H., 1890). Cf. Krüger loc. cit. p. 432.

5 Moeller loc. cit. p. 150.

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world-order, it unquestionably moves along the right track. Apart from the fact that the number acknowledged as characteristic for the basilidian system (of the heavens, world-divisions, διαστήματα), namely 365 as the number of the solar year, points not to an ogdoadic but to a hexadic foundation[7], such as indeed presents itself in Irenaeus and Hippolytus I as prefigured in the Godhead itself, everything we otherwise know of the gnostic significance of σοφία speaks

against transferring σοφία from the end of the aeon-series into the middle. Wherever this plays a role as a divine potency — and this is, as will be shown in what follows, the case in a series of the most outstanding systems — in it the ground of the origin of the world is recognized[8], and through its mediation (its activity or suffering) the transition from the divine to the creaturely, from absolutely unitary to antithetical being, is accomplished; it is therefore necessarily the (proper or improper) final member of the aeon-chain. To assume a dissensus on this principal point of gnostic doctrine in Basilides is inadmissible — doubly so if he is to be regarded as a disciple of Menander[2] and as such stands in mediated relation to Simon, who in his Ennoia created the type of gnostic Sophia. If therefore σοφία admits of no successor at all in Basilides, then least of all δικαιοσύνη. The doctrinal proposition of Cerdo and Marcion, that the essence of the Godhead is goodness, not justice, that the latter rather characterizes the fabricator mundi, the false god of the Law and the prophecy of the Old Testament[3], expresses a general fundamental idea of

1 The appearance of the number 365 among the Valentinians and the "Gnostics" (Epiphan. *haer.* 31, 4; 26, 9) is a later borrowing. Cf. on this and on *Pistis Sophia*: C. Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache* 1892 (*T. u. U.* VIII), p. 408.

2 Epiphan. *haer.* 23, 1.

3 Iren. *haer.* I, 27, 1: Κέρδων δέ τις ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σίμωνα τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαβών — ἐδίδαξε τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν κεκηρυγμένον θεὸν μὴ εἶναι πατέρα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ.· τὸν μὲν γὰρ γνωρίζεσθαι, τὸν δὲ ἀγνώστου εἶναι, καὶ τὸν μὲν δίκαιον, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν. Cf. I, 27, 2; III, 12, 12; Clem. *recogn.* 3, 38 (Simon asks: *quomodo potest unum atque idem et bonum esse et justum?*). Hilgenfeld loc. cit. p. 322.

dualistic Gnosticism: δικαιοσύνη, as a glance at the systems shows, is not a pleromatic concept; it tolerates no application to the essence of God in his being-in-himself; its presupposition is the creaturely world, the domain of antithesis, of the distinction between good and evil, light and darkness[1]. Under these circumstances the purely cosmic significance of the ὀγδοάς in the present passage of Clement cannot remain in doubt and yields a conception analogous to the Ogdoad of the Pseudo-Basilides of the *Philosophumena*. Here the Ogdoad is the seat of the supreme Demiurge, the great Archon (Abrasax), and of his son who surpasses him in wisdom[2], situated in the highest region of the aether-heaven and thus of the elemental visible world. Above this realm of the Ogdoad (πάντων τῶν αἰθερίων) lies the kingdom of the supra-cosmic,

1 If the Valentinian Ptolemaeus, by softening the Marcionite contrast between goodness and justice, ascribes to the τέλειος θεός, in distinction from the God of the Law, a perfect justice (Epiphan. *haer.* 33, 7: καὶ ἔσται μὲν καταδεέστερος τοῦ τελείου θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνης ἐλάττων οὗτος ὁ θεός), it nevertheless did not occur to him either to include δικαιοσύνη among his thirty Aeons, although he even goes so far as to take up πίστις, ἐλπίς, and ἀγάπη. Cf. Iren. *haer.* III, 12, 12. Even the late Gnosis of the *Pistis Sophia*, which over against a highest and a next-highest world of light places the world

of the Aeons rather as the lower, as the κόσμος of “mixture” or of corruption, makes the thirteenth Aeon—immediately bordering on the “treasury of light” and forming the highest region of the Aeon-world—into the “Topos of δικαιοσύνη”: “into it matter has already entered and mixed itself with the pure light; therefore it is also called the Topos of δικαιοσύνη, which is mixed, i.e. the Topos of σύγκρασις; — toward it strives the soul of human beings who still harbor within themselves a small part of the higher world of light” (C. Schmidt in *Texte u. Unters.* VIII, pp. 380, 410). As for the δικαιοσύνη τοῦ θεοῦ which Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, is said to have taught in support of his shameless communism and to have treated monographically (see Hilgenfeld pp. 403 ff. and cf. v. Schubert in Moeller, *Kirchengesch.*² I 151), this stands in no recognizable connection with a theological system (Clem. Alex. *strom.* III, 2, 5 speaks of a μοναδικὴ γνῶσις).

2 Hippol. *phil.* 7, 23 (αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὀγδοὰς λεγομένη, ὅπου ἐστὶν ὁ μέγας ἄρχων καθήμενος); 10, 14.

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beneath it the earthly world with the seven “planets” and first of all their highest sphere with its archon: the Hebdomad[1]. This conception and terminology are by no means isolated. In Ptolemy the double of the pleromatic Sophia that has fallen away (the Sophia Achamoth), in all probability as representative of the world-region proper to her, is called the Ogdoad: she occupies the “middle place”, beneath the Pleroma and above the Demiurge, who as creator of seven angels or heavens is also called the Hebdomad[2]. According to the *Philosophumena*, in Valentinus as well the Ogdoad begins outside the Pleroma with the abortive Sophia, beneath whom the Hebdomad, the realm of the Demiurge, has its place[3]. But also in Anatolian Valentinianism the Ogdoad is the seat of the fallen Sophia, beneath which the realm of the Demiurge, the “place” pure and simple, is located[4]. The same fundamental conception further reveals itself when, among the “Gnostics” of Irenaeus, there is talk of a cosmic Ogdoad in the sense of an eightfold number of heavenly powers and regions, in such a way that the offspring of the Sophia enthroned at the highest height, descending in gradation from the first Demiurge (Jaldabaoth), are subordinated as the “holy Hebdomad”[5]. Whether now Clement, when he speaks of the Ogdoad in the remark under discussion, employs a basilidian terminus or avails himself of another, long-established mode of expression — nothing can be determined here — in any case we must seek the δικαιοσύνη and εἰρήνη of the

1 Hippol. *phil.* 7, 24. 25; 10, 14.

2 Cf. Hilgenfeld p. 357.

3 Drs. p. 467 f.

4 *Excerpt. Theod.* §§ 63, 80; cf. Hilgenfeld p. 510. Thus also according to Bardesanes the Sophia Achamoth stands above the Hebdomas (sun, moon, and five planets) and the twelve signs of the zodiac (above the movable and the fixed), at whose summit the Demiurge is to be conceived. Hilgenfeld p. 521.

5 Iren. *haer.* I, 30, 9 (*sanctam autem hebdomadam septem stellas, quas dicunt planetas, esse volunt*). The parallel cosmic Ogdoad (Iren.: *octonatio*) of the Barbelo-Gnosis is significant through the characterization of the number seven of the beings sprung from Sophia in their designation (Iren. *haer.* I, 29, 4).

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cited passage not in the supra-worldly realm of inner-divine being, but in that highest, heavenly region of the world itself that is elsewhere also designated by the name Ogdoad, and which, as follows from what has been shown, stands in closest relation to the supreme principle of world-origin, to Sophia. In doing so, however, it can scarcely be doubtful that δικαιοσύνη and εἰρήνη together are meant to be an expression for the principle of natural and of moral world-order at the same time[1], and if now of this potency the orderly μένειν in the Ogdoad is asserted, one is thereby reminded not only of the "remaining" of the fallen Sophia beneath the heaven formed from her body for the protection of the world of light among the "Gnostics" of Irenaeus[2], but also of the fact that according to the Anatolian doctrine of the Valentinians the pneumatic (the essence of the Pneumatics, who await admission into the Pleroma) remains in the Ogdoad until the consummation[3]. Finally, as regards the image of bearers (ὑποστάται) applied by Basilides to δικαιοσύνη and εἰρήνη, light is shed on this by the remark of a peculiar section of the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, that the extra-pleromatic Sophia erected seven pillars and first brought forth the Demiurge, εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς θεόν, δι' οὗ ἐποίησεν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν[4]. For the rest, it remains only to draw attention to the affinity of the gnostic conception set forth with the ancient and fundamental idea of Rita (zd. Asha) — world-order — and its heavenly "seat" (sadas, sadanam, etc.) in Indo-Iranian religion[5]. The result of our investigation, however, is the

1 συνωνυμία δὲ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ εἰρήνης, says Clement immediately before (IV, 161); cf. Ps. 85:11.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 30, 3; cf. Hilgenfeld p. 242.

3 *Excerpt. Theod.* §§ 63 ff.; Hilgenfeld p. 516.

4 §§ 45, 47; cf. Prov. 9:1 and Hilgenfeld p. 511. Quite analogously Philo says of the divine δυνάμεις: ὥσπερ κίονες οἰκίας ὅλας ὑπερείδουσιν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ θεῖαι δυνάμεις τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τὸ ἄριστον καὶ θεοφιλέστατον γένος (*fragm.* H 655 M).

5 Cf. especially Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda* 1894, p. 195 ff. As a classical counterpart may be mentioned ἡ παλαίφατος Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις (Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1381 f.). In the Old Testament one might compare Job 25:2.

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mediating position of the basilidian σοφία between the realm of the supra-worldly, divine and the κόσμος as the totality of the created, from which it follows that under the incompleteness and

obscurity of Irenaeus' reporting it is not so much the theology of the system that suffers as rather the cosmology and doctrine of salvation that are certainly conditioned here, just as in the related systems, by the function of Sophia. The further pursuit of the equally difficult and interesting question concerning the fundamental features of the original basilidian doctrine cannot be undertaken here.

According to the doctrine of the Barbelo-Gnostics[1], the primal being, differentiated into a male and a female principle—the syzygy of the All-Father (πατήρ ἀκατονόμαστος, μέγα φῶς) and of the primordial Mother (Βαρβηλώ)—brings forth from itself, by way of immediate and mediate generation, an ogdoadically structured system of divine potencies (aeons). A first tetrad is formed by the syzygies Ennoia and Logos, Aphtharsia and Christ (the image of the primal light), Aionia Zōē and Thelema, Prognosis and Nous[3]. To the second fundamental dyad that has sprung

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 29 (cf. Philastr. *haer.* 33; Epiphan. *haer.* 25, 26). Hilgenfeld pp. 232–241; in addition the contributions to textual criticism and interpretation by C. Schmidt in *Texte u. Unters.* VIII (*Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache aus dem cod. Brucianus*) 1892, pp. 649–658, and the communications by the same author on the presentation of the Barbelo system in the (*by Irenaeus used in the original?*) *Εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Μαριάμ*: *Sitzungsberichte der K. Preuss. Ak. der Wissenschaften* 1896, pp. 842–846.

2 In the *Evangelium Mariae* the "Father of the All" is characterized as the invisible pure light, the spirit unthinkable for anyone, the unnameable, eternal one. Barbelo is his image, thought by him and thinking him, the "first Ennoia", the perfect Pronoia of the All; the "spark of light" (cf. Saturnilus); the Aeon perfect in glory; the pre-cosmic, perfect power that has come to manifestation, the non-aging Aeon; the Protanthropos (the three-male, belonging to the tri-power, three-named, three-born, male-female); the παρθενικὸν πνεῦμα (Schmidt loc. cit. p. 843).

3 On the origin and original sequence of the female members on the one hand and the male on the other, each separately, see Schmidt in *T. u. U.* VIII, p. 651.

from Ennoia and Logos—Autogenes and Aletheia—there come, as auxiliary lights, four syzygies (Soter [Harmogenes] and Charis, Raguel and Thelesis, David and Synesis, Eleleth and Phronesis)[1]. There follows Adamas, who proceeds from Autogenes, is united with Γνῶσις τελεία, and endowed with invincible power (archetype of humanity, "perfect man"); he marks the concluding point of the inner-divine process of development (et refrigerant (ἀναπαύονται) in hoc omnia, hymnizare magnum Aeona). The further revelatory impulse of the aeons leads to a fall out of the sphere of the divine spiritual being into the material and morally perverted. Only here, and here in the first instance, does "Wisdom" appear. The "first angel" of the Monogenes[2] brings forth a counterpart of Barbelo, who is more precisely defined as an aeon *nunquam senescens* in *virginali spiritu*: a *spiritus sanctus*, who is called Sophia and Prunicos (that is, according to Epiphanius: harlot)[3]. This Sophia feels lonely, seeks a companion within the realm of the divine

potencies, and, since none is found, humbling herself and acting against the divine will, abandons her home (— *prospiciebat ad inferiores partes, putans invenire hic conjugem, et non inveniens exsiliit taediata quoque, quoniam sine bona voluntate Patris impetum fecerat*). As such, Sophia becomes the mother of the Protarchon[4], the creator of the visible world, the dominion of evil and

1 For correction of the male names see Schmidt in the *Sitzungsberichte* p. 845.

2 The presentation becomes, precisely in the transitional section (from Adamas to Sophia), regrettably incomplete and obscure (cf. Schmidt in *T. u. U.* pp. 654 f.). According to the *Evangelium Mariae*, the Monogenes is the named Aeon Christ, the αὐτογένητος—God, the first-born Son of the All (Schmidt in *Sitzungsberichte* p. 844).

3 Cf. Hilgenfeld p. 237. The image is a transfer of the well-known, extraordinarily much-varied mythical conception of the double-light (to which the Helena-name of the Simonian Ennoia also points). The reference to “the enticing play which she carries on, according to Simonian doctrine, with the powers of matter” (Moeller, Jacobi) is not sufficient.

4 Thus with Theodoret against the “Proarchon” of Irenaeus.

sin. Together with the Sophia who at last flees sorrowfully *in altiora*, the related brood forms a lower ogdoad.

Considerably clearer and more complete is the image of Sophia as it appears among the “Gnostics” of Irenaeus, who represent a kind of Ophitism[1]. The divine being (Βυθός) presents itself as a world of light (in this sense called ἄφθαρτος αἰών), as a “holy congregation”. This consists first of the *primum lumen*, which is both God and human (the primal Father, the *primus homo*), and of the thought proceeding from him (Ἔννοια), which is called “Son of Man” or “second man”. To this there is added a further emanation: the Holy Spirit, standing beneath the Father and the Son and, as “first woman”, made the primordial Mother through their influence of light, who together with the third god-human being sprung from her (of male sex), Christ, is raised into the sphere of life of the primal Father and the Son of Man. If this elevation already indirectly indicates the beginning of a self-depotentiation of the divine being, a transition into the extra-divine (the Holy Spirit from the beginning hovers over the elements: ὕδωρ, σκότος, ἄβυσσος, χάος), this becomes immediately evident in that the life-generating illumination through which the Holy Spirit becomes the mother of Christ, by virtue of its overflowing fullness, brings forth from this maternal potency on the other (“left”) side the “Wisdom” (Sophia, Ἀριστερά), conceived as androgynous and made the actual cosmogonic principle; as such she is called Prunikos. She does indeed still possess a breath of light (φωτὸς ἰκμάδα) within her, but she falls away into the hylē and, because of the heaviness of the hylēic body she has assumed, is unable to return to her mother, but can only (by virtue of the breath of light in her) raise herself

again so far as to form from her body the heaven that protects the world of light against the elemental powers above herself and

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 30; Hilgenfeld pp. 241–250.

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subsequently to rid herself of her serpentine form. As thus through the fall of Sophia the process of the coming-into-being of the world is initiated, so she now on the other hand proves throughout the entire course of the development and history of the world to be the principle of life striving upward toward the world of light, and of the separation of the spiritual from the hylēic, of the divine from the ungodly, of the gathering of the entire spiritual dew of light for the purpose of elevation into the imperishable aeon. In this way she becomes the principle of salvation for humanity, though a subordinate one: for according to the course indicated she herself is in need of redemption. In order to weaken the selfish, arrogant cosmic powers whose emergence Sophia has caused (above all her immediate offspring Jaldabaoth, the creative supreme planetary spirit, who still possesses from his mother a breath of imperishability), she cunningly incites precisely these powers to the creation of humanity and brings the human being—within whom the consciousness of his divine origin immediately awakens—to refuse obedience to the demiurgic powers ("fall into sin"). After Sophia has then prevented the loss of the breath of light in the human being at his expulsion from paradise by Jaldabaoth, she continues to work toward the end that the human being, burdened by the earthly body, may on the one hand be preserved from the ruin prepared for him by the spirit of the deep (the Ophis: idolatry, paganism), and on the other hand be freed from the bondage of the higher cosmic powers, the archons (Jaldabaoth and his companions), who seek to maintain their dominion in the entire imperfect salvific dispensation of the old world, in the history of primeval times and of the patriarchs, in Mosaic law (the Law) and prophecy, in Judaism. The result of her penitent, imploring appeal for help to her divine mother (the Holy Spirit) is that the primal human (God) sends down the Christ, and that he unites himself not only with her (his sister) but also with the Jesus prepared by her. Thereby, however, not only is the exaltation of Sophia accomplished (who before the crucifixion

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of Jesus returns with Christ into the imperishable aeon), but also the final gathering and reception of all light-related human souls capable of higher knowledge into the divine sphere of life.

A distinctive expression of the fundamental conception contained in the system of the "Gnostics" of Irenaeus is also found in the mysterious diagram which Celsus described in his *ἀληθὴς λόγος*, and which Origen (c. Cels. 6, 24) attributes to the Ophians. Here too, Sophia is assigned as her dominion the realm which lies between the world of light and the world of bodies (the realm of the world-creator) and which unites light and darkness within itself[1].

A circumstance analogous to what has preceded is found with respect to Wisdom also in the conception of Valentinus[2]. In a pleroma of divine aeons, in which the primordial being—already containing within itself a higher sexual polarity—the dyad of the Ἄρρητον or Βυθός and the Σιγή—continually allows its power to radiate forth in mediated fashion, so that a descending series of syzygies arises, consisting of a division of four, of five, and of six pairs[3], Sophia appears only in the last division, namely as the one aeon who falls away from the others[4]. Just as the "begotten" aeons are delimited from the primordial being itself, so Sophia, after her fall, is separated from the

1 For details see Lipsius (on the Ophitic systems) in *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1864, I 37–57; Hilgenfeld loc. cit. pp. 277–282.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 11, 1 ff.

3 The highest division splits into the two tetrads: Ἄρρητον — Σιγή, Πατήρ — Ἀλήθεια; then Λόγος — Ζωή, Ἄνθρωπος — Ἐκκλησία. The lowest division gives (according to Ptolemaeus) in the female series the Aeons: Πίστις, Ἔλπίς, Ἀγάπη, Σύνεσις, Μακαριστής, Σοφία.

4 ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας δώδεκα (sc. δυνάμεις λέγει προβεβλήσθαι), ὧν μίαν ἀποστάσαν καὶ ὑστερήσασαν τὴν λοιπὴν πραγματείαν πεποιῆσθαι (Iren. I, 11, 1). According to the *Excerpta ex scriptis Theodoti* (§ 31; Clem. Alex. ed. Dindorf III 438): ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δωδεκάτου Αἰῶνος πείσεως (= πάθους, Hilgenfeld p. 311) τὰ ὅλα παιδευθέντα, ὡς φασί, συνεπάθησεν, Sophia is the twelfth Aeon of the Dodecas, thus the thirtieth and thereby the last of the entire Pleroma. Cf. Ps.-Tertull. *adv. omn. haer.* (Oehler, *corp. haereseol.* I p. 275 f.) c. 12.

pleroma (by a ὅρος). She then reveals her dual nature, in that on the one hand she gives birth "κατὰ τὴν μνήμην τῶν κρειττόνων" to the Christ, who, by virtue of his masculine nature, divests himself of the shadow brought along with him into the world and immediately soars up into the pleroma, and in that on the other hand, after the loss of her pneumatic being (κεκενωμένη τῆς πνευματικῆς ὑποστάσεως), she brings forth the Demiurge (Pantokrator) and together with him the ἀριστερός ἄρχων (the Devil)[1].

Clearer and more complete than the account of the doctrine of Valentinus is the depiction that Irenaeus has handed down to us of the system of Ptolemaeus, the outstanding representative of the western school of Valentinus[2]. Characteristic of Ptolemaeus is that he helped the conservative basic tendency of his teacher's conception to prevail still further. Whereas Valentinus (similarly to the Basilides of Irenaeus and in contrast to the Barbelonites and the "Gnostics" of Irenaeus) makes Sophia an originally integrative member, a full citizen of the pleroma, in such a way that her peripheral position, her distance from the primal ground (Βυθός), is made as conspicuous as possible, Ptolemaeus goes further toward a division of Sophia into two distinct potencies, of which one not only belongs to the pleroma from the

beginning but also remains there uninterruptedly, so that here one can no longer speak, without qualification, of a fall of Sophia. It suffices to set forth the principal moments of the ptolemaean account. A passionate desire for knowledge of the primal ground of all things (Bythos)[3], by which the last (thirtieth) aeon, Sophia, is seized, encounters an insurmountable barrier (the Horos) and causes not only

1 The doctrine that the Aeon Sophia herself fell was maintained by the Anatolian school of the Valentinians (Clem. Alex. *Excerpt. Theod.* § 31).

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 1–8. On the interweaving of controversies within the Ptolemaean school itself, emphasized by Heinrici, cf. Hilgenfeld p. 350.

3 This knowledge is granted exclusively to the Noῦς as the only-begotten Son of the Bythos (Μονογενής).

a separation of the disturbing element (the disorderly ἔνθυμησις bound up with πάθος) from Sophia, but also gives rise to a further unfolding of the divine being in the pleroma aimed at healing the damage that has occurred: the production of the syzygy of Christ and the (femininely conceived) Holy Spirit, through which the harmony of the aeons is restored, as well as (as the work of the aeons as a whole, filled with gratitude) the generation of a Savior (Jesus, Σωτήρ) for the shapeless being—comparable to a miscarriage—that has fallen away from Sophia. With the latter, an extra-divine, lower Sophia has come into existence, which provides the ideal and real ground for the emergence of the world of the finite and conditions its entire development, and which therefore, characteristically, is referred by the name Achamoth to the Old Testament Chokhma as a cosmic principle[1]. It is not necessary to follow in detail the course of the world-process as it presents itself in this artfully and ingeniously elaborated system. In the union of the moment of ἔνθυμησις and of πάθος in the being of Achamoth lies the explanation for the coexistence of the psychic and the hylēic in the world that has arisen from her and through her; the pneumatic element in world and humanity derives from an influence of Christ and the Holy Spirit, through the mediation of the Soter, respectively his angels, upon Achamoth. The goal of cosmic development is the redemption of Sophia Achamoth, who, as the syzygos of the Soter, enters with him into the pleroma, but also the redemption of the pneumatic (gnostic) natures that have sprung from her, with the cooperation of Achamoth herself.

Already the Valentinian Secundus had not allowed the aeon Sophia to fall away, but rather located the fall in a potency already derived from the pleroma (καὶ τὴν ἀποστάσαν δὲ καὶ ὑστερήσασαν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα Αἰώνων λέγει γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ

1 According to Ps.-Tertull. *adv. omn. haer.* c. 12 (Hippol. *syntag.*), even the one Sophia of Valentinus already bore the name Achamoth.

τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν)[1]. It would be all the more interesting to know how he conceived this fall more precisely, since he is said, remarkably, to have already incorporated the opposition of φῶς and σκότος into the first ogdoas[2]. The distinction of the upper (ἄφθαρτος) Sophia from the fallen one (Achamoth) as her daughter was also adopted by the school of the Valentinian Marcus (— whether by Marcus himself?) . In a later, multiply modified form, Hippolytus[3] gives the account of the fall of Sophia and of the subsequent formation of the miscarriage separated from her “for her consolation and calming” into a perfect aeon outside the pleroma (the ἔξω Σοφία). The name Achamoth is absent here, just as it is also not found in Heracleon[4]. On this side too belongs the double (inner and outer) Sophia of the contextually foreign piece in Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* §§ 43–47. Even in Bardesanes of Edessa (born 154), in the opposition of the two daughters of the Holy Spirit, one of whom is called Chakmuth, the after-effect of that double Sophia of Valentinian systems can scarcely be doubted[5].

Of particular interest, finally, is the illumination provided by the gnostic conception of Wisdom in the *acta Joannis* (attributed to the alleged disciple of John, Leucius) in the case of a representative of a Valentinian-type Docetism (in his *διήγησις θαυμαστή*, found as the second and third piece of the *περίοδοι Ἰωάννου* in the Acts of the Nicaean Synod of 787)6. According to him7 we have,

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 11, 2 (see Harvey I 101 f.).

2 Cf. Hilgenfeld p. 313.

3 *Philos.* 6, 31.

4 Cf. on this and on the character of the presentation of Valentinianism in Hippolytus’ *Philosophumena* Hilgenfeld pp. 471, 500.

5 On the divergent interpretation by Lipsius cf. Hilgenfeld pp. 519 f.

6 Text of the *cod. Vindobonensis* edited by M. R. James, *Apocrypha Anecdota*, second series, 1897, pp. 1–15; Nicene text by Max. Bonnet, *Acta Joannis* (in Lipsius and Bonnet, *Acta apostolorum apocrypha* II, 1) 1898, pp. 193–203. On this: Hilgenfeld, *Der gnostische und der kanonische Johannes über das Leben Jesu* in *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1900, pp. 1–61 (text of the *diegesis*: pp. 6–18).

7 I cite according to Hilgenfeld.

on the one side, a kingdom of light (β' 6); a kingdom of Aeons (γ' 49), at whose head, next to the “Father” (β' 4. 6. 46. 48. γ' 27), stands the Logos together with Charis as a kind of syzygos (β' 5. 16. 46); the Lord of the place of rest (γ' 21); further, the Holy Spirit together with the Holy One or Christ (β' 5. 46); a supreme Ogdoad (β' 19), also a Dodecad, whose final member, Sophia, has experienced a disturbance and had to be brought back into harmony (β' 20. γ' 15); an A and Ω

or Pleroma (β' 21). “It can only be the disturbance that befell the final member of this Pleroma that gave rise to the cosmos. Opposed to the kingdom of light stands a kingdom of darkness”1.

The result is that Σοφία does indeed occupy a highly significant position in the gnostic worldview, but that, in striking agreement across the systems, she appears in a degraded form. Her peculiar nature consists in the fact that she constitutes the half-active, half-suffering principle of the coming-into-being of the world and, as such, in the great process of becoming of things, marks the transition from the development of divine being and supersensible potencies to the psychic and material series of beings. As such, precisely in contrast to her original ideal height, a lower rank necessarily had to be assigned to her. This entire transformation is clearly the consequence of a dualism that has advanced, in comparison with Philo2, and that characterizes the relevant gnostic

1 Hilgenfeld loc. cit. p. 48. On the chronological circumstances of the author in question (mid–2nd century?) cf. from recent years: Corssen (*Monarchianische Prologe zu den vier Evangelien* 1896, pp. 118–134), and in opposition Jülicher in *Gött. G. Anz.* 1896, pp. 841–851; H. Holtzmann in *Th. L. Z.* 1897, col. 331 ff.; James, *Texts and Studies, Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature* 1897, where, according to Bonwetsch’s judgment, the acquaintance of the Leucian Acts of John with the Gospel of John is demonstrated “convincingly” against Corssen (*Th. L. Z.* 1897, col. 509 ff.). In addition especially Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchristl. Litt.* 1897, I, pp. 541–543; Th. Zahn, *Die Wanderungen des Apostels Johannes* in *Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.* 1899, pp. 191–218; A. Meyer in *Theol. Rundschau* 1899, pp. 300 f.; Ehrhard in *Strassb. Th. Stud. Suppl.* I, 1900, pp. 158–160.

2 The parallel dependence of Philo on the biblical conception must not be forgotten.

systems. Whereas in Philo σοφία and λόγος are still identical, and where a distinction is hinted at and the former is subordinated, σοφία is conceived as the essence of the λόγος (see above p. 152 f.), in Gnosticism a pronounced separation of the two occurs, and σοφία becomes a fallen magnitude. In this connection it is to be considered that σοφία, presenting itself as a female principle, in accordance with the all-dominant gnostic conception of the opposition of the female and the male, the “left” and the “right”, the hylic and the pneumatic, darkness and light, was consistently made, in distinction from the male Logos, into the immediate cosmical principle.

In this history of the theological idea of σοφία lies the explanation of the astonishing fact that “Wisdom” is eliminated outright by precisely that Evangelist with whose world of thought it otherwise shows the greatest elective affinity. As she presented herself in wider and notable circles of Gnosis, transformed and evaluated as she was, she was inseparable from the presupposition of a dualistic worldview. If therefore the Evangelist (and his school) does not grant her a place at all within his theological total conception, this expresses the strongest rejection of gnostic dualism, and the correct insight was decisive, that with the introduction of

the concept in question (above all in the structure of the Prologue) the danger of ambiguity and therefore of gnostic misinterpretation would have been connected to a considerable degree. This stance of the fourth Evangelist toward his historical models, this rejecting attitude toward a theologically congenial concept grounded primarily in biblical, that is, Old- and New-Testament tradition, is under the circumstances one of the most important, most decisive criteria for answering the question concerning the origin and the time of origin of our Gospel. Here too we are compelled to the conclusion that at the time of the

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composition of the fourth Gospel, or in the region of Christian and ecclesiastical life to which the author belonged, and for the consciousness of the latter, Gnosticism must already have attained a richer development and have been recognized as one of the foremost among the spiritual powers of the age that were to be combated and overcome1. Only in passing may express reference be made here to the confirmation that this result of our discussion provides for John 13 (see above p. 91).

A further proof that the Evangelist deliberately abandoned σοφία in word and concept can be furnished by showing that we can demonstrate the need for a substitute and can securely identify this substitute. It is found at a characteristic place already in the Prologue and from there permeates the entire Gospel as a cardinal concept. It is the higher and more comprehensive concept of αλήθεια. Already the statement of the Gospel of Luke (2 40) concerning the child Jesus: το δέ παιδίον ηυξανεν καί έκραταιούτο πληρούμενον σοφία, καί χάρις θεού ήν έπ' αύτό should make clear—what in any case readily suggests itself—that in the statements of the Prologue concerning the Logos become flesh: πλήρης χάριτος καί αλητείας (v. 14) and ή χάρις καί ή αλήθεια διά 'Ιησού Χριστού έγένετο (v. 17), "truth" has taken the place of "wisdom". This concept, too, was not taken over by the Evangelist from the doctrinal usage of his New Testament predecessors. In the Pauline and Deuteropauline corpus αλήθεια is an ideal concept and denotes the opposite of falsehood (deception, falsification) or error. Objectively conceived, "truth" is the correctness of the conception of God's being as a moral norm-principle, as it emerges from natural revelation: Rom. 1 18. 25; 2 8; especially, however, of the divine will to salvation and the facts of salvific revelation: Rom. 2 20; I Cor. 13 6; II Cor. 6 7; 13 8; Eph. 1 13; 4 24; Col. 1 5 f.; I Tim. 2 7; 6 5;

1 It is to be borne in mind that with Simon Magus it is only the precursor of the gnostic Sophia, the ″Εννοια, that appears.

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II Tim. 2 15; Jas. 1 18; 3 14; 5 19; I Pet. 1 22; II Pet. 2 21. In many cases, together with this correspondence to the objective state of affairs, both the representation and the teaching are simultaneously intended: II Thess. 2 10; I Tim. 3 15; II Tim. 2 18; 3 8; Tit. 1 14; II Pet. 1 12. In other cases the content of apostolic testimony and of the gospel proclamation based upon it is directly characterized thereby: II Cor. 4 2; Gal. 2 5. 14; 5 7; II Thess. 2 12. 13; I Tim. 2 4; 4 3; II Tim. 2 25; 3 7; 4 4; Tit. 1 1; Hebr. 10 26 2. We encounter the subjective concept of αλήθεια

(correspondence of thinking and willing with word and deed, truthfulness) in: Rom. 3 7; 15 8; I Cor. 5 8; II Cor. 7 14; 11 10; Eph. 4 25; 5 9 (cf. 6 14); Phil. 1 18. General correspondence with what is factual is άλήθεια in: Rom. 2 2; 9 1; II Cor. 12 6; likewise among the Synoptics (Matt. 22 16; Mark 5 33; 12 32; Luke 4 25; 22 59) and in Acts (4 27; 10 34; 26 25). In the fourth Gospel there is not an absolute lack of passages in which αλήθεια shows a meaning that connects with what has preceded. John 18 38 gives the most general concept (in the mouth of Pilate). If, however, according to 8 44 the devil έν άληθείά ούκ έστηκεν, δτι ούκ έστιν αλήθεια έν αύτώ, then here truth is already spoken of in the sense of theoretical and practical correspondence of consciousness with the creative will and salvific will of God. And in the same sense truth can also be understood where Jesus announces the sending of the πνευμα της αλήθειας (14 17; 15 26; 16 13). Nevertheless, the concept of αλήθεια from 18 37 may already form the background here. As in this passage (cf. above p. 94

> **1** The concept of ἀλήθεια remains theoretical even where it refers to human obligation. ἀδικία, too, when it appears as the opposite of ἀλήθεια (Rom. 1:18; 2:8; 1 Cor. 13:6), is essentially: incorrect conception; it is called so, however, because it leads to improper conduct, to injustice.
>
> **2** Eph. 4:21 is uncertain (the sense possibly: Christ is presented and recognized in Jesus in accordance with his being and his idea); cf. v. Soden ad loc.
>
> **3** Accordingly ἀληθής = truthful, Rom. 3:4; 2 Cor. 6:8; cf. Matt. 22:16 = Mark 12:14; ἀληθινός (the same) Heb. 10:22; *Apoc.* (throughout).

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on 8 47: ό ών έκτου θεοΰ), so with the fourth Evangelist the concept of truth frequently combines, alongside the ideal element concerning knowledge and will (the sense of theoretical and practical correspondence with the object of representation), a real one: that of the supramundane, divine essence and power in sharp contrast to the earthly as essence-less and perishable1; where truth is spoken of, there is essentially thought of the apprehension of that which belongs to that higher realm. It is precisely this concept that appears foundationally in the Prologue. According to 1 17, through Jesus Christ there has come about the revelation both of the divine will to salvation (χάρις) and of the perfect, heavenly goods of salvation corresponding to the true being of God and the highest destiny of humanity (spiritual realities and eternal life-forces: αλήθεια); that the revelation of this αλήθεια has taken place in the person and work of the Logos become flesh in a perfect measure is already attested by 1 14 (see above p. 102). Because Jesus, in this perfect sense, is the personal representation of divine salvation, he calls himself “the truth” (14 6). Already John bore witness for “the truth”, that is, for the fact of the uniqueness and perfection of Jesus’ mediatorship of salvation arising from his divine sonship, 5 33 (cf. 18 37: τή άληΑεία). As the adequate revelation of the supramundane being of God and of his will toward the world, the life of salvation mediated by Christ is also called άλήθεια in 8 32 2. If, however, in 8 40. 45 f.; 16 7; 17 17, αλήθεια initially designates, according to ordinary linguistic usage, the correct conception of a given state of affairs, the real element of 8 32 nevertheless also enters here into the speaker’s meaning. Thus even the morally good

1 Cf. also Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 375, 378; O. Holtzmann loc. cit. p. 85: “What matters is to assert that the absolute concept ἡ ἀλήθεια, which continually recurs in John, is unheard of not only on the lips of Christ and his first disciples, but quite generally on the lips of any Israelite uninfluenced by Hellenism.”

2 Truth itself is designated as the liberating principle, not the knowledge of it.

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within human nature, insofar as it has its deepest ground in God and is oriented toward the perfect revelation of God, falls under the concept of “truth”, 3 21; and worship of God takes place ἑν αλήθεια when it bears the character of conduct corresponding to the real, that is, supramundane-spiritual being of God, 4 23 f. The relatively numerous passages in I–III John in which αλήθεια is spoken of closely follow the conceptual development in the Gospel. The assertion, however, that the adjective άληθινός in the Gospel and in the first Epistle throughout1 indicates reference to the real element of the speculative concept of truth under discussion (heavenly—archetypal in accordance with the idea, perfect) can hardly be maintained2. If one compares, however, Luke 16 11 (τδ αληθινόν in contrast to τφ άδίκφ μαμωνά)3, Hebr. 8 2 (τής σκηνής τής αληθινής, ήν έπηξεν ό κύριος, ούκ άνθρωπος) and 9 24 (αντίτυπα τών αληθινών—sc. χειροποίητα), one nevertheless recognizes at least here with sufficient certainty that the peculiarly speculative concept of truth of “Johannine” literature was by no means entirely lacking in preparatory antecedents within Christian modes of thought and teaching. Also noteworthy is I Thess. 1 9 (θεφ ζώντι καί άληθινφ as opposed to τών ειδώλων)4. As far as the passages of the Epistle to the Hebrews are concerned, reference should be made to the multiple points of contact of this letter with Philonic theology and style5. In Philo himself the designation of

1 On John 7:28; 8:16; 19:30 disputed by Dechent (“Zur Auslegung der Stelle Joh. 19:35” in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1899, pp. 459, 461 ff.).

2 Titius, *Die johanneische Anschauung unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit* 1900, p. 132. Cf. the discussion of the positions of B. Weiss (*Johanneischer Lehrbegriff* and commentary), Wendt (“Der Gebrauch der Wörter ἀλήθεια, ἀληθής und ἀληθινός im N. T. auf Grund des alttest. Sprachgebrauchs” in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1883, pp. 511 ff.), Rüling (“Der Begriff ἀλήθεια in dem Evangelium und den Briefen des Johannes” in *Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.* 1895, pp. 625 ff.), and Cremer (*Bibl.-theol. Wörterbuch*) in v. Schrenck, *Die johann. Anschauung vom Leben* 1898, pp. 86 ff.

3 “Entirely the Johannine ἀληθινόν,” Holtzmann, Comm. ad loc.

4 Cf. 1 John 5:20 f.; John 6:57.

5 H. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*³ p. 299.

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God as τδ προς άλήθειαν δν occurs several times1; it indicates not only the being that corresponds purely to the idea, but thereby at the same time his supramundane transcendence2. One easily sees, however, that the idea of truth of the fourth Evangelist ultimately points back to that of Plato's ideal realism3. And when the Evangelist allows the αλήθεια of his theosophical-salvation-historical conception not merely to be revealed through the Logos become flesh, when he lets this Logos call himself "the truth", it cannot be overlooked that consideration of the gnostic systems—which determined him to eliminate σοφία—placed no obstacle in the way here: "truth" also has among the Gnostics a meaning unobjectionable in its own way and a position in one of the foremost ranks of principles. According to the Barbelo doctrine, Αλήθεια is the female potency of the second basic dyad (Autogenes—Aletheia), having sprung from Ennoia, which immediately proceeds from the primordial being (All-father—Urmother), and from the Logos united with her. In Valentin, Aletheia is the female member of the second syzygy (Πατήρ—Αλήθεια), separated from the ungenerated highest being (Άρρητον—Σιγή) only by the Horos4, from which the sequence of generated Aeons proceeds, and among these, in the first place, the syzygy of Λόγος and Ζωή. An emanation of Aletheia is also the Holy Spirit, who invisibly permeates the Aeons. As here, so

1 According to Drummond three times (*Philo Judaeus* II 63). Cf. moreover (on the conception of the visible world as an imprint of the higher) Siegfried loc. cit. p. 328.

2 Cf. also An. Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der christl. Lit.* 1899, pp. 80 f.

3 Cf. Zeller II, 14, pp. 532, 602, 645, 672, 688, 694, 707 ff.; E. Pfleiderer, *Sokrates und Plato* 1896, pp. 316 f., 384 f., 415 f. As for the materialistic realism of the Stoics, which makes ἀλήθεια itself into a σῶμα (Sext. *Math.* 7, 38), ἀλήθεια — λόγος — νόμος become interchangeable concepts (cf. the different conceptual relation in John 1:14, 17); on this see Heinze loc. cit. pp. 150 f.; Zeller III, 13, pp. 120, 144.

4 On the Πατὴρ τῆς Ἀληθείας among the Marcosians (Iren. *haer.* I, 20, 2) see Hilgenfeld loc. cit. p. 310.

also with the Valentinian Ptolemaeus, Aletheia appears to be superior to the Logos. She is brought forth together with the Nους (the άρχή τών πάντων) by the primordial being (Βυθός—Σιγή), whereas from her herself and the Nους the Logos together with Zoe, the third syzygy of the Pleroma, proceeds.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 206, n. 1: At any rate, the assumption lies closer at hand that the Λόγος, as he is combined in theology and especially in the cosmogony of Stoic-Egyptian Hellenism with the creative god of the Word (the Speech), Hermes—Thoth, and is presented as a personal principle of revelation, formed, in a certain sense, a facilitating process and a positive point of connection for the Logos-idea of the Evangelist (cf. above p. 167). In this respect reference should be made to Reitzenstein, *Two History-of-Religion Questions on Unpublished Greek Texts of the*

Strasbourg Library 1901, pp. 47–132 (“Creation Myths and the Doctrine of the Logos”; especially pp. 56, 70 ff., 80 ff., 91 f., 95 f., 100). One should note in particular, in view of the relationship between Λόγος and ἀλήθεια in the Fourth Gospel, how Thoth has from ancient times been characterized as the one “who rests upon truth” (p. 73); with which compare the attribute of the corresponding Λόγος: αἰὼν ἀληθής (p. 56).

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We have hereby, so to speak, investigated the source region of the theological concept of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel. From an expansion of the horizon over the wide field of Oriental religion and speculation, insofar as this may in any way have given stimulus to the described development of thought, only data would be expected whose significance is subordinate in the same degree in which they have the character of mediation 1. The connection into which the Logos is brought already in John 1 4 with the concept of ζωή, and the all-dominating significance which, on this basis, accrues to the idea of life in the distinctive presentation of the person and saving work of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel (s. o.), above all impel us further to pursue the historical presuppositions of this New Testament concept of life. The obvious continuation of the

> **1** One may compare the attempt made by Bäumlein in his time (on the basis of the then completely inadequate knowledge of the mythologemes in question and of the philosophies of religion) (“Attempt to develop the meaning of the Johannine Logos from the religious systems of the Orient,” 1828), and, by contrast, the remark of Lücke (*Commentary on the Gospel of John*³ I 255 f.). Albr. Weber (“*vāc* and *λόγος*,” *Ind. Stud.* IX 473–480) and (with correction of his historical presuppositions) Garbe (*Die Sāṃkhyaphilosophie* 1894, p. 103 f.) thought of a “borrowing of the Logos concept from India.” Despite the points of comparison that have been adduced, I cannot convince myself of a historical connection—already in view of the grammatical gender of *vāc* (*vox*) and *λόγος*. Cf. on the hymns concerning *Vāc* (Rigv. X, 125 and 71) Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* 1894, I, 1, pp. 146–149. As for the *Vohu manō* of the Avesta (on which cf. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*² II 177; Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum* 1898, pp. 4, 28–30; Holtzmann in *Protest. Monatsblätter* 1898, p. 486), this may in any case be set aside.

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comparison with the teaching of Philo leads here to a strikingly less positive result than in the case of the Logos idea 1. While in the Gospel the fundamental Logos, apart from the Prologue, remains unnamed and, as it were, in secrecy, all the more does his essence as ζωή (and φῶς) come to explicit presentation; the concept of ζωή, by contrast, occupies a subordinate position in the doctrine of God and in the wide-ranging Logos doctrine of Philonic Alexandrianism, because in reality it is of a different kind. Philo connects with the word ζωή a multiple meaning. He himself expresses this in *qu. rer. div. h.* 9 (III 11 CW) in a way that makes the opposition decisive for his view leap to the eye: ζωῆς δὲ τριττὸν γένος, τὸ μὲν πρὸς θεόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς γένεσιν, τὸ δὲ μεθ-όριον, μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν (“una spectans Deum, altera creaturam, tertia media, mixta ex utraque”), τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεόν οὐ κατέβη πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ἦλθεν εἰς τὰς σώματος ἀνάγκας. On the one hand, Philo, following linguistic usage, designates as “life” without qualification that life which is common to all “living beings” (ζῷα) (*leg. alleg.* I 12 presupposed as the opposite of the ἀληθινὴ ζωή), that is, the irrational, psychical-material; the psychic, airy principle of this life, adhering to the blood, he calls δύναμις ζωτική, καθ’ ἣν ζῶμεν (*qu. det. pot. ins.* 22. 23. I 277

CW). On the other hand, he characterizes precisely this life (the ἔναιμος καὶ αἰσθητὴ ζωή: the entire natural life of sense and impulse, *qu. rer. div. h.* 11. 12. III 15 CW) as improper, not corresponding to the idea, by setting over against it the true life 2. This belongs exclusively to the spirit (νοῦς) in the sense of reason (λόγος, φύσις λογική) 3, springing from it, and makes the human being, who apart from this is only ζῷον, first into

1 A more extensive collection of passages on the Philonic concept of life, drawn from the manuscript legacy of Grossmann, is found in v. Schrenck, *Die johanneische Anschauung vom Leben mit Berücksichtigung ihrer Vorgeschichte untersucht*, 1898, pp. 17–31.

2 ἀληθής or ἀληθινός, cf. v. Schrenck loc. cit. p. 21.

3 On the double sense (lower and higher concept) of νοῦς in Philo see Drummond I 322 f.

ἄνθρωπος (*qu. det. pot. ins.* a. a. O.). It is therefore of heavenly origin: the human being has become ψυχὴ ζῶσα in the true, higher sense through the in-breathing of the divine πνεῦμα, which is nothing other than Logos-power (*qu. rer. div. h.* a. a. O.; cf. *leg. alleg.* I 12: — εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς· τότε γὰρ γένεται — εἰς ψυχὴν — νοεράν καὶ ζῶσαν ὄντως —) 1. The λογικὴ ζωή is ζωή θεοῦ: ἐπεὶ γὰρ — ὁ θεὸς πηγὴ λόγου, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀλόγως βιοῦντα τῆς θεοῦ ζωῆς ἀπεσχοινίσθαι (*poster. Cain* 20. II 15 CW). From this spiritual essence and divine origin of the true life, which alone corresponds to the destiny of the human being, there follows of itself a series of attributes, as Philo emphasizes in various contexts. It is a life morally normed by the idea of the divine good (virtuous, pious, and wise): τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή (*profu.* 11. III 122 CW); τὴν γὰρ ἀληθῆ ζωήν ὁ σπουδαῖος κεκάρπωται (*poster. Cain* 13. II 10 CW); the ὅσιοι are those οἳ ζῶσιν ἀψευδῶς (*qu. rer. div. h.* 42. III 46 CW); ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐμπνευσθεὶς τὴν ἀληθινὴν ζωήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄπειρος ὢν ἀρετῆς, κολαζόμενος ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἡμάρτανεν εἶπεν ἄν, ὡς ἀδίκως κολάζεται (*leg. alleg.* I 13. I 70 CW); τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν βίου, ὃς ἐστὶν ἀψευδεστάτη ζωή, μετέχουσιν ὀλίγοι· οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων φημί, τούτων γὰρ οὐδεὶς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ζωῆς κεκοινώνηκεν (*mut. nom.* 38. III 193 CW); οὐκοῦν ἡ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ζωή περιπατοῦντός ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσεσι καὶ προστάξεσιν, ὥστε θάνατος ἂν εἴη τὰ τῶν ἀθέων ἐπιτηδεύματα (*congr. erud. g.* 16. III 89 f. CW); οἱ δὲ ζῶντες ὄντως μητέρα μὲν ἔχουσι σοφίαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ δούλην (*qu. rer. div. h.* 11. III 13 CW) 2. The true life is also the only blessed one: ὥστ᾽ ὁ Ἄβελ, τὸ παραδοξότατον, ἀνήρηταί τε καὶ ζῇ· ἀνήρηται

1 On the question of the relationship between πνεῦμα and λόγος cf. Zeller III, 23, p. 395 (the πνεῦμα ζωῆς is something purely incorporeal). On the citation of Gen. 2:7: εἰς ψυχὴν ζωῆς (Cohn: εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν) cf. the critical discussion by Nestle in *Philologus* LIX (N.F. XIII), 2, pp. 259 f.

2 Cf. also *poster. Cain* loc. cit.: τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ θεὸν ζῆν (thus true life) ἐν τῷ ἀγαπᾶν αὐτὸν ὁρίζεται Μωυσῆς; moreover especially *leg. alleg.* I 32 (I 88 f. CW). On the element of wisdom cf. v. Schrenck pp. 20 f., 24 f.

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μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἄφρονος διανοίας, ζῇ δὲ τὴν ἐν θεῷ ζωήν εὐδαίμονα. — ὁ μὲν δὴ σοφὸς τεθνηκέναι δοκῶν τὸν φθαρτὸν βίον ζῇ τὸν ἄφθαρτον, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ζῶν τὸν ἐν κακίᾳ τέθνηκε τὸν εὐδαίμονα (*qu. det. pot. ins.* 14. 15. I 269 CW); λέλεκται δ' ὅτι οἱ προσκείμενοι τῷ ὄντι θεῷ ζῶσι πάντες (Deut. 4 4). ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τρισμακάριος καὶ τρισευδαίμων βίος —; ἀθάνατος δὲ ἤδε ἡ ζωή καὶ μακραίων ἐν ταῖς τῆς φύσεως στήλαις ἀναγέγραπται (*monar.* I 3. II 216 M). Eternal life it is: ἀλλ' οὐ ζωή μὲν ἐστὶν αἰώνιος ἡ πρὸς τὸ ὂν καταφυγή; (*profu.* 15. III 126 CW) 1; προτρέπει δὴ τὸν μὲν ὠκυδρομεῖν ἱκανόν, συντείνειν ἀπνευστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον θεῖον, ὃς σοφίας ἐστὶ πηγή, ἵνα ἀρυσάμενος τοῦ νάματος ἀντὶ θανάτου ζωήν ἀίδιον ἆθλον εὕρηται (*a. a. O.* 18. III 130 f. CW) 2; the inner being of the human being, lacking the supervision of ὀρθὸς λόγος, is μακρὰν λογικῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου ζωῆς ἀπῳκίσται (*poster. Cain* 19. II 15 CW); τοὺς γὰρ πρόσφυγας καὶ ἱκέτας τοῦ θεοῦ μόνους ζῶντας οἶδε, νεκροὺς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐκείνοις δ' ὡς ἔοικε καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν μαρτυρεῖ διὰ τοῦ προσθεῖναι· "ζῆτε ἐν τῇ σήμερον" — σήμερον δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπέρατος καὶ ἀδιεξίτητος αἰών (*profu.* 11. III 122 CW) 3. No less firmly established, however, is the fact that the true life in the human being strives, after overcoming the material sphere of being, toward full realization, and thus attains complete actuality only with the separation of the spirit from the body: a part of human souls strives from beginning to end to die to bodily life, ἵνα τῆς ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου παρὰ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ ζωῆς μεταλάβωσιν (*gigant.* 3. II 44 CW); τοὺς δὲ ἀστείους, κἂν τῆς πρὸς σῶμα κοινωνίας διαξευχθῶσι, ζῆν εἰσαεὶ ἀθανάτου μοίρας ἐπιλαχόντας — ὅρος (definitio) ἀθανάτου βίου κάλλιστος οὗτος, ἔρωτι καὶ φιλία θεοῦ ἀσάρκῳ καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ

1 That αἰώνιος in this connection is only an isolated expression in Philo (cf. also v. Schrenck p. 21) is at least formally to be noted in comparison with the mode of expression of the Fourth Gospel.

2 Cf. *plant.* 9 (II 141 CW).

3 Cf. Wendland, *Neuentdeckte Fragmente Philos* 1891, p. 98 (f. 221v): πάγκαλον δὲ φασι τὸ μήτε μησὶ μήτε ἐνιαυτοῖς καταριθμεῖσθαι τὸν βίον τῶν ἱκετῶν (Ex. 23:26) — τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἑκάστου σοφοῦ ἡμέρα ἰσότιμός ἐστιν αἰῶνι. On the repeatedly occurring attributes ἄφθαρτος and ἀθάνατος see the index of passages in v. Schrenck p. 21.

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κατεσχῆσθαι (*profu.* 10. 11. III 122 CW); ὡς νῦν μὲν, ὅτε ζῶμεν, τεθνηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐν σήματι τῷ σώματι ἐντετυμβευμένης, εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνοιμεν, τῆς ψυχῆς ζώσης τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένης κακοῦ καὶ νεκροῦ συνδέτου τοῦ σώματος (*leg. alleg.* I, Schluss) 1.

Although, however, according to this Philo also speaks of the life of God (ἡ θ-εοῦ ζωή) and explicitly presents this γένος ζωῆς, in contrast to lower kinds, as existing in itself (— the kind of life which is πρὸς θεόν remains absolutely exalted above the human mode of existence and the laws of the bodily world —), strictly speaking the concept of ζωή admits of no application to God in him. Significant in this regard is the statement connected with Jer. 2 13 in *profu.* 36 (III 152

CW). If here God is called the πηγή ζωῆς, because he not only caused the entire world to stream forth (ὥμβρησε!), but specifically because he alone is the cause of soul and life and, in a distinctive sense, of rational soul and of life accompanied by reason 2, this at first accords with what has been set forth. But if it is further remarked: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη νεκρόν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς πλέον τι ἢ ζωή, πηγή τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἶπεν, ἀέννaος, it follows from this that the designation of God as the "source of life" in reality negates the concept of life in relation to God himself. The reason emerges from the reference to the eternity of God. Philo indeed expressly says that the "life" of God is eternity 3; likewise, that eternity is the "life" of the intelligible world 4. But if this

1 On the alternation of ζωή and βίος cf. Drummond II 298; v. Schrenck pp. 27 f. As regards the practical consequences of Philo's theory—the cultivation of ecstasy and of the contemplative way of life as the most important means of promoting true life, and the resulting aristocratic–esoteric character of the religious concept of life—cf. v. Schrenck pp. 22 f., 29 f.

2 Cf. *opif. mund.* 8 (I 9 CW): ζωτικώτατον τὸ πνεῦμα, ζωῆς δὲ θεὸς αἴτιος.

3 *qu. D. s. imm.* 6 (II 63 CW): καὶ γὰρ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ παράδειγμα αἰὼν ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ (on the reading αὐτῶν cf. Mangey and CW).

4 *mut. nom.* 47 (III 202 CW): αἰὼν δὲ ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίος κόσμου, ὡς αἰσθητοῦ χρόνος.

eternity is determined in the sense of being the archetype of time, such that change and succession are excluded and the opposition of past and future appears displaced by absolute presentness, then it is clear that with the admissibility of the analogy of time the conception of life, which cannot be carried out without this analogy, also becomes invalid. Here, in other words, the contradiction comes to light between the manifold statements of Philo, in which he ascribes to God ζωή, indeed the only true life, and his ultimately decisive metaphysics. Consequently his theology is compelled to fall back from the physical concept of life upon the metaphysical concepts of motion and of being. God is for Philo, in the strict sense, not the Living One, but the One Who Is (ὁ ὤν, τὸ ὄν; ὁ ὄντως ὤν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄν) 2, exalted above every ποιότης (finite quality) (cf. especially *Cherub.* 15. I 182 CW). If, however, in Philo's view the general presupposition also holds that the concept of life includes within itself the opposition of activity and passivity (spontaneity and receptivity), then it is immediately evident that this concept is also incompatible with the Philonic-Stoic idea 3 of God as the δραστήριον αἴτιον, absolute activity in the sense of pure motion from himself 4, 5.

It may at least be recalled that even the Greek philosophers, when they ascribed life

1 *qu. D. s. imm.* loc. cit.: ὥστε οὐδὲν παρὰ θεῷ μέλλον τῷ καὶ τὰ τῶν χρόνων ὑπηγμένῳ πέρατα — ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὔτε παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὑφέστηκεν.

2 Cf. Zeller loc. cit. p. 356 and Drummond II 63, where in the long list of common designations of God “ἡ τῶν ὅλων ψυχή” and “ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή” occur (each once), but no expression referring to the life of God.

3 Zeller loc. cit. p. 358.

4 *opif. mund.* 2 (I 2 CW); *leg. alleg.* I 3 (I 62 CW). Cf. above on John 5:17.

5 One should recall here the circumstance (to be shown further below) that Philo gladly replaces the concept of life with that of fullness, i.e. fullness of power (πλήρης, πλῆρες, etc.), with the powers conceived as active. On the application of this concept to God, reference may for the present be made to *leg. alleg.* I 14 (God is ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης), *qu. det. pot. ins.* 16, and *mut. nom.* 4 (τὸ ὂν ἑαυτοῦ πλήρες).

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to the highest being, repeatedly remained caught in the contradiction between mode of expression and representation on the one hand and the metaphysical concept on the other. It is well known how, in the course of his development, Plato felt the urge, in opposition to the rigidity and emptiness of the ontology of the Eleatics and Megarians, to grasp the highest being appearing in the world of ideas as a living one. The ideas are, by their essence, as true, absolute being (ὄντως ὄν, παντελῶς ὄν), power. What holds for reality in general must hold most perfectly of the idea: τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις (*Soph.* 247 D). As powers, however, the ideas are causes of motion; they are not merely the conceptual essence of things, but are “the immanent causes”, the real grounds of their coming-to-be 1. And since by definition they are nothing other than powers of reason, they bring forth not only being, but also consciousness and knowledge 2; they are causes of self-moving being: of the soul (of individual beings as well as of the world) 3, and thereby of life, which consists in nothing other than the continuous activity, partly moving, partly cognizing, that springs from the soul itself 4. From this complex of ideas it is explained why Plato in the *Sophist* goes so far as to declare motion and life and soul and intelligence to be inseparable attributes of the Absolute (παντελῶς ὄν)

1 Cf. on *Phaedo* 95 E Zeller II, 14, p. 687.

2 Cf. especially the discussion concerning the highest Idea (the ἀγαθόν) *Rep.* 6, 508; Zeller loc. cit. pp. 709 f.

3 The soul is τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, *Phaedr.* 245 C–D; ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴ αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησις, *Leg.* 10, 896 A.

4 On the soul as a transitive principle of motion cf. *Phaedr.* 245 C: μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὐδέποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγή καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως; *Leg.* 10, 891 E–896 E. The motive power belongs to the soul by virtue of its participation in the Idea of life (*Phaedo* 105 C f.; cf. 100 C ff., 104 B, 106 D); cf. *Timaeus* 30 A ff. with 39 E. An explanation from the essence

of the Idea in general (as αἰτία) is provided by the *Philebus* (30 D). Alongside this stands in the *Timaeus* (35 A) the derivation of the motive power of the soul (primarily the world-soul) from its mixed character (ἀμέριστον and μεριστόν, ταὐτόν and θάτερον). Zeller loc. cit. pp. 774 f.

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(248 E) 1. And indeed he conceives the latter not merely as something that moves, but also as something that is moved, in that he applies to it the characteristic of everything that truly is: the capacity (δύναμις) for acting and for being acted upon 2, the latter coming into consideration for what is absolutely real as soon as it becomes an object of knowledge (*Soph.* 248 C f.). Of course, these chains of inference are not meant to shake the well-known foundations of the doctrine of ideas. It must remain the case that the substantiality of the idea as the absolutely real (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό) excludes every change and thus every motion: the ὄντως ὄν is ὡσαύτως ὄν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως (*Timae.* 35 A; 38 A; *Phaedo* 78 D; cf. *Soph.* 248 A) 3; ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται (*Phaedo* 78 D) 4. How, however, under these circumstances the concept of life, of the living, is still to be compatible with that of the idea, is not to be seen. "It is therefore completely understandable that Plato subsequently withdrew more and more from the attempt made in the *Sophist* to ascribe motion, soul, and reason to the ideas" 5.

More sensitively even than in Plato does the question at issue make itself felt in Aristotle, and indeed in the same proportion in which he worked out the relevant concepts with greater clarity. It is the unfortunate influence of physics upon the metaphysics of the philosopher that here clearly comes to light. Life is a kind of movement; the process of movement, however, is inseparable from materiality6; life is therefore a concept of physics.

1 Cf. also Edm. Pfleiderer, *Sokrates und Plato*, pp. 354 f.

2 *Soph.* 247 D–E: λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ πάσχειν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι.

3 Cf. *Sympos.* 211 A–B: αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν.

4 On this basis the eternal essence (ἀΐδιος οὐσία, *Timaeus* 37 E), the ungeneratedness and imperishability of the Idea are most emphatically stressed.

5 Zeller loc. cit. p. 697; cf. Windelband, *Platon* 1900, pp. 100 f., 115 ff.

6 With motion there is always simultaneously posited that which moves and that which is moved (ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, *Phys.* 7, 1, 241 b 24); the latter is by its nature matter (τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐτέρας δυνάμεως, *Gen. et corr.* 2, 9, 335 b 29 ff.).

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The characteristic movement of living beings is self-movement (de anim. II, 1, 412, b, 16) 1. Only organic bodies possess the capacity for this kind of movement; the cause of their self-movement, however, the force that uses the body as an instrument and stimulates it to purposive activity, is the soul of each individual. This cause of life, although not existing without a body, but always indwelling a body 2, is in itself purely incorporeal and therefore neither moved from without nor moving itself (ἑαυτο κινοῦν)3. Although therefore, according to this, the essence of the soul itself, together with movement, also excludes life, as indeed it is expressly said in particular of the νοῦς that it is not an object of physics (but of metaphysics, of first philosophy)4, Aristotle nevertheless even ascribes to the Absolute (the deity) life, indeed the most perfect (best, completely self-sufficient, blessed and eternal) life δ. The quaternio terminorum thereby introduced lies on the surface. Admittedly the highest being (the πρῶτον κινοῦν) is conceived not merely

1 Cf. *De anima* II, 2, 413 a 25 ff.: διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι’ ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι; II, 1, 412 a 14: ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.

2 A θερμόν or πνεῦμα akin to ether according to *Gen. animal.* II, 3, 736 b 29 ff.

3 *De anima* I, 3, 404 a 2 ff.; ch. 4, 408 a 30 ff. What is said applies to the soul in all its parts, its lowest as well as its highest faculties (cf. Zeller loc. cit. p. 364; 2, 598).

4 *Part. an.* I, 1, 641 a 17–b 10.

5 *De coelo* I, 9, 279 a 26 ff.: ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωήν καὶ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα (sc. τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, the incorporeal, the θεῖον τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον); *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072 b 28 ff.: φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός; *De coelo* II, 3, 286 a 9: θεοῦ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀΐδιος; *Metaph.* loc. cit. 1072 b 24 ff.: εὖ ἔχει ὁ θεὸς ἀεί — καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωή ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος.

as absolutely incorporeal and non-spatial, exalted above all movement, change, and passivity, but also positively as pure energy, perfect activity, and indeed as absolute thinking activity3. But if the deity thinks only itself, if its thinking as νόησις νοήσεως amounts to an “unchangeable resting of thought in itself, the indivisible unity of thinker and thought”2, then it is clear that here no place remains for the conception of a real activity, that rather the pure negation of movement constitutes the ultimate presupposition; with this, however, every scientific justification for applying the concept of life (as also of immortality and blessedness) to the absolute being necessarily falls away3.

Stoicism opens up the possibility, through the fact that the essence of the highest principle is conceived as material, of grasping this principle as a living one. God, the ultimate cause of all

movement and all life, is more precisely the unity of propertyless matter and the rational-like primal force immanent within it, in other words the rationally powerful primal substance of the world. Accordingly,

1 *Eth. Nic.* X, 8, 1178 b 20 ff.: τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη; *Metaph.* XII, 9, 1074 b 25 f.: δῆλον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει.

2 *Metaph.* loc. cit. 1074 b 33: αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις; *De anima* III, 4, 430 a 3 f.: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον; *Metaph.* XII, 9, 1075 a 7: ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην; cf. XII, 7, 1072 b 24: ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον; *Eth. Nic.* VII, 15, 1154 b 25 f.: εἰ τοῦ ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν.

3 It is characteristic how the contradiction of the Aristotelian view reappears in the doctrine of the soul when, in the human soul—of which all motion is denied (see above)—the active and the passive intellect are distinguished as special parts (the νοῦς insofar as it is αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, and the νοῦς παθητικός). For details see Zeller loc. cit. pp. 572 ff., 592 ff. On the question of the connection of Philo's anthropological concept of life with that of Plato (especially his βίος βιωτός, *Symp.* 211 D) and Aristotle, cf. Teichmüller, *Geschichte des Begriffs der Parusie* 1873, pp. 136–153, and v. Schrenck loc. cit. pp. 28 f.

life, when predicated of the Absolute, of God, means quite generally the entire infinite activity of the primal substance—proceeding in an absolutely law-governed and purposive manner and therefore appearing rational—that forms, preserves, and transforms the world; this substance is determined as the finest, air-like substance (ether) and, by virtue of the warmth ("fire") inherent in it, has within itself the principle of movement and presents itself as πνεῦμα (moved and moving air, breath). If, however, accordingly God (and the world) is designated as ζῷον1, and on the other hand the ζῷα are nevertheless distinguished from the φυτά and from inorganic nature2, it becomes evident that even in this school quite different things are understood by "life." Whereas in Aristotle an improper, metaphysical concept is added to the proper, physical concept of life, Stoicism combines with the proper, physical one an improper, likewise physical one: it speaks of life not merely in connection with the self-preserving activity of organic beings (of the individual and of the species), but also in connection with the totality of elementary cosmic processes and the changes and formations of inorganic nature. Dependence on the Heraclitean worldview (in particular on Heraclitus' concept of life: πυρ ἀείζωον3) presses itself upon one of its own accord. No less, however, is it evident that these related systems, in the same proportion in which they materialize the ultimate principle of all being and regard the capacity of the ideal merely as a force of matter (acting back upon matter, but in the last analysis nevertheless again conditioned by it), come into contradiction

1 Diog. 7, 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον λογικὸν τέλειον· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον; ibid.: Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν; ibid. 143: τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῴου κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρ’ ὁ κόσμος.

2 Sext. *Math.* 9, 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτά, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα.

3 κόσμον τόνδε τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα (Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae* 1877, frg. 20).

with the concept of the Absolute. What scientific value, under such circumstances, the statements about the life of the deity are to retain is difficult to say.

It must, however, be considered in particular that the Prologue of the Gospel does not designate God himself as the source of life of the world,—that naturally stands in the background,—but the Logos, and that from the causal relation of the latter to the life of the world its significance as a source of light for humanity is immediately derived. A closer connection with Philo does not result from this either. Admittedly, in his case the conception of God as primordial light is familiar. And in agreement with this the essence and activity of the Logos are also gladly compared with light. The Logos is the archetype (παράδειγμα) of all light: τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα ὁ πληρέστατος ἦν αὐτοῦ λόγος, φῶς somn. I 13 (III 221 CW)2; τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη λαμπρότερον ἢ τηλαυγέστερον θείου λόγου leg. alleg. III 59 (I 151 CW); ἥλιον καλεῖ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, τὸ τοῦ κατ’ οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντος—παράδειγμα· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸ γεώδες ἡμῶν σύστημα ἀφίκηται, τοῖς μὲν ἀρετῆς συγγενέσι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀποκλίνουσιν ἀρήγει καὶ βοηθεῖ, ὡς καταφυγὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν αὐτοῖς πορίζειν παντελή, τοῖς δὲ ἀντιπάλοις ὄλεθρον καὶ φθοράν ἀνίατον ἐπιπέμπει somn. I 15 (III 223 CW)3; εὐξώμεθα,—ἵνα ἡμῖν ἀνοίξῃ ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ “θησαυρόν” (Deut. 28 12) καὶ τὸν μετάρσιον καὶ ἔγκυμονα θείων φώτων λόγον, ὃν δὴ κέκληκεν οὐρανόν leg. alleg. III 34 (I 136

1 *Somn.* I 13 (III 221 CW): οὐ μόνον φῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὸς ἑτέρου φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀρχετύπου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀνώτερον, λόγον ἔχον παραδείγματος; *human.* 22 (II 403 M): θεὸς ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος; *sacrificant.* 4 (II 254 M): ὁ γὰρ θεός — ἡλίου ἥλιος, νοητὸς αἰσθητοῦ, παρέχων ἐκ τῶν ἀοράτων πηγῶν δρατὰ φέγγη τῷ βλεπομένῳ; *ebriet.* 11 (II 178 CW): ὅταν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀμμάτι ἀμιγεῖς καὶ καθαρώταται καὶ τηλαυγέσταται τοῦ φωσφόρου θεοῦ νοηταὶ ἐναστράψωσιν αὐγαί etc. Cf. also on the most radiant light of the ungenerated divine powers: *qu. D. s. imm.* 17 (II 74 CW).

2 Cf. especially *opif. mund.* I 8 (I 9 f. CW).

3 Cf. *leg. alleg.* III 59 (I 150 CW). In relation to God (the primal sun) the Logos is reflection: καθάπερ γὰρ τὴν ἀνθήλιον αὐγὴν ὡς ἥλιον οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν

ἰδεῖν δρῶσιν —, οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα, τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὡς αὐτὸν κατανοοῦσιν (*somn.* I 41; III 255 f. CW).

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CW); the Logos is the φῶς ψυχικόν leg. alleg. III 59 (I 151 CW); πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ᾠκείωται λόγῳ· θείας τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς opif. m. 51 (I 51 CW); the soul is nourished with light by the Logos: ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐ γηίνοις καὶ φθαρτοῖς τρέφεται ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ὄμβρήσῃ λόγοις ἐκ τῆς μεταρσίου καὶ καθαρᾶς φύσεως, ἣν οὐρανὸν κέκληκεν (sc. the Logos as the begetter of the θεῖα φώτα) leg. alleg. III 56 (III 148 CW); cf. III 34 (I 136 CW). In this same context the affinity of the concepts life and light also occasionally becomes apparent1. But there can be no question that these two concepts assume a specific role in the Philonic doctrine of the Logos, that they became basic concepts and catchwords, similar to the case in the fourth Gospel. As little as there is any lack of manifold expositions that allow the Logos also to be regarded as a principle of life2, it has nevertheless been rightly noted that Philo nowhere, after the manner of John 1 4, explicitly brings the essence of the Logos under the concept of ζωή3. Even in somn. II 37 (III 298 CW), where the Logos is presented as an ἀέννaος πηγή, the concept of ζωή is absent, and probably not by chance: in the background of the consideration stands God, but characteristically not as the Living One, but as the "Being," whose essence is εἰρήνη, i.e. perfect exaltation above all change, all oppositions (ibid. II 38) h. We shall therefore not be mistaken,

1 Cf. *leg. alleg.* III 34 with 56 and Drummond II 218.

2 See above what was remarked on Philo's natural philosophy and anthropology. The Logos is shown in particular to be the principle of the preservation of life of the human soul: τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ ζωτικὸν καὶ ὀρθὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ λόγον (*qu. D. s. imm.* 27; II 83 CW); τρέφεται δὲ τῶν μὲν τελειοτέρων ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλῳ τῷ λόγῳ (Deut. 8:3), *leg. alleg.* III 61 (I 152 CW). If, according to *profu.* 21 (III 135 CW), it lives (ζῇ) in the soul as moral power, the application of the concept of life here is essentially conditioned by the allegory (Num. 35:20). See further above the parallels nos. 25–27 (pp. 125 ff.).

3 Reville, *La doctrine du Logos* p. 67: "*Philon ne dit nulle part, à ma connaissance, que le Logos soit vie*."

4 When H. Holtzmann asks with reference to John 1:4: "How can everything have come into being through the Logos, how can he have been the principle of creation?" and answers: "because his content is life, being that brings forth other being, because he was πηγὴ ζωῆς (Philonic)," it must be noted that in the well-known passage (see above p. 210) Philo calls not the Logos but God πηγὴ ζωῆς.

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if at this point too we recognize in Philo's doctrine of the Logos a result of the metaphysical presuppositions of his teaching concerning the essence of God1.

More than Philo's Logos-mediating being, in formal respects there came closer to the Logos-idea of John 1 4 what Greek philosophers had put forward concerning the Logos in the sense of the Absolute in itself. When Stoicism characteristically unites in the highest being (the primal-fire Logos) the two moments of (physical and spiritual) generative force (λόγος σπερματικός) and luminous force, at least an external parallel in the indicated direction is suggested. Even Philo was unable to escape the influence of the Stoic idea of God in his Logos doctrine: the allusion is clear when he calls his Logos ἔνθερμος καὶ πυρώδης (Cherub. 9. I 177 CW) and again σπερματικός καὶ γεννητικὸς τῶν καλῶν (leg. alleg. III 53 [I 147 CW]). More important, however, than the connection of the two related notions—life and light—is the evident, consistently prominent primacy of the representation of life among the Stoics. Light is only a form, a particular manifestation of life. The philosopher's gaze does not rest on light when it is a matter of the ultimate explanatory ground of the world-process, but on life, on that concept which comprehends the infinitely many and manifold forms of movement of the all-being conceived as an organism. Heat, as moving, generating, and preserving principle, is what constitutes the fundamental property of the absolute substance of "fire"; in it also lies the source of light2. The

> **1** This is connected with the fact that Philo emphasizes the essential difference of divine light from everything else no less strongly than that of divine life from everything else that is called life.
>
> **2** The secondary significance of the manifestation of light is also shown by the fact that the fire into which the world periodically dissolves (ἐκπύρωσις) is occasionally also called φλόξ (Cleanthes) or αὐγή (Chrysippus) (according to Philo *aetern. mund.* 19); cf. Zeller III, 1³, p. 153. Indirectly confirmatory are the statements about the cold element: according to Chrysippus the air is φύσει ζοφερός καὶ πρώτως ψυχρός (Plut. *Stoi. rep.* 43, 1, p. 1053); cf. Zeller loc. cit. p. 183.

Stoics, however, do not stand alone with this view; their theory rests upon that of Heraclitus. What the latter already intimates by designating the primal being (the embodied λόγος ξυνός) as πυρ ἀείζωον (see above), the totality of his flashes of thought makes clear: that the fundamental force of the substance (the primal material) of all being is determined by the all-embracing concept of life (in its metaphysical abstraction)1. Not the opposition of shining and darkening is primarily at issue when Heraclitus speaks of the eternal alternation of the kindling and extinguishing of that fire (for example in the sun)2, but the opposition of movement and rest (in the sense of transition into another quality and form of movement). Against this background it appears sufficiently characteristic when Plato, from the standpoint of his ideal realism, in the famous comparison between the sun and the highest good (ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), places the production of light and of knowledge prior to the causal relation to life and to the reality of being (Rep. 6, 508 E)3. We are thereby led to a standpoint that is of the greatest importance for understanding the essence and the historical relations of the view of the fourth Evangelist sketched above in outline. The fundamental concept of the entire contemplation of the Logos-essence and the Logos-manifestation is ζωή: so thoroughly is there in the Logos in itself

and from eternity life, continuous, unified purposive activity of the forces comprised in it as an absolute, personal being, that

1 Cf. especially frg. 25 (Bywater p. 11): ζῇ πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον, καὶ ἀήρ ζῇ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον· ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος.

2 Neither φῶς, nor—as it seems—αὐγή, occurs in the vocabulary of his fragments. On the latter cf. especially Zeller II⁴, p. 643 f.; Bywater on frg. 75 (pp. 30 f.).

3 Cf. 7, 517 B–C, where the sun produced by the Idea of the Good is called the lord (κύριος) of light (φῶς).

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he can also, as the salvation-mediator of the world who became flesh in Jesus, call himself “the life” (14 6; 11 25; cf. I John 1 1. 2). Only in second line, as a derived concept, though also as a further cardinal concept, does that of light appear: καὶ ἡ ζωή ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Here too it is clearly presupposed that the general life-power, which is absolutely substantivized in the Logos, becomes light, manifests itself as light, by bringing forth the objective and subjective conditions of seeing and the activity of seeing—not only the sensible, but also the intellectual and moral—in human beings. If light in turn proves itself to be a “life-mediating, life-capacity-bestowing” power (John 8 12), this can be explained only by the fact that its own essence, the source from which it has flowed, is life1. This state of affairs is all the more emphatically to be stressed, since its principled significance has not yet been sufficiently recognized and expressed even in the most recent discussions of the concept-pair in question of the Prologue and the Gospel2.

This all the more urges one already here to cast a comparative glance at the manner in which the concepts *life* and *light* are employed in the gnostic systems, the less, in the discussion of the question of the position taken by the fourth Evangelist toward the theologoumenon of Wisdom, a conscious opposition to Gnosticism has been discernible (see above p. 200 f.). One first easily observes a certain agreement with the fundamental view of the Evangelist in Valentinus and his school. Not only do here (according to the presentation of the system in Irenaeus) Λόγος and Ζωή, as the first syzygy

1 It hardly needs recalling that according to the widespread view of the ancients (including the philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics) the heavenly sources of light are living beings.

2 Cf. e.g. Beyschlag, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*² II 433 ff., and the section “The Logos as light and life” in Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 399 f., whose heading is objectionable in view of what has been shown. See also Lütgert, *Die johanneische Christologie* 1899, p. 133.

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of the second Tetrad, attach themselves immediately to the “primal quaternity” (see above p. 195), but Valentinus also, in homiletical exposition, sets the upper world, the divine-pneumatic κόσμος, over against the corporeal world as the “living” Aeon (ζῶν αἰών)1. If it follows from this that he does not hesitate to apply the concept of life to the supramundane, divine, eternal, and absolute, his address to the Pneumatics on the other hand—ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοί ἐστε καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς ἐστε αἰωνίας2—contains the indication that by “eternal life” is to be understood what more scientifically is called ἀθανασία (ἀφθαρσία). Confirmation is provided by the finding in the system of the Barbelo-Gnosis, where to the syzygy of the primal being and the first derived (Ennoia-Logos) there follows first the syzygy Aphtharsia-Christus and only then Αἰωνία ζωή-Thelema. While, to be sure, in Valentinus’ conception or at least in his presentation light strikingly recedes3, the Barbelo-Gnosis conceives the primal being according to its male aspect (the primal Father) as the “great light” and thereby betrays a certain intermediate position. For elsewhere it becomes much clearer that for gnostic thinking the concept of life, strictly speaking, does not come into consideration when the ultimate principles are at issue, that here rather only the natural image of light can be involved. Already with Saturnilus the animating spark (σπινθὴρ τῆς ζωῆς) for the human being proceeds from the light of the unknowable All-Father (ὃς διήγειρε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῆν ἐποίησε) and after the death of the latter returns upward into the world of light (ἀνατρέχειν πρὸς τὰ ὁμόφυλα) h. The ζῆν here is unmistakably an effect of light, insofar as it organizes matter as body (cf. Irenaeus: *et articulavit*); the concept ζῆν, by contrast, loses its significance for the existence of the soul freed from the body, the redeemed soul. The Barbelo-Gnosis designates the female primal principle itself as the spark of light (the perfect

1 Clem. Alex. *strom.* IV, 13, 92.

2 Clem. Alex. *strom.* IV, 13, 91.

3 This is in any case presupposed when there is talk of the **σκιά** of the Sophia-son Christ.

4 Iren. *haer.* I, 24, 1–2.

power and the perfect Pronoia of the All)1. According to the “Urmensch Gnostics” of Irenaeus the primal Father is “the primal light.” From him proceeds the “Son of Man,” i.e. the Ennoia (which clearly corresponds to the masculine Logos; cf. the Barbelo doctrine), and further the Holy Spirit as “Mother of the Living.” The light-emanation (φωτὸς ἰκμάς) of the latter becomes in Sophia both principle of creation and principle of redemption, i.e. of the complete reception of those human beings who are bearers of that light-outflow into the being of light, namely into the ἄφθαρτος αἰών (cf. Saturnilus). The physical life-breath (πνοὴν ζωῆς), which does not belong to the factors *quae salvantur*, Jaldabaoth has breathed into human beings2. Among the Sethians as well, the ungenerated light is the principle of the spiritual being (νοῦς) of the human being and of his liberation from corporeality (ἀπὸ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ πονηροῦ καὶ σκοτεινοῦ σώματος); the medium of redemption is ὁ ἄνωθεν τοῦ φωτὸς τέλειος λόγος k. Particularly noteworthy is also the fact that the “Ophians,” according to their diagram in Origen, seem not to have

assigned Ζωή to the realm of light (of the Father, the Son, and the Ἀγάπη [= the Holy Spirit, the primal female?]) but to the sharply separated intermediate realm (to which Sophia belongs)4.

A not to be overlooked instructive process in this conceptual history within Gnosticism is already offered by ancient Indian philosophy based on the Veda (Vedānta). The concept of life (jīva) here is the existence of the individual soul (of the individual or the personality), but for that very reason

1 Schmidt in *Sitzungsberichte der K. Preuss. Ak. der Wiss.* 1896, p. 843.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 30, 1 ff.

3 Hippol. *phil.* 5, 19. Among the Naassenes the concept of φῶς for the νοερόν in the primal being appears more only occasionally (cf. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergeschichte* p. 260 f.). On the conception of light in the apocryphal gnostic Adam writings cf. Preuschen in the *Festgruß für B. Stade* 1900, pp. 214 f., 217, 220; among “Ophites and associates” ibid. pp. 225, 229 f., 236.

4 Origen, *c. Cels.* 6, 38. Cf. Hilgenfeld pp. 278 f., 281 f. On the Leucian realm of light see above (pp. 198 f.); on the σταυρός τοῦ φωτός Zahn, *Acta Joannis* 1880, p. 223; Corssen, *Monarch. Prologe* p. 120 f.; Hilgenfeld in *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1900, p. 36 f.

not applicable to the highest being (the *brahman* or the *ātman*), which is the ἕν καὶ πᾶν, the absolutely universal. All life is only apparent being; the Absolute is the only real, pure being. Just as the conception of the personal God (the “Lord”: Īśvara), so too is the conception of his life illusion1. This is decisive also for the scientific valuation of the conception of the living as it is transferred to the primal being in the cosmology of that philosophy, in accordance with the Vedic myth of creation2: here the ancient religious theory has merely been preserved alongside, in contradiction with philosophical thinking. The full truth lies, as before, in the recognition that the unknowable, immortal highest being is the primal light, the light of lights (*jyotiṣāṃ jyotis*), which eternally uninterruptedly creates day (the “eternal day of *brahman*”)3.

Finally, an equally valuable counter-test is provided by the conception of Orphic cosmogony, determined in principle by religious imaginative need, when this, in further development of the theogony of Hesiod, lets the Protogonos Phanēs arise from the world-egg formed by Chronos, the πρώτιστον αἴτιον, out of Chaos4 and Aether5 as the most primordial life-potencies: the personified cosmic light, the principle of the entire world-formation and

1 *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* 3, 3 ff.; *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya Up.* 9. Cf. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda* 1897, pp. 587 ff., 797 ff.

2 Cf. Rigv. X, 129, 1–3 and Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* I, 1, pp. 121 f.; I, 2, pp. 165 f.

3 *Kāṭhaka Up.* 5, 14–15; *Maitrāyaṇa Up.* 6, 24; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV, 4, 16; *Chāndogya Up.* 3, 11; *Nāḍabindu Up.* 17. Cf. Deussen, *Sechzig Upan.* pp. 284, 346, 478; 105, 645.

4 πελώριον χάσμα: undifferentiated matter in unlimited quantity and extension.

5 αἰθήρ is conceived as a potential cause of heat and motion. One may compare the analogous *tapas* (heat) alongside the "lightless surge" (*apraketam salilam*) in the oldest Vedic creation myth (Rigv. X, 129, 3) and the conception of the cosmic egg already announced here (Deussen, *Allg. Gesch. d. Philos.* I, 1, pp. 122 f.).

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individualization of physical and spiritual life1.

Whether, in the case of our Evangelist, a mediated relationship of any kind to one or another of the phenomena in question may come into consideration or not, in any case, upon closer inspection, a far broader, richer in content, and more homogeneous immediate foundation remains for the conceptual relationship "Life" and "Light" in the Prologue. We encounter the same interconnection of the two concepts and the subordination of the one to the other in the religious worldview and doctrine of God of the Old Testament. Here, first of all, the concept of divine life itself is to be determined, and for this purpose one must proceed from the conception of the essence of God. If prophetism, on the basis of its historically conditioned idea of revelation, apprehends God on the one hand as an absolute being of power, on the other hand as a perfect moral personality, then it thereby posits in God an infinite fullness of physical and spiritual powers, governed by a free will that under no circumstances comes into contradiction with itself. The conception of the essence of God, when more closely considered, cannot detach itself from the analogy of the human being and thus from the distinction between nature and spirit, as they are united in a finite way in the human person. Just as in one direction the spiritual and moral qualities of the human being appear heightened to perfection in God, so, in the other, the statements concerning the relationship of the divine essence to the corporeal world are based on the conception that to the natural side of the human being there corresponds in God an immaterial substance, i.e. one not belonging to the realm of sensuous perception, which at the same time serves the creative will of God as the means for the production of a material world (see below), and furthermore that the influence of God upon this world (in world-government and revelation), in particular the transmission of divine thoughts, impulses, and feelings into the content of human

1 Cf. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 470 ff.; Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* II 739 f.

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consciousness, is to be conceived as mediated1. If this immaterial substance of his essence, to be distinguished from the I of God2, is called Spirit (ריה: moving air), and thus, despite the specific difference, is compared to the finest materiality as something higher, then one sees all the more clearly how far the Old Testament religion of revelation is from transferring the

conception of the highest being into the abstraction of a metaphysical concept. From the personal essence of the Absolute, however, as the Old Testament consciousness apprehends it, it follows that it can only be thought in morally purposive and purpose-realizing activity and in corresponding spiritual and physical energy. In this self-movement of God, partly immanent, partly acting outwardly, consists his life3. Insofar as this is a purely inward one, it naturally withdraws itself from pious contemplation: the thought of it stands only, more or less consciously, as the final presupposition behind the manifold statements about the self-revealing life of God. This holds true even of those passages which most immediately and clearly connect with the concept of the life of God the thought of absolute being and acting, of eternity and autarky4. As unquestionably as Jer. 2 13 (secondary 17 13) and the statement based upon it, Ps. 36 10, represent Yahweh with the image of the inexhaustible fountain as the one who has the ground of his existence in himself and as such is engaged in

1 Cf. especially also Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes* 1888, pp. 34 f.

2 “Substance” also in the sense of power.

3 Cf. Kleinert, *Zur Idee des Lebens im Alten Testament* in *Studien und Kritiken* 1895, p. 701 (“his life is action, restless energy”); p. 720 (“God’s life is restless activity”).

4 That the interpretation of the name “Yahweh” in Ex. 3:14, arising from prophetism, intends to designate the absolutely living one, in such a way that here too the salvation-historical–ethical side of the consideration stands in the foreground, not the metaphysical, seems to me the most probable. An extensive discussion must be omitted here. Cf. moreover Dillmann–Ryssel ad loc. in the *Exeg. Handb. z. A. T.*³ pp. 36 ff.

unceasing, perfect activity, so this reflection nevertheless forms only the foundation for the thought that Yahweh is the perfect and exclusive source of the well-being of Israel (of life as an Old Testament salvific good, see below), or (quite generally formulated, Ps. 36 10) of human beings. Similarly, the thought of the self-sufficiency of God arises only indirectly from the poet’s longing for blissful elevation of the soul in communion with God the Living One, as expressed in Ps. 42 3; 84 3. Even where the designation of Yahweh as the “Living One” explicitly appears with emphasis on his eternity (Deut. 32 40; Jer. 10 10; Dan. 4 31; 12 7; cf. Job 19 25), this determination of essence serves as an explanation of his governance over Israel and the world. The decisive element, however, here and in the entire body of passages for the concept of the life of God is the conception of unlimited power. In this respect it is characteristic of the spirit and nature of Old Testament religion (as opposed to philosophical speculation) that the thought of the powerful divine being, in its thoroughgoing contrast to the nature of the “dead” false gods (Ps. 106 28; Isa. 8 19; Jer. 10 10; Ps. 115 5 ff.), is rooted just as much in the conception of his moral fullness of power as in the presupposition of the physical; that accordingly the ethical power of Yahweh is throughout also presupposed where it is initially a matter of influence upon the external world1. Particularly instructive in this respect is Num. 14 17, where the “power of my Lord” is to prove itself just as much in the self-overcoming of forgiving)נח(grace as in the

external execution of the work of salvation upon Israel. In similar fashion, in the reference to the livingness of God there is also joined the thought of his merciful love: thus Gen. 16 14; 24 62; 25 11 (concerning the governance of providence); II Kings 4 30; Ezek. 33 11. Much more frequently, however, the omnipotent activity of the living God is thought in connection

1 Only apparently does Job 27:2 form an exception, where Job impiously denies the justice of God.

with the energy of his holiness, righteousness, and truthfulness. Thus it is explained that precisely as the Living One he can become a destructive power (Deut. 5 23: as a consuming fire for all flesh); thus, because he is the Living One, he can refuse the giving of oracles to idolatrous Israel (Ezek. 20 3.31); thus, by virtue of this very living essence, he is the absolute guardian of justice (Ezek. 14 16; cf. Job 19 25), who reveals himself as such especially in Israel and for Israel (punishing the people, the holy city, the rulers, the wicked: Ezek. 20 33; Ezek. 5 11; Jer. 22 24; Ezek. 17 16; 34 8; Jer. 23 36; Ezek. 18 3; bringing honor to the people Isa. 49 18; punishing his enemies I Sam. 17 26.36; II Kings 19 4.16 [= Isa. 37 4.17]; Jer. 46 18; Zeph. 2 9; Dan. 12 7). Just as Yahweh himself presents himself as such with the oath חי, so the Israelite likewise invokes this Living One with the customary formula of affirmation אני חי as the All-powerful and the infallible protector of justice (Judg. 8 19; Ruth 3 13; I Sam. 14 45; 19 6; 26 10.16; 28 10; II Sam. 12 5; 14 11; 15 21; I Kings 1 29; 2 24; II Kings 2 2.4.6; 5 16 [20]; the ethical reference remains more or less indeterminate in Hos. 4 15; Jer. 5 2; 12 16; 16 14 f.; 23 7.8; 44 26). Quite analogously there runs alongside this the affirmation that Yahweh, as the Living One, stands up for the truth (Ezek. 16 48: as truly as I live—and as such stand for the truth; I Sam. 20 3.21; 25 26; 29 6; II Sam. 2 27.49; I Kings 17 12; 18 10.15; 22 14 [= II Chron. 18 13]; II Kings 3 14). The wonder-working character of his governance corresponding to the livingness of God finds expression especially in I Kings 17 1; Jer. 10 10; Hos. 2 1; Dan. 6 20.26. Particularly significant for the essence of the Old Testament idea of the life-power of God is finally the belief in the blessed immortality of the members of the kingdom from all peoples entering with the completion of the kingdom of God on earth (Isa. 25 8, where only the word “life,” not the concept, is lacking) and in the resurrection of the chosen dead of Israel to “eternal life.” That the latter hope appears only late and timidly and in quite indeterminate outlines (Isa. 26 19; Dan. 12 2) is explained solely by the fact that

precisely the conception of the fate of the human being after death constituted from the beginning the most difficult obstacle to overcome for the development of that theological idea (according to ancient conception, the power of Yahweh does not extend into the realm of Sheol).

To the theological concept of life in the Old Testament there corresponds the soteriological one also apart from the last things. חיה and חיים, predicated of the human being and designating the salvific good for the rightful members of the theocracy, refer without exception partly to bodily existence (strength and duration thereof—cf. already Gen. 2 9; 3 22: tree of life), partly to the

lower and higher processes of consciousness insofar as they are conditioned by the natural nexus (with respect to possession, power, and enjoyment in the physical and spiritual realm); an influence of the moral being, ethical activity and development, as well as of religious consciousness, may come into consideration; but purely by itself the name and concept of life is not applied to ethical and religious being1. The morally-religious moment enters in: Lev. 18 5; Ezek. 20 11.13.21; Ps. 33 15; Prov. 1 19; 6 11 (where it will not concern life after death)2; Ps. 22 27; 34 12 ff.; 69 33; 119 144 (v. 17 speaks of natural life as the presupposition of the morally-religious; cf. vv. 77.116); Prov. 3 22 f.; 4 13.22.23 (where חיים according to the context—vv. 20–22.31 ff.—is likewise to be interpreted as referring to well-being; the sense therefore: the heart must be guarded more than anything

1 If the latter point of view is disregarded, no conceptually exact result is attained. This applies to the traditional treatment of the subject down to the most recent times (cf., for example—leaving aside Tausch, *Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Begriffs des Lebens im A. T.* in *Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.* 1892, pp. 1–33—Kleinert loc. cit.; also Dillmann's presentation [*A. Theol.* § 46], which moreover suffers greatly from New Testament interpolation; likewise Franke, *Das Alte Testament bei Johannes* 1885, p. 233). The Old Testament has the concept of "eternal life" only in the physical sense of Gen. 3:22 and of Dan. 12:2 (or Isa. 25:8; see above).

2 Against Cheyne, Dillmann, Dalman, etc., see rather Baethgen.

3 Cf. Nowack ad loc.

else, i.e. preserved in adherence to the divine precepts of wisdom, because upon its desires and decisions depend for the most part life-happiness, length of life, and well-being); 6 23; 8 35; 9 11; 10 16 f.; 11 19.30 (righteousness a tree of life); 12 28; 13 14 (the teaching of the wise a fountain of life); 14 27.30; 15 4.24 (the insightful walks on the upward, i.e. happiness-leading path; reproof which leads to life in the indicated sense, because it warns against sins and guides to right action); 19 23; 21 21; 22 4. By contrast, the opposition between divine goodness and the "life" of the human being in Ps. 63 4 is well to be noted: the morally-religious salvific good, the grace of Yahweh, or the blessedness of the consciousness of grace (cf. Ps. 73 25.26), is here opposed as an absolutely more valuable inner reality to all that is encompassed in the concept "life" (cf. Ps. 17 14).

With these Old Testament data the corresponding statements of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic Jewish writers are in general related only as an echo. In the same sense as there God is also here designated as the "Living One." He is ὁ ζῶν εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας and as such creator of all things (Sir. 18 1; Hen. 5 1; originator of human life-breath IV Ezra 3 5); Lord over life and spirit (II Macc. 14 46; over all flesh Bel. 5 25 Theod.); the source of physical and spiritual (moral) life (Hen. 96 6); heavenly ruler and thus founder of the Sabbath (II Macc. 15 4); the almighty, protecting Father of the Jews (Jdth. 13 16. III Macc. 6 28. vgl. 7 6), who chastises his people in wrath and grace (II Macc. 7 33). The entire course of nature and the whole doing and

destiny of human beings is determined by God's "deep thoughts of life" (מחשבות עמקא די חיי) (Apoc. Bar. 54 12). In the same sense as in the Old Testament, the (Mosaic)

1 On Jer. 2:18; Ps. 36:10 see above.

2 According to G; but cf. on the original reading **κρίνει** (according to S) Schlatter loc. cit. p. 140 and Ryssel in *Apokr. u. Ps.* I 318.

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law given to human beings by God is designated as a νόμος ζωῆς: Sir. 17 11. 45 5. Bar. 3 9 (ἐντολάς ζωῆς). 4 1. The situation is different with the eschatological concept of life in the literature in question. This is Old Testament–like only in those writings which, similarly to the Book of Daniel, uphold belief in the resurrection. Thus above all in the Psalter of Solomon and in the Second Book of Maccabees, where in both cases at first only the resurrection of the righteous is proclaimed[2]. According to Ps. Sal. 3 16 (al. 12) the God-fearing will rise εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Accordingly, not only 13 9 (11) (ἡ γὰρ ζωὴ τῶν δικαίων εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) and 14 2 (3) (the pious of the Lord ζήσονται ἐν αὐτῷ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα; they are the trees of life of Paradise) are to be interpreted thus, but also 9 9 (5) (the righteous θησαυρίζει ζωήν αὐτῷ), 14 7 (3) (the pious of the Lord κληρονομήσουσιν ζωήν ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ), 15 15 (13) (the God-fearing ζήσονται ἐν τῇ ἐλεημοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτῶν at the last judgment). Above all, however, it deserves to be emphasized that 14 1 (2) (ἐν νόμῳ ᾧ ἐνετείλατο ἡμῖν εἰς ζωήν ἡμῶν), as shown by the second verse, allows the ultimate purpose of the Mosaic Law to be recognized in the acquisition of that ζωὴ αἰώνιος[3]. With particular emphasis, the Second Book of Maccabees also advocates precisely this concept of eternal life: ὁ τοῦ κόσμου βασιλεὺς ἀποθανόντας ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτοῦ νόμων εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς ἡμᾶς ἀναστήσει (7 9); οἱ μὲν γὰρ

1 See, however, Ryssel ad loc. I 314.

2 Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 170 f.; Dillmann, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 410.

3 Cf. IV Ezra 7 17 ff. 80. 92. 129. 14 30 ff.; *Apoc. Bar.* 38 2. 44 7. 14 f. c. 46 u. ö. (according to 5 2 the promise of future life was already planted in the era of Abraham), and the ὁδὸς τῆς ζωῆς in the (Jewish?) writing on the "two ways" (Harnack, *Die Apostellehre und die jüdischen beiden Wege* 1886, p. 52 ff., to which add Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu* p. 129 f.). How also according to Targumic understanding the divine legislation is directed toward the eternal life (חיי עלמא) of the pious (Onkel. Lev. 18 5; Targ. Ez. 20 11. 13. 21; Hos. 14 10) is shown by Dalman a. a. O. p. 128. When Targ. I Sam. 2 6 states that God causes to rise up "into eternal life" from the realm of the dead, it is evident from this, as also from other passages, that in Targumic usage חיי עלמא can be more or less synonymous with עלמא דאתי (future aeon). For further details see Dalman a. a. O.

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νῦν ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ βραχὺν ὑπενέγκαντες πόνον ἀεννάου ζωῆς ὑπὸ διαθήκην θεοῦ πεπτώκασι (7 36); with which are to be compared 7 14 (αἱρετόν — τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προσδοκᾶν ἐλπίδας, πάλιν ἀναστήσεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ · σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωήν οὐκ ἔσται) and 7 23 (ὁ τοῦ κόσμου κτίστης — καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν ζωήν ὑμῖν πάλιν ἀποδώσει μετ' ἐλέους). To this are further to be added the parabolic discourses of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch, in which, as in the older parts of the book, the general resurrection is assumed[1]. The risen (5 11) elect will be in the light of eternal life (58 3), clothed with the garment of life (i.e. with radiance of light as the manifestation of life; cf. 58 3. 6), which does not grow old (62 (15) 1c); as in these passages, so elsewhere as well the unlimited duration is especially strongly emphasized: the "long" life of the Son of Man (71 17) is an infinite one (cf. v. 16). The righteous take possession of eternal life as the lot predetermined for them (37 4. 40 9. 47 3)[2]. The endless life of the

1 Cf. also (with reference to 22 13) Schwally p. 138 f.

2 The Book of Enoch, in its older constituent parts, ascribes "eternal life" to the angels, but not to the resurrected righteous (among the godless the "years of life" are followed by the "years of destruction" in eternal damnation: 5 5 according to the Greek fragments). According to 15 4–6 the angels, in contrast to humans who are mortal and perishable because of their flesh and blood, are "spiritual beings" "in the enjoyment of eternal, immortal life." From this it is explained that God does not allow the hope of the angels, who united themselves with daughters of men, for an "eternal" life, lasting up to 500 years, for each of their sons, to be fulfilled (10 9. 10; cf. also with regard to chs. 6–11 Beer in *Apokr. u. Ps.* II 225). If, however, according to 10 17. 5 9 the righteous all remain alive on the earth purified of injustice of every kind until they beget 1000 children, and all the days of their youth and of their old age (not: their sabbath-evening of life — see Beer II 243) are completed in peace, so that many years of their good fortune will be in eternal bliss and peace throughout their entire life (cf. Isa. 65 20. 22; Zech. 8 4 — Beer), then the earthly-sensuous nature of this future salvific life leaves all the less room for doubt that the eternity of the same is excluded, than that in 25 5. 6 Enoch is expressly told that after the great final judgment the righteous will be handed over the tree of life (cf. thereto Lods, *Le livre d'Hénoch; fragments grecs* 1892, p. 185 f.); they will let its fragrance penetrate into their bones and live a "long" life upon the earth, "as your fathers have lived" (Greek: a longer life — than that which). Accordingly, against Huhn (*Die messianischen Weissagungen des israelitisch-jüdischen Volkes* 1899, p. 88: "One must assume that even the righteous are granted imperishable existence; 5 p. 25 6, where only a long life is spoken of, is not to be taken literally"), Schürer is correct (*Gesch. d. jüdischen Volkes*[3] II 510. III 200; cf. also Charles, *The Book of Enoch* 1893, p. 111. 262).

risen pious is everywhere in the writings mentioned, in agreement with Dan. 12 2 (cf. vv. 1 and 3 and Isa. 66 24), conceived as a blessed and glorious one[1]. If then IV Ezra and the Apocalypse of Baruch also align themselves with Daniel, the Psalter of Solomon, II Maccabees, and the Enoch parables in their belief in the resurrection (here too universal) and bodily continuance in the future world, they nevertheless constitute, with regard to their usage of language, a certain

intermediate link between those writings on the one hand and the Wisdom of Solomon on the other. In both apocalypses the awakening is indeed not infrequently designated as vivification: IV Ezra 5 45 (vivificans vivificabis a te creatam creaturam in unum)[2]. 14 35. Apoc. Bar. 42 7. 85 15, and the continuance of the risen righteous as life: IV Ezra 8 60 (ipsi qui creati sunt — ingrati fuerunt ei, qui praeparavit eis vitam). 7 48 (Bensly = 6 21.22 Fritzsche: cor malum — longe fecit nos a vita sc. the eternal blessedness of the saeculum venturum). 8 52 (vobis enim apertus est paradisus, plantata est arbor vitae). Apoc. Bar. 54 12 (see above). 57 2 (promissio vitae, quae postea veniet). 76 5. 51 11; cf. 21 13 (si enim haec tantum vita esset, quae hic est omni homini, nihil esset amarius hoc — because everything earthly is subject to change); indeed, in Apoc. Bar. 85 10 the future life is, in contrast to the temporal one, explicitly characterized as the perfect one (the age of the world draws to its close: prope est hydria cisternae et navis portui et cursus itineris urbi et vita consummationi). But the more clearly in the statements in question the idea of an unending blessed life is expressed, the more striking it must appear

1 Cf. also Hen. 99 1: chewat sanajet.

2 Cf. Zöckler, *Die Apokryphen des A. T.* together with an appendix on pseudepigraphic literature 1891, p. 453, and Gunkel in *Apokr. u. Ps.* II 363.

that the expression “eternal life” is nowhere to be found. This is certainly connected with the other peculiarity that those two apocalypses display a preference for the application of the concepts *tempus*, *mundus* (Syr. ܥܠܡܐ ,ܕܗܪ)/(syr. עלמא ,זבנא) and *immortalitas*[1]. The presupposition underlying all these testimonies[2], namely that the righteous after death also experience glorification of the body, through which they are transferred into a state of incomparable being (cf. also *Apc. Bar.* 51, 3. 5), is now however abandoned where Jewish thought is eschatologically dominated by the dualism of Platonizing Hellenistic philosophy. The concept of “eternal life” is indeed retained here as well, but it now refers only to the spiritual being of the human person, to the eternal continuation of the soul in contrast

1 Thus above all the Apocalypse of Baruch: God himself is *solus vivens immortalis* 21 10. What falls to the righteous at the final decision is: *hereditas temporis* (זמן) *promissi*, *mundus* (עלמא) *venturus* (14 13. 16); *glorificabitur splendor eorum in commutationibus — ut possint potiri et accipere mundum, qui non moritur* (51 3); *videbunt mundum, qui invisibilis est eis nunc, et videbunt tempus, quod nunc occultatum est ab eis; et iterum non veterabunt eos tempus* (51 8. 9); *liberati enim sunt ex mundo isto tribulationis* (51 14); *in quo ergo periciderunt homines vitam suam et quocum commutaverunt animam suam illi, qui fuerunt in terra? tunc enim elegerunt sibi* (rather: “since they had not in fact chosen for themselves” — Ryssel) *tempus istud quod expers angustiarum praeterire non potest* (which is rather to be placed after *angustiarum*!), *et elegerunt sibi tempus, cujus exitus pleni sunt gemitibus et malis, et abnegaverunt mundum, qui non veterat eos, qui perveniunt ad eum, et rejecerunt tempus et gloriam* (rather *tempus gloriae*), *ne pervenirent ad honorem, quem praedixit tibi* (51 15. 16; cf. 76 2. 5). But also IV Ezra: *dies enim judicii erit finis temporis* (עלמא) *hujus [et initium] futuri immortalis temporis*

(עלמא), i.e. of the inalienable possession of the power and enjoyment of blessedness, as well as of the impossibility of moral fall (7 13 ff. = 7 43 ff. Fritzsche); *praeparatum est (den Gerechten) futurum tempus* (עלמא) — *ostensus est in finem thesaurus immortalitatis* (אוצר, “treasure of life” Gunkel 8 62. 4); *extantes quomodo corruptibile effugerint nunc — immortales* (7 96 = 6 98 f. Fritzsche); *quid enim nobis prodest, si promissum est nobis immortale tempus* (עלמא), *nos vero immortalia (ewigen Tod wirkende) opera egimus?* (7 19 = 7 49 Fritzsche). Cf. on the history of the concepts Aeon and World Dalman a. a. O. p. 120 ff. 132 ff.

2 Cf. also *Test. XII Patr.* Asher 5: τὰ δὲ πάντα ὑπὸ ἡμέραν εἰσὶ καὶ ὑπὸ ζωὴν τὰ δίκαια· διὸ καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ ἀναμένει.

to the perishability of the body. Thus we find the concept in *Sapientia Salomonis*: δίκαιοι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ζῶσι (5,15)[1]. It is characteristic, however, that the author of this writing prefers to speak of immortality or incorruptibility: God created man for incorruption (2 23); to know your power is the root of immortality (15 3; cf. 3 4; 11 5); attention to the laws is the confirmation of incorruptibility (6 18). But if—just like eternal life—immortality (incorruptibility) is promised only to the righteous, it becomes clear that the one expression, like the other, has acquired a pregnant meaning and at the same time signifies the blessedness of moral perfection (cf. 6 20: incorruptibility brings one near to God), without thereby in any way restricting the basic presupposition of the natural imperishability of the human soul in general. The same concept of eternal life is represented by the author of Fourth Maccabees (15 3: he loved piety more than the saving life according to God unto eternal life; 17 18: for which [i.e. virtue and endurance] they now stand before God and live the blessed age). The Slavonic Book of Enoch also appears to adopt this standpoint (50 2: “now, my children, in patience and meekness accomplish the number of your days, and ye shall inherit the endless life which is to come”; 65 8–10: “there shall be one

1 On 16 13 (σὺ γὰρ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις καὶ κατάγεις εἰς πύλας ᾅδου καὶ ἀνάγεις) cf. Schwally a. a. O. p. 155.

2 Cf. Schwally p. 152 f. and Rohde’s remark on the Greek-philosophical origin of the belief in the natural immortality of the soul among Hellenized Jews (*Psyche*² II 378 f.).

3 “Particularly noteworthy are the statements of the Fourth Book of Maccabees, since it otherwise stands very close to Pharisaic conceptions. All the more striking is the fact that it everywhere suppresses the resurrection hope so strongly emphasized in its source, 2 Maccabees, and in its place has set the hope that the righteous will be transferred to God into heaven” (Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüdischen Volkes*³ II 549).

4 Cf. Morfill and Charles, *The Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, transl. from the Slavonic 1896, p. 66 (“A blessed immortality for the righteous is taught in this book, but apparently no resurrection of the body”), and p. 43 (to 30 6). In this sense the concept of blessed life in (Ethiopic) Hen. 99 1 (cf. 98 10. 14) would also have to be restricted, if, as Charles

thinks, Hen. 91–104 teaches no resurrection of the body. Alone 103 3–4 does not prove this, and 91 10. 92 3 speaks against it (cf. also Dillmann, *Das Buch Henoch* 1853 on 102 4).

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eternity and all the just who shall escape the great judgment of the Lord shall be gathered together in eternal life, and for ever and ever the just shall be gathered together and they shall be eternal; and bright and incorruptible paradise shall be their protection and their eternal habitation; for all corruptible things vanish; and there shall be eternal life"; 66 6: "then ye shall be heirs of eternity"). If, however, it is said occasionally (42 2) of sinners in hell that they "always suffer in the eternal life" (in contrast to the immeasurable bliss and pleasure and eternal life of those who come into paradise, 42 5), one sees here once again how the concept of life is translated into the temporal notion of duration.

More significant is the preparation of the concept of life given in John 1 4 and, in agreement with this (see the first investigation), throughout the Fourth Gospel (as also in 1 John), as it presents itself in the development of this concept, proceeding from the Old Testament view, among the other writers of the New Testament. It cannot be assumed from the outset otherwise than that what is essentially new in this development, and the real driving force behind it, arose from Christology.

1 Whether the gloss (248) to Sir. 19 17: γνῶσις ἐντολῶν κυρίου παιδεία ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ ποιοῦντες τὰ ἀρεστὰ αὐτῷ ἀθανασίας δένδρον καρποῦνται (heightened contrast of ζωή and ἀθανασία) is to be interpreted in the sense of Schlatter (a. a. O. p. 111) may be left undecided.

2 Since, after what has been said above (especially the discussion of "wisdom" pp. 95–110), it must be reckoned possible that the Fourth Gospel was written only after the non-"Johannine" literature, the question necessarily arises which elements concerning the concept "life" presented themselves to the author of the Fourth Gospel himself in the totality of our New Testament literature and could be united into a foundation or presupposition of his own view. Since the individual character and the genetic sequence of the individual concepts of life are, of course, not further under consideration here, it is rather first simply a matter of showing how the utterances of the various writers arrange themselves from the theological and soteriological point of view.

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At first, there is also no lack here of statements in which God is designated as the absolute originator and sustainer of natural life (1 Cor. 15 36–38; Acts 17 25, 28; Matt. 6 25; Luke 16 25; Jas. 4 15; 1 Tim. 2 2; 4 8). In this, even where God's relationship to believers in Christ is in view, only an Old Testament truth is fundamentally confirmed, one which is also recognized in part outside the sphere of biblical revelation. More interesting is the observation that the New Testament writers, wherever they expressly speak of God as "the Living One," consistently

conceive God's essence as power, in continuity with Old Testament usage and concept. One should note especially how in Matt. 26 63 Jesus is adjured by the high priest by the living God as the almighty guardian of truth and justice. In contrast to the powerless and ineffective pagan gods, God has made himself known as the Living One in the creation of the world and in his revelation in nature (benevolent providence), Acts 14 15; but especially through his revelation in Christ, his Son, Matt. 16 16. In explicit contrast to the idols, according to 1 Thess. 1 9 the living and true God also bears witness to himself to human beings as a moral power through the resurrection of his Son (v. 10) and through the efficacy of Christian life of faith (vv. 2 ff.). Heb. 9 14 assures us that dead works—that is, human works which do not accomplish the main thing, the purification of the conscience—do not correspond to the living God (cf. 6 1), because his essence is energy, in the sense of spiritual and moral power. From this it also follows that the Spirit of the living God proves effective in human hearts through the evangelical ministry of preaching (2 Cor. 3 3). In carrying out his plan of salvation toward Gentiles and Jews, God reveals the complete

1 Cf. also the "Spirit of life" calling back into earthly life from God, Rev. 11 11. In Rom. 8 38 life, like death, is presented as a power apart from God; that this power is created by God (κτίσις) is presupposed (v. 39).

2 Note the emphasis on the power of this Son of the living God in vv. 18–19.

freedom of will and physical power that belong to him as the Living One (Rom. 9 26). The living God has shown himself in the old covenant as in the new, in zeal of wrath as in grace, to be the Almighty (Heb. 12 22; cf. vv. 26 f.). As the Living One, he is the mighty Savior of all human beings, especially of believers (1 Tim. 4 10), who preserves his holy possession, the Christian community, and avenges its profanation (2 Cor. 6 16; cf. "Lord Almighty," v. 18, and 1 Cor. 3 16–17); similarly 1 Tim. 3 15. The all-powerful activity of God in creation, world-governance, and the ordering of salvation as a whole is in view when Rev. 1 18 (cf. 4 8–9) speaks of the One who "lives for ever and ever." In particular, God's judgment is also brought into relation with his livingness. In it lies the power to subject all humanity to his judgment (Rom. 14 10–11); as the Living One, God powerfully and zealously safeguards his honor through judgment upon the unbelieving (Heb. 3 12; 10 31); but as the same Living One he is also the Lord who rules over the elements and rescues his own in the judgment of wrath (Rev. 7 2; cf. 15 7–8).

If these immediate statements about the life of God show us that, according to New Testament conception as well, this life is the perfect physical and moral exercise of power given with the essence of the absolute personality, which outwardly becomes corresponding impartation of power on the one hand and manifestation of might on the other, then this truth receives further illumination and emphatic confirmation through the many-voiced testimony concerning the causal relationship of God to the Old and New Testament life of salvation. As God himself, so also his word of Old and New Testament revelation (λόγος) is called living

1 “City of the living God”: the emphasis lies on *city*, whereby the supersensory place of the true and abiding presence of God is meant, in contrast to Sinai. The attribute of God “living” suits just as well the characterization of Old Testament (Sinaitic) revelation as that of New Testament revelation — all the more so since even in the latter God does not cease to judge (vv. 23. 29).
2 II Cor. 6 16 likewise has in view the contrast with the εἴδωλα.

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(Heb. 4 12; cf. vv. 1–11), because it proves itself continually effective as the bearer of divine power (cf. 3 12), in that it judges the innermost processes of consciousness in those who receive the revelation and powerfully decides their eternal destiny. By its origin and purpose, the Mosaic law already contained “living oracles” (Acts 7 38); as a truly life-generating, regenerating power of God, the imperishable word of the gospel proves itself (1 Pet. 1 23). The life which is regarded as the Old Testament good of salvation is the eternal well-being in the messianic kingdom conditioned by God-pleasing disposition and conduct on earth. God himself is the one who has pointed human beings to the path for attaining this life through special commandment, comprehensively and in detail in the Mosaic law (Matt. 19 16–17; Mark 10 17; Luke 18 18; Luke 10 25–28; cf. Acts 7 38; Rom. 10 5; Gal. 3 12). But of course the power of sin in the human being makes it impossible for him to reach the goal by way of fulfilling the law: the unavoidable transgression of the commandment given to him for life draws upon him the penalty of a death from which there is no resurrection (Rom. 7 10). As good as the commandment is (Rom. 7 12), as spiritual as the law of God is (Rom. 7 14), through human guilt its purpose—to help human beings to life—is thwarted; there is no law that could make alive (this side and beyond, ethically and physically) (Gal. 3 21). The path to life opens for human beings only in God’s saving action in Christ. Through this saving action it comes about that the sinner condemned to death by the law is freed from the binding force of the law through faith in the crucified Christ and enabled to live a life in accordance with God’s gracious will (Gal. 2 19); and that through the righteous act of Christ’s life, completed in obedient suffering unto death, the justifying bestowal

1 See above the remark on the interpretation of the νόμος ζωῆς as eternal life in *Psalt. Sol.* 14 1 (p. 231).

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of eternal life (or dominion in the life of the coming kingdom of God) has been effected for humanity (the believing recipients of grace) (Rom. 5 18; cf. vv. 17, 19, 21). From the same saving action of God is explained the personal proclamation of salvation by the deceased Christ to the “spirits in prison” for the purpose of transferring them into a divine-like (eternal and blessed) spiritual life (1 Pet. 4 6); likewise the admission of deceased believers and of those who experience the Parousia into the life-community with Christ beyond (1 Thess. 5 10). And so it is also the throne of God and of the Lamb—that is, of the crucified Messiah—from which the powers of eternal, undiminished, and indestructible life flow forth in the future world (Rev. 22 1; cf. v. 17; 7 17). God’s work is, in particular, also the resurrection, through which, according to general testimony (apart from the Fourth Evangelist), the slain Christ was reanimated and came

to resurrection. And indeed it was the divine spiritual essence of Christ on the basis of which this reanimation occurred (1 Pet. 3 18). What David had already intuited was fulfilled in the Messiah Jesus, in that he was introduced by God from death into life and into the blessedness of exaltation (Acts 2 28). As death was necessary, so according to God's counsel resurrection was necessary for him, in order that he might be appointed ruler over both the dead and the living (Rom. 14 9). As this servant of God raised by God, Christ is possessor of a life and opens up a life that is the only true, perfect, and indestructible one, and which—although it is a future and otherworldly one—nevertheless even wonderfully influences the earthly corporeality of believers

1 Note the impersonal passive expression εὐηγγελίσθη alongside 3 19.

2 Cf. Holtzmann (Hand-Comm.) on Rev. 5 6.

3 Col. 2 12 speaks of the ἐνέργεια τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Cf. also I Tim. 6 16: ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν.

4 His πνεῦμα as "the divine factor" (Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 311). Cf. also B. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.* (6th ed.) § 48 e.

5 Cf. B. Weiss (Comm.)[8] ad loc.

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("author of life," Acts 3 15–16). By virtue of the mystical fellowship of the baptized with the Christ raised by the glory of God, they receive both the capacity and the obligation to a new moral mode of life (Rom. 6 4, 8; cf. Col. 2 13; Eph. 2 5; applied to ethical effectiveness in apostolic ministry, 2 Cor. 13 4). Through the resurrection of Christ from the dead, God has also begotten believers anew to a "living" hope—that is, to a hope of heavenly consummation of salvation which is the driving force of salvation's development in human beings, because it is grounded in the fact of Christ's resurrection and binds them to the risen One (1 Pet. 1 3). And so the God who raised Christ Jesus from the dead and already on earth revealed the same life-giving power to Christ's apostles in repeated rescues of life (2 Cor. 4 10–11) will also make alive the mortal bodies of those in whom his (God's) Spirit dwells (Rom. 8 11); in the risen Christ (ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ) all will be made alive (1 Cor. 15 22). God's saving action reaches its completion in what he accomplishes in the exalted Christ and through him. Just as Christ's resurrection is effected by God, so also is the eternal continuance of the risen One in exclusive belonging to God (in freedom from the dominion of death brought by sin, Rom. 6 10, 9); the one crucified in weakness lives by God's power (2 Cor. 13 4). In this glorification (as Lord) he shows himself to be the living stone chosen by God, that is, the personal, pneumatic foundation of life for the New Testament community, who effects the salvation of believers

1 According to the *Recepta* διά τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος this Spirit of God would also be the means of bodily quickening (cf. Holtzmann a. a. O. II 201).

2 πάντες: in any case only as those who are spiritually united with Christ (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ v. 23); cf. B. Weiss a. a. O. § 97 a; 99 b; Holtzmann II 199. On the question whether and how the final beatification of all (ἀποκατάστασις πάντων) is presupposed, cf. Schmiedel (Hand-Comm.)² p. 195 f.; Holtzmann II 202.

3 "On the basis of weakness," Schmiedel.

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including honor (1 Pet. 2 4–5; cf. vv. 3, 7, 17). Only by way of justification through faith in the crucified One and the impartation of the Spirit of the exalted Christ can life—"already beginning now, but reaching its completion in the messianic kingdom" (Lipsius)—be attained according to God's saving arrangement (Gal. 3 11; cf. vv. 1–5, 14; 4 6). Therefore God has also arranged matters so that those predestined for eternal life receive pedagogical instruction in faith in Jesus Christ through the exemplary demonstration of patience shown by the exalted Christ to his apostle himself (1 Tim. 1 16). Believers are preserved by God as those raised with Christ in the hidden fellowship of life with the exalted Christ until the Parousia (Col. 3 3): having died to the world, they live a life flowing to them from the risen and exalted Christ. This life is at first spiritual (seeking the things above, setting the mind on them, vv. 1–2), hidden in God who is invisible to the world, just as the life of the exalted One is; but it will appear in bodily reality with the manifestation of Christ. From present as well as future judgment of wrath, God's power in the gospel saves the life of every human being, provided it has as its ground and content faith in the risen and exalted Christ, through whom the human being becomes partaker of the righteousness coming from God (Rom. 1 17; cf. vv. 9, 1–5). And just as certainly as Christians have already been rescued from the impending final judgment of wrath through the reconciling death of the Son of God, so certainly will they, because they are now justified, also be saved positively in the sense that they will one day participate in the life of the exalted Christ (Rom. 5 10). The mercy shown by Jesus Christ himself in the final judgment will help them to eternal life on the basis of God's love (Jude v. 21). They then enter—declared righteous by the Savior's grace—according to their hope into possession of

1 Cf. Huther z. St.

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eternal life, in accordance with the intention by which God, according to his mercy, poured out the regenerating and renewing Holy Spirit upon them through Jesus Christ (Tit. 3 5–7). That eternal life will be the reward of God for the self-denial of faith and love practiced on earth for Christ's sake (his person, his name, the gospel, the kingdom of God) is already evident from the words of the Lord in Mark 10 30 (Matt. 19 29; Luke 18 30) and Matt. 25 46. The New Testament writers do not, however, stop entirely at the point that the mediation of divine life to humanity is conditioned by those events which complete Christ's work; they occasionally also look back to pre-temporal presuppositions. Thus when Paul explains the pneumatic life proceeding from Christ—which from the Parousia onward also renews believers bodily—not merely from the essence of the risen One, but in the last analysis traces it back to that of the pre-existent One:

“the last Adam became a life-giving Spirit,” that is, Christ, the founder and initiator of pneumatic humanity, is already determined and disposed by virtue of the heavenly spiritual nature imparted to him to attain the life-power which he manifests as the risen One (1 Cor. 15 45). And when the author of Hebrews lets the Christ appointed as priest according to Scripture become such not according to the law of a “commandment dependent on flesh,” but according to the power of an indestructible life, he is thinking of that life which Christ possesses—over against his destructible earthly bodily life—before, during, and after his earthly existence by virtue of his eternal spiritual essence (cf. Heb. 9 14) (7 16). Elsewhere, the entrance into eternal life effected by Christ’s saving work appears for each individual participant to have been divinely

1 Compare the formulation in Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum* p. 213; Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 75 ff. 80.

predetermined from the foundation of the world, as shown by the “book of life of the slain Lamb,” connected with Old Testament and Jewish conceptions (Exod. 32 32–33; Isa. 4 3; Ps. 69 29; Dan. 12 1), in which the relevant names have been written from the foundation of the world (Rev. 13 8; 17 8; cf. 21 27; 3 5; 20 12, 15; Phil. 4 3). Likewise, for those appointed to eternal life according to Acts 13 46–48, we shall have to think both of a pre-temporal decree of God and of inclusion in Christ’s mediating work. [line 9] But when Paul, according to Titus 1 2, declares himself an apostle of Jesus Christ “in hope of eternal life, which the truthful God promised before eternal times,” comparison with 2 Tim. 1 9 shows that the promise is conceived as a volitional utterance of God falling within pre-worldly eternity, which determined eternal life for future believers in Christ (the ones chosen from eternity, Eph. 1 4). The question naturally arises whether the divine “word of promise” is perhaps conceived as addressed to the pre-existent Christ.

Not infrequently the moment of the mediation of life through Christ does not stand out in any special way alongside the causal activity of God, without therefore being absent. When Eph. 4 18 speaks of the “life of God” from which the Gentiles are alienated by their disposition and manner of life, God is thereby conceived as the author of the original ethical-religious life corresponding to the nature and destiny of the human being, which (cf. vv. 19 ff.) is restored through the saving efficacy of the example of Christ by means of the spiritual renewal of the human being. Proceeding from the view that in Christian piety the Old-Testament piety comes to fulfillment, the Old-Testament promise of life is also intensified in the Gospel for the author of 1 Tim. 4 8 (cf. Mark 10 30; Luke 18 30): but it is God upon whom the promise, valid for the New-Testament pious person, of the present and of the

1 See further Schürer a. a. O. II 552.

2 Against Bengel (χρόνοι αἰώνιοι *secuti sunt creationem et lapsum*), B. Weiss (§ 108 a), et al.

3 Cf. v. Soden (Hand-Comm.)² ad loc.

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 244, l. 9 read: Tit. 1, 2 (cf. also II Tim. 1, 1).

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future life[1] goes back (cf. vv. 9–10; 1 Pet. 3 7. 9 ff.). From God — also to the Gentiles — (by means of the Gospel) comes the gift of repentance, which leads to life (eternal; cf. Acts 13 46) (Acts 11 18; cf. 1 Tim. 6 12). The Spirit of the new covenant coming from God, who alone is the source of apostolic vocational competence, is absolutely the principle of life (effects a life that does not perish: 2 Cor. 3 6). Through the driving force of his Spirit God in principle governs "life" (that is, first of all the ethical consciousness) of those who belong to Christ Jesus (Gal. 5 25). If Christians by the (Spirit of God) put to death the (fleshly) activity of the body, they will live (spiritually now, spirit-bodily hereafter; Rom. 8 13; cf. vv. 10–11). God educates those receptive to the general revelation of grace in Christ toward ethical-religious conduct of life and thereby rescues them from the power of death (Tit. 2 12); he makes use of suffering as a paternal means of discipline in order to save his own for eternal life, after the struggle in the world has been fought through (Heb. 12 9. 4). Through his Holy Spirit he has also prepared us for being clothed with the heavenly body, so that in this way the mortal may be swallowed up by life (2 Cor. 5 4–5; cf. above, p. 71 f.). According to an Old-Testament divine saying, however, it already stands firm for Jesus that God preserves in life and raises up in death those to whom he acknowledges himself as their God (as to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) (Mark 12 27; Matt. 22 32; Luke 20 38); that our common father Abraham believed God occurred for this reason, because he is the one who makes the dead alive (Rom. 4 17)[3]; just as God gives life to everything in the world, not only to the dead

1 What is meant is the enjoyment of a content of life corresponding to the true concept of life on this side and the other.

2 Cf. v. 18. The "Spirit" is the "objectively divine [one] as a supernatural principle of moral life" (Lipsius on v. 16).

3 Paul has, in accordance with the context (v. 19), referred this in itself more indefinite Old Testament expression specifically to the quickening of the "dead reproductive powers" (B. Weiss) (cf. I Sam. 2 6), without, however, probably losing sight of the New Testament sense that includes the actual resurrection of the dead (note Paul's otherwise customary use of ζωοποιεῖν).

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(τοῦ ζωογονοῦντος τὰ πάντα, 1 Tim. 6 13). Its crowning point the divine work of enlivening will attain with the resurrection of the dead conditioned by the final conversion of the great whole of Israel (Rom. 11 15) and with the allotment of eternal life that takes place in the final judgment, whose most general canon (abstracting from the personal relation to the saving work of Christ), according to Paul's exposition, makes the decision for Gentile and Jew in each case dependent upon the fact that the human being has "with perseverance in good work striven after glory and honor and incorruptibility" (Rom. 2 7). That the same apostle, where he speaks of Christians

and designates sanctification as the fruit of their servitude to God, and eternal life as the final fruit, does not in general lose sight of the causal relation of Christ to this divine gift of grace of eternal life, is shown by Rom. 6 22–23. This very gift — and indeed as one coming from God who richly provides us with everything for enjoyment — will be meant when in 1 Tim. 6 19 the rich are admonished to lay hold of the true life (τῆς ὄντως ζωῆς) (note εἰς τὸ μέλλον and in v. 12 the parallel ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς; cf. 2 Tim. 4 7–8)[2]. Just as here the practice of good works carried out in trust in God constitutes the condition, so Jas. 1 12 sets before those who love God and have proved themselves in trial the reception of the crown of life as the promised reward of honor from God; whereas in Gal. 6 8 the explanation is indeed (Lipsius) first sought in the imperishable nature of the Holy Spirit of God bestowed upon believers, when the reception of eternal life presents itself as a harvest from the sowing upon the Spirit, that is, as the fruit of trust "in the life-giving power" of that supernatural

> **1** Here we have the most general concept of life, including eternal life, to which believers are raised. The emphasis in this passage places the appeal to the all-quickening God alongside the usual one: to the living God (see above).
>
> **2** Against v. Soden: "Perhaps, however, according to 4 8, the present life in a form truly worthy of life is also included."

principle. Beyond the final judgment the gaze of the apocalyptist penetrates still further, when, in view of the new Jerusalem that has come down from heaven (the bride of the Lamb) upon the renewed earth, he receives from God himself the promise that he will give to the one who thirsts from the spring of the water of life freely (Rev. 21 6).

In numerous passages finally the causality of God is expressed only more or less indirectly, while the significance of Christ for the life of salvation, both temporal and beyond, is brought into the foreground. The presupposition throughout remains the function of Christ as a divine organ. With his body he bore our sins up onto the tree, so that we, having become free from sin, might live to righteousness (1 Pet. 2 24). Even more than with the reconciling death of Christ, however, the thought of the life-effect proceeding from him is connected with his resurrection (Mark 16 11; Luke 24 23; Acts 25 19; Luke 24 5; Acts 13) and with what followed and will follow from it. The one who was once dead is alive for ever and ever (Rev. 1 18; 2 8). The life of the one raised from the dead is a life for God, no longer subject to the power of death, but wholly belonging to the sphere of life of the eternal God and therefore itself imperishable (Rom. 6 10). If he thus lives forever, he can also fulfill the task incumbent upon him, to intercede as priest for those who draw near to God through him (Heb. 7 25; cf. v. 8). He has shown himself to be the great high priest over the house of God, in that through the sacrificial blood of his death he procured for us the "entrance into the sanctuary," that is, opened up for us the New-Testament relation of grace and consecrated this relation (through our sprinkling with his blood) as a way leading through the veil of his flesh into the Holy of Holies itself (to the most

1 “As in Heb. 10 26, the matter is liberation from the guilt of a former life of sin, not merely the removal of the sinful life and moral renewal, even though this latter thought always forms the resting point of the discussions” (Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 314).

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immediate nearness to God and the most perfect communion with God), a “living” way, insofar as with it not merely the direction is designated (as in the Old-Testament way of salvation), but also (through purification of the conscience from dead works for service to the living God) the powers are given that lead to the goal (Heb. 10 19–20; cf. 9 14. 18 f.). Everything that serves true life, above all pious life (ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν), and thereby the appropriation of the imperishable and holy divine nature (θείας φύσεως), has been bestowed upon us (initially upon the apostles) by the divine power “of our God and Savior Jesus Christ” through the knowledge of him (2 Pet. 1 3–4)[2]. The impartation of the New-Testament life of salvation takes place by way of the proclamation of the Gospel: this consists of words of the life proceeding from Christ (τῆς ζωῆς ταύτης), that is, of words which, when received in faith, effect life in the sense of Acts 3 15 (see above) (Acts 5 20; cf. vv. 12–16); it is λόγος ζωῆς (Phil. 2 16)[3]. While the message of the living Christ for unbelievers acquires the foul odor of the proclamation of a dead man, effects turning away from the revelation of salvation and thereby eternal death, for believers the apostolic proclamation of the exalted, continuing-to-live Christ is a pleasing fragrance, and this becomes a breath of life that creates life in them (the spiritual life on this side and the eternal life that follows from it) (2 Cor. 2 16). Christ Jesus, the conqueror of the power of death (the risen one), has through the apostolic teaching of the Gospel caused the light of a life of imperishable nature (streaming from him) to dawn upon the world

1 With B. Weiss (§ 123 d) the interpretation of ἐνεκαίνισεν (“by the fact that he himself entered it, he also inaugurated it for us”) is not satisfactory. Cf. v. Soden on 9 18.

2 Cf. v. Soden ad loc. and Holtzmann a. a. O. II 324.

3 According to B. Weiss § 104 e, n. 9, “the ζωή here is probably eternal life.” Expression and context, also 4 3, make this interpretation probable. The assumption of v. Schrenck (a. a. O. p. 40), that “the word of life” has acquired a sense no longer purely future, and the justification offered for it, introduce obscurity into the passage.

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(2 Tim. 1 10). The eternally living Christ, however, according to Pauline teaching, also becomes Christ in us. In the apostle (believer) freed from the binding force of the law through Christ’s death, Christ himself lives: he governs (through the Holy Spirit, who is Spirit of God and of Christ; Gal. 3 2. 9–10) the personality of the former, whose life in the flesh is in principle determined by faith in the Redeemer (Gal. 2 20)[1]. The law (the determining power) of the Spirit of the (holy and indestructible) life has led to actual freedom from the law of sin and death in Christ Jesus (Rom. 8 1–2). In those who have Christ in themselves, the body is indeed dead (declared dead by virtue of baptism) on account of sin (dwelling in the body), but the Spirit

(renewed through the Spirit of Christ) is life (filled with ethical power and progressively exercising this fullness of power) on account of righteousness (conformity to God) belonging to the essence of the Spirit (Rom. 8 10; cf. vv. 5–8). The striving of the Spirit (from Christ) aims at appropriation and exercise of an ethical nature which already here leads to (true, indestructible) life and to peace with God, or is equivalent to this (Rom. 8 6). Thus believers themselves, ethically considered, are living from the dead (ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντες, Rom. 6 13); they live for God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 6 11). As those who have died with Christ to the elements (elemental powers) of the world, they are not to allow themselves to be ethically determined by external prescriptions—whether of the Old-Testament law or of Christian false teachings—as though they were still living in the world (Col. 2 20). True, God-pleasing life must prove itself in Christian works of love, as they spring from repentant faith (Rev. 3 1)[3]. In that Christians consecrate their bodily organ exclusively to the service of God in the

1 Phil. 1 21: τὸ ζῆν is remaining alive: Christ has taken my earthly life in the body wholly into his service, is the sole purpose of it (cf. Lipsius ad loc.).

2 Cf. B. Weiss § 84 b.

3 Cf. B. Weiss § 135 a.

doing of his will, they present a “living” (accomplished in the power of the bestowed Spirit)[1] and therefore holy and God-pleasing sacrifice (Rom. 12 1). The unavoidable consequence of pious life in Christ Jesus, namely suffering (persecution, 2 Tim. 3 12), is not to be regarded as a hindrance but rather again as a means of promotion: suffering in the sense of Christ signifies and effects the break with sin, as a result of which the Christian no longer lives for human desires but only for the will of God (1 Pet. 4 1–2). As for the final goal as such, Jesus himself designates repentance and self-denial (the narrow way and the narrow gate, Matt. 7 14), the ruthless combating or putting to death of [line 15] fleshly desires (Mark 9 43. 45; cf. 48–49), as the sole way that at the Parousia leads into the life of the messianic kingdom. While here mediation through him is at first left aside, it emerges all the more clearly in the apostolic statements. Believers will be revealed with Christ, the author of their life originating from the upper world (ἡ ζωή ἡμῶν), who continually gives it direction, measure, and content, in glory at his manifestation (at the return) (Col. 3 4). Whoever has died with Christ Jesus (as his witness) will also live with him (in eternal glory) (2 Tim. 2 10–11). It is especially the apocalyptist who brings this final goal to the fore— not without distinctive features. Christ will not erase the name of the “victor” from the book of life (Rev. 3 5); he gives to the one who is faithful unto death (if necessary unto martyrdom) the crown of life (2 10). First the Christian martyrs will come to life (the first resurrection) and reign with Christ for a thousand years before the end of the world (20 4), while the remaining dead (those who died in the Lord, 14 13) will come to life only after the completion of the millennium (20 5). Of all “victors,” however, it holds that the Exalted One will give them to eat from the tree of life in paradise, that is, will grant them in the future world eternal

1 Not merely “effective” (wirkungskräftiges) (B. Weiss ad loc.).

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 250, l. 15 read: Matt. 18, 8 f.

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life in undiminished power and blessed sufficiency (2 7; cf. 22 2. 14. 19). The Son of God’s own post-existence rests upon his pre-existence: just as his life has no end, so his days have no beginning (he is the one to whom even in this respect Melchizedek is made like, ἀφωμοιωμένος, Heb. 7 3; cf. Rev. 1 17: “I am the First and the Last”; 2 8; 22 13).

One sees: a development of the concept of life took place within the New Testament literature in question not so much on the theological side of soteriology as rather on the christological side. We still have to set out the result of the preceding discussion in this respect. Insofar as God himself is conceived as principle of life, reference to the causal relation to the existence of the creature and to the natural life of human beings recedes, in the Pauline and Deuteropauline writings, in comparison with the earliest phase (in the Synoptics, Acts, and Apocalypse); by contrast, in the former the derivation of human salvific life from the life of God occupies an all the broader scope and an all the more important position. This applies less with regard to the future, other-worldly life. This salvific good is emphasized relatively frequently, in synoptic and especially apocalyptic passages, as the goal of striving and hope, as well as as the object of promise.[1] In a noteworthy manner it is illuminated above all according to its physical side, in such a way that the connection between this and the moral constitution of that life is already taken into view here. If Mark 12:24–27 (cf. Matt. 22:32; Luke 20:38; also Matt. 5:30) instructs us that life after the resurrection is similar to that of the angels, thus taking place—in contrast to earthly-sensuous conditions—on the basis of spiritual-bodily reality, then from Mark 10:30 (Matt. 19:29; Luke 18:30) we learn that “eternal life” is possession and enjoyment of a perfect objective good in the future world, which

1 On Jesus’ usage (ζωὴ αἰώνιος and ἡ ζωή) cf. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu* p. 127. 130 f.

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in its kind corresponds to temporal possession of goods (houses, brothers, sisters, mothers, children, and fields), namely as reward for moral-religious conduct (toward Christ or the Gospel) during earthly life; and Matthew 25:46 likewise presents “eternal life,” in contrast to κόλασις (punitive torment) αἰώνιος, according to the side of enjoyment, of the experience of well-being, as reward of the “righteous.”[1] Elsewhere the moral essence of eternal life is asserted in its own right. If, according to a saying of Christ that connects with Old Testament presuppositions (Matt. 19:16 ff.; Mark 10:17; Luke 18:18; cf. Luke 10:25–28), eternal life can be attained only through fulfillment of the divine commandments (uprightness and love of neighbor; love of God), that is, through moral achievement, then it must be conceived as essentially ethical-religious in nature. The same conclusion follows if, according to Acts 11:18 (ζωή) and 13:46, 48 (ζωὴ αἰώνιος), it can be attained only through repentant, believing acceptance of the Gospel (cf. Christ’s reference to the path of repentance and self-denial, Matt. 7:14; Mark 9:43, 45). The same basic

conceptions as above are presupposed when the Apocalypse speaks of those who are written in the book of life, or who will one day receive the water of life (cf. especially Rev. 21:8; 22:15). The earliest Christian conception of eternal life is thus that of the infinity and perfection of possession of power, exercise of power, and awareness of power, belonging to pneumatically transfigured personal beings morally united with God (through Christ). Since here the individuals are conceived as integrated into the social organism of a community of God,[2] the concept of eternal life touches

1 The latter contrast is one-sidedly emphasized by Dalman (a. a. O. 131 f.). The life pronounced in judgment is also, for Jesus' own consideration, in the first place the perfect realization of the life appointed by the Old Testament God of salvation for his people (cf. Matt. 19 17 with Lev. 18 5; Ezek. 20 21. 25).

2 This follows not merely from the ethical conditionality of that life and from the nature of personal life as such, but also comes into view in the physical illumination of Mark 10 30.

that of the kingdom of God as a community.[1] The equation: "kingdom of God and life are interchangeable concepts"[2] is, however, contestable in view of the fact that life, that is, "eternal life," in the proclamation of Jesus—not only but in the earliest proclamation generally—belongs to the beyond, in exactly the same respect in which, for the kingdom of God (kingdom of heaven), as the concept developed, the two-sidedness of the present and the future, of earthly-temporal development and heavenly consummation, seems to be characteristic. Even in Pauline statements about life in the future aeon, attention is relatively often directed simultaneously to the physical and the ethical significance of that life. Those freed by the Spirit of God in Christ from the dominion of sin will also be enlivened bodily with Christ (Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 15:22; 2 Cor. 5:4–5), and the eternal life to be attained "through perseverance in good work" bears the character of δόξα, τιμή, and ἀφθαρσία (Rom. 2:7): the "life" conditioned by God-bestowed righteousness will express itself in completely free disposal (βασιλεύσουσιν) over the external goods of the future world (Rom. 5:17, 18, 21; cf. 4:13). The remaining statements point exclusively to the ethical factor. Fundamental condition of rescue unto life is reconciliation with God and justification through Christ (Rom. 5:10), subjectively conversion to faith (Rom. 11:15; cf. v. 23). The "eternal life" is

1 Cf. especially Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I 207 ff. (despite Joh. Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*[2] p. 78 ff.).

2 Holtzmann a. a. O. I 222. Cf. Joh. Weiss a. a. O. p. 118; Krop, *La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume de Dieu d'après les évangiles synoptiques* 1897, p. 29.

3 Holtzmann I 215 ff. It may therefore be asked, if one does not stop with Mark 9 43 ff.; Matt. 19 16 ff.; 25 46 (A. Hering, *Die Idee Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche* 1899, p. 481), whether "eternal life" (in Jesus' proclamation) "forms the

comprehensive expression for the good offered in the kingdom of God" (Holtzmann I 204).

4 Cf. also Rom. 4 17 (see above).

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fruit of the sowing of the Spirit (Gal. 6:8), goal of sanctification (Rom. 6:22 f.); it is a "life with Christ" that can be attained only through growth in sobriety (faith, love, and hope) (1 Thess. 5:8–10). Among those whose names are written in the book of life belong in particular also those who have fought for the Gospel at the Apostle's side (Phil. 4:3). Insofar as life in the eschatological sense is conceived by the writers of the "Deuteropauline" stage, we encounter—apart from 1 Peter 4:6, where the life of those redeemed from the underworld (on the basis of their faith in Christ's own proclamation) is designated as a divine-spiritual (spiritual-bodily[1]) life—purely ethical points of view. Eternal life is to be hoped for by virtue of justification through the grace of Jesus Christ (rebirth and renewal of the Holy Spirit, Titus 3:7); it is consequence of faith in Christ (1 Tim. 1:16), object of unfailing hope for the elect of God, who possess "faith" and recognize the truth corresponding to (Christian) [line 18] "piety" (Titus 1:2); to be expected from Christ's mercy on the basis of the most holy "faith," prayer in the Holy Spirit, and the love of God (Jude 21). Love for God and proven endurance in temptation render one worthy of receiving the crown of life (James 1:12). Only on the path of struggle in the exercise of Christian virtue can eternal life be seized (1 Tim. 6:12; cf. v. 11); special moral-religious demands are placed upon Christian spouses with regard to the attainment of life (1 Pet. 3:7); good works must be performed in rich measure if the "true" life is to be grasped (1 Tim. 6:18–19); willing submission to the discipline of God is also required if we are to "live" (Heb. 12:9). The future life (ζωή ἡ μέλλουσα) is, in a word, promised to piety (εὐσέβεια) (1 Tim. 4:8).[2]

If, then, the emphasis on the ethical factor increases in the eschatological concept of life, there becomes apparent

1 B. Weiss a. a. O. § 50 d.

2 Cf. v. Soden (Hand-Comm. III, 1.2 p. 173).

[*From Addenda and Corrections*] To p. 254, l. 18 read: (Tit. 1, 2, according to which II Tim. 1, 1 is also to be understood).

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accordingly an even sharper difference between the earliest and the later mode of conception where the this-worldly salvific life is concerned. Under the concept and name of life this good does not appear at all in the Synoptic literature, nor in Acts and the Apocalypse, wherever the causality of God (as distinct from the salvific activity of Christ) is under consideration. By contrast, from Paul onward life in the sense mentioned becomes a familiar basic concept in the presentation of God's salvific revelation. A communication of life is implied when Paul derives the state of grace (the divine sonship of those called to glory, Rom. 9:26), the faith and

righteousness of Christians (2 Cor. 6:16; cf. vv. 14–15, and with regard to the “temple” as God’s own work, 1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19), Christian piety (1 Thess. 1:9; cf. vv. 2 ff.: work of faith, labor of love, perseverance in hope toward Jesus Christ), and the conversion of hearts to Christ (Christian disposition and conduct) from the “living” God and from the Spirit of the “living” God (2 Cor. 3:3). In other passages the Apostle explicitly calls the salvation effected by God in believers life. The state of justification attained through faith in Christ is a θῷ ζῆν (Gal. 2:19; 3:11), a life preserved from the judgment of wrath now and in the future (Rom. 1:17). As a new condition of life (καινότης ζωῆς) the Christian’s freedom from bondage to sin is to be designated (Rom. 6:4, 8), his inner moral determination by the Spirit of God as “life through the Spirit” (Gal. 5:25). The Christian capacity to fulfill the divine will, which manifests itself especially in apostolic fitness for service, is life effected by the New Testament Spirit of God (2 Cor. 3:6; 13:4). The mortification of the sinful functions of flesh and body by the divine Spirit dwelling in the children of God already lays the foundation for (future, eternal) life (Rom. 8:13). Also in the deuteropauline literature

1 On the communication of life as the “dominant point of view” of Paul’s entire soteriological conception cf. Titius, *Der Paulinismus* 1900, p. 52–54.

we gain the concept in question indirectly from a number of passages that relate the ethical nature of the Christian to the “living” God. The standpoint of divine communication of life also comes into play here, when the state of grace of the righteous of the New Testament community advancing toward consummation (Heb. 12:22; cf. v. 23), or the salvation of believers (already beginning on earth, 1 Tim. 4:10[1]), is traced back to the activity of the living God; when the church’s standing for the truth of Christian salvific doctrine in word and deed is understood as the effect of the living God dwelling within it (1 Tim. 3:15); or when the selfless brotherly love of believers, the very nature of the reborn, appears as begotten by the “living” word of God (1 Pet. 1:23[2]). As a factor of the inner life of believers their hope of heavenly consummation, to which the Father of Jesus Christ has begotten them anew, is characterized when it is called “living” (1 Pet. 1:3). In more general consideration the concept of ζωή itself emerges. The heavenly-minded spiritual being of believers is a hidden life with Christ in God (Col. 3:3). Life is their (through God’s grace in Christ effected) renunciation of sinful conduct according to the will of flesh and world (Eph. 2:5), and the relationship of exclusive moral dependence upon God in Christ grounded in the forgiveness of sins, in contrast to enslaving intermediary beings (Col. 2:13). Above all, piety (εὐσέβεια) constitutes the (true) life of Christians (2 Pet. 1:3); the morality and piety effected by God’s saving grace is a life in this world that will issue in blessedness and glory at the Parousia (Titus 2:12). It should further be emphasized that the this-worldly salvific life in

1 Cf. v. Soden ad loc.

2 Heb. 3 12 and 10 31, where in both cases the “living” God is predominantly viewed from the side of his moral self-consciousness and his power, may be left aside here,

although these statements too rest on the presupposition that the believing heart has a share in divine life.

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Pauline-ism and Deuteropaulinism is nowhere—nor even in the passages still to be discussed where it is conceived as the effect of Christ—called “eternal life,” just as it is also not so designated in the Synoptics and in Acts (in the Apocalypse the expression ζωή αἰώνιος does not occur at all).

Where life is predicated of Christ in himself, that is, apart from his mediatorial activity, the concept is always grasped only in a (pneumatic-) physical sense. Christ “lives,” or has been brought to life by God, through the resurrection: this testimony of Paul, which accords with the faith of the earliest community (II Cor. 13 4. Rom. 610 cf. v. 4. 149. Luc. 24 5. 23. Mrc. 1611. Act. 13. 2 28. 2519. Apc. 118. 28; cf. I Cor. 15 3: ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον), is repeated by those who follow (Hebr. 7 25. 8 cf. with v. 3: μήτε ζωῆς τέλος ἔχων; I Petr. 318). Progress is evident only insofar as Pauline and post-Pauline Christology also speaks of the “life” of Christ in the sense of his pre-existence (I Cor. 15 45. Hebr. 71c. 3 s. 0.).

All the more striking is the development of the concept that the conception of Christ as originator of human salvific life presents. Whereas in the synoptic Gospels, where Christ is identified as founder of that salvation, the concept “life” is not yet introduced at all,[1] the author of the Acts of the Apostles and the Apocalyptist at least remain with the notion of physical life-effect proceeding from the glorified, exalted Christ (Act. 315. 5 20 [see above on both passages]; Apc. 210. 35; 27. 222.14.19; 717. 221 cf. 204. 5). Only in Apc. 31 does the activity of true faith and true love demanded by Christ appear as the mark of inner “life”.

1 In Luke 15 24. 32, where the closer context has reference neither to God’s causality nor to that of Christ, one will understand ἀνέζησεν, or rather ἔζησεν, correctly only if one has recognized the eschatological background of the parable (note v. 28: οὐκ ἤθελεν εἰσελθεῖν and cf. 14 23). Still less is it self-evident from Matt. 8 22 = Luke 9 60, “let the dead bury their dead” (and related passages), that the Synoptics were also accustomed to designate the this-worldly life of salvation as life.

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By contrast, in Pauline and deuteropauline thought the “life” deriving from Christ, insofar as it is ethical life, attains fundamental significance. When Paul ascribes to the believer freedom from obligation to the Mosaic law and freedom from the law of sin and of death, he explains the former moral condition as a life that has Christ as its governing principle (Gal. 2 20), the latter as a life in the power and conformity of the πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς mediated through Christ (to those united with him) (Rom. 8 2). By virtue of union with Christ there comes about a breaking with sin that is a life for God (Rom. 611. 13); Christ dwelling in the children of God effects in them a life that consists in God-pleasing, “righteous” activity of the spirit (Rom. 810). With this “life,” however, the foundation for further development is already laid. The ethical nature of Christians,

wrought by the divine Spirit out of Christ and resisting sin, is, because it harmonizes with the will of God and thus maintains connection with the primal source of life, an indestructible life, which will one day also result in the reanimation of the body (Rom. 86: note that εἰρήνη v. 6 stands in the same logical relation to the preceding ζωή as ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν v. 7 does to θάνατος v. 6). The Apostle likewise views spiritual, this-worldly and eternal, other-worldly "life" in their inner connection when he emphasizes the causal significance of the salvific message of Christ in Phil. 2 16 and II Cor. 216. Entirely similar is the result in deuteropauline exposition. The freedom of the Christian from morally determining powers of lower order in the world (στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου) is a life (a life-condition) whose cause lies in the relationship of dependence on Christ (Col. 2 20). The service of Christians corresponding to the "living" God requires an ethical nature from which no dead works proceed, which therefore is life in the divine sense; but for this the conditions were first created through the life-sacrifice of Christ offered

in the power of the eternal Spirit (Hebr. 914)[1]. On the basis of redemption through Christ's death on the cross, the life of Christians has righteousness (opposed to sin) as its content and purpose (I Petr. 2 24). If their life is renunciation of sin and dedication to the will of God, especially also in suffering for the sake of righteousness, the motive for this lies in Christ's own suffering (I Petr. 4 1.2). Christian piety therefore inevitably exposes them to persecution, because it is a "life in Christ" (II Tim. 312)[2]. To these testimonies are joined here also those which indicate the connection between the ethical salvific life wrought by Christ on earth and the consummated salvation in the other world. The hidden, heaven-directed nature of Christians is a life which, as founded by Christ and absolutely determined through his mediation, will also attain glorification (Col. 3 4). Christ Jesus has brought to light through the Gospel a life that is imperishable (ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν II Tim. 110), beginning already on earth in believers; and it is a life in eternal glory that is granted to the elect, as the consequence of the salvation attained in Christ Jesus, in fellowship with Christ (II Tim. 210. 11)[3].

More than in the concept of life, in the idea of light a concrete natural phenomenon initially comes into

1 Cf. 10 19–20: the relation of grace established through Jesus' blood as a "living way."

2 Cf. v. Soden on ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ: "that the pious life rests on Christ Jesus."

3 On the question whether and to what extent contact occurs between the Pauline concept of ζωή and that of Philo, cf. v. Schrenck (a. a. O.) p. 51–55 ("accordingly, we would be in a position, if any Philonic influence at all, to assume one of a more formal or general nature. That the consideration of 'true life' as a present reality, as Philo had it, and as it perhaps lay in the Hellenistic air, could have exerted some influence of any kind on Paul, appears at least not entirely impossible. But the distinctiveness of the Pauline concept of life would not thereby be explained." — "The Pauline concept of life seems rather to be rooted essentially in Jewish presuppositions.").

view.[1] How easily, however, in accordance with the conception of the nature of God that has been set forth, the source of this natural phenomenon, too, was immediately sought in God, and at the same time a more general concept of light was gained, one which also comprehended the spiritual forces, processes, and phenomena comparable to natural light, is attested by a sufficient number of Old Testament statements. Of particular importance in this regard is the close essential connection in which here, too, the concept of light presents itself together with that of life. That light proceeds immediately from God, that light belongs to his essence, follows as an undeniable consequence both from the manifold descriptions of his heilsgeschichtliche manifestation and from the natural outlook of the Old Testament. When Yahweh reveals himself in the flashing fire-appearance of the storm (Ex. 19:16, 18, etc.), when at night he gives light to the Israelites from the pillar of fire (Ex. 13:21), when in the visionary theophany of Ezekiel 1 rays of light break forth on all sides from the fireball surrounded by cloud, then in such cases a sensibly (whether outwardly or inwardly) perceptible, creaturely light is indeed first conceived,[2] and this, as such, although wondrously produced, has its place alongside the natural cosmic light in which Yahweh wraps himself as in a mantle (Ps. 104:2).[3] Unmistakably, however, believing reflection discerns in such light an effect of that uncreated, supersensible primordial light in God, whose revelation in the world is also variously designated as glory (Ps. 104:1; כבוד).[4]

This “light of God of the light-essence itself,” in distinction from the derived light

1 Not only the poetic depiction Job 38 19 (cf. 36 30. 32; Hab. 3 4), but also the creation narrative (Gen. 1 3. 4) conceives light as a cosmic substance (cf. Hen. c. 17. 23).

2 Cf. Smend on Ezek. 9 1.

3 Cf. Delitzsch ad loc.

4 The idea of a primordial fire in God, whose reflection is the fire of the theophanies (cf. especially Exod. 3 2; Deut. 5 19–23; 4 24; Isa. 10 17), naturally presses itself upon one as a parallel; this would yield a certain contact with Stoic doctrine of God. Otherwise, recall what was remarked above concerning the significance of the *kabod* of Yahweh in P (p. 174), and refer to the discussion of the *kabod* concept below. Particularly noteworthy is also the “living fire” (’ešāt ḥayyāwē), which according to Hen. 7 10. 6 constitutes the immediate dwelling of God (cf. 14 16–17).

of the “light-bodies,” is what hovers before the poet of Job 25:3 as the primal source of all creaturely light, as the power blessing and ruling over all individual beings of the world.[1] This supersensible, perfect light of God is also meant when Dan. 2:22 says: “The light dwells with him”;[2] otherwise God’s omniscience could not be explained thereby, nor could that light be grasped specifically as a power of knowledge present in God’s essence, which uncovers and reveals everything before him.[3] In this latter respect the passage joins together with Ps. 90:8

(מָאוֹר פָּנֶיךָ) and 139:11–12 (the light proceeding from God is for him a means of absolute knowledge of the natural and spiritual world). One step further is taken when the divine word (law) is grasped as light and thereby viewed as a source of knowledge for human beings (Ps. 119:105; 19:9; Isa. 2:5; 51:4). If, however, with this element that of the preservation of life is shown to be linked (Prov. 6:23), this leads over to the larger series of sayings in which the causal relationship between light and life confronts us in various ways. The thought contained in the customary expression אור חַיִּים ("light of life" or "of the living": Job 33:30; Ps. 56:14), that—for human natural life, just as for the plant world (2 Sam. 23:4)—sunlight is a condition (Job 3:16, 20: to see the light = to live; 33:28: the life-force delights in the light; Ps. 49:20), deepened and expanded in religious reflection involuntarily into the portrayal of God, or of his grace,

1 See Dillmann ad loc. אוֹרִים is, moreover, text-critically not entirely certain (Duhm reads אוֹרִי; cf. LXX).

2 That by the form in which the thought is expressed the transcendence of God is to be cautiously safeguarded (Behrmann) cannot be asserted with certainty (one should note the עם in Ps. 36:10).

3 Similarly Sap. 7:26 says of divine Wisdom: ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστι φωτὸς αἰδίου (καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας): it is eternal light-power and light-activity in God.

as the true and highest light: as all-powerful power of blessing and protection for life, the outward and inward happiness of his people and of individuals (Num. 6:25; 2 Sam. 22:29; Isa. 10:17; Yahweh 20–60:19 ,אוֹר יִשְׂרָאֵל; Mic. 7:8; Job 29:3; Ps. 4:7; 27:1; 36:10; 43:3; 44:4; 89:16; 112:4; Ezra 9:8, etc.). Relatively rare is the application of the idea of the light proceeding from God to the purely ethical side of human life. To the passages concerning the word of Yahweh as law (see above) Job 24:13 also attaches itself, where the moral world-order, the divinely true and good, is called light (cf. also Isa. 5:20). The ethical element also enters here when the saving completion of salvation, through which the well-being of external and internal conditions corresponding to the divine will is brought about in Israel and in the world, and the means of that completion, are regarded as light (Isa. 9:2, cf. v. 6; 60:1–3; 42:6, cf. vv. 1, 3, 4; 49:6). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that according to Isa. 26:19 a power proceeding from Yahweh that also awakens the dead (of believing Israel) is spoken of, whose effect is to be compared with that of the dew and of the light.[1]

But as regards finally the relationship of the concepts *light* and *life* in general, as it is presupposed in the Old Testament worldview, it should not pass unnoticed that even the creation account of the Priestly Writing, in the manner in which it first introduces the "Spirit" of God brooding over the primordial matter of the world and only then the light, makes the life-principle the presupposition of the light: the creation of the latter through the word is, like every subsequent act of creation, conceivable only as a continuation of the activity of that life-spirit.[2] What is set into motion and activity in a determinate direction in and with the divine

1 According to Dan. 12:3 that light-power also comes to manifestation in the splendor (זִיו; LXX λαμπρότης) of the resurrected righteous. On later developments of that "robe of light" see Preuschen in the *Festgruss* (presented to B. Stade), p. 225.

2 Cf. Kleinert, loc. cit., p. 697: "It requires only the divine act of will in the word,—that under that fructifying operation of the divine spirit of life the earth should bring forth green growth as its covering and the sea produce a teeming swarm" (on Gen. 1:20).

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word is precisely the physically and spiritually life-creating, as well as life-preserving, Spirit (breath, breath-of-life) of God.[1] From this general fundamental conception proceeds also the saying of Deut. 8:3, which specifically illuminates the relationship of human life to the divine word: "— that the human being does not live by bread alone, but that the human being can live by everything and anything (namely the creative word) that proceeds from the mouth of Yahweh."

For the believing contemplation of the extra- and post-canonical Jewish writers as well, with respect to light the fact that it has its primal source in God stands in the foreground. It is above all the attributes of the wisdom and love of God and the revelation of God's will in the law with which the idea of light is here chiefly associated; as the sphere of the effects of the light proceeding from God, however, both the physical and the spiritual world present themselves. Divine wisdom is set over against natural light as something higher in Sap. 7:29 (φωτὶ συγκρινόμενη εὑρίσκεται προτέρα). But when in Sap. 7:26 the same wisdom is described as ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀϊδίου καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, it follows from this that the "eternal light" is given in and with the infinite physical and moral power of God (conceived as absolutely operative). Accordingly, in v. 27 wisdom—within whose being and activity that primordial light comes to manifestation for the human being—is also presented as a power operative physically and spiritually, specifically ethically and in salvation history. From the former side the

1 The explanation of Ps. 33:6 which treats דבר and רוח פיו as completely equivalent (= word) fails to recognize the continuing effect of the—still more clearly prominent in Gen. 1—original distinction between the creative breath and the creative word. The divine breath in Gen. 1:2 presupposes a first creative word of God, as is already given with the ברא of v. 1. From the appeal to Isa. 11:4 one should already maintain regard for the significance of the divine **רוח** in vv. 1–3.

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interpolation of the Vetus Latina in Sir. 24:3 grasps it (ego feci in coelis, ut oriretur lumen indeficiens), in that it is recognized as a mediating principle of the cosmic creation of light. The latter side is emphasized by the Apocalypse of Baruch (54:13): *quia tu consilio tuo gubernas omnes creaturas — et tu omnem fontem lucis apud te constituisti et thesaurum sapientiae subtus thronum tuum praeparasti.* Alongside this, in the addition to Sir. 17:15 (Minusc. 106, 248)

the light of God's love (φῶς ἀγαπήσεως) appears as an outwardly saving power in the history of Israel (cf. III Macc. 6:1: φέγγος ἐπιφάνας ἐλέους Ἰσραὴλ γένει). In particular, however, the divine law is celebrated as a source of light: τὸ ἄφθαρτον νόμου φῶς, which was to be given to the world through the sons of Yahweh, is the counterpart of sunlight (Sap. 18:4); in the absence of this law the inhabitants of the world are *sine lumine* (IV Ezra 14:20; cf. Apoc. Bar. 17:4; 18:1; 19:3; 59:2; 77:16). The φῶς κυρίου that shines forth from the law is also light of divine wisdom (Sir. 50:29; Bar. 4:2).[1] The spiritual light flowing to human beings from these divine sources is manifold: light of wisdom (προειλόμην αὐτὴν ἀντὶ φωτὸς ἀντέχειν, Sap. 7:10; cf. the light of the knowledge of God in the addition to Sir. 16:14 [248, 106, Syr.] and IV Ezra 14:25: *ego accendam in corde tuo lucernam intellectus*, i.e. of revelatory knowledge; 12:42); light of righteousness and discipline (the God-fearing will make δικαιώματα shine forth, Sir. 35:16[2]; τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης φῶς—ὁ ἥλιος in the spiritual sense—does not shine upon the godless, Sap. 5:6; παιδείαν ὡς ὄρθρον φωτίζει, Sir. 24:32 [30]); light of love (ἀγάπησις δὲ κυρίου—toward the Lord—ὑπὲρ πάντα ὑπερέβαλεν εἰς φωτισμόν, gloss on Sir. 25:11[3]; *qui timetis dominum diligite illum, et illuminabuntur corda vestra*, Vet. Lat. to Sir. 2:9).[4] Summarily, the Slavonic Book of Enoch 30:15 speaks of light as the way of the

1 In an indeterminate formulation the divine light appears in the Vetus Latina at Sir. 46:13 (quia vidit—Samuel—deum lucis).

2 δικαιώματα (Ryssel: righteous ordinances) ὡς φῶς ἐξάψουσιν.

3 Cf. Ryssel ad loc.

4 One should note in addition that according to Vet. Lat. and codices 70, 248 at Sir. 24:17 *mater pulchrae dilectionis* (μήτηρ τῆς ἀγαπήσεως τῆς καλῆς [ἀγαπῆς 70]) is the divine Wisdom. Cf. Harkenne, *de Veteris Latinae Ecclesiastici* cap. I–XLIII, 1899, p. 192. Schlatter, loc. cit., p. 112; as well as p. 104 f. (on 1:10; 2:9).

good that God showed Adam (to be compared with Apoc. Bar. ch. 18).[1] But the conception in question attains special significance in the eschatology of the writings mentioned. There is expected the revelation of a light of a higher kind, proceeding from God and communicating itself to creation, spreading over it a supramundane radiance; the connection with Dan. 12:3 is unmistakable. The life of the resurrected God-fearing is ἐν φωτὶ κυρίου (Ps. Sol. 3:16). The light of the Lord of spirits shines from the messianic judgment onward upon the face of the holy ones ([Ethiopic] En. 38:2, 4); their face will shine with joy (En. 51:5); they will come forth clothed in radiant light at the last judgment (En. 108:12 [Charles]), shine like the lights of heaven (En. 104:2),[2] like the light of the stars (*stellarum lumini similes*, IV Ezra 7:97 [= 6:71 Fritzsche]),[3] indeed still brighter (IV Ezra 7:125 [= 7:55 Fri.]). The Apocalypse of Baruch (59:11) speaks of *promptuaria lucis* in the world beyond, that is, probably repositories for those awaiting the revelation of their light-nature.[4] The (Ethiopic) Book of Enoch also holds out the prospect of the transformation of heaven into eternal blessing and light (45:4). Whether only a spiritual illumination is intended when, in the addition to Sir. 24:30 (Vet. Lat. v. 45), it is said of wisdom:

penetrabo omnes inferiores partes terrae et inspiciam omnes dormientes et illuminabo [omnes] sperantes in domino, is doubtful (the

1 From the presumably older constituent parts of the *Testamenta XII Patriarcharum* mention may here still be made of Asher 5: οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ψεῦδος, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄδικον· ὅτι πᾶσα ἀλήθεια ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς [v. 1, τοῦ φωτός] ἐστι, καθὼς τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τὸν θεόν. Benjamin 6: κύριος γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ (the well-disposed, the pure) κατοικεῖ καὶ φωτίζει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. Gad 5: ἡ κατὰ θεὸν ἀληθὴς μετάνοια—ψυχαγωγεῖ τὸ σκότος καὶ φωτίζει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ γνῶσιν παρέχει τῇ ψυχῇ.

2 Whether in the latter two passages the resurrection is presupposed is disputed. In this direction reference may also be made to Slav. Enoch 22:9.

3 Cf. Gunkel ad loc. (*Apokr. u. Ps.* II 375 f.).

4 Cf. also Schürer³ II 548. Charles, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*, p. 42.

"sleeping ones" surely stand in relation to the resurrection?). A more comprehensive concept, concerning both physical and spiritual being, is present where light repeatedly signifies the inner and outer salvation in the future world as a whole, or rather the divine salvific power that brings it about, and indeed in such a way that to the outward side of that salvation there belongs throughout, more or less determinately, the new, supramundane radiance.[1] In this sense light is said to dawn for the righteous according to En. 1:8 (grace, peace, well-being, blessing); 5:7 (joy, peace, possession, power); 38:2 (possession, power, vv. 4–5); 50:1 (contrast with the suffering of the oppressed; so also 96:3);[2] 92:4 (grace, dominion).[3] How closely the physical and the spiritual side of this light of salvation are viewed together is shown by En. 58:3–6.[4] But if here a specifically ethical meaning of light also enters in (berhāna ret'e, "the light of righteousness," v. 6), the passage touches on others in which precisely this meaning appears fundamental. What is in view are spirits whose being is light in the ethical sense (moral rectitude before God, cf. 108:7–10), and who precisely as such are also

1 See especially Dillmann, *Das Buch Henoch* 1853, p. 142.

2 To be placed here also is Apoc. Bar. 48:00: *in mundo illo, cui finis non est, accipietis lucem magnam*. Cf. also the ἀθάνατον φῶς Sibyl. III 786.

3 The "resurrection of the body" seems to be set aside in the *great light* of Slav. Enoch 65:9, which otherwise represents the contrast to all spiritual and physical evil of earthly life (cf. Charles p. 80 f.).

4 "The righteous will be in the light of the sun and the elect in the light of eternal life;—they will seek the light and find righteousness with the Lord of Spirits; the righteous will have peace in the name of the Lord of the world. Thereafter it will be said to the holy ones that they are to seek in heaven the mysteries of righteousness, the lot of faith, for it

has become bright like sunshine upon the mainland, and the darkness has departed. Unceasing will the light be,—for the former darkness will be destroyed, and the light will be mighty before the Lord of Spirits, and the light of righteousness will be mighty [shine] forever before the Lord of Spirits" (Beer in *Apokr. u. Ps.* II 268).

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destined for light in the physical sense (supramundane radiance of personal appearance and of outward life), when En. 61:12 says that (at the messianic judgment) every "spirit of light" capable of praise will praise God,[1] and 108:— that God (at the last judgment) will call the spirits of the good "of the lineage of light" (*'emtewled 'enta berhān*) and will glorify those who were born in darkness, to whom in the flesh honor was not granted as their faithful loyalty deserved.[2]

As in the Old Testament and the subsequent Jewish literature, so already in the non-"Johannine" writings of the New Testament the concept of light, related to the concept of life, has received a distinctive employment and development whose significance for the "Johannine" view must not be overlooked. Only rarely is reference still made here to God's natural creation of light: he has brought forth light as a cosmic substance and force (II Cor. 4 6) and is the "Father" of the heavenly lights (Jas. 1 17)[3]. Interest turns more and more to the supernatural, eternal essence of that "inaccessible" light in which God dwells, invisible to every mortal human being (I Tim. 6 16; cf. Matt. 17 5: νεφέλη φωτινή)[4], which surrounds him, in other words,

1 Dillmann ad loc.: "righteous but perfected human beings and holy angels as good spirits in contrast to the evil ones, the spirits of darkness; in any case a noteworthy mode of expression, preparing the New Testament usage, but grounded on passages such as Job 24:13 ff.; 38:10." Charles: "this thought is more fully developed in the N. T.; children of light Luke 16:8."

2 Dillmann ad loc.: "The opposition of light and darkness and the expression 'generation of light' indeed sound entirely New Testament, but in our book they have their precursor at 6:12; since of the condemned v. 13 (read 14) he uses the same expression 'those who were born in darkness,' he seems to set this entire world of sin and evil, as the world of darkness, over against the world of light, and although all human beings are born in it, nevertheless to make a distinction among them, that some believe, others do not and therefore remain in darkness."

3 Cf. moreover on the latter passage Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I 53.

4 The conception does not attach itself to Ps. 104:2 (cf. Job 38:19), but to Job 25:3; Dan. 2:22, according to which latter passage the light dwells with God (see above).

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as the immediate radiation of his essence. Just as this light, substance and power at once, in a derivative way constitutes the element of the angelic world (II Cor. 11 14; Acts 12 7 cf. Matt. 28

3; Rev. 18 1), so it is also an essential factor of the life of salvation mediated through Christ. The transfiguration of Christ was a wondrous anticipatory representation of the heavenly light-nature of the Son of Man (Matt. 17 2; Rev. 1 16: ἡ ὄψις αὐτοῦ ὡς ὁ ἥλιος φαίνει ἐν τῇ δυνάμει αὐτοῦ cf. 2 12.3)[1]. The believing brothers in Christ, however, have been made fit by God to receive the share in the lot appointed for the saints in the light (ἐν τῷ φωτί), that is, precisely in that "otherworldly realm of light"[2], which is at the same time designated as the kingdom of the Son of love (Col. 1 12.13). This conception of the realm of light also seems to form the background when Paul is commissioned by Jesus with the conversion of Israel and the Gentiles ἀπὸ σκότους εἰς φῶς (Acts 26 18)[3]; likewise when elsewhere believers in Christ are characterized as those whom God has called out of darkness into his "marvellous light," where initially reference is made to the knowledge and fulfilment of the divine will of salvation (I Pet. 2 9): the goal of this calling lies in that marvellous realm of light. The righteous will one day shine like the sun in their Father's kingdom (Matt. 13 43),—according to the vision of the apocalyptist, in the Jerusalem coming down from heaven, radiant, illuminated by God himself (Rev. 21 11.23 f.; 22 5). Beyond the previously given concept of a physical reality of a supraterrestrial kind leads, in the first instance, the repeated representation of the totality of salvation created through Christ, or personified in Christ, under the image of light. Reference is made to the physical and the intellectual-moral, the this-worldly and the otherworldly salvation in Christ, when mention is made of the great light that appeared to the people sitting in darkness

1 One should also recall the light from heaven at the conversion of Paul (Acts 9:3; 22:6, 9, 11; 26:13).

2 Cf. v. Soden ad loc.

3 "Exact parallel" to Col. 1:13 (v. Soden).

(Matt. 4 16 cf. vv. 17 ff. and vv. 23.24); when Simeon beholds in the child Jesus the light destined for revelation to the Gentiles and for the glorification of Israel (Luke 2 32); and when Paul (with reference to the same Old Testament passage: Isa. 49 6 LXX) appeals, for his mission to the Gentiles, to the divine command that Christ has been set as a light for the Gentiles (Acts 13 47)[1]; likewise when Paul speaks of whether the risen Christ is to "proclaim light" to Israel and to the Gentiles (Acts 26 23): this light is the this-worldly and otherworldly life of salvation grounded in the suffering and resurrection of Christ[2]. In a peculiarly mystical exposition, the same apostle has portrayed as light the power that works in believers the knowledge of the truth of salvation, already progressively transfiguring them pneumatically on earth, which proceeds from the exalted and glorified Christ and is mediated through the gospel (II Cor. 4 4.6 cf. 3 18)[3]. Furthermore, this image is applied in the New Testament in manifold ways specifically and exclusively to the cognitive and volitional side of the human being and of the life of salvation. Thus Jesus intimates that the New Testament truth of salvation proclaimed by him is destined to become the content of knowledge and understanding of those who hear rightly, just as the light in a house is intended to be seen (Mark 4 21 cf. Luke 8 16: ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι βλέπωσιν τὸ φῶς)[4]. If believers are to know what glorious inheritance they are

to hope for on the basis of their calling from the all-powerful energy of God, then God must give them the spirit of wisdom and revelation “in his knowledge,”

1 Note vv. 46, 48, according to which in this latter respect it concerns eternal life.

2 On Luke 11:38 cf. Holtzmann in the commentary.

3 On II Tim. 1:10 (φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν) see above p. 259.

4 According to the context in Mark the saying serves to explain Jesus’ behavior toward the disciples (cf. 4:10 f., 34): Jesus would act contrary to purpose if he were to leave the truth unintelligible, the light invisible, for those who hear rightly. Cf. further Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu* 1899, II 86 f.

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thereby eyes of the heart that are enlightened (Eph. 1 18)[1]; and as a special experience of grace Paul boasts, according to the same letter, that as apostle to the Gentiles he has been given the task of giving light (φωτίσαι) as to how the primordial mystery of the world-embracing divine plan of salvation is to come to revelation and realization (Eph. 3 9). According to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, at conversion (baptism?) there takes place the fundamental, non-repeatable reception of the light of salvific knowledge as a heavenly gift (6 4; 10 32)[2]. The moral element of God-pleasing disposition and direction of will comes more to the fore when Christian brothers are called “sons of light” (I Thess. 5 5; Luke 16 8), enabled and obligated to walk as “children of light,”—because they are light in the Lord (Christ) (Eph. 5 8), after Christ has shone upon them, imparting moral instruction and power (Eph. 5 14),—to put on the armour of light (Rom. 13 12) and by their light to expose the works of darkness among the sons of disobedience (Eph. 5 13). Righteousness (moral rectitude) stands as φῶς over against lawlessness as σκότος (II Cor. 6 14). To the same series of ideas belongs the fact that specifically the hope and readiness of Christians for the coming of the Lord is conceived as keeping the light burning (Luke 12 35), and that the disciples of Jesus, with reference to the Christian model of God-pleasing being in word and deed, are called the light of the world (Matt. 5 14)[3] or are exhorted to let their light shine (Matt. 5 16), like heavenly lights in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation (Phil. 2 15). In isolated instances the image of light is also transferred to the prophetic word-revelation of the Old Testament (II Pet. 1 19), as well as to

1 ἐν ἐπιγνώσει αὐτοῦ (v. 17) lets the knowledge of God be viewed as the sphere of activity of that πνεῦμα.

2 10:32 φωτισθέντες—Weizsäcker: “after your baptism.” Cf. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II 301.

3 On the Hellenistic character of the expression φῶς τοῦ κόσμου cf. Dalman, *Worte Jesu* p. 144.

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Old-Testament legal teaching authority (Rom. 2 19); moreover, to the moral cognitive power of the human spirit in general (Matt. 6 23 cf. Luke 11 35).

Predominantly—and this must be emphasized at once—in the non-"Johannine" writings the appearance of light is brought into view: this leads from the more material φῶς, which designates the essence of light, to glory (δόξα), whose concept proves no less elastic than the former. The word δόξα is the biblical-Hellenistic equivalent of כבוד, the latter having developed, from the notion of heaviness, of what is weighty and imposing, the meaning of the resplendent appearance of something powerful (cf., for example, *gravitas*) (subjectively: of the corresponding honoring recognition). Very frequently the Old Testament Hebrew word, in its application to Yahweh, contains an abstract concept: it designates his power or his dominion as one that makes a mighty impression and in this sense comes to appearance in splendor, whether in general or with reference to a particular manifestation: Exod. 16 7 (R according to P)[1]; Num. 14 22 (R)[2]; Jer. 14 21 (secondary?); 17 12 (secondary); Ezek. 39 21; Hab. 2 u (secondary); Zech. 2 9[3]; Ps. 19 2 (cf. 50 6); 24 7–10; 26 8; 29 3.9; 57 6.12; 63 3; 72 19; 96 3 (= I Chr. 16 24); 102 16.17; 104 31; 108 6; 113 4; 138 5; 145 5.11 f.; Neh. 9 5. A transfer to the Messiah takes place

1 Cf. Dillmann–Ryssel, *Ex. u. Lev.* 1897 ad loc. ("the glory of Yahweh is his power and greatness") and p. 181; Baentsch, *Exodus–Levit.* 1900, p. 149 ("the glory of Yahweh is to be understood in a spiritual way as the glorious, gracious, and powerful activity of Yahweh"; "it is documented in that he can answer").

2 Sense: the power (כֹּחַ) of Yahweh will and must, after the Egyptians have experienced it, also display itself splendidly to the other *gojim* (the Palestinians v. 14 and the wide world). The passage seems to rest on Isa. 6:3 (cf. also Dillmann).

3 Cf. Wellhausen on Hab. 2:14: "Kingdom, power, and glory are one. Glory is the full appearance in contrast to latency."

4 Cf. against Baethgen's "concrete" interpretation ("the divine glory which fills the Holy of Holies of the temple") and v. Gall, *Die Herrlichkeit Gottes* p. 44: Cheyne, *The Book of Psalms* ad loc. ("God's glory is spiritualised") and Ps. 63:3.

in Isa. 11 10 (secondary). Often, in the passages cited, the context makes clear enough that the power of God appearing as *kabod* is determined by his ethical attributes (righteousness, goodness, condescending grace)[1]. Significantly, already in Isa. 3 8 and 6 3 (cf. v. 5), as then also with the redactor of Num. 14 21, in the concept of the resplendent revelation of the perfection of life and power of Yahweh, the ethical moment of the divine essence is immediately united with the dominant physical one[2]. That *kabod*, in the totality of the relationships named, is the correlate of the holiness of Yahweh (the form of appearance of the latter according to its prophetic full sense), need not be further demonstrated here. Special attention, however, is still deserved by the fact that Jer. 2 11 3; Ps. 106 20[4] characterize Yahweh as the personified *kabod*

and, with reference to his people Israel as his possession, as its נצח Hos. 5 5; 7 10 and גאין *kabod* (cf. I Sam. 15 29), from which light is shed on the Ark of Glory in the "pre-prophetic" passage I Sam. 4 21 (22 R). Perhaps not much later than the linguistic usage discussed, however, there is now first attested, in a larger series of other passages, the meaning of *kabod* already mentioned above (p. 260), according to which it is something concrete, an actual radiance of light inseparable from the essence of Yahweh, which can also reveal itself in an outwardly sensible theophany. We encounter this conception (leaving aside Exod. 24 10

1 See especially Ex. 16:7; Num. 14:22; Ezek. 39:21; Ps. 57:6, 12; 102:16, 17; 113:4; 138:8; 145:—, etc.

2 According to v. Gall Isa. 6:3 says only "that Yahweh makes the whole earth the stage for the manifestation of glory that is here shown to Isaiah. Wherever a thunderstorm comes, Yahweh's glory is displayed" (loc. cit. p. 23). He thinks that only Ezekiel "detached" the thunderstorm from the glory of Yahweh (p. 64). His presentation is in many respects too external—this especially in the principal passage in question, which is thereby trivialized. Cf. in contrast the emphasis on the ethical moment in Marti (*Das Buch Jesaja* 1900, p. 65).

3 The kabod of this passage is the opposite of לֹא יוֹעִיל, thus: something that is effective, helpful, a power-being that comes into appearance, not = reputation, honor. Similarly kabod corresponds in Ps. 106:20 to מוֹשִׁיעַ v. 21.

4 On the fluctuation of the reading cf. Cheyne and Baethgen.

as an exception, where in the mutilated J the designation כבוד is not used) in the revised Yahwistic passage: Exod. 33 18.22[2]. As here, so also in the later Elohistic tradition of the "pluralistic" narrator[3] in Deut. 5 21, the matter concerns the appearance of God on Sinai or Horeb respectively. For the purpose of strengthening him in faith in his mission as leader, Moses is granted to see the divine *kabod* as splendid light (Exod. 33 19); the assembled people behold it at the giving of the law as a mighty fiery radiance (Deut. 5 22). Concerning the *kabod*-revelation on the latter occasion, the Priestly Writing reports with renewed emphasis in Exod. 24 16.17 ("the *kabod* of Yahweh offered the Israelites the sight of a consuming—fiercely blazing—fire on the summit of the mountain"). Only according to the present redactional presentation does P allow the *kabod* to appear already on the way to Sinai, at an unspecified place in the wilderness of Sin (Exod. 16 10): in reality, at this point he recounts an event from the time after the establishment of the wilderness sanctuary[4], and he speaks here, as in the other cases (Exod. 29 43; 40 34 f.; Lev. 9 6.23; Num. 14 10; 16 19; 17 7; 20 6), of the *kabod* transferred to and bound to the tabernacle[6]. When then the same "glory" of Yahweh appears at the dedication of Solomon's temple (I Kings 8 11), we recognize this all the more readily as a subsequent consequence of the priestly tradition concerning the Mosaic sanctuary, the more manifestly the entire narrative section in question (I Kings 8 1–11)

1 Cf. Holzinger, *Exodus* ad loc. (p. 104).

2 Cf. Kraetzschmar, *Die Bundesvorstellung im A. T.* p. 92, 94; v. Gall loc. cit. p. 15 f., and alongside this Holzinger loc. cit. p. 108.

3 See Steuernagel, *Das Deuteronomium übersetzt und erklärt* 1898, p. XII–XIII. He thinks of the period between 690 and 650 (around 670).

4 See Dillmann–Ryssel pp. 181, 185, 291; Baentsch, *Exodus–Lev.* pp. 145, 148.

5 That the kabod in this sense was originally also intended in the revised passage Ex. 16:7 (see above), and that the appearance of it in the two verses in P itself had, alongside the purpose of confirming its leaders, the purpose of terrifying chastisement of the people, has been demonstrated by Dillmann–Ryssel loc. cit.

has been reworked according to P[1]. The Chronicler follows suit, doubling the appearance (II Chron. 5 14; 7 1–3)[2]. Prophecy—but only the later (post-exilic)—allows this *kabod* of Yahweh to appear with heightened splendor in the expected time of the consummation of salvation. Thus the apocalyptist of Isa. 24 23 after the final world-judgment: “for Yahweh of hosts will then be king on Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, and before his elders is glory” (in clear antitype to Exod. 24 16 ff.); similarly Isa. 4 5 (in an obscure gloss to the antitype of the cloud- and fire-pillar). In the majority of the prophetic utterances belonging here, however (—they all belong to the book of Isaiah—), the conception of that wondrous radiance of light and the concept of the wondrous manifestation of Yahweh’s power seem to interpenetrate, in such a way that the latter predominates: Isa. 40 5 (35 2)[3]; 59 19; 60 1 f.; 66 18 f. (cf. 41 20; 52 10). Isa. 58 8 carries the *kabod* of Yahweh, which brings the procession of returning Israel to a close, over into the purely figurative (cf. Exod. 14 19; Isa. 52 12). In an indeterminate generality of concept and temporal reference, at most only remotely alluding to the Sinai phenomenon[4], we have the “glory” of Yahweh in the thunderstorm theophany described in Ps. 97 6 (cf. especially Hab. 3). Finally, the ancient conception of a real radiance of light is not abandoned even where it is perceived in prophetic vision; thus in Ezekiel: 1 28; 3 12.23; 8 4; 9 3; 10 4.18 f.; 11 22 f.; 43 2.4 f.; 44 4 5. The mediation of the divine appearance that already expresses itself in this *kabod* of Yahweh with Ezekiel (despite 1:26) and,

1 Cf. Kuenen, *histor.-krit. Einleitung* I, 1, 179, 181. Wellhausen, *Compos. d. Hexateuchs*[3] S. 265 ff. Wildeboer, *Literatur d. A. T.* 1895. S. 240.

2 Cf. further Kuenen a. a. O. I, 2, 129 f.

3 On the question of authenticity with respect to 40[5] cf. Duhm and Cheyne (*the book of Isaiah* 1899. p. 38).

4 See Hupfeld–Nowack ad loc.

5 From the connection of כָּבוֹד with כָּבֵד etc. (to honour = to acknowledge the glory) one must abstract here. The Niphal of כבד, predicated of Yahweh, yields the concept of glorification through the demonstration of power (positively or negatively) in Ezek. 28[32]; 39[13]; Hag. 1[8] (cf. Wellh. Now.). Ex. 14[4].[7].[8] (P). Lev. 10[3]. Isa. 26[15]. — How matters stand with Ps. 73[24] (אַחַר כָּבוֹד תִּקָּחֵנִי) is questionable. Beer reads אֹרַח instead of אַחַר and interprets the "way of glory" in the sense of אֹרַח חַיִּים as referring to the "messianic time of salvation," *ZAW* 1901. S. 78 (?).

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intensified, with P, has its counterpart in Mal. 3:1, where in place of this כבוד יהוה there enters the Yahweh-hypostasis of מלאך הברית (concerning whose nature see above, p. 56).

In post-canonical ancient Jewish theology, particularly in the (Ethiopic) Book of Enoch, the sublimity of the position of power and the glorious manifestation of power of God (in creation and world-rule, salvation history, final judgment and world-consummation), which proceeds from the immeasurable abundance of forces, is emphasized under the concept of glory. God is the "Lord of Glory" (*egzî ʿa sebḥat*): 22:14; 25:3, 7; 27:3, 5; 36:4; 40:3; 63:2; 75:3; 83:8; the "eternal King of Glory" 81:3[1]; before whose glory the angels stand 39:12 [40:1][2]. Similar is also the general conception that underlies Sap. 7:25: the essence of God is pure, absolutely effective power; the appearance of God as the Almighty is his δόξα. The passage is, however, significant in that it teaches us to recognize the most eminent form of revelation of that δόξα in divine Wisdom as a cosmic and salvation-historically active principle (ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής)[3]. In precisely these two directions, the cosmic and the soteriological, the other utterances of the literature in question also display the glory of God. In the realm of the revelation of nature Sir. 42:16 stands (τῆς δόξης κυρίου πλήρες τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ). Most often, however, the discourse concerns the salvation-historical revelation that encompasses physical and spiritual life, and the concept is thereby brought into relation with the sphere of moral action. The divine δόξα comes into consideration just as much where God, with reference to his miraculous power, lets his grace and his mercy prevail (through the rescue of a remnant at

1 See further on the reading: Dalman, *die Worte Jesu* S. 139. Beer (in *Apokr. u. Ps.*) II 285.

2 Further reference to the glory of God in the sense indicated: Hen. 27[2]; 50[4]; 63[3].[5]; 102[3]; 103[1]; 104[1].

3 Cf. the parallel passage Sap. 9[10] (ἀπὸ θρόνου δόξης σου πέμψον αὐτήν) and Hen. 63[2] ("the Lord of glory and the Lord of wisdom").

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the Flood, Hen. 83:8; enactment of the Sinaitic lawgiving, IV Ezra 3:19; royal rule over Israel, Ps. Sol. 5:19 [22]; future guidance, rescue, restoration of Israel, Bar. 4:24; 5:9; Ps. Sol. 11:6, 8 [7, 9]; consideration of the believing Israelites at the last judgment, IV Ezra 8:30; liberation of

Israel from bondage and the ban of death in the final judgment, Apoc. Bar. 21:23; salvific consummation of the world, admission of the righteous to enjoyment of the tree of life, Hen. 25:3, 7), as also where he reveals himself in punitive fashion as righteous judge (in the Flood, Hen. 60:2; overthrow of the enemies of Israel, Sir. 33:6; vengeance for the blood of the righteous in the messianic time, Hen. 47:3; punishment of the godless in the final judgment, Hen. 27:3–5; 50:4). More rarely, in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, δόξα denotes the supraterrestrial radiance of light of God:—as Moses beheld it (ἔδειξεν αὐτῷ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, Sir. 45:3; cf. 17:13 [11]); as it will again reveal itself at the gathering of Israel in the end-time (2 Macc. 2:8)[1]; and as it appears to the human being immediately after death and on the day of judgment (IV Ezra 7:78, 87, 91, 42 = Fritzsche 6:56, 62, 64, 14); whereas in the targumic theology and the later theology grounded upon it the conception of divine glory as immaterial substance occupies an ever broader space. The conception in question here stands in the closest connection with that of the שכינה, the real presence of God at a particular place: at first and originally in heaven, then, however, in revelation-historical fashion upon earth. The majestic radiance of light conditioned by the Shekinah (יְקָרָא, זִיו), in itself hidden, attains in particular cases sensibly perceptible emission. “The glory of the Shekinah of Yahweh” is a standing expression; and יְקָרָא יְיָ is used in the oldest as well as in the later Targums quite directly even for the simple divine name of the Vorlage, when God is conceived as appearing[2]. How

1 Sir. 49[3] (Ἰεζεκιὴλος εἶδεν ὅρασιν δόξης) has δόξης according to the evidence of the Hebr. Sirach gloss.

2 Cf. Weber, *altsynagog. paläst. Theol.* § 33, c. 39 and thereto Dalman a. a. O. S. 187–189. Abundant material is provided by v. Gall (a. a. O. S. 66–81), to whose discussion of details reference may be made here.

the divine δόξα, in the quality of that light-substance, is also the element in which the angelic beings exist, is shown by Hen. 69[131]. In the same δόξα the prophet Jeremiah appears to Judas in a dream (II Macc. 15:13), just as, according to the Slavonic Book of Enoch, Enoch himself had already been wrapped in this glory in the vision (22:8, 9). It will, however, fall to all the righteous in the community of the messianic future that unites the earthly and the heavenly saints as a “garment of life” (Hen. 62:15, 16; 39:9 cf. with v. 7; 58:2); a glory like the radiance of light of the angels and of the stars will transfigure the countenance of those who are justified through God’s law (Apoc. Bar. 51:3ff., 10). In many cases, moreover, the physical conception of that higher radiance of light may also form a principal element even where “glory” is asserted in the broader sense. This is, as already with the discussed stereotypical divine designation in the Ethiopic Book of Enoch[2], especially probable also in the passages dealing with the Messiah (he will return *in gloria*, namely into heaven, where he originally was, before the resurrection and the final judgment, Apoc. Bar. 30:1; he will, as companion of God, occupy the throne of glory, Hen. 45:3; 55:4; 61:8; 62:2, 3, 5; 69:27, 29; cf. 49:1); likewise in other eschatological expositions that concern the radiant lot of the righteous in the future world (Apoc. Bar. 15:8; 48:49; 54:21, 15 cf. 66:7; IV Ezra 7:95 [= Ehr. 6:68], 85:1). Otherwise, the soteriological concept of δόξα corresponds to the horizon of Deutero-Isaianic prophecy of salvation: as the totality of the

splendid physical and spiritual salvation wrought by God for the restored, perfected people of God (Ps. Sol. 11:7 [8] cf. 2:31 [35]; 17:31 [34f.]; Bar. 5:1, 2, 7; according to v. 4 Jerusalem will be called δόξα θεοσεβείας in the sense of the outward radiance

1 According to the later doctrine the angels draw near from there (Weber § 34).

2 To be placed here — also with regard to Ezek. 1^{28} — are Hen. 9^{4}; 47^{3}; 60^{2} (what is said about the "throne of glory") and $14^{20.21}$, with which cf. IV Ezra 8^{21} and Gunkel a. a. O. II 380.

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which is the consequence of fear of God)[1]. The concept of glory is here not referred to the ethical, either theologically or soteriologically.

Just as already in the Old Testament the *kabod* of Yahweh, so also in the New (leaving aside for the moment the "Johannine" literature), God's δόξα is in the main the radiant demonstration of his supremely exalted power, especially in salvation history (Rom. 6:4; 9:23)[2]. The thought of the majestic fullness of divine power also underlies the more numerous cases in which δόξα is related to the intellectual-ethical sphere: it designates the radiant revelation, perceptible through the inner sense, of the salvific intellectual and moral life-forces of God. Paul speaks of the δόξα of God with reference to the demonstration of his truthfulness (Rom. 3:7). More frequently this concept appears in the deuteropauline literature. When in Eph. 1:17 God is called the Father of glory, when Eph. 1:12, 14; 3:16; Col. 1:11 speak of his glory, then according to the evidence of the context what is always more precisely meant is the δόξα of his χάρις, as in Eph. 1:6; whereas Col. 1:27 (πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τοῦ μυστηρίου) brings out more the intellectual moment.

1 On the relationship of Bar. 5 to Ps. Sol. 11 cf. Schürer³ III 341. — Subsequently it may further be noted here that Philo also occasionally speaks of the δόξα of God: by τὴν περὶ σὲ δόξαν he denotes the powers surrounding God, serving him (τὰς σε δορηφορούσας δυνάμεις). "But these are invisible and intelligible as himself, and are properly named ideas; the figurative character of these passages (monar. I 6. II 218 M; cf. qu. D. s. imm. 24. II 79 CW. poster. Cain. 48. II 37 CW) is apparent and no comment is needed" (Drummond a. a. O. II 117).

2 In Rom. 6^{4} it is εἰς δόξαν unambiguously: more precisely, Christ was raised from the dead through the power of the Father which in that act manifested itself in splendour (cf. Eph. $1^{19.20}$). With regard to the πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης Rom. 9^{23} note v. 22: γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦ. In the doxologies it remains more or less questionable whether δόξα is meant in the sense indicated, or in the sense of the creature's acknowledgement of the divine majesty (= honour, praise, etc.). It is noteworthy that the doxology Jude 25 expressly speaks of the δόξα of God (together with μεγαλοσύνη — cf. Hebr. $1^{3.81}$ — κράτος and ἐξουσία) πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος.

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To this also belongs the δόξα of the blessed God, which according to I Tim. 1:11 is revealed in the gospel (in contrast to the law)[1]. Analogously to the Old Testament *kabod*, however, δόξα has also become, theologically, a designation of a distinctive supersensory-physical phenomenon. It is the majestic radiance of light proceeding from God according to his essence, surrounding him, which can communicate itself transfiguringly to the creature and, insofar as it makes itself perceptible to it, produces awe and reverence (Rom. 1:23; Acts 7:55; Rev. 15:8; Luke 2:9; II Pet. 1:17)[2]; in the multiple Old Testament Shekinah it has also revealed itself on earth (Rom. 9:4; Heb. 9:5; cf. in this connection the reflection upon Moses' face and the δόξα of the Old Testament mediatorial office represented therein according to II Cor. 3:7ff.); it will come fully into appearance at the final judgment (Jude 24) and in the future Jerusalem (Rev. 21:11, 23). If now possession of δόξα is predicated of Christ as of God, this too occurs above all in the physical sense; comparatively rarely, however, in such a way that only that glory of a supersensory light-substance is thought of (Luke 9:32; II Pet. 1:17 at the transfiguration; Acts 22:11 at Paul's Christophany; Phil. 3:21 with respect to the body of the Exalted One). Here too, rather, the dominant notion is that of the manifestation

> **1** The δόξαι Jude 8, II Pet. 2[10] are (good) angelic beings, insofar as their power and majesty are a reflection of the divine. In I Cor. 11[7] also the splendour of the divine power seems to be that which is fashioned, brought to appearance on a lower level (in the ἀνήρ).
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> **2** In Acts 7[2], where ὁ θεὸς τῆς δόξης recalls כְּבוֹד־אֵל Ps. 29[3] (see above S. 271), the "radiant splendour that makes present the glory of God's revelation" (Holtzmann ad loc.) also seems to be intended (cf. likewise v. Gall a. a. O. S. 92). That in Rom. 1[23] δόξα is essentially thought of in this sense is suggested by the contrasting parallel: ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος; the μεγαλοπρεπὴς δόξα of II Pet. 1[17] designates the God dwelling in that heavenly δόξα (cf. I Tim. 6[15]; the glory of the transfiguration of Christ is an effect of that one). This divine δόξα has its natural–creational reflex, in manifold gradation, in the "glory" of heavenly "bodies" (of angels) and of earthly ones (I Cor. 15[40]. Apoc. 18[1]; cf. also Luke 9[31]) and similarly in the light-splendour of the stars (I Cor. 15[41]). Less precisely Hebr. 9[5] denotes the δόξα of God by bringing it into connection with the cherubim.

of a power, a life-power. That one can remain with the concept of a radiant demonstration of power is shown by Acts 3:13 (God has made known the δόξα of his servant Jesus through a healing miracle effected by the power of the latter). In the vast majority of cases, however, the metaphysical element is combined with the purely physical in the meaning of the radiant light-appearance of that higher kind accompanying a deployment of power. In the corresponding state Christ has been since his suffering unto death, which precisely constituted the unavoidable path to glorification (Luke 24:26), as the Risen One (I Pet. 1:21; according to 4:13 it comes to revelation at the Parousia) and the Exalted One (I Cor. 2:8: τὸν κύριον τῆς δόξης—proleptically [cf. Phil. 2:9]—; Jas. 2:1; Heb. 2:7, 9). To the author of I Peter it seems that in the δόξαι that refer to Christ the glorification is divided into a sequence of stages[1]. Above all the glory of the one who appears for judgment and for the consummation of the salvation of his own is

emphasized (Mark 13:26: μετὰ δυνάμεως πολλῆς καὶ δόξης = Matt. 24:30; Luke 21:27; Matt. 25:31; 19:28; II Thess. 1:9: τῆς δόξης τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ; I Pet. 4:13), and indeed as an outflow of the δόξα of God (Mark 8:38 = Matt. 16:27, alongside which the divergence in Luke 9:26 is to be noted). In the congregational confession cited in I Tim. 3:16, the evidently stereotyped mode of expression—despite the pressing logical objections[2] (Luke 9:51; Acts 1:2, 11, 22; Mark 16:19; cf. Sir. 49:14 of Enoch; II Kgs. 2:11; Sir. 48:9; I Macc. 2:58 of Elijah)[3]—argues that the ascension is regarded as the outstanding moment in the effectuation of the δόξα of Christ[4]. The hope of the disciples in Mark 10:37 seems to be directed toward the eternal ruling splendor of Christ in the messianic kingdom after the Parousia. Whether in the doxologies I Pet. 4:11

1 Cf., however, v. Soden ad loc.

2 See v. Soden ad loc.

3 Cf. especially Charles, *the apocalypse of Baruch* 1896, p. 73.

4 How the concept of the manifestation of power also comes into play here is evident from Acts 1^{9} ff.; Matt. 28^{18}; Luke 24^{49}; Mark 16^{19}.

(δόξα and κράτος), Rev. 1:6 (likewise), and 5:12 (δύναμις—ἰσχύς—δόξα) this concept of glory is present, or the subjective meaning (honor), nevertheless remains questionable. A significant expansion and deepening is also experienced, in application to Christ, by the concept of δόξα through the incorporation of the intellectual-ethical moment and its connection with the physical or metaphysical. This occurs in the context of a soteriological-mystical exposition by Paul in II Cor. 3:18. Here the δόξα κυρίου is determined as the radiant revelation of the power of the pneumatically perfected essence of the Exalted One—mediated initially to the eye of faith (II Cor. 4:4) through the gospel (II Cor. 4:4—in contrast to the Old Testament 3:15) as through a mirror (cf. I Cor. 13:12)—a power that renews the human being in every respect (spiritually and bodily), and in particular also frees for the unification of the will with God (II Cor. 3:8, 6)[1]. Christ has attained this δόξα on the basis of his being in the image of God (II Cor. 4:4 cf. Phil. 2:6): in the Exalted One himself the δόξα of God is mirrored (II Cor. 4:6)[2]. In cosmic and historically universal exposition the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews uses this concept of the glory of Christ. Heb. 1:3 illuminates the relation of Christ as “Son” to God with reference to the world. The δόξα of God, which is the appearance of his essence (ὑπόστασις), comes to presentation in the Son from the beginning, thus already before the creation of the world mediated through him (v. 2), but already also with reference to it, in a derived yet at the same time again original, unique, and perfect manner (ἀπαύγασμα, radiance), because his essence entirely comprehends the distinguishing properties of the divine (he bears the imprint, the stamp—χαρακτήρ—of the same). Since now the Son, by virtue of this divine essence, has become not only the personal organ of creation and

1 Cf. essentially Schmiedel ad loc., Excursus 5, b, and in addition Titius, *der Paulinismus* p. 60.

2 ἐν προσώπῳ probably with reference to 3[7].[13] and alluding to the appearance at the conversion of the apostle, a more specific reference to the earthly radiance of light (cf. Luke 9[32] with Matt. 17[2]).

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preservation of the world, but also of the revelation of salvation (καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος ἁμαρτιῶν), the δόξα of God that is presented in him according to his original essence will, apart from the real, supersensory radiance of light, be conceived as reproducing not merely the ideal splendor of omnipotence, but also that of the perfect intellectual-ethical life-forces of God. Finally II Pet. 1:3 also seems to belong here, when—apparently—of our "God and Savior Jesus Christ" it is said that he "has called us ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ," that is, by virtue of the physical and moral power that is his own and works gloriously (in his word) (cf. Rom. 9:23, 24). It means the will and the capacity to bring about the inner and the outer salvation of the human being: δόξα refers simultaneously to the physical and the moral power-factor; ἀρετή highlights the latter in particular.

Its reflection is found in the δόξα of God and of Christ in those who, through Christ, come to share in salvation[1]. And here, in the relevant statements, what now comes chiefly into effect is the "general axiom" of Pauline eschatology, "that what has a share in the Spirit also possesses immortality, power, and glory (ἀφθαρσία, δύναμις, and δόξα)"[2]. From the physical side, which here comes particularly to the fore, the δόξα in this connection signifies either simply the heavenly radiance of the pneumatic resurrection body, which is similar to that of Christ (I Cor. 15[43]; Phil. 3[21]), or

1 Almost throughout, in this respect the causality in God is expressly combined with the mediatorship of Christ.

2 Kabisch, *die Eschatologie des Paulus* 1893, p. 205 ff., 278 ff.; Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 196. That in this both the metaphysical and the ethical essence of the πνεῦμα must be taken into account is shown partly by the wording, partly by the context of the relevant passages: II Thess. 2[13]; I Cor. 15[43] (44 f.); II Cor. 3[18]; 4[17] (16) cf. 5[5]; Rom. 5[2] (0); 8[17].[18].[21].[30] (cf. vv. 2. 4–6. 9–11. 13–16. 23. 26 f.); I Pet. 4[14]; indirectly I Cor. 2[1] (cf. vv. 4. 5. 10 ff.); Eph. 1[18] (17). As regards the relation between δόξα and πνεῦμα with respect to Christ and God, reference should further be made here to II Cor. 3[18] (see above), I Tim. 3[16] (the one exalted in glory is the one justified by his entry into a purely pneumatic mode of existence and activity), as well as Eph. 1[6] (3)[14].[17]; 3[16].

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together with that suprasensory glory the radiant position of power of the transfigured and the shining joy of their blessedness in the future, eternal life (I Thess. 2[12]; II Thess. 2[14]; I Cor. 2[7]; Rom. 2[7]. 10. 9[23]; Col. 3[4]; Eph. 1[18]; Tit. 2[13]: the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, hoped for by us and becoming ours at the Parousia). Frequently the contrast between this δόξα and the temporal θλίψεις, παθήματα, and the like is emphasized (II Thess. 1[10]: glorification

through the δόξα τῆς ἰσχύος of Jesus in contrast to the θλίψις of v. 7; II Cor. 4[17]; Rom. 5[2]; 8[17]. 18[1]; 8[30]; Col. 1[27]; II Tim. 2[10]; Hebr. 2[10]; I Petr. 4[14]: the δόξα inwardly pledged and prepared for Christians through the Spirit of God, insofar as he grants them superior ethical insight and strength of will in the trial of suffering; 5[1]. 10, to which v. 18 is also to be compared)[2], just as in particular the glory of the heavenly body is emphasized at the cited passages over against the ἀσθένεια and ταπείνωσις of the earthly one. Paul proceeds to a noteworthy generalization of the physical concept when in Rom. 8[21] he also holds out to the irrational creation a share in the freedom of the glory of the children of God, and in doing so understands δόξα as the radiant mode of existence of imperishable beings in general, such as is the physical effect of the transfiguring divine πνεῦμα. On the other hand, however, an ethical formulation of the concept is not entirely lacking here either. At several points the context argues that the ethical moment is conceived together with the physical. This is so above all in the mystical contemplation of II Cor. 3[18] (μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν)[3]: according to the explanation given above, under this δόξα we must surely understand the glory of the ethical as well as of the spiritual-bodily being, which, in the case of the ministers of the New Testament office (in contrast to Moses), already on earth, by virtue of their mystical contemplation of the

1 Lipsius too narrowly: “δόξα is the luminous heavenly splendour in which the sons of God will one day shine.”

2 See B. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 51, e.

3 That the concept of δόξα, with the exception of this passage, is always used to depict the perfected salvation is rightly emphasized by Titius (a. a. O. p. 59).

transfigured Christ, increases in gradual inward metamorphosis, and which in the future world will come to completion and corresponding outward manifestation. Similarly, in Phil. 4[19] (πληρώσει πᾶσαν χρείαν ὑμῶν) the highest inner and outer goods will be included of which the Christian is finally in need, and the δόξα will signify their radiance, as it comes about when God will have granted their full possession “in Christ Jesus” (from the Parousia onward). Finally, we find δόξα conceived in a purely spiritual and inward sense in Eph. 5[27], where it signifies the radiance of the morally blameless beauty of the community of Christ in the state of consummation. We thus stand here in Deuteropaulinism, and in contrast we do not overlook that in the testimonies of the earliest phase (Syn., Acts, Apocalypse) δόξα (= glory) occurs only either in the physical or in the metaphysical sense, and indeed as predicated of God and of Christ, and otherwise only as yet of angels and of Moses and Elijah at the transfiguration of Christ; — this will have to be taken into account in the more precise interpretation of Mark 10[37] (εἷς σου ἐκ δεξιῶν καὶ εἷς ἐξ ἀριστερῶν καθίσωμεν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ σου).

With what has been set forth we are put in a position to form a judgment concerning the historical position of the Prologue and of the fourth Gospel itself, which, as has been shown, rests precisely upon it, also with regard to the fundamental concepts of life and light (glory). First, however, the conceptual content of ζωή and φῶς (δόξα) and of the related expressions in

the fourth Gospel must be more precisely established than was done in the exposition of the significance of these concepts in the first investigation. In doing so, the intimate connection of ideas between the Gospel and the First Epistle of “John” at the same time compels us to take into view the relationship of the latter writing to the former in the present question[1].

1 On the concept of life in the Fourth Gospel cf. the work cited by v. Schrenck (*die johanneische Anschauung vom ‘Leben’* 1898; especially pp. 62–78; 130–172: “life as present and future,” “the content of life,” and “the source of life”), which also takes account of the older monographic literature: Kaeuffer, *de biblica ζωῆς αἰωνίου notione* 1838; Brueckner, *de notione vocis ζωή, quae in N. T. libris legitur, commentatio* 1858; Huther, *die Begriffe ζωή und πιστεύειν in den johanneischen Schriften* (Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1872); Schmidt, *esquisse de la pensée de S. Jean ou notion de la vie éternelle dans le 4e évangile et les épîtres johanniques* 1876; Zietlow, *Untersuchung über den Begriff ζωή αἰώνιος in den Schriften des Johannes* (Gymnas.-Progr. 1880). A history and critique of these and other attempts at defining the concept does not fall within the scope of our task. In this respect cf. especially Zietlow p. 21 and v. Schrenck pp. 1–2. — Hoare, *life in St. John’s gospel* 1901 belongs to the devotional literature.

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What is of primary importance for the fourth Gospel is the unmistakably principled manner in which, here, in the concept of life, the theological-christological thought is made the all-determining and all-illuminating presupposition of the soteriological. The intention of the author to derive the latter from the former, to allow the reader, proceeding from the contemplation of the absolutely original and perfect, all-conditioning life in God, to recognize in the Christian life of salvation the focal point of the total revelation of that divine life, is announced in the most significant way already in the cardinal statement of the fourth verse of the Prologue; it corresponds to the characteristic fundamental trait of our Gospel given with the starting-point from the *altior speculatio*, from the contemplation of earthly and temporal things in the light of the beyond and of eternity[1]. With this, the starting-point for the

1 It is a momentous methodological error when v. Schrenck believes that, in contrast to the well-founded traditional procedure, one ought to proceed from “what was known and readily accessible to John and frequently treated by him,” in order, with the directives perhaps thus gained, “also to recognize the essence of what is initially foreign and little touched upon” (p. 60). The appeal to “the fact that John speaks just as rarely of the life proper to God as he frequently touches upon that which accrues to believers” does not suffice in the present case: the statements in which the inner-divine life (of God and of the Logos) and the life which Christ has and which he is — in distinction from human salvific life — are spoken of are relatively numerous, and the assertion that Johannine theology does not proceed from above downward but from below upward turns matters on their head in this generality. That “for John speculation about the life of God or of the Logos does not form the main point” is sufficiently made clear also by the “method” delineated by the Evangelist himself. In all seriousness the Evangelist demands of the thoughtful reader that first of all what he understands by the life of the God-Logos be

grasped in its contextual coherence and that, proceeding from this idea of life, one penetrate into the understanding of what the Gospel further says about the life of God and of the Son of God on the one hand, and about the life of the children of God on the other.

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discussion of the relevant passages is also determined[1]. The fundamental fact is that in the Logos there was life (1^{4}): a potency from which what has been said immediately before is explained, and which in this determination at once also offers the foundation for the explanation of what is to be developed further (see above, pp. 31, 92). According to the context, the Evangelist thinks in this ζωή of the sum and interaction of those forces which are given with the existence of an absolute personal being (v. 1; cf. the statement concerning the "Son" 5^{26}), and from whose free activity outward the origin and continuance of the world as a unified whole of partly material, partly spiritual substances, forces, and beings is to be explained (v. 3)[2]. This thought comes to expression in statements of the incarnate Logos himself, in which he speaks concerning the origin and nature of the life peculiar to him. The life in the Logos reveals itself most perfectly as that in the Logos-Christ. This, however, is in its final relation explained from the life in God the Father: the Father has life in himself (5^{26}), a life absolutely springing

1 The purpose of this investigation and the interest of the overview demand here as well a restriction to what is necessary and the most concise possible formulation of the conceptual content of the passages.

2 Against the one-sidedness and inadequacy of B. Weiss's interpretation, according to which the essence of this Logos-life would consist in "the beholding of God, as Scripture throughout holds out for the final consummation," cf. Weizsäcker in *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie* 1862, p. 624 ff., and Holtzmann H.C., 2nd ed., on 5^{26}. With the phrase ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν the ζωή is clearly characterized as a power which belongs to the Logos by virtue of his essence and over which he disposes. If, in distinction from this, Christ occasionally identifies himself with the life (11^{26}; 14^{6}), the emphasis there lies on the person.

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from his own ground of being. According to what precedes, this life initially presents itself as an infinite fullness of physically effective (bringing about bodily-organic activity) power, as it manifests itself in the ἐγείρειν and ζωοποιεῖν of the dead (v. 21)[1]. The parallel between Father and Son, however, in accordance with the Son's consistent relation of dependence, compels the inference that the life of the Father as the primal ground of all life already in itself comprises the unified activity of all those forces by whose communication to the human being his spiritual as well as bodily preservation, salvation, and perfection, insofar as this comes into consideration on this side and on the other side, is effected[2]. In agreement with this, Jesus in 6^{57} calls God the living Father as the personal primal source and possessor of all those imperishable creative powers which, proceeding from the Son, show themselves effective in human beings not only on the spiritual (especially ethical) side of their being, but also spiritually-bodily (cf. vv. 39, 40, 44,

54). Just as the first statement in 5^{26} (concerning the life of the Father) is to be understood in connection with v. 21, so also the statement concerning the life of the Son—that it has been given to him by the Father likewise to have life in himself—connects with vv. 20, 21. The Father "shows" the Son still greater works than that of the miracle of healing (which Jesus has just performed): the raising (negatively) and the making alive (positively) of the dead, the execution of which, together with the κρίσις that takes place thereby, he has entirely transferred to the Son—as a further unfolding of the power which, according to the testimony of the Old Testament, proceeds from himself. In the Son, namely, the raising and making alive of the dead takes place both in the spiritual and in the bodily realm

1 It is to be noted that the vivification of the dead in question is an immediate intensification of what takes place in the miraculous healing of the sick (vv. 16–20).

2 B. Weiss's explanation, which finds the ζωή of the Father in self-contemplation in blessed sufficiency, rests on a strange misunderstanding of the context of v. 26 and of the logical relation of the two members of the verse itself.

(the latter already in the case of Lazarus) (hence in the following exposition the one point of view after the other). The life-giving effect of the power flowing forth from the Son, however, is not explained from a merely mediating function of the Son, but from the absoluteness of his ground of life and fullness of life, willed and ordained by the Father himself: whoever, like Jesus, wills to make the dead alive must have a being that is creative life-power. This very thought underlies the statement when Jesus in 6^{51} designates himself as the living bread that has come down from heaven. He means to say that he is a living one like God (5^{26}; 6^{57}), and by virtue of this absoluteness of his person, according to God's will (vv. 32, 33, 38–40), since his descent to earth he is the principle of the preservation and development of the immaterial being of human beings who receive him in faith. That it is the consequence of an absolute divine act of will when he, like God, has a life grounded in himself, he indicates in particular when he says in 6^{57}: "I live because of the Father," that is, because the Father wills it. The importance of this ethical mediation of intra-divine being hardly needs to be emphasized. What this life, however, means for Christ himself as the Logos who has entered into earthly-human conditions of existence is brought to light by the context of the "I live" of 14^{19}: because Jesus is the Living One in the indicated sense, he continues after death—which for him is the going to the Father—not only in full possession of his personal powers of consciousness, but also in the state of spiritual-bodily perfection, perceptible for believers spiritually united with him and the Father now in one way, and (under circumstances and in cases of need and mediated in this or that way) also in the other aspect of his being[1]. In contrast to this, the thought that Christ in the totality of his life-moments has the determination of being the personal ground of salvation for humanity comes to emphatic expression where Jesus directly calls himself the life (ἡ ζωή). Thus in 11^{25} ("I am the resurrection and the

1 Cf. especially H. Holtzmann ad loc.

life"): corresponding to the nature of his person as the Living One (in the sense of 5[26]; 6[51], 57) is the power and task peculiar to him not only to place human beings who believe in him in possession of a higher spiritual-personal being and existence not impaired by bodily death, but also to transform their earthly bodily organism into a homogeneous spiritual one (as was prefigured by the miracle of the earthly re-animation of Lazarus). Likewise in 14[6] ("I am the way, the truth, and the life"): Jesus is the sole way which leads the human being, in the totality of his being, beyond the earthly-bodily stage of existence to the consummated communion with God the Father, because he is the truth, that is, in person, word, and work the perfect revelation of the divine will of salvation and of the eternal heavenly goods of salvation[1]; but he can be this only as the personified life (in the sense of 5[26]; 6[51], 57; 11[25]). Corresponding to this distinctive nature of Christ it is and from it it is explained that what Jesus communicates to human beings in order to save them is itself something living and therefore life-giving. Jesus first expresses this thought to the Samaritan woman in 4[10] ("he would give you living water"): the powers of salvation proceeding from Jesus through his word are living, they continue to work unceasingly in the human being refreshing and stimulating, because they are of divine-spiritual origin and nature (vv. 10, 13–15; cf. also v. 23). At first, in any case, powers of moral-religious consciousness, such as are peculiar to Jesus himself, are intended (cf. v. 34); their reality shows itself especially in the fact that they are neither lost nor weakened for the human being in death (cf. v. 14: ἁλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον). To this also belongs 7[38] ("streams of living water will flow from his body")[2]. Verse 39 expressly testifies that the nature of the forces in question is Spirit. No less decisively does the

1 See above the discussion of ἀλήθεια (p. 203).

2 See above p. 16.

pointed statement 6[63] ("the Spirit is the one who makes alive; the flesh profits nothing; the words that I have spoken to you are Spirit and are life") connect the concepts of Spirit and life. This means: the σάρξ of Christ is not, according to its material, earthly-sensuous constitution (v. 52), a means of vivification, but as the bodily nature later transfigured and taken up into the spiritual being of Christ (cf. pp. 13 f., 75, 300),—into the being of that same Spirit from whom already previously through the entirety of Jesus' word-testimony forces of vivification in the most comprehensive sense go forth for human beings.

The theological and christological statements concerning life discussed thus far make possible the understanding of the more numerous soteriological statements, whose peculiarity already at first glance is expressed in the fact that here all life coming to the human being from Christ is "eternal" life. As little as any doubt can exist about this, it nevertheless appears in several respects expedient to arrange together the passages in which explicit mention is made of αἰώνιος ζωή and first to examine them, and then to confirm and supplement the result obtained by consideration of those which simply speak of ζωή. Just as 1[4] is the fundamental passage for

the theological-christological concept, so 3[14]–16 is such for the soteriological: (the Son of Man must be lifted up,—God so loved the world that he gave his only Son,—) “in order that everyone who believes (in him, v. 16) should not perish but (in him, v. 15) have eternal life.” This “eternal” life is, in other words, as the entire context shows[1], the imperishable [life] that comes to the believer through Christ, and indeed in complete measure[2] through the exalted Christ, that is bestowed[3]

1 This stands firm even if, in contrast to what precedes, “here the Evangelist, not Christ, is speaking”; the summarizing thought of 3[1]–21 is: salvation comes only from above (see above p. 7).

2 As regards the necessary birth of the Spirit from above (vv. 8; 6–8) cf. 7[38]. The basic presupposition of a difference of stages in the working out of salvation through Jesus — before and after his glorification — must also be kept in view in the other soteriological statements about ζωή.

3 Not the purely future, exclusively otherworldly sense (as B. Weiss would have it) is to be observed in ἔχῃ in contrast to ἀπόληται (Godet: the former announces a gift bestowed immediately and forever, the latter designates a possibility to be feared).

a being and an endless growth, creating[1] and enjoying[2], that cannot be harmed by bodily death. The distinction between what is purely spiritual and what is spiritual-bodily is not yet brought explicitly into view here[3]. The same conception of eternal life is contained in 3 36 (“he who believes in the Son has eternal life”). But if here, as in the fundamental passage, faith in the person of the Son of God (more precisely: of the exalted Jesus, vv. 14, 15) is made the condition for receiving eternal life, other sayings point more specifically to the means of grace of Jesus’ word,

1 In the direction of the activity of knowledge (17[3]), as of the activity of love (see below on I John 3[14]). Against the argumentation of v. Schrenck, who excludes the “ethical qualities” from the Johannine concept of life (p. 147), it must already be noted here, in discussing the fundamental passage: just as certainly as only the morally–religious activity of the will manifesting itself in faith renders one receptive to the salvific good in question, it must by the biblical author above all be conceived as an ethical endowment of power. Love, like everything else that falls under the concept of ethical being, is according to the Evangelist’s view not merely a “consequence” of life, but a mode of operation, a form of its activity. If there is mention only of a commandment of love, but not of life (13[34]; 15[12].[17]), this is simply explained by the fact that the concept of ζωή throughout has a scope that extends beyond the ethical domain. But that the knowledge of God, which v. Schrenck recognizes as a constitutive moment of the soteriological concept of life, never appears as a commandment but always as a gift, will not be conceded by anyone who heeds the reproach directed against non-recognition in passages such as 1[10]; 14[9]; 16[8]. Cf. also Titius, *die johanneische Anschauung unter dem*

Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit 1900, p. 26; Wrede, *das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* 1901, p. 201 f. (on 7^{17}).

2 χαρά (cf. 15^{11}; $16^{22.24}$; 17^{13}; I John 1^{4}). The content of "eternal life" must coincide with what according to v. 3 and a (and indeed already on earth) is attained in the kingdom of God. This leads, however, according to the concept of the kingdom of God in the synoptic passages that clearly underlie it (Mark 10; Luke 18), to the idea of a fullness of goods of a higher kind, a creating and enjoying that forms the counterpart to that in natural possessions and relations of community (Mark 10^{30}; cf. above p. 251 f.).

3 The same holds for ἀπόληται, by which the opposite of "eternal life," the consequence of unbelief, is designated: sinking into a mode of existence that is no life, as an unending state of punishment (cf. υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας 17^{12}).

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which addresses itself to faith. To this belongs first of all 4^{14}: "the water that I shall give him will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life"; without imagery: the divine spiritual powers received through faith in Jesus' word of salvation (cf. vv. 41, 42) become, as an inner fund of the human being maintaining and increasing itself independently of the external world (cf. above on 4^{10}; 6^{63}), the immanent principle of a personal life in the sense of 3^{15}, 16^{1}. The same applies to 5^{24} ("whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life"), 6^{68} ("you have words of eternal life," cf. on 6^{63}), and 10^{28} ("I give them eternal life," cf. v. 27: my sheep hear my voice). But the saying 4^{36} also belongs here ("the reaper receives wages and gathers fruit for eternal life"): while according to the context the Samaritans who turn in faith to Jesus' word and person are first presented as those who are ripe for receiving eternal life (cf. vv. 10, 14, 15), the image of ripe ears of grain used for that state of ripeness, taken over from synoptic sayings (Matt. 3^{12}; 13^{30}), lets those concerned rather be viewed as those who are to be taken up into the realm of eternal life (like the fruit into the barn) through the mediating harvesting work of the disciples of Jesus. This eternal life, however, is no other than that promised in v. 14, thus that which already presents itself within temporality and is to be

1 An unending life that follows temporal life only afterward is not meant here either by ζωή αἰώνιος. The "water" offered by the Exalted One (note the fut. δώσω) immediately creates "eternal life" in the believer; εἰς ζωήν αἰώνιον expresses the immediate product of the ἅλλεσθαι. That, moreover, the growth and development of this life in the world does not remain free from weakening through contaminating impulses of self-interest and from endangerment (through the guilt of its possessor) is indicated by 13^{10}; 15 s ff. — likewise with images — (cf. I John 5^{16}, where the concept of life is expressly adduced; see below). The more the basic idea of an effective fullness of power dominates the concept of life, the more intelligible it is that the immediate statements all remain on the positive side in their illumination of life.

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appropriated in principle[1]. Analogous to faith, the sentence 12[25] sets the ethical act of enduring self-denial as the condition for the gain of eternal life ("whoever hates his soul in this world will keep it unto eternal life"): whoever allows the soul, more precisely the principle of his entire life of impulse and feeling (as in 10[24]; 12[27]), to express itself in selfish enjoyment of earthly-sensuous life brings it to ruin; whoever denies it that lower activity and false satisfaction in this world through self-sacrificing service of love in the kingdom of God will preserve it unto eternal life, that is, will maintain for it up to death (during the whole earthly time of decision: note φυλάξει and cf. 17[12]) a power that makes it imperishable (namely that same influx of spiritual power from above—John 3—by virtue of which he overcomes the dominion of selfish natural life-impulse). The concept of eternal life therefore also here—despite the adoption of a synoptic saying—corresponds to that of the fundamental passage 3[15], 16[2]. In other passages containing the same concept, instead of the subjective point of view of the condition for receiving eternal life, the objective moment of the cause effecting this salvation is brought to the foreground. Thus with reference to the word of Jesus: in the statement 12[50] ("his—the Father's—commandment is eternal life"): the effect of the word spoken by Jesus on commission from the

1 Against B. Weiss ("Note how ζωή αἰώνιος here, contrary to the specifically Johannine manner, stands over against eternal life in the perfected kingdom of God as in 3[16].[36]; 4[14]").

2 The usual explanation (also emphatically advocated by v. Schrenck, p. 64), which lets the Evangelist make an exception here, fails to recognize that κόσμος οὗτος and ζωή αἰώνιος do not denote a contrast of time (present and future aeon) but of essence, while the temporal notion that comes into play is indicated by the future tense of the verb ("in this world," i.e., in the midst of a humanity under the dominion of sin and death). The κόσμος of Mark 8[36]; Matt. 16[26]; Luke 9[25], which unmistakably underlies the phrase ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ in our passage, is likewise not a temporal concept but denotes the "sum total of all enjoyments" (H. Holtzmann in H.C. I 196).

Father in the believer is eternal life in the specified sense. Alongside this, with regard to the person of Jesus himself: "just as you have given him authority over all flesh" (17[2]), "that he may give eternal life to all whom you have given him"—as according to 3[15], 16. In a peculiar, more indirect way the thought is presented in 5[39] ("you search the Scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life, and it is they that bear witness about me [and you are unwilling to come to me that you may have life]"). The sense is: you Jews think that in the Scriptures of the Old Testament you already have that salvific good (as something to be appropriated by a research that does not even penetrate into the essence of those Scriptures) which only I, to whom they point, can communicate to you[1]. Accordingly, ζωή αἰώνιος, as with the Evangelist himself, is conceived as the activity of supernatural powers in the human being which transform his being into an imperishable one that comes after death to spiritual and bodily consummation; at the same time, however, this Jewish opinion is characterized as a delusion insofar as it lacks the real condition lying in mediation through the Son of God[2]. We thereby already arrive at a further series of statements which differ from the preceding ones in that, according to the

conception of our Evangelist, the physical moment included in the concept of eternal life comes forward more or less distinctly in its particular significance. At the head of this series belongs 6:27 (“do not work for the food that perishes, but for the food that remains unto eternal life”): the powers appropriated through faith in the “Son of Man” authenticated by the “Father” are a nourishment that is not used up by the

1 Where there is talk of having “eternal life,” in the Fourth Gospel and in I John it is not something first future and otherworldly that is meant (John $3^{15}.^{16}.^{36}$; $5^{24}.^{26}$; $6^{40}.^{47}.^{63}.^{64}$; 10^{10}; 20^{31}; I John 3^{14}; $5^{12}.^{13}$).

2 Cf. moreover the sayings cited by Weber (*altsynagog. pal. Theol.*² p. 24) concerning belief in the death-conquering power of the Law in Mechilta 24a; Sifre 40a; Schemoth rabba e. 51 (“death can gain no power over one who occupies himself with the Torah”).

believer, as natural food is, but continues to operate within him unimpaired and undiminished and is not lost to him even in death; for that very reason the life effected by this nourishment from the outset is eternal life. In contrast to 4:14, the Evangelist here—according to the connection with what follows (note especially vv. 39, 51)—already seems to have in view the dual aspect (the natural alongside the spiritual-ideal being) of eternal life. The same is to be assumed in 6:40: “For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who sees the Son and believes in him should have eternal life, and I will raise him up on the last day.” The reference to bodily resurrection makes it clear that in this context *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* is conceived specifically in relation to the physical side of human existence. So also 6:47 (“he who believes has eternal life”). The impression of this dual aspect of the concept is further reinforced where, instead of faith, the corresponding sacramental participation is emphasized as condition and mediation. This occurs in 6:51 (“if anyone eats of this bread, he will live forever”): the (believing) recipient of the sacrament in question has—specifically also as a result of the participation specified in vv. 51 ff.—eternal life; likewise 6:54 (“he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up on the last day”). Confirmation will be provided by the discussion of what is said in 6:33 and 6:51 concerning the simple *ζωή*. Only apparently does the isolated saying of Jesus deviate from the overall result of our investigation, which gives a concise and direct answer to the question of the nature

1 The reference to the resurrection on the last day (as already 5^{28} to the sojourn in the graves) does not rest on an interpolation or a later adaptation by the Evangelist himself “to the conventionally given manner of thinking and speaking” (H. Holtzmann), but is grounded in the character of the Gospel as a whole, in that duality peculiar to it which, alongside the spiritual, also distinctly emphasizes the physical conditions of salvation — a duality that is particularly evident also in the treatment of baptism and the Lord’s Supper (cf. Holtzmann in H.C.² p. 110 f.), and whose mysterious background will be illuminated in a subsequent investigation.

or content of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*: 17:3 (“And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”). The “knowing” to be understood here, unquestionably in a pregnant sense, is the believing knowledge of Jesus as the one sent by God *κατ’ ἐξ.* (17:8, 20 f.) and the thereby mediated knowledge of God, not attainable by means of natural intellectual or rational activity; this knowledge, although in concept[1] a truthful apprehension of the being of God in general within a coherent nexus of corresponding ideas and thoughts, is as such essentially practical in character: through progressive appropriation of the moral being of God (doing of the will, cf. 7:17; keeping of the commandments, cf. 17:6–8) (“love” toward God, 5:42)[2], and on the other hand inseparably connected with the experience of the beatifying effect (joy, 17:13) of communion with God (17:21, 23). Whether, however, we possess here a “full conceptual definition of eternal life” is a question that must be answered in the negative[3]. Everything here depends on keeping sharply in view the horizon shaped by the immediate context of the high-priestly prayer itself. In that knowledge corresponding to the true, deepest being of the Father and of the Son sent by him, “eternal life,” which the Son is authorized by the Father to impart to believers and is enabled to impart in the state of the requested glorification (exaltation) (17:2), is already present, simply because reflection remains at the level of the immediately impending stage of the disciples’ existence, their earthly life, as is the case in what follows (vv. 11, 15; cf. above, pp. 28 f.). That ethically conditioned intellectual activity and development of the

1 Knowing = intellectually grasping the true essence of someone or something.

2 Cf. H. Schultz, *die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi* 1881, p. 444.

3 In contrast to B. Weiss cf. Weizsäcker a. a. O. p. 625; Schanz (*Comm. über das Evangelium des hl. Johannes*) ad loc.; Holtzmann, *neutestl. Theol.* II 379; v. Schrenck a. a. O. p. 134 ff.; Titius a. a. O. p. 24; 141 ff. It must not be overlooked that the emphasis lies not on γινώσκωσι but on the double object of the verb.

disciples of Christ, together with the accompanying affective reflex, is eternal life, because it is the effect of the imparted divine spiritual powers; and it therefore also results in the realization of eternal life in its full concept (including the bodily factor; see below on 6:51). Whether, however, the Evangelist, in this concluding context, by choosing precisely the concept of *γινώσκειν* for defining the essence of eternal life, also intends at the same time a summary rejection of false Gnosis, is a question that naturally suggests itself.[1]

That now in those cases in which *life* is spoken of without qualification, in general nothing other is meant than the *eternal life* of the elucidated passages, is easy to recognize.[2] Here too we are dealing at first with a series of statements in which the physical side of human existence does not yet come into consideration. The causal relation of Christ to the reception or possession of that life is emphasized in 10:10 (“I have come that they may have life and have abundance”), where the moment of fullness of power and duration of life, as well as that of the blissful enjoyment of fullness, seems to be especially indicated by *περισσόν*, and in the saying 14:19 (“I

live, and you will live"), which probably is meant to say: you will, in contrast to the world, stand after my departure in a continuing personal communion of life with me (and by virtue of this, already on earth, possess those spiritual and moral powers that enable you to behold me in my otherworldly mode of existence). For the most part the faith that conditions possession of salvation is emphasized. Thus already 3:36: whoever does not render to the (God-sent and God-beloved)

1 Whether an allusion to the mystery-idea also enters in (cf. in this direction Holtzmann a. a. O. II 378 f.) may for the present remain undecided. To some extent one is also reminded of the fundamental idea of Indian theosophy (cf. Deussen, *allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* 1894, I, 1, 290. 293).

2 Cf. already Köstlin (*der Lehrbegriff des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis* 1843, p. 237) and v. Schrenck ("the word αἰώνιος is therefore only an *epitheton ornans*, a predicate that is already contained in the concept of the subject. Thus it is understandable how it can be absent or added without changing the sense," p. 63).

Son the obedience of faith (*ἀπειθῶν*), will not see life, that is, he will not receive or come to know the previously mentioned "eternal" life and therefore no "life" at all; as one who remains under the "wrath of God," alienated from God, he remains outside all connection with the ground of life (5:26; 6:57). In order to have the life that alone is "life," one must come to Jesus: 5:40. "That you may have life in his name through faith (in the sonship of Jesus)"—for this reason the signs that Jesus performed have been written down by the Evangelist: 20:31. The significance of the word of Jesus comes especially to the fore in 5:24 ("whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me—does not come into judgment, but has passed from death into life"): whoever receives the word of Jesus as the word of the one sent by God and Son of God in faith, has already, through the spiritual and moral personal union with Jesus thereby effected, been removed from the sphere of judgment and has appropriated divine powers that render his spiritual being inaccessible to the dissolving and destructive power of death (he has, as is first said, eternal life). Corresponding to this is the immediately following assurance in 5:25: the (spiritually) dead who, at the decisive moment, have heard the voice of the Son of God (have given it believing hearing), will live (in the sense of v. 24). Greater difficulty is presented to the interpreter by the profoundly significant passages that speak of life *simpliciter*, in which the duality of the spiritual and the bodily factor becomes apparent. Foremost stands the saying 5:29: those who have done the good (have rendered obedience of faith to the Son of God)[2] will come forth (from the

1 On ὄψεται cf. ἰδεῖν = εἰσελθεῖν $3^{3.5}$.

2 There can be no doubt that in the case of this class of persons alone relevant for the ἀνάστασις ζωῆς one must by no means think only of those who belong to the sphere of the effects of the Gospel (from the mouth of Jesus himself or of his witnesses), but also of all those who, standing at the level of Old Testament faith or on the ground of general

revelation of God, have shown themselves by their love for the light of divine truth to be such as are destined for sonship with God in Christ (see above p. 93 on 14 and cf. the statement in John $3^{20}.^{21}$ linked to Rom. $2^{7}.^{10}$; also John $5^{40}.^{46}$; 12^{39}–41; 10^{16}; 11^{52}). The mere indication of the scope of Christ's future revelation of life (with the indeterminate οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες) corresponds to the mere indication of the scope of the Logos' revelation of life to humanity in the pre-Christian past, as given by the Prologue. Against the critical objection to vv. 28.29, which fails to take account of the overall character of the Fourth Gospel, cf. Holtzmann in H.C.² p. 92 f.; *neutest. Theol.* II 519.

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graves) to the resurrection of life—to entrance into a personal mode of existence which, after the resumption and simultaneous spiritualization of the bodily organ (cf. I Cor. 15:44), in its heightened power, its comprehensiveness, and its harmonious formation, will present itself as the completion of the previously possessed stock of life held in faith in Christ. The eschatological conception of the resurrection of the body in the indicated sense thus forms an essential moment of the soteriological concept of life (see above on 6:40). The same result must also follow from a penetrating consideration of the larger doctrinal context in chapter six (vv. 32 ff.). In 6:33 ("the bread of God is that which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world"), to which 6:35, 48 immediately attach themselves ("I am the bread of life"), the concept of life, like that of the bread of God, is to be determined from the entirety of the following exposition (up to v. 58), whose purpose is nothing other than the elaboration of the general thought of vv. 32 f. Accordingly, *life* here is prefigured in the whole fullness of its soteriological moments: as the product of the spiritual powers proceeding from God, mediated through Jesus, operative both ethically and physically in the human being,[1] both on this side and beyond (cf., with respect to the latter, already 4:10 f., 14, and otherwise the discussion of 6:51 below). To the wondrous character of this life belongs the fact that it becomes for the human being a possession independent of his relation

1 For this the logical relation between vv. 32.33 on the one hand and vv. 39.40 on the other (resurrection on the last day), compared with 5^{29}, is decisive.

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to the visible world; that in the one who possesses it there has at the same time become immanent the principle of its preservation and development (6:35, 27). One further step in the presentation of this very life is taken in 6:51, in that the mediation of it to believing humanity receives a particularly mysterious illumination: "The bread that I will give is my flesh for the life of the world." Just as Jesus himself, generally speaking, as the bread of life must be eaten, that is, spiritually appropriated through faith (v. 50), so in particular the eating of his *σάρξ* is an indispensable condition of life for the world, for which it is appointed as a means of salvation and to which it is offered as such. What is meant by this? Jesus makes his (as yet still purely earthly) bodily life—the *σάρξ* of the Logos who has entered human nature (1:14) according to its physical constitution—indirectly into a source of blessing for the world (*κόσμος* 3:16): it becomes, as that which is transfigured with the resurrection of Jesus into the being of the Spirit

(cf. above, pp. 75, 290),[1] the bread of life for human beings, in that Jesus gives it to believers to partake of in the mystery of the Lord's Supper (to eat his flesh, to drink his blood) (6:53–56). The effect of this sacramental nourishment of the Spirit is in general the same as that of the word of Jesus (see above on 4:10 and 6:63, pp. 289 f.): it consists in the preservation of the human being (even in death), in "eternal" life (6:54). But since it is grounded precisely in the transfigured bodily life of Jesus, it seems especially and in the most immediate way to be related to the resurrection of the body. The underlying conception of the Evangelist is probably that at the raising of believers by Christ on the last day (vv. 39, 40, 54, 55), the powers communicated to them in the holy meal are set into activity for the transfiguring re-formation of the body as their specific effect.[2]

1 On the "transition from σῶμα to σάρξ" cf. Holtzmann in H.C.[2] p. 110.

2 It deserves special notice that those who through their faith in the Son of God already have "eternal life" within themselves nevertheless still require resurrection on the last day: the one who has passed from death into life (5^{24}) cannot, like Christ, rise by his own power; rather, the spiritualizing revivification of his body takes place through an additional, special act of Christ. The emphatic ἐγώ, stressing identity ($6^{40.44.54}$), indicates, however, that Jesus would not be the author of "eternal life" for believers if the bodily resurrection of the dead were not also his work. Cf. also Titius a. a. O. p. 17.

With this, the sayings 6:53 and 6:57 are also dealt with.[1]

That now the author of that larger epistle, which bears the same name as the fourth Gospel, moves within the same fundamental conceptions as the Evangelist, cannot be denied, insofar as the soteriological concept of life is in question. All passages, whether they say something about ζωή αἰώνοος or simply about ζωή, contain the concept of the evangelical fundamental passage John 3:15–16. They concern for the most part origin and mediation of "life". Already the first in this series, 4:9, points by its very wording to the named verses of the Gospel: "In this the love of God toward us has been manifested, that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, so that we might live through him". The fruit of the work of Christ, specifically the liberation from guilt and the power of sin accomplished through him as the instrument of the loving will of God (v. 10), is the life of Christians in the sense of that fundamental passage. There follows upon this 5:11: "And this is the testimony (of God concerning his Son), that God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son"; 5:12: "He who has the Son (namely through faith, vv. 1, 5, 10) has the life; he who does not have the Son of God does not have the life"; 5:13: "This I have written to you, so that you may know that you have eternal life, you who believe in the name of the Son of God"; 2:25: "And this is the promise that he has promised us (that is to say: the saving good held out to us by Christ and, after his departure, having come to us as our share

1 On δι' ἐμέ 6^{57} cf. above the remark on διά τὸν πατέρα in the same verse.

2 II and III John do not come into consideration for the concept of life (nor for light and glory).

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— cf. on ἐπαγγελία Acts 1:4), eternal life (τὴν ζωήν τὴν αἰώνιον)", the preservation of which is conditioned by abiding in God or Christ (cf. vv. 24, 28); 5:16: "If anyone sees his brother sinning — a sin not unto death — he shall ask, and he (— God?) will give him life —" (the life in question, if through an individual sin it has suffered disturbance, weakening, and endangerment, but not complete destruction through full apostasy from Christ, can be restored through brotherly intercession). Attention to the distinguishing mark of that life is taught by 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death into life, because we love the brothers". The underlying connection of thought is approximately this: Whoever does not love his brother is not begotten of God (in truth no Christian and brother), v. 10; for if he were, he would (in accordance with his nature) follow the fundamental commandment of love, v. 11; he murders the brother like Cain, because he is from the Evil One (begotten by Satan), like that one, and belongs to the world (lying in evil, 5:19), v. 12. Just as certainly as the murderous hatred of the world toward the children of God corresponds to the nature of the world which remains under the dominion of the power of death because it shuts itself off from divine life, just so certainly is the love of Christian brothers for one another the proof that they have taken up within themselves the principle of divine life and as such have been separated from the realm of death, vv. 13–14: for the same spiritual power that in the individual children of God has effected the true life

1 *δώσει αὐτῷ ζωήν*: he will preserve him from the *θάνατος* threatening him ("relapse into the original lifelessness," H. Holtzmann) by imparting to him the necessary strengthening of life (cf. Jas. 5:20.16). The life of salvation, despite the immanence of its principle (see above on John 4:14), remains in constant dependence on the absolute source of life in God and Christ; its course and development are not a uniform natural process, but are entirely subject to ethical conditions. Erroneous is the forced interpretation of v. Schrenck, according to which in the case posited the sinner's life would be "lost," but only "not irretrievably lost." — In favor of referring *δώσει* to God cf. Klöpper in Hilgenfeld's ZWTh. 1900, p. 587 f.

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and brings it to development, works through them upon others in a life-giving way (producing life, preserving it, promoting it, and uniting the living into an organism of community; cf. 1:1–4). The concept of life in this context initially presents itself according to the ethical side, but allows its metaphysical background to shimmer through all the more clearly the more directly the author, even in expression, already reaches back to John 5:24: that divine life in the human being which expresses itself in Christian brotherly love grants to the children of God a being indestructible by death.

It is otherwise with the epistle writer in the case of the concept of life in its christological-theological formulation: that this is one and the same as that in the Gospel is

definitely to be denied. This is shown immediately by the opening of the epistle: “What was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we beheld and our hands touched, concerning the ‘Word of life’ — and the life was manifested, and we have seen and bear witness and proclaim to you the life that was with the Father and was manifested to us” (1:1–2). The thought of vv. 1–3 is as follows: the primordial being sensibly perceived by us in the earthly corporeal world, the eternal life manifested to us, which (as such, from eternity) was with the Father — for it is a matter of the “Logos” (namely the Logos of the fourth Gospel, presupposed as known to the readers of the epistle), whose essence is “life” — this we proclaim to you. One sees here immediately that the concept of ζωή simply (vv. 1–2) is taken from John 1:4. But in place of the subordination of the concept of the Logos over the concept of ζωή there appears here the subordination of the latter over the former, and thereby, in place of the personal bearer of ζωή, the abstraction of the life-principle[2].

1 *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς* sc. *λαλοῦμεν*; cf. John 7:18; 8:26; 12:41; Acts 2:31; Heb. 2:6.

2 On the affinity with the monarchian conception cf. Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum* p. 197 (“He avoids designating the divine life revealed in Jesus as a Logos-subject personally distinct from God; he speaks (1:1–3) merely of the ‘eternal life which was with the Father and was revealed to us,’ so that it became sensibly real for the community of disciples and the content of their historical testimony”); H. Holtzmann in *Jahrb. f. pr. Theol.* 1882 p. 141 (“The general Monarchianism of the second century appears here not in the Artemonite [Ebionite] but in the direction characterized by the formula *δοξάζειν τὸν Χριστόν*; — by eliminating the Logos-concept that intervenes between God and Christ in the Gospel, such a degree of unity is posited that in a whole series of cases there is no possibility of deciding whether God or Christ is the subject”); idem, *Einleitung in das N. T.*[*3] p. 478; *neutest. Theol.* II 396. What Häring (*Gedankengang und Grundgedanke des 1. Johannesbriefs* in *Theol. Abhandlungen*, dedicated to Carl v. Weizsäcker, 1892, p. 193) sets forth ultimately also amounts to the view that in the Epistle a need announces itself which in Monarchianism sought further satisfaction in less significant “speculation.”

But as in this respect, so there also appears in the concept of ζωή αἰώνιος in v. 2 a divergence from the mode of conception and linguistic usage of the Gospel. Whereas in the latter ζωή αἰώνιος occurs exclusively as a soteriological concept, in statements about the human beings to be saved, as a designation of the saving life grounded by Christ in human beings, beginning in time but enduring eternally, in 1 John 1:2 “eternal life” is a christological or theological concept (exact parallel to ὃ ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς in v. 1), signifying the absolute, primordial life, which according to John 1:4 is the essence of the Logos. With this latter observation the result in the theological passage 5:20 corresponds exactly: “This one (God) is the true God and eternal life”. The train of thought of vv. 19–21 may be summarized as follows: we are from God (cf. v. 18), and indeed we know that we owe the knowledge of God (the “True One”) — conditioned by begetting from God

1 Although the Evangelist, like God, thinks the Logos as such absolutely transcending time (cf. above p. 78), the need to negate temporal representation in the idea of God and

the Logos understandably recedes the more strongly he emphasizes the personality of the absolute being, and the more his conception regarding everything that occurs through absolute personality is dependent on the temporal schema. Cf., by contrast, the abstraction in Philo (see above p. 210 f.).

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and determining toward non-sinning (cf. v. 18) — to the Son of God; and we are in God (the "True One"), namely in his (through his) Son Jesus Christ. This one (the God manifested to us in Jesus Christ) is the true God and (in himself and for us) eternal life. Do not let yourselves be led astray into belief in self-invented gods (εἴδωλα), which have no life and can give no life (cf. Jer. 2:13). Over against this ζωή αἰώνιος, which here briefly brings the essence of God to expression, there also stands in the Gospel the simple ζωή (5:26). But even if in that "eternal life", which according to the epistle constitutes the essence of God, the metaphysical side of the concept of life (cf. on John 5:26) is not entirely left out of consideration, it is nevertheless certainly the ethical thought that is the main point there. The metaphysical element of the conception recedes in the epistle altogether, in comparison with the fourth Gospel, noticeably behind the ethical, and it is at least plausible to assume an inner connection between this circumstance and the relation of the emphasis of the moments in the christological concept of life in 1 John 1:1–2. [2].

1 Cf. also Häring, loc. cit., p. 192 f.

2 That these more deeply grounded divergences do not favor the assumption of the unity of the author of Epistle and Gospel must surely be conceded. For my part I find the conjecture that we are dealing with two different writers—so that the epistle-writer is a man from the school of the Evangelist—simpler and more convincing than the assumption of identity, which would require explaining the repeatedly noticeable differences on principial points out of the theological development of a single author. The problem cannot of course be pursued further here. Only this question may be asked: Is it really likely that a personality of the original intellectual magnitude and mature, coherent individuality displayed by the author of the Gospel should have undergone in language as well as in theological conception and conceptual world the considerable transformation that must be assumed (despite all affinity and similarity) if the Epistle is to stem from the same writer as the Gospel—a transformation that could evidently only have followed the composition of the Gospel and would have to be understood as a clarification occurring at a still later age? I have particularly in view the positions of Jülicher (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, 3rd and 4th eds., 1901, pp. 194–196). In my judgment Weizsäcker is on the right track (*Das apostolische Zeitalter*[2] p. 539 f.); cf. also Brückner (*Die chronologische Reihenfolge, in welcher die Briefe des N. T. verfasst sind*, 1890, p. 302 f.) and Pfleiderer (*Urchristenth.* p. 791 f.).

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If finally the conceptual content of the statements of the fourth Gospel itself concerning life is to be brought into a brief summarizing expression, then this, insofar as it concerns the soteriological concept, may be formulated approximately as follows: Life in the religious sense of the life of salvation is the constant, organically unified activity of a capacity of powers imparted by God through Christ to receptive (believing) human beings, which by its nature is continually renewed and perfected from the divine primal source, which not only (and in the first instance) is effective in a purely spiritual way, on the side of consciousness, ethically and morally-intellectually, as a principle of development, but also constitutes the real condition for the physical transfiguration, the spirit-bodily consummation of the human personal being, and from the outset arouses the feeling of blessedness. From the metaphysical nature of this life it follows that it must be an infinite, indestructible one, subject to no interruption at the bodily death of the human being. This moment is especially emphasized when it is called “eternal life”. But as regards the pressing question, arising with respect to the ethical conditionality of possession, concerning the possibility of the loss of “life”, this remains just as characteristically in the background and finds no clearly articulated answer. On the one hand it is attested that the “disciple” can, through his own culpability, become deprived of the influx of life from Christ and thereby perish (6 66. 15 2. 6. 17 12). On the other hand Jesus assures that, according to the will of the Father, he should lose nothing of all that the latter has given him, that is, no one who believes in him (6 39 f.); that indeed his sheep, to whom he gives eternal life, shall never perish, and that no one can snatch them out of his and his Father’s

hand (10 28 f.); and that he has kept those whom the Father gave him in such a way that none of them has been lost except the υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας (17 12). This does not seem to accord; yet we are not compelled to assume a contradiction. The disciples of 6 66 (in contrast to the Twelve v. 67), like the betrayer, form a false discipleship, an external following of Jesus, which has not at all taken into itself the life proceeding from him for lack of true faith. Among the true disciples, however, who have come into possession of this life, alongside the security of this possession guaranteed by Jesus and the Father, the subjective condition of continued obedience of faith remains in force according to the image of 15 4 ff. Nevertheless, the strong emphasis with which, in the cited passages, the preservation of those who belong to Christ by the Father and the Son is set in prospect makes it probable that, in the view of the Evangelist, generally speaking, among those who have become genuine children of God, despite the endangerment on earth, a final loss of “life” cannot in fact be spoken of. In any case the epistle writer points in this direction in I John 3 9, when he no less emphatically stresses that resistance to sinful impulses has become second nature to the one born of God (“his seed remains in him, and he cannot sin”)1.

What now, in the “life”2 that constitutes the highest good of the human being, is posited in a derivative way and, in accordance with the nature of all that is creaturely, in a limited manner3, that is given in and with God’s essence as something absolute and perfect, and as such comes, through the Logos (the “God with God”), to its revelation consummated in Christ4.

1 Cf. also Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 495.

2 See also Titius, loc. cit., p. 21 ff.

3 Thus in particular conditioned by the contrast of spirit and body.

4 After v. Schrenck has excluded the ethical-practical moment from the soteriological concept of life (see above p. 291), he finds himself compelled, in defining the theological–christological concept, to go a step further and eliminate also the theoretical element of the activity of knowledge (pp. 165 ff.)—all the more so since he had already reinterpreted the knowledge of God in the soteriological concept into the less determinate and correspondingly unclear concept of communion with God (p. 137 ff.). Against this the Prologue already speaks. For—only to indicate briefly—there can be talk of life in the Logos only because, correspondingly, there is life in God (cf. the analogy 5:26). If one now looks from here to the connection between 1:4 (*ζωή*) and 1:14, 16–17 (*χάρις*) on the one hand, and 3:16 (*ἠγάπησεν*) on the other, one is driven to the further inference that the divine love, which revealed itself as *χάρις* in the incarnate Logos, is in itself divine life-activity *κατ᾽ ἐξ.* (cf. above p. 102 f.). This further suggests that, when that Logos-life is designated in 1:4 specifically as the means of the divine illumination of human beings, in human apprehension of truth the life of God itself manifests as the principle of illumination. V. Schrenck's result becomes still more questionable in that—connected with the shown restriction of the life-concept—he does not maintain for the content of life the basic concept of power and exercise of power, but rather, in contrast to life conceived as pure power and activity in God (and Christ), lets human "life" be "primarily" a "state" and "passivity" (p. 145). Thereby the concept in reality loses its unity, and at the same time an inner contradiction and a contradiction with the preceding historical development of the concept are imputed to the Evangelist.

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In immediate, inner connection, according to the fourth Gospel, with the concept of life stands the one to be examined further: that of light; and indeed this relationship is here brought to bear so emphatically and so fundamentally as nowhere else. Here too, however, the statements of the Prologue prove to be decisive and foundational for all others. According to the Prologue (vv. 4. 5. 7—9), the "light of human beings" is the life of the Logos, revealed to humanity from the beginning, coming to its perfect, "true" revelation in the Christ of the evangelical history (cf. on 1 4), insofar as through it, in the receptive (v. 2 נ), knowledge of the divinely true and good (the conditions of σωτηρία 4 22) and, by means of this knowledge, the (initially ethical) renewal of life itself (1 13. 16. 17) is effected (cf. above p. 92 ff.). The practical effect, life in disposition and conduct corresponding to the knowledge of divine truth, cannot be separated, because it is already posited in principle

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with the knowledge itself; for this latter is absolutely conditioned by the positive ethical activity of the human will (3 19—21). Just as, according to the fundamental conception of the Evangelist, all light is by its nature radiating life-power (1 4), so the effect of light is fundamentally life1; but

this concept, as soteriological, throughout includes the ethical moment within itself (cf. above). Thus, just as certainly as we do not arrive at a purely intellectualistic concept2, so, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the theoretical moment stands in the foreground (v. 9)3. In a similarly general manner as in the Prologue, light is conceived in 3 20. 21 (“for everyone who does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, lest his works be exposed as what they are; but whoever does the truth comes to the light, that his works may be made manifest — that they are wrought in God”). Here too light signifies the revelation ultimately proceeding from the Logos as life-principle according to the exposition of the Prologue, and indeed insofar as it initially effects knowledge of moral-religious truth, of the distinction between good and evil. That it is not merely a matter of theoretical apprehension of truth is already shown by the condition expressed with ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Whoever does evil does not come to the light, that is, he closes himself off from the knowledge of truth that comes to human beings through the Logos-revelation, and thereby at the same time from insight into the reprehensibility of his own being and actions, because with this shaming ἔλεγξις there would simultaneously arise the unconditional demand, the moral compulsion, to break with his previous disposition and conduct. But whoever does

1 The natural parallel—the life-giving effect of the initially illuminating sunlight—suggests itself of its own accord.

2 Against B. Weiss and v. Schrenck, loc. cit., pp. 81–85. Cf. already the remarks of Weizsäcker, *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1862, p. 628 f.

3 The relation of cause (or means) and effect consistently maintained by the Evangelist forbids speaking of an “equation of truth-knowledge and morality” (O. Holtzmann, *Johannesevangelium*, p. 116) in the concept of light. Cf. also Titius, loc. cit., p. 122.

the truth (cf. above p. 92 f.) comes to the light, that is, he himself wishes to place his moral being and conduct into the light of the designated knowledge of truth, to let it become manifest before this light (ἵνα φανερωθῇ cf. II Cor. 5 11. 7 12; only indirectly Eph. 5 13, where φῶς is otherwise determined), in order thereby to obtain the confirming, initially inner testimony that his conduct is grounded in communion with God1. No other than the one radiating from the Logos according to 1 4 ff. was also the light which, according to 5 35 (“you wanted to rejoice for a moment in his light”), was disseminated by the Baptist as bearer of light (λύχνος), so certainly as it was merely destined to announce the rising of the true light, the revelation of the one who himself is the light (1 6 ff.): the Baptist has precisely in this direction let the light of knowledge of truth go forth through his testimony (5 33). Consideration in the remaining statements is restricted to the revelation of the Logos-light in the person of Jesus. Thus already in 3 19 (“the light has come into the world, and human beings loved the darkness more than the light”), where the Logos-life given in Jesus, made manifest from the time of his public appearance, is presented as the light in the sense shown in 1 4 ff.; — a thought that is grounded and explained in the discussed verses 20. 21 by a general consideration2. Even more emphatically and clearly than here, reference back to 1 9 is found in 8 12 (“I am the light of the world; whoever follows

me will never walk in darkness, but will have the light of life"). Here, in Jesus, the true light of 1 9 presents itself as the personal principle of religious-moral knowledge of truth for human beings and thereby of life in the demonstrated full sense of eternal life. That this life, like

1 The context does not lead to the notion of appearing before *human beings*.

2 Accordingly, darkness is defined as moral obscurity, ignorance, deception, distortion, and denial of the truth in the human being alienated from God, together with their practical consequences.

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knowledge itself, is ethically conditioned and ethically constituted is shown by the explicit presupposition of continued activity of the will of faith (ὁ ἀκολουθῶν μοι)1. Only, as it were, an echo of this saying is 12 46 ("I have come into the world as light, so that everyone who believes in me may not remain in darkness"). But also the self-testimony 12 35 f. ("Yet a little while the light is among you; walk accordingly as you have the light, lest darkness overtake you; whoever walks in darkness does not know where he is going; in accordance with the fact that you have the light, believe in the light, that you may become sons of light") unquestionably shows Jesus representing himself in the same sense as 8 12, on the basis of 1 9 ff., as light. The thought is: make the light, as it presents itself to you in my person during a now only briefly lasting earthly activity, useful for your moral-religious life, so that you may not, unexpectedly deprived of it, become forever incapable of giving your course of life the right direction and security; appropriate, through faith corresponding to the still continuing self-presentation of the light, its life-generating power (bringing about walking in the light)2. But special attention is also deserved by the saying 9 5 ("As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world"). Here too Jesus shows himself to humanity, that is, to those receptive through faith, manifestly in agreement with 1 9. 8 12, as the light "without qualification". Significant for the nature of this light is here first that its effect is viewed above all in the knowledge of the divinity of Jesus as to person and mission (as shown by the concluding verses 35 ff.). But if the practical significance of this knowledge is not further pursued, the saying gains a peculiar value through the immediate

1 It follows at the same time that the opposite concept of darkness is to be defined in this way as well, as at 3:19.

2 On *uἱοὶ φωτός* see above the remark on 1 Thess. 5:5; Luke 16:8; Eph. 5:8; and cf. especially Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 469.

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occasion. The restoration of natural sight (healing of a blind man), which initially symbolizes that spiritual illumination, is at the same time of eschatological prefigurative meaning (like the miracle of the raising of the dead following in ch. 11): in the domain of the light-power proceeding from Jesus there ultimately also falls the corporeality of the believers (cf. above p. 21)1.

Unmistakably we are led by the theology of the letter-writer beyond the outlook of the Evangelist. I John 1 5.7 states that “God is light and there is no darkness in him”; “if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses us from all sin”; 2 8—10: “again I am writing to you a new commandment, which is true in him and in you, because the darkness is passing away and the true light already shines; whoever says that he is in the light and hates his brother is until now in darkness; whoever loves his brother remains in the light, and in him there is nothing that causes him to stumble.” For this writer the light signifies essentially and immediately an ethical concept; it is the image of the love that constitutes the being of God (1 5.7) and of Jesus Christ (2 8), and that, wrought by God, likewise by Christ, in Christians, is holy love (denying the impure, self-seeking drives of the fleshly and worldly-minded human being 1 7.9. 8 3. 2 15.16) (4 7 ff. 16. 3 16. 2 9.10. 4 19 ff.). The letter-writer does not employ the image where, according to the Gospel, the general concept, or first of all the theoretical moment, the knowledge of the truth as such, is at issue—thus already in the opening verses referring to the revelation of the Logos of life to human beings (1 1—4)—in order thereby to make the application to the purely ethical moment all the more marked and effective. Not as though the light were no longer conceived at all in the sense of knowledge; but this

> **1** Entirely by itself stands the figurative use of light in an independent parable 11:9–10. The sunlight (daylight) is here an image of the guiding and preserving divine providence as the external condition of security and success in one’s vocational life.

does not receive special weight in its foundational significance for the religious morality of Christians, but appears more merely as its self-evident companion (cf. 2 11 the addition: “and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his eyes”) 1. In connection with the letter’s stance toward the doctrine of the Logos, however (see above), it follows that in the former the light is thought absolutely, identified with the being 2 of God himself.

The more characteristically and fundamentally, according to what has been shown, the conception of light proves to be for the overall outlook of the fourth Evangelist, the less can the writer’s pronounced preference for applying the concept of δόξα, of glory, surprise 3. For the shaping of this concept as well, the Prologue forms the point of departure and the general foundation. The fundamental passage 1 14 (“we saw his glory”) designates by δόξα the radiant appearance of the full possession of divine “life” and “light” belonging to the Logos who became flesh (see above ad loc.), as it was realized during his earthly activity for the eye of believers, not merely now and then in striking external manifestations (“signs”), but continuously in the spiritual revelation of divine grace and truth (see above, p. 101 f.), and bore witness to the unique sonship of God of Jesus Christ. This δόξα of Jesus is attested precisely as one mediated through miraculous action both in 2 11 (“Jesus revealed his glory”) and in 11 4, where an illness provides the occasion (“so that the Son of God may be glorified through it”). From the specific case the gaze then turns to

1 The thought that knowledge of the truth can be spoken of at all only where the fundamental “doing of the truth” (3:21) takes place is thus expressed even more strongly in the Epistle (2:8; 4:4; 4:8) than in the Gospel (3:21). V. Schrenck himself speaks of a “certain bending,” which the idea of light has undergone in the Epistle (pp. 84, 169).

2 Not the mode of revelation (cf. also Häring, loc. cit., p. 190).

3 It is perhaps no accident that this concept has found no place in the Epistle. Might this be connected with the indicated recession of the metaphysical element in the author’s conception?

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the general, when Jesus in 13 31 (“now the Son of Man has been glorified”) declares, in view of his immediately impending suffering and death (see above, p. 24), that now the δόξα mediated at all through his earthly activity and temporally limited with it (of 1 14) has been brought to completion 1. Attention is then again directed to the more precise manner in which this glory appears when Jesus in 17 10 (“and I have been glorified in them”) makes it clear that this δόξα has become manifest in the saving effect of his testimony upon the disciples, specifically in the knowledge that has come to them of his unique divine being and commission (vv. 7. 8). The same holds for the saying 17 22 (“I have given them the glory that you have given me, that they may be one, just as we are one”), the only one that explicitly transfers the conception of δόξα from Christ to his disciples: the radiant outflow of the divine life revealing itself as “grace and truth” is archetypically and creatively bestowed upon Jesus Christ as the Son of God (in the sense of 1 14) and is by him transferred representatively to his disciples through indwelling (of the Son and of the Father); through the overwhelming impression of the holy community of love of the disciples, grown out of the divine life, it brings about, in the world willing to believe, the knowledge of the divine sending of Jesus and of the love of God corresponding to the divine love for Christ toward the disciples of Christ themselves (17 23).

That the unfolding of the δόξα of Jesus during his earthly vocational life is to be regarded only as a preliminary stage of what took place after his death is taught by a further group of passages. With the remark 7 39 (“the Spirit was not yet there, because Jesus had not yet been glorified”), the Evangelist makes it understood that the fulfilment of the scriptural word cited by Jesus, “Streams of living water will flow from his body” (see above p. 16), that is, the impartation of the Holy Spirit

1 According to Spitta, 13:31b ff. does not attach to what immediately precedes, but to 16:33 (*Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums* I, p. 175 f.).

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to believers, was not possible during Jesus’ lifetime, but that this required rather the increase of the δόξα of 1 14, conditioned by death and exaltation into the purely spiritual, heavenly mode of being. This thought is confirmed above all by the other remark of the narrator at 12 16, that the disciples remembered a scriptural word referring to Jesus and its fulfilment at the last entry into

Jerusalem “when Jesus was glorified”: this remembrance was the effect of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Exalted One. The Evangelist has the Lord himself announce the transition to this higher stage of δόξα at 12 23 (“The hour has come that the Son of Man should be glorified”) and also ask for it at 17 1 (“Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son”); he also knows how to make use of a hint of Jesus suitable for explaining the mysterious event at 13 32 (“God will glorify him through himself; indeed, he will glorify him at once”): the limitation of the δόξα of Jesus given with the earthly mode of being and activity (in the σάρξ) is abolished through the admission, occurring after his death, into absolute unity with God[1]. From this there is explained as well the further glorification of his person by the Spirit of truth, announced by Jesus at 16 14, that is, through the instructing and educating activity of the Holy Spirit sent by the Son, in the last instance by the Father (14 16. 17. 26; 15 26; 16 7), in the disciples, through which they are first introduced into the depth and fullness of divine truth in Jesus. To the whole of the earthly and heavenly glorification of Jesus by the Father refers the word 8 54 (ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ δοξάζων με).

It now asks itself, however, whether alongside that understanding of the δόξα of the post-existent Christ as an enhancement of the glory perceived in the historical Jesus the Evangelist does not

> **1** One readily recognizes the complementary relation between the glorification of the Son by the Father in these passages and the elsewhere emphatically foretold self-resurrection of Jesus (see above pp. 6, 11, 20, 75).

also maintain another, and thereby introduce a peculiar difficulty into the total conception? The glory of Jesus gained through exaltation is also set in relation to the δόξα which he already possessed as the Logos before the creation of the world and, to all appearance, is thought of as a restoration, a regaining of the latter. When Jesus asks at 17 5, “Glorify me, you, Father, with yourself with the glory which I had with you before the world was,” δόξα here designates the radiance of divinely perfect life-activity conformable to the absoluteness of being (cf. 5 26), in which Jesus, in his pre-worldly pre-existence as “God with God” (1 1), manifested himself, and which is to accrue to him again after the transition from the sarkic (1 14) into the purely spiritual and absolutely divine mode of being. It is not a matter of the physical notion of the radiance of a supersensible light-substance, even if this may play a role, but of the all-embracing (metaphysical as well as ethical) concept of the glory of an absolute personal life[1]. Precisely this δόξα to be regained with the exaltation is meant at 17 24 (“Father, where I am, what you have given me — I will that they also be with me, that they may behold my glory, which you have given me, because you loved me before the foundation of the world”): it is one bestowed from eternity by the Father upon Jesus as the beloved of God κατ’ ἐξ.[2]. As the presupposition of what is said in the Prologue about the revelation of the Logos, there emerges from this repeated retrospective glance of the high-priestly prayer the following conception. The Logos enters into the salvation-historical revelation with a δόξα that does not

1 On the presupposed “continuity of the consciousness of the historical Christ with the Logos” see above p. 42.

2 See above p. 86. Against the view that “the *δόξα* of Christ, as of the *λόγος ἄσαρκος*, according to the conception and manner of expression of the N.T., was not one communicated to him out of love, but belonged to the Son metaphysically by necessity in the unity of the divine essence through the ontological–trinitarian relation to the Father,” cf. B. Weiss, *Ev. des Joh.*[8] ad loc.

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equal his inner-divine, pre-worldly glory[1]. In this there lies, by all indications, the conception that the light radiating from the divine being can be received only imperfectly and gradually by the element into which it penetrates (the κόσμος of humanity), and indeed not merely because of the ethical constitution (sinfulness) of human beings, but also because of their physical (materially bound) nature. The goal of the Logos-revelation is the degree of perfection for his salvation-historically acquired δόξα requested by the Logos-Christ at 17 5, that is, a degree of unfolding of radiance in the spiritual and spirit-bodied communication of life to his own in the beyond that yields nothing to the perfection of his primordial glory with the Father. As a result of their elevation into the purely spiritual and divine element of life, his own will then be capable, in full immediacy, of apprehending the fullness of light of the life flowing forth from him. To this final revelation, however, two preliminary stages of the unfolding of the glory of the Logos lead. The immediately preceding one, extending from the incarnation of the Logos to the death of Jesus, constitutes the messianic saving activity of Jesus on earth. The already heightened, in its kind perfect radiance of the Logos-life revealing itself at this stage in Jesus Christ, in comparison with what had previously been given, is determined by 1 14 as the manifestation of the fullness of divine grace and truth (see above p. 102 f.). But 1 17 allows one to recognize as the first stage the pre-Christian activity of the Logos in humanity, whose elementary degree of glory is conditioned by the fact that here the divine being and life first come to light merely as “law.” Under this point of view there also falls, according to the Evangelist’s remark at 12 41 (“Isaiah said this because he saw his glory”), the δόξα of the (metaphysically and ethically conceived) perfection of life of the pre-existent Jesus, as

1 The assumption of a simultaneous loss of *δόξα* in relation to God himself does not follow from this, since the *σάρξ* assumed by the Logos (see above p. 100 f.) cannot possibly be an impediment for God to vision and personal intercourse. One should note carefully the imperfect *εἶχον* and cf. the christological statement 10:38; 14:10.

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it presented itself to Isaiah in his consecration vision as the kabod of the holy Yahweh (see above on Isa. 6 3). From all this it follows that the glorification of Jesus requested in 17 5 cannot, in the proper sense, be meant as a restoration of the primordial δόξα of the Logos; rather, what is intended is an equivalent increase of glory in another direction added to the stock of the original possession of glory. The total conception, however, presents all the less difficulty

for the Evangelist in that the identity of the I of the Logos and the I of the Messiah Jesus is established for him from the outset, and thereby an essential difference of the cause effecting the δόξα falls away[1].

With regard to the δόξα that is not infrequently and no less emphatically predicated of God, it must above all be emphasized that it is throughout conceived as mediated through Christ. It is referred to the metaphysical essence of God when Jesus says of the illness of Lazarus in 11 4 that it is ὑπέρ (for the benefit) τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, that is, destined to serve the demonstration of the glory of God[2]. This glory is the radiance of the perfect, unrestricted life-power of God (revealing itself in the following resurrection miracle of Jesus, thus mediately). The same holds true of 11 40 ("that, if you believe, you shall see the glory of God"). As here, so also further on the theological concept clearly connects with the christological one of the foundational passage 1 14. We now have to do only with the verbal expression δοξάζειν. To the petition to the Father, "Glorify your name!", Jesus receives the response from heaven in 12 28: "I have glorified it, and I will glorify it again." To glorify the name here is essentially to bring the person whose name it is into honor through the demonstration of glory. Above all the testimony of the Father is to be considered, that he has glorified his name.

1 On the "parallel concept" of glorification—exaltation (*ὑψοῦσθαι*)—see above p. 46 and Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 455 ff.

2 Weizsäcker: "for the glory of God"; B. Weiss, H. Holtzmann: "for the promotion of the honor of God"; rightly Schanz (cf. Godet, Schegg) points to v. 40.

This glorification God has accomplished insofar as, as the ultimate source of the δόξα of Jesus determined by 1 14 (and specified more closely in what follows by 13 31), which encompasses the earthly activity, he has splendidly displayed his own absolute perfection of life (understood ethically and metaphysically at once). Jesus himself repeatedly confirms precisely this δόξα of God at the end of his course: 13 31. 32 ("God is glorified in him") and 17 4 ("I have glorified you on earth"). He does not, however, regard himself merely as the organ of the glorification of God, but also places his disciples indirectly in the service of the same in 15 8 ("By this my Father is glorified, that you bear much fruit and become my disciples"): in their appropriation and cultivation of the life of salvation effected by Christ, the ultimate ethical perfection of life of the Father presents itself splendidly to the eye of faith. The perfected glorification of the divine name, however, belongs according to 12 28 ("I will glorify it again") to the future: the Father will bring this about by means of the intensification of the δόξα of Jesus — on the path indicated in 13 32 (see above) — and will thereby show himself still more splendidly as the one who has life in the most perfect sense in himself. That this future self-glorification of the Father is likewise not to be conceived without a mediating activity of the Son is stated by Jesus himself. According to 14 13 ("Whatever you ask in my name, that I will do, so that the Father may be glorified in the Son"), the absolutely perfect (ethical and physical) life-power of God will be brought to radiant manifestation in that Jesus himself, after his departure to the Father (and the glorification thereby effected of his own person: 7 39. 12 16. 23. 13 32), by virtue of his unity of being and

life with the Father, wondrously continues his saving activity in the world through the disciples by means of the infallible answering of prayer “in his name”. To the same mediation of the glory of the life of God in the most comprehensive (that is, ethical and metaphysical) sense through the heavenly perfected saving activity of the exalted Son (the communication of eternal life to those belonging to him

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Characteristic of the entire mode of conception of the Evangelist is that, just as on the one hand the glorification of the Father through the Son is principially and without exception traced back to the causality of the Father, so on the other hand, in the glorification of the Son through the Father, the Son is consistently represented as not merely passively involved.

As the comparative retrospective view now shows, with the idea of life, insofar as it concerns the life of God, we stand in the fourth Gospel essentially on one and the same ground of conceptions and presuppositions as with the other New Testament writers. Here as there the concept of life is a theologically fundamental one, equally indispensable for grasping the essence of God as for grasping his revelation, which latter, moreover, in this connection in the fourth Gospel is considered only salvation-historically and eschatologically (no longer as natural revelation). In agreement, the statements lead to the fundamental conception of a purposive activity arising from the essence of absolute personality, of an all-embracing and inexhaustible unity of power that is metaphysically and ethically perfect. That in this way the concept of life of the Old Testament doctrine of God (developed in prophecy) is taken up is evident from what has been set forth above, and shows itself especially in the fact that in the New Testament as in the Old Testament concept the moment of power comes to the fore above all, and the positive relation to physical being on the one hand and to spiritual being on the other comes equally decisively and pervasively into effect — in the strongest contrast to the Philonic idea of life and its

> **1** Excluded from consideration are the passages John 5:41, 44; 7:18; 8:50, 54; 9:24; 12:43, where *δόξα* and *δοξάζειν* do not go beyond the concept of honor or fame. At 21:19 (glorification of God through martyrdom; recalling 1 Pet. 4:16) there might possibly be a conjunction with 15:8; cf., however, H. Holtzmann: “the conventional language of the martyr church sounds through in *δοξ. τὸν θεόν*.”

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Greek-philosophical presuppositions. The essence of God, insofar as it is determined by the concept life (חיים, ζωή), is one and the same in the Old and in the New Testament, uniting before and after the same fundamental moments. The difference in the knowledge of this life on the two sides concerns solely the degree of perfection of its stages of revelation, as well as the manner and nature of its media of revelation: the New Testament places the concept in an illumination whose multiplicity and brightness cast into shadow what was attained in the Old Testament, in that at this stage the richness of the powers operative in the life of God unfolds

itself in the perfected dispensation of grace, and thereby the life-power of God experiences its most splendid manifestation in the power of his love[1].

Only when we continue the critical comparison in this direction and first consider the divine life as it is recognized in the New Testament mediator of salvation do we encounter deeper differences of a specific kind within the New Testament conception itself, a course of development in which the fourth Gospel occupies its own significant place. Whereas elsewhere throughout, where Christ is designated as mediator and personal principle of life, whether of future or of earthly life of salvation, he is meant as the one who has death and the grave behind him, the post-existent and beyond-worldly one, or the one raised and exalted by the Father, the fourth Evangelist allows Christ himself, in the great majority of the relevant statements (self-testimonies), to ascribe to himself that communication of life as one that already began with his earthly activity. The explanation of this striking circumstance lies in the characteristic difference of christological basic conception. Whereas Christ according to the general presupposition of the New Testament writers[2] becomes

1 As regards the Fourth Gospel see above p. 306.

2 Nor are 1 Cor. 15:45; Heb. 7:16 to be excluded, where there is a retrospective glance at the being of the preexistent one (see above); likewise those related passages in which the concept of life is not explicitly employed, such as Phil. 2:6 ff.

the possessor of the perfect divine fund of life required for the redemption and completion of humanity, the ἀρχηγός τῆς ζωῆς, only through the resurrection and exaltation crowning his active and passive life-work (cf. especially Rom. 1 3. 4. II Cor. 5 16), the fourth Evangelist teaches him to be recognized as the Logos become flesh, and expressly allows the continuance of the perfect divine possession of life of the Logos through the “Son” to be attested in the confession: “As the Father has life in himself, so he has also granted to the Son to have life in himself”[1]. If, in other words, according to the usual conception the acquisition of the life-perfection in question for Christ occurs only after death, according to the fourth Gospel it belongs to him as a continuation of what was already possessed from eternity before time throughout his entire earthly existence and activity, insofar as by his very nature he is and remains the Logos, and the “tabernacling” in the flesh serving the salvation of the world has as its consequence only a self-limitation in the use of that perfect possession, graded in accordance with the will and activity of God (the Father).

Precisely with this fact, that the fourth Evangelist makes “life”, in accordance with his Logos-idea, the fundamental concept of his Christology, is further connected the fact characteristic of his soteriology, that he (and after him the author of I John), in contrast to the other New Testament writers, does not use the concept and name of “eternal life” exclusively eschatologically, but applies it also and primarily to the this-worldly life of salvation of those who believe in Christ, thus for αἰώνιος replacing the concept of time with a higher concept, the

qualitative concept of a determination of essence[2]. The saving powers flowing from the Logos-Christ, the “Son”, to human beings, which not only renew their

1 Regarding Hebrews and Colossians see above p. 81 ff.

2 That the “future resonance” of the concept is nowhere entirely lacking (Titius, loc. cit., p. 19) is a necessary consequence of the fact that its complete realization remains conditioned by glorification.

ethical being but subsequently their entire nature, are as such of indestructible essence and therefore already in time bring about a life elevated above the antithesis of becoming and passing away, an eternal life. It has already been shown that, consequently, for the doctrine of salvation of the fourth Evangelist the question of the losability of this “life” recedes noticeably (pp. 306 f.). But precisely this circumstance can point the way to the correct solution of the riddle why Paul, who actually first brought the this-worldly Christian saving good under the concept “life” (see above), and even the representatives of later, modified Paulinism, speak of “eternal life” only in connection with primitive Christian and partly Old Testament, partly post-canonical Jewish eschatology, that is, in the sense of the never-ending blessed life of the resurrected in the world to come, although their manifold statements about the pneumatic life-powers communicated by the exalted Christ to his own on earth no less definitely awaken the notion of indestructible heavenly reality than what Jesus in the fourth Gospel says about the saving life proceeding from him for believers in the world. How much one must guard against an overestimation of the weight of the theologically constructive lines of thought of the apostle Paul concerning predestination to salvation and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit (— in the deuteropauline conception one in any case notices a gradual displacement of the predestinarian idea)[1], how little determinism in the Pauline consciousness itself[2] asserts itself at the expense of subjective conditions, of the purely ethical manner of final attainment of salvation, is attested precisely by the fact that in the entire Pauline sphere

1 On the Pastoral Epistles and Hebrews see Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 267 f., 307 f.; on 1 Peter and 2 Peter ibid. p. 322; on James p. 347 f. (passages such as Col. 1:22–23; Eph. 4:30 may be set beside Phil. 3:20).

2 This alone is at first decisive, not the logical inferences that result for our thinking.

of the New Testament world of thought the attribute “eternal” has found no application to the this-worldly Christian life of salvation. If in the fourth Gospel a full, principled advance is made here, this is explained both from the already emphasized dependence of the soteriology of this Gospel on Logos-Christology and from the characteristically heightened significance of the metaphysical factor within the total conception of the Evangelist[1]; but it proves at the same time that the author, in the adoption and transforming appropriation of Hellenistic modes of thought and expression, wished to take a further significant step. In fact, we see him here too attaching

himself to Philo and surpassing Philo: the former by extending the concept and term ζωή αἰώνιος to the this-worldly life of salvation as substantially identical with the beyond-worldly; the latter by abandoning the distinction between true and false life, placing only death over against life, and thus applying the concept of life in full exclusivity to the saving good flowing from Christ; but no less decisively by eliminating, on the basis of Christology and the salvation-historical concept of God, the Alexandrian-religious-philosophical dualism between spiritual and bodily being[2].

1 On the "developed determinism" of the Fourth Gospel see Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 491 ff. and our restrictive discussion above p. 94 f.; further on the "metaphysical formulation of the concept of God" Holtzmann II 390 f., and in soteriological respect II 466 ff. V. Schrenck's explanation ("Whereas in present life a strong tone falls on the ethical side, this recedes in the future life and gives place to the thought of the glory bestowed with life. — With this difference between present and future life is connected the fact that Paul never bestows the predicate *αἰώνιος* on the former. For although present life contains within itself the guarantee of eternal duration, Paul was evidently prevented by the sense of the need of completion of its mode of appearance from taking that step and ascribing 'eternal life' to the present.") stops at the mode of appearance where it is a matter of essence (pp. 48 f.).

2 On the dualistic spiritual immortality of believers in Menander (Iren. *haer.* I, 23, 5) and in Valentin (*ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοί ἐστε καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς ἐστε αἰωνίας*, Clem. Alex. *strom.* IV, 13, 91) cf. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. d. Urchrist.* p. 188 f., 298.

How the elimination of the ambiguity of ζωή at the same time signifies a going beyond the prevailing New Testament conception and terminology is evident from what has been set forth earlier (cf. especially Rom. 6 4. I Tim. 4 8. 6 19).

The significance which the conception of light has received in the fourth Gospel likewise reveals its distinctive character. Characteristic above all is the emphasized intimate connection into which that conception is brought throughout the Gospel with the concept of life. That the older biblical conception already brings life and light into connection has been shown. The Old Testament knows light both as effect and as cause of life and gives this connection definite expression in multiple ways. Whereas, however, that connection in the expositions of the extra- and post-canonical Jewish and the New Testament writers in general remains an unexpressed ultimate presupposition, it gains for the doctrine of salvation and worldview of the fourth Evangelist all the more definite and emphatically fundamental significance. This is itself again conditioned by the relation into which the pair of concepts in question is set to the distinctive basic idea of the Gospel: the Logos-revelation. The more decisively it is expressed already at the beginning of the Prologue that the light flowing to humanity is simply revelation of the Logos-life, the more intelligible it becomes why the Evangelist, in all statements about the essence and origin of light[1], remains with the Logos and the Logos-Christ. If one recalls in what manifold sense and how emphatically not only in the Old Testament and the adjoining ancient Jewish literature, but also in the non-"Johannine" writings of the New Testament, God himself is

portrayed as a being of light and source of light, then one will pay all the more attention, in view of that peculiarity of the fourth

1 Apart from the isolated parable 11:9–10 (see above).

Gospel, to the statement in I John, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστίν (1 5). As for what finally concerns the created light and the light communicated to the creature as distinct from the divine, it can appear all the more characteristic of the elevated position of the fourth Gospel that here essentially only the salvation-historical and eschatological conception of light comes into speech (on 1 19. 10 see previous remark), the more clearly one sees in the rest of the literature the religious interest step by step turning away from the realm of light of natural life toward that of the supernatural[1].

That our Evangelist, by the specific integration of the concepts life and light into the context of Logos-doctrine and by the outstanding significance thereby accorded to those concepts, stands in very sharp opposition to the conception of Philo has already been shown[2].

Finally, as is to be expected given the particular relation of dependence of the concepts, the situation with the concept of δόξα in the fourth Gospel fully corresponds to the characteristic fundamental moments obtained with φῶς. With the more precise determination, δόξα, the radiant appearance of Christ is consistently characterized as the mode of appearance of the Logos become flesh in his person and is explanatorily traced back to the mode of appearance that belongs to the Logos in himself, pre-worldly and inner-divine (1 14. 17 5). If on the one hand the μορφὴ θεοῦ ascribed by Paul to the pre-existent Christ (Phil. 2 6) and the divine δόξα of the pre-existent “Son” of which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks (1 3) form a preliminary stage, there remains in contrast the characteristic difference, to be understood from the depth and energy of the Logos-idea, that the fourth Evangelist also predicates δόξα of the earthly mode of appearance of Christ, whereas elsewhere only the state of

1 On the relation of the Johannine epistle-writer to the Evangelist see above.

2 Some attention may perhaps be given, by contrast, to the fact that Valentin in his second Tetras pairs *λόγος* and *ζωή* as a syzygy (see above).

exaltation (including the earthly moment of transfiguration) is in view. From the same root it is explained that our Evangelist presents the δόξα of God only as mediated through Christ, whether historically or eschatologically (see above), where it should also be especially noted that the suprasensible physical radiance of light in God (as in Christ himself) does not emerge as a special moment of δόξα. Finally, it is no less characteristic that δόξα, in the one passage where it is ascribed to the disciples of Christ, the possessors of eternal life (17 22, see above), is likewise conceived as one already realized on this side, whereas otherwise, in that part of New Testament literature in which the δόξα of those saved through Christ alone is still attested

(see above), alongside the eschatological conception a reference to this-worldly life-development appears only quite sporadically and timidly (cf. II Cor. 3 18. I Pet. 4 14).

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When it is now the Logos who, according to the conception of the fourth Evangelist, reveals himself in Christ Jesus as the absolute principle of salvation, life and light of humanity, believing thought cannot evade the question in what manner the wondrous union of the divine being Logos and the man Jesus of Nazareth came to pass. The more clearly the difficulty that here forces itself upon him is conscious to the Evangelist, with all the greater emphasis does he also add to his fundamental Prologue the assurance that there did in fact occur a becoming-flesh of the Logos in the person of Jesus Christ. This remark, however, when more closely considered, has more the value of a confirmation of what was said previously about the "coming" of the Logos into the world than that of an explanation. Nevertheless, the hint given in the latter direction is not to be overlooked. With "σαρξ ἐγένετο" it is beyond doubt intended to be indicated that, in the unity of the historical person of Jesus, there came about a real and abiding union of the divine of the Logos with the bodily-psychical nature of a

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human individual being. That, in this entering into human nature and mode of existence, the materially sensible being of the same was only temporarily appropriated, the Evangelist omits nothing to note: on this side the σάρξ was for the Logos only a wandering tent, which was struck with the death of Jesus (καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν) 1. How, however, that process of the union of the Logos with the human being in Jesus is to be more precisely conceived, about this our Gospel allows us to derive only an indirect information. The attempt to gain this will at the same time serve to determine the position of the incarnation idea of our Evangelist in relation to other biblical as well as extra-biblical conceptions.

Relatively simple does the problem take shape, insofar as it might concern the question suggested by our first investigation, whether the becoming-flesh of the "Johannine" Logos could have resulted as a consequence in any sort of connection with the Philonic Logos doctrine. Auxiliary lines in this direction, such as have been drawn repeatedly,

1 The passage and its significance for the evangelist's overall conception remain misunderstood if the double meaning intended by the choice of expression (σκηνοῦν; not οἰκεῖν, κατοικεῖν) is not recognised (see above p. 100 f.).

2 Cf. Réville (*La doctrine du Logos* p. 104–112, 137, 83 f.): "Nous affirmons non seulement que l'idée d'une incarnation du Logos n'est pas inconciliable avec la philosophie de l'auteur alexandrin, mais que tous les éléments d'une pareille doctrine se retrouvent dans ses œuvres"; *Le quatrième évangile* p. 104–106). The objection as well, that "the Philonic Logos becomes flesh in John" (Holtzmann, *N. Th.* II 419), is not unassailable.

3 In this respect neither the discussion of the question whether Philo (in his doctrine of creation) could conceive matter as "intrinsically malignant" (Drummond a. a. O. II 299 f.; note instead especially the passage cited p. 50 *leg. alleg.* III 34), nor the reference to

statements in which perseverance in the body and the demand that “veiller à ce que la chair ne soit pas le principe de son activité” is urged, nor the Logos-type of Moses (Réville a. a. O. p. 83 f.) accomplishes anything; Heinrici appeals, in order to prove the distance between the evangelist’s conception and that of Philo, to *qu. rer. div. h.* 53 (ἐξοικίζεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἄφιξιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταχώρησιν αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰσοικίζεται) and 54 (νόθα γὰρ καὶ ξένα διανοίας τὰ σώματα ὡς ἀληθῶς πάγῃ, σαρκὸς ἐξενεκχθέντα, προορῶνται), where it is denied that divine and human can be organically connected (*Theol. Lit. Z.* 1900, col. 661).

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can only be misleading. That, already in general view, the sharp and thoroughgoing dualism characteristic of Philo between the divine being and matter opens up no prospects, is evident 3. But as regards the statements of Philo about the Logos in particular, decisive comes in the manner in which the latter is reckoned into the class of angels. In their essence the angels are ἀσώματοι καὶ εὐδαίμονες ψυχαί (sacrif. Ab. 2. I 204 CW). Now there is indeed a division of souls which have come to the earth and into a body not as a result of a sensible attraction, but for the sake of the perfection of their knowledge (the souls of the patriarchs and other “wise men”: conf. lingu. 17. II 244 CW) 1. But to place the Logos alongside this category of souls is forbidden already for the reason that the angels are precisely the highest among those souls which, as the purer ones, remain outside the body 2, and because to the Logos there is even expressly ascribed the rank of an ἀρχάγγελος and of the πρεσβύτατος of the angels (conf. lingu. 28. II 257 GW). And if elsewhere he is even brought into the closest connection with the two supreme powers of God (δυνάμεις) and set on one line with them 3, then there can be no doubt that, starting from these presuppositions, it was absolutely impossible to arrive at the thought of an incarnation of the Logos. Of a contact of the evangelical Logos conception with that of Philo can therefore in this respect be no question; rather the principled opposition here asserting itself is to be emphasized in the strongest manner 4.

1 Cf. Drummond a. a. O. I 337.

2 Cf. especially Zeller³ III, 2, p. 363 f.

3 See the discussion in Zeller a. a. O. p. 370.

4 Cf. also An. Aall, *Geschichte der Logosidee in der christl. Literatur* p. 119 (“the bold expression goes beyond what philosophical thinking could produce”).

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Seemingly more right and ground has the customary harmonizing explanation of the becoming-flesh of the Logos in the sense of the birth narrative of Jesus, as the “infancy gospel” offers it in Matthew and in Luke 1. From the very beginning, at a superficial glance, it lay after all near enough to recognize in the intimation of the Prologue a confirmation or a supplementation of that other tradition, a further illumination of the higher side of the mystery 2. In reality the Prologue, provided that the fourth Evangelist at all — as indeed will rather have to be assumed

— knew the wondrous birth narrative of Jesus in one or another form, can only signify a rejection of the same. The narrative of the begetting of Christ by the Holy Spirit and of the birth from the Virgin Mary corresponding to this process, in which the Holy Spirit is thought as a physical potency acting in the capacity of the male factor 3, leads to the conception of a personal individual which indeed is of divine and (in an indeterminate relation) human being at the same time, but which, according to the one as according to the other side of its being, has come to be in time, and whose mode of origin contains neither the conditions for the coming-to-be of full divinity nor for that of full humanity. We are here clearly dealing with a concession of the early Christian explanation of the divine sonship of Jesus (κληθήσεται υἱὸς θεοῦ Luc. 1 35) 3 to the religious need of representation of the Greek world, a concession that is only seemingly facilitated by “Old-Testament

1 Cf., however, regarding the strangeness or non-originality of Luke 1 34–35, following Hillmann, *Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu nach Luc.* (*Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.* 1891, p. 213 f.), Joh. Weiss (in Meyer I²⁸ p. 303); Holtzmann (*neutest. Theol.* I 413); following Kattenbusch (*Das apostolische Symbol* II 621 ff., 666 f. n. 300), who regards only ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω v. 34b as a gloss; Weinel in *Preuschens Zeitschr.* 1901, p. 37 ff.; especially also A. Harnack (on Luke 1 34–35) ibid. p. 53–57.

2 Cf. in this direction also most recently Belser, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* 1901, p. 275, and the discussion by Th. Zahn (“Born of the Virgin Mary”) in *The Expositor* Feb. 1898, p. 100–103. On the formulation of the third article: *qui de coelo descendit, conceptus est de Spiritu sancto, natus ex Maria virgine* (Synod of Rimini a. 359), see ibid. p. 93.

3 ἐπερχεσθαι and ἐπισκιάζειν are admittedly correlates of γινώσκειν (Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 413 f., on Luke 1 34 f.).

analogies” and “inferences from Paulinism” only apparently facilitated 1, in reality not to be justified 2, a concession of the early Christian explanation of the divine sonship of Jesus (κληθήσεται υἱὸς 9′-εοῦ Luc. 1 35) 3 to the religious need for representation of the Greek world 4. With the repute of a hero, obtainable without difficulty from the general presuppositions of Greek religion for the founder of the New Testament religion, of a man who after his death had entered into a higher life and become the object of religious veneration 5, one could

1 The purely allegorical treatment by Philo concerning Sarah, Rebekah, Leah, Zipporah (*Cherub.* 12. 13) is in any case to be disregarded. Lobstein’s question in his noteworthy study on the doctrine of the supernatural birth of Christ: “Is the (namely the being filled with the Holy Spirit from the mother’s womb — according to a narrative ‘which shows a striking similarity to the story of the birth of Isaac’: Luke 1 7, 13, 15, 44) not a conception that comes very close to that which underlies the narratives of the miraculous birth of Jesus?” (*2nd ed.* 1896, p. 30), must be answered with a decided no. The essential difference lies precisely, in the latter case, in the exclusion of the natural male factor in

procreation. From the Old Testament–prophetic concept of God there leads absolutely no bridge to the presuppositions of the doctrine or narrative of the supernatural birth of Jesus.

2 For details see Holtzmann a. a. O. I 412 ff.

3 Not his sinlessness! “Nowhere in the New Testament is the sinlessness of Jesus brought into relation with the manner of his generation” (B. Weiss, *Leben Jesu*³ I 213).

4 “The idea that our Saviour was a Son of God born of a pure virgin was the involuntary, indeed naturally necessary reflection of the divinity of Christ in the souls of converted Greeks.” Usener, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* 1889, I 75.

5 Here it should also be recalled that Christ is repeatedly designated as ἀρχηγός (Acts 5 31; 3 15; Heb. 2 10; 12 2), whereby he is represented in a sense as a hero. Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*² II 348: “In its true and original sense the name ‘hero’ never denotes a single spirit standing alone for itself. ‘Archegetes,’ the leader, the originator, is its properly characteristic designation. The hero stands at the head of a series of mortals beginning with him, whom he leads; as their ‘ancestor,’ progenitor of a family, a lineage, real or merely imagined, are the ancient heroes: archegetes of communities, of tribes, even of entire peoples, even if only postulated, venerated in the ‘heroes’ after whom the members of such communities wish to be named. They are always outstanding, pre-eminently distinguished deceased persons, who are thought to have entered heroic life after death. Heroes of a later type too, though no longer leaders of lineages attached to them, are nevertheless singled out from the mass of the people that venerates them by high virtue and excellence. A hero, after death, was a progenitor of great and rare natures, who already during life could not be confused with the mass of men”; I 169: “Instead of the bare ἐπώνυμος, the word ἀρχηγέτης also appears as the designation of tribal heroes — still more clearly it emerges that the hero is regarded as the ancestor of his φυλή when he is called its ἀρχηγός —.”

by no means be satisfied; thus one heightened his significance and his splendor by ascribing to him also a mode of origin analogous to that of the Hellenic ἡμίθεοι (through gods and mortal women) 1. That now, however,

1 From this analogy essentially nothing is to be conceded, since it is evident that elsewhere as well the two synoptic narrators strive, by a mediation with the concept of God of the religion of revelation, to avoid an inadmissible sensuous element (the mediation is given through the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, which Luke expressly characterises as δύναμις Ὑψίστου). Cf. also Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* p. 296 f. On the relation of hero and ἡμίθεος cf. Rohde, *Psyche*² I 152 f.: “That in Greece descent from a demigod in living times was not a condition of heroisation is shown simply by the fact that one paid no attention at all to descent for the great majority of heroes. Nevertheless

one invented it, in order to enhance the dignity of a hero, by giving him a divine father, cf. Pausan. 6, 11, 2); but this was not a condition for heroisation (rather for elevation from hero-status to divine rank).” From the influence of an Essene (Hilgenfeld, *ZWTh.* 1901, p. 235) or Orphic and Neopythagorean (Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* II, 1⁴ p. 31; III, 2³ p. 157, 326; Schürer II³ p. 583) related conception of the nature of sexual life, the questionable supernatural generation according to the Zeugiten is at any rate not to be explained “in the first line” (cf. also Lobstein a. a. O. p. 35 f.). Instructive is how already Justin, in his doctrine of the birth of Christ from the virgin, in which he sees a main element of the church’s faith, unmistakably conforms to a current way of thinking corresponding to the classical belief in demigods (sons of Zeus by human women) as the higher and true, and at the same time secures it against misunderstanding and moral offence: *Apol.* I 6 (God is the “Father of chastity” — σωφροσύνης), 21 (*ἀναγέννησις*), 22, 33, 54. Cf. v. Engelhardt, *Das Christentum Justins des Märtyrers* 1878, p. 124, 290–292; O. Craemer, *The fundamental features of Christian communal belief around the year 150 according to the Apologies of Justin Martyr*, in Hilgenfeld, ZWTh. 1896, pp. 232 ff.

what has been attained on this not unobjectionable path 1 does not at all accord with the statement of the fourth Gospel: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, hardly requires a proof. With the Logos-Christ only the act of the union of the human with the divine being falls into time; to the finite, human, according to its nature, there stands opposed on the divine side an eternal, from eternity self-conscious personal being, which as such continues incarnate and through the mouth of Jesus expressly bears witness to the continuity of its divine self-consciousness. That thereby also after the becoming-flesh it does not cease to be, in the original fullest sense of the word, θεός, is evident and has been shown above. How, under such circumstances, one may undertake to demonstrate that the Gospel of the becoming-flesh of the Logos agrees with the infancy gospel of the named Synoptics and has one and the same source-writing as its basis 2, is difficult to comprehend and

1 On the manner in which the first Evangelist seeks to meet the objections that force themselves upon the Jewish (and Jewish-Christian) reader (by pointing to the messianic-genealogical significance of the story of Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and the “wife of Uriah”), attention may be drawn to the instructive exposition of Th. Zahn (loc. cit. pp. 97–99) (the Evangelist wished to say: *“Suppose that all were true which Jewish hatred has invented about the beginning of Jesus’ life, the Jew who does not allow those dark passages in the history of the house of David to disturb his faith in it as the history of a divine Revelation still waiting for its fulfilment, has also no right, because of those unwarrantable accusations against Mary and her Son, to keep himself afar from Jesus, and to allow himself to be embittered against Him”*).

2 Resch, *The infancy gospel according to Luke and Matthew, investigated source-critically with the aid of the extracanonical parallel texts*. 1897. pp. 241–255. Cf. *Parallel texts to John* 1896. pp. 41 f., and already Gelpke, *The youth history of the Lord. A contribution to the higher criticism and exegesis of the New Testament*. 1841. On

Conrady, *The source of the canonical infancy narrative of Jesus* 1900, cf. H. Holtzmann in *ThLZ* 1901, cols. 135–137.

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is not made intelligible2 either by the appeal to the pre-canonical reading of 1 13 (ὃς οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκός οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός ἐγεννήθη) 1.

So certain as it is that the Logos, of whom the becoming-flesh is asserted, can be no other than the absolute personal being that is designated already at the beginning of the Prologue as θεός, so certain must he, in the view of the Evangelist at the sarkosis[=becoming flesh], in opposition to the complete passivity of being begotten, be thought of as active 3. This presupposes on the one hand the purely human begetting of the man Jesus, on the other hand a purely pneumatic act of revelation of the Logos, through which Jesus has become the bearer and abiding possessor of the Logos-being and Logos-consciousness. By this we are at first referred back to the presuppositions of the oldest evangelical tradition, as it is represented by Mark 4, — all the more so since even Matthew and Luke could not and would not entirely detach themselves from it, as their report of the baptism of Christ

1 Resch, *Infancy Gospel* pp. 249 f. *Parallel texts to John* pp. 57 ff. 221 f. Cf. further Th. Zahn, *History of the New Testament canon* I 518 f., and Holtzmann in *H. C.*² ad loc.

2 Cf. Reville, *Le quatrième évangile* p. 100. Characteristic is the contradiction into which Justin already becomes entangled in the attempt to combine the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos with that of the birth of Jesus from the virgin. The sexless principle that produces the sexual effect in the womb of the virgin is, according to Justin, the Logos himself, who for this purpose is identified with the *pneuma*, or with the *dynamis* of God of Luke 1:35, i.e. must therefore cease to be a personal individual being (*Apol.* I 32, 33, 66).

3 The same Logos does not enter into pure passivity even in the death of Jesus, just as it belongs to the essence of the “Son” to have life in himself. “All suffering is action for the Logos-Christ” (Holtzmann, *H. C.*² on 19:27–31). One may compare the gnostic exploitation of this peculiarity by Leucius Charinus, in whom “the entire appearance of the Lord in the word-eucharist — a kind of substitute for the institution of the Lord’s Supper or the Eucharist — is comprehended as passive and active together, especially the impending *passio* as an *actio*: ‘To be saved I will, and to save I will; to be dissolved I will, and to dissolve I will—’” (Hilgenfeld, *The gnostic and the canonical John on the life of Jesus* in *ZWTh.* 1900, p. 30).

4 With regard to the Syriac Sinaiticus at Matt. 1:16 cf. Holtzmann, *New Testament Theology* I 410; Nestle, *Introduction to the Greek New Testament*² pp. 80 f., and (the discussion with Zahn) pp. 290 f. Against Hilgenfeld, *ZWTh.* 1889, p. 498; 1901, p. 317, see Holtzmann, *The Synoptics* (*H. C.*³) on Mark 6:3.

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proves 1. That, however, the fourth Evangelist does not assume a development of decades between the birth of Jesus and the becoming-flesh of the Logos, that the latter cannot coincide with the baptism, is clear 2. It already follows from the significance attributed by this Evangelist to the baptism of Jesus: the Baptist himself designates the Messiah, already before he is recognized by him in his baptizand Jesus 3, as the one who, according to his personal being, his

1 While Luke 3:21–22, in fairly close connection with Mark, represents the reception of the Holy Spirit — through which Jesus receives his messianic empowerment and consecration — as an event perceived only by Jesus himself (the person of the Baptist recedes in this account even more than in Mark), and indeed in visionary imagery, Matthew already draws the consequence of the begetting by the Holy Spirit: to the Baptist the baptismal request of the one whom he recognises, in (momentary?) prophetic illumination, as the messianic bearer of the divine Spirit announced by him appears contradictory; Jesus concedes that his baptism is not demanded by an inner personal need of his own; and although here too Jesus is designated as the one who saw the appearance of the Spirit descending upon him (*ep' auton*, as in Luke, in contrast to *eis auton* in Mark), nevertheless the wording of the voice from heaven (*houtos estin*—) leaves no doubt that the purpose of the revelatory event is rather the confirming attestation before the Baptist. In Luke the more precise indication *kai proseuchomenou* is significant; it is not meant to have Jesus pray at the baptism "according to Christian custom" (Wernle, *The Synoptic Question* 1899, p. 27), but to explain the following act of revelation and at the same time to characterise it as one perceived in a vision by the one who is praying. One should recall how deliberately and frequently the author of the third Gospel and of Acts allows prayer precisely to bring about or to favour the reception of a vision, whether immediately (Luke 9:28 ff.; 22:41, 43; Acts 9:11–12; 10:2–3, 30; 10:9 ff.; 12:12; 10:22, 17), or mediately (Luke 1:10–11, 22; Acts 12:6 ff.). "All the people" finds no place in this connection; the being baptised of the multitude is mentioned only by way of transition as the outwardly historical occasion of Jesus' baptism. The "*somatikō eidei*" does not "materialise," but recalls the clear and vivid description of a visionary appearance in Acts 10. In contrast to the variant of the Lukan text that remains with Ps. 2:7: *egō sēmeron gegenneka se* (cf. Usener, loc. cit. I 40 ff., and against him Bousset, *The Gospel quotations of Justin Martyr* 1891, pp. 54–57, 60 ff.; Bornemann, *The baptism of Christ by John* 1896, p. 7), the appropriateness of the reference to Isa. 42:1 is especially to be emphasised.

2 Against Reville, *Le quatrième évangile* p. 255 f.

3 H. Holtzmann (following Scholten): "Probably the appeal to a testimony previously borne concerning Christ presupposes the distinction of two periods in the consciousness of the Baptist: in the first he knew the Messiah, as it were, only in the abstract, according to his concept; the second begins with the moment when, in v. 33, the identity of that abstraction with the concrete of the appearance of Jesus was made known to him." Cf. also above p. 103 f.

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nature, “absolutely precedes” him (H. Holtzmann), that is, however, as the same one who, in the light of the Prologue, thus for the knowledge of the Evangelist, presents himself as the Logos become flesh (1 15 cf. v. 1) 1. Consequently, in accordance with this, the purpose of the baptism of Jesus is recognized solely as lying in the fact that the Baptist is led to the conviction of the Messiahship of the latter in the sense of unity with that absolutely Higher One, in order then to be able to testify to this before the people (1 31. 33 f.). What he perceived with his inner sense (τεθέαμαι v. 32), — the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus and its abiding over him, that is, the entrance of a (conceived nimbus-like ?) pneumatic glory over him — was not a process altering the essence of Jesus, but a symbolic assurance immediately effected by God, that Jesus, as ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θ·εοῦ, in the indicated sense 2, was empowered and destined to translate the salvation-desiring humanity into the holy spiritual being of God 3. Rather, the analogy offered by the Pauline conception of the sending of the

1 If the Evangelist does not allow Christ himself to speak of the Logos, this can of course apply even less to the Baptist. By contrast, however, the discourse put into the mouth of John in 3:31 ff., in which one rightly perceives “an echo of the reflections of the Prologue” (Meyer-Weiss; Holtzmann on v. 32 f.), leaves no doubt that the Evangelist attributes to the Baptist at least a profound presentiment of the Logos-nature in Jesus (cf. the no less comprehensive insight ascribed to John in 1:29).

2 What holds of God — that he is *pneuma* (4:24) — must also hold of the one who, as *theos*, was with God from the beginning (cf. 2 Cor. 3:17).

3 The thought is to be conceived, for the consciousness of the Baptist, probably in accordance with 3:34; 6:63; 3:5 (cf. Eph. 5:26), whereas, from the standpoint of the Evangelist himself, the fulfilment is brought about only through the Exalted One (7:39; cf. Tit. 3:5–6). Cf. further, on the relation of the synoptic and the Johannine narrative type with respect to the baptism of Jesus: Loofs in *Pr. R. Encl.*³ article “Christology, Church doctrine” IV 20.

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Son of God, more precisely of the pre-existent heavenly spirit-man revealing himself in Jesus as the Son of God (I Cor. 15 45. 47. 48; see above p. 68. 80 f.), into the sphere of the physically-psychical life characteristic of human nature (Gal. 4 4. Rom. 8 3), leads onto the right track. Over against the primordial divine being of the fourth Gospel stands here the pre-cosmically pre-existent intermediate being. The same reasons that oppose the assumption that the Logos-Christ was begotten by the Holy Spirit and Mary already exclude, in the case of the god-like personal being of the ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος of Pauline teaching, the notion that he, just as he forms the principle of the personality of the Messiah Jesus, came into being through an act of begetting of the kind in question 1. The otherwise unavoidable combination, that the pre-existent personality was transformed into σπέρμα (emanation of begetting power) of the Holy Spirit, as such

entered into a maternal organism, assumed human nature, and in this connection developed to new self-consciousness in the person of the Messiah Jesus, can be demanded of a Paul as little as of the author of the fourth Gospel. In any case, such a chain of representations is no more suggested by the emphasis, found also in Paul, on the voluntary self-activity of Christ in his entering into the flesh (II Cor. 8 9. Phil. 2 5 ff.) than by the reference to the descent of Jesus Christ κατὰ σάρκα from the seed of David (Rom. 1 3), that is, from a Davidic father 2. Rather

1 Late-Jewish ideas concerning the pre-existence of the Messiah are not to be taken into consideration. A correction of the widespread assumptions (Schürer, Baldensperger, H. Holtzmann and others) is given by Dalman (*The Words of Jesus* pp. 106–108, 246–248): “The statements about pre-existence in the Parables of Enoch, the Fourth Book of Ezra, and Pesikta Rabbati do not presuppose a human birth of the Messiah. He is to appear on earth as a finished personality. This has nothing to do with the later Jewish doctrine of the pre-existence of all human souls. Of a pre-existence peculiar to the Messiah preceding his birth as a human being Judaism has never known anything. In fact the older rabbinism was content, following Ps. 72:17, to let only the name of the Messiah pre-exist.”

2 Cf. Holtzmann, *New Testament Theology* II 90 f.: “That Christ ‘came to be of the seed of David’ (Rom. 1:3), Paul has simply inferred from given Jewish premises out of the Messiahship of Jesus. One must not ascribe to him any further inference from this to a supernatural begetting without the cooperation of a man — least of all to one who, also in this respect thinking genuinely Jewishly, determines genealogical descent exclusively through the men (Rom. 4:13; 9:5; Gal. 3:16). Above all this latter remark, which for example Wittichen (*Life of Jesus* p. 14) makes, has been refuted by none of the subsequent investigators of the life of Jesus, least of all by B. Weiss with the note on Rom. 1:3.” And Loofs in *Pr. R. Encl.*³ IV, 19, on Justin *Dial.* 48; Origen *C. Cels.* 5.61, 65; Eusebius *Hist. eccl.* 3.27; Epiphanius *Haer.* 30.13 ff.: “No one with a good conscience will be able to trace that assumption of Jesus’ descent from Joseph back to an original rejection of the parthenogenesis. But if tradition lies here, then this is a weighty instance against those who do not wish to allow the *argumentum e silentio* to count in Mark, John, Paul, and who contest the positive probative force of the genealogies (Matt. 1 ff.; Luke 3:23 ff.) and of the *sperma Dauid* in Rom. 1:3. That Matt. 1:18 ff. and Luke 2:1 ff. represent one of the latest strata of biblical tradition is therefore no arbitrary thesis.”

the statements of Paul, like those of the fourth Evangelist, press toward the presupposition that the real and true human child Jesus, from the very first beginnings of his existence and his development 1, was united so intimately with the pre-existent heavenly personal being that all human powers of consciousness (expressed in Pauline terms: ψυχή and νοῦς in their entirety)

were continually brought under the dominion of the purely pneumatic-personal transcendent principle, were made serviceable to it, and in this way the latter acquired the significance of the properly “person-forming” higher factor of being in Jesus (cf. above p. 69) 3. So deep and all-embracing

1 Note the analogy Luke 1:15, 41, 44.

2 Loofs (loc. cit. IV 29) remarks: “The assumption of a distinction of the Pre-existent from the Father is a dogmatic auxiliary line, whose pursuit to its end thinking had just as little interest in, as it could find occasion to reflect on the ‘person-constituting’ element in Christ: the living intuition pushed such thoughts aside.” He probably underestimates the “theologian” in the Evangelist, however little this theologian may have been guild-trained, and however certainly therefore the supports of his view lay on average more in the realm of representation than in that of conceptually strict cognition. With the “living intuition” attributed to the Evangelist, however, things stand on precarious ground if it is, as with Loofs, to be postulated through an understanding of the “disparate thoughts” of that narrator’s Christology. With others, I am able to see in this only an illusion. The counter-proof must be carried out from a broader basis.

does the union of the “earthly” and the “heavenly man” appear in this person that a differentiation of the lower and the higher I falls away. Thereby, however, alongside the emphasized difference with respect to the higher I that entered into the flesh, the difference in the significance attributed to the σάρξ of Christ by Paul on the one hand and by the fourth Gospel on the other does not remain concealed. If the σάρξ, conceived by Paul in and for itself and quite generally in absolute opposition to πνεῦμα, though in Christ it mediated only incentives to sin 1, did not become the cause of actual sin, it nevertheless brings the potential relation to ἁμαρτία given with its sensory and instinctual being into a relationship of principled exclusion, of opposition, to the spiritual being of Christ. Under these circumstances, for that Apostle, for the entry of the heavenly primal man into the materially conditioned mode of existence and appearance of the earthly man, the negative thought of the temporary renunciation of the original μορφή θεοῦ and of self-humiliation becomes the all-governing point of view 2. Otherwise with the fourth Evangelist. To be sure, he too emphatically sets the flesh as such over against the spirit. While, however, in Paul’s concept of σάρξ the ethical valuation is the chief moment, the concept of the Evangelist presents itself as one that is in principle metaphysical 3. Both 6 52 and 6 63, where with σάρξ the substance of the material body of Christ is thought of 4, as well as 17 2, where with πᾶσα σάρξ humanity according to its natural constitution of life is designated,

1 On Rom. 8:3 (*en homoiōmati sarkos hamartias*) cf. the discussion by Holtzmann, loc. cit. II 69–74 and *ZWTh.* 1888, p. 283 ff.; Grafe in *Theological Essays dedicated to C. v. Weizsäcker* 1892, p. 263. The passage is the basis of Col. 1:22; Eph. 2:15; 1 Pet. 3:18; 4:1, where everywhere the relation of Christ’s flesh to sin comes into play. With regard to the Epistle to the Hebrews cf. Holtzmann II 288 f.

2 Cf. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* I³ 761.

3 Christologically, apart from 1 John 4:2; 2 John 7, the following take this side: Heb. 2:14; 5:7; 10:20; 1 Tim. 3:16 (the *sarx* of Christ conceived as weak, capable of suffering, perishable).

4 Cf. 8:15, where *sarx* is used in the sense of the naturally perceptible being of a human, with reference to the person of Jesus.

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leave no doubt that the Evangelist regards what he understands by σάρξ as the opposite of πνεῦμα because it in and for itself has no share in true, indestructible reality and therefore in the conditions of eternal life. This concept of the flesh is also to be maintained in 1 13 and 3 6 as the proper basis of the thought. In the former passage this is already indicated by the juxtaposition of αἱμάτων and σαρκός, which goes back to the familiar “flesh and blood” (or “blood and flesh”). With the latter, the human being is designated in distinction from God (Gal. 1 16. Matt. 16 17) and from higher powers (Eph. 6 12), or the earthly material being of the human in distinction from the pneumatic divine (I Cor. 15 50. Hebr. 2 14) 1. That the Evangelist also, in the verse in question, has in view first of all the contrast of human-natural and divine-supernatural causality in the rebirth effected by the appearing light-Logos, is shown moreover by the explicit οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός, which, in accordance with the context, places the human being, conceived essentially as sexually determined, immediately over against God 2. Upon the divine sonship ethically conditioned according to v. 12 there falls back from here a light that lets its essence be recognized as a pneumatic-real and imperishable one. Decisive, however, is the circumstance that the context does not permit the σαρξ of v. 13 to be taken in any other sense than that into which, according to v. 14, the Logos himself has entered, and indeed in such a way that the Evangelist can quite directly say: “he became flesh” 3. But as regards finally John 3 6 (τὸ

1 Cf. v. Soden on Eph. 6:12: “There is no moral determination inherent in the expression.”

2 The choice of the expression *thelēma* with *sarx* (as with *andros*) instead of the *epithymia* fixed for the ethical consideration of the flesh (Gal. 5:16, 24; Rom. 13:14; Eph. 2:3; 1 Pet. 2:11; 2 Pet. 2:10, 18; 1 John 2:16) is to be carefully noted (cf. also 1 Pet. 4:2; 1 John 2:17). The *thelēmata tēs sarkos* parallel to *epithymiai tēs sarkos* in Eph. 2:3 stand entirely isolated (plural of *thelēma* in the NT otherwise only Acts 13:22 — of God; quotation).

3 Cf. above p. 100 f.: “There is no longer any question here of our no longer knowing Christ according to the flesh; the Christ in the flesh indeed moves toward his exaltation, but as such he is already in this personal appearance the divine being—.” Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age*² p. 534.

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γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμα ἐστιν), in the first place the context is all the more to be taken into account the less it immediately strikes the eye. At first glance the wording of the instruction that Jesus gives to Nicodemus from v. 3 onward allows the logical relation of this instruction to its occasion, the address of the latter to Jesus, to appear doubtful (hence the widely divergent explanations). One arrives at the correct understanding only when one has recognized that the exposition of Jesus beginning in v. 3 is an answer to the question discerned in the Pharisaic ἄρχων τῶν Ἰουδαίων (cf. 2 25 and the intentional ἦν δὲ ἄνθρωπος 3 1): "What has one of us (note the plural οἴδαμεν) to do in order to inherit eternal life?" If the course of Christ's exposition itself already points in this direction (v. 15. 16), the unmistakable formal and material reference of the Nicodemus narrative to Luc. 18 18 ff. leads still more decisively to it 1. The figure of the Pharisaic ἄρχων and διδάσκαλος of the Jews in John 3 1. 10 forms the counterpart to the ἄρχων of Luc. 18 18 (cf. 14 1: ἀρχόντων τῶν Φαρισαίων); the emphatic recognition of the divine sending of Jesus as a διδάσκαλος with which Nicodemus introduces himself corresponds to the captatio benevolentiae in the address διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ of the Lucan passage 2. Here as there it is a matter of an illumination of the difficulty of entering into the kingdom of God that surpasses human power

1 That this passage forms the Vorlage, not the parallel passages Mark 10:17 ff.; Matt. 19:16 ff., is easy to show. Cf. on the "pervasive influence which the Gospel of Luke has exercised on the Gospel of John" Jacobsen, *Investigations on the Gospel of John* 1884, p. 49 ff.

2 The unambiguous testimony of Jesus to his supra-earthly nature and origin in John 3 (cf. 1:46) offers a counterweight to the — for the conception of the fourth Evangelist at any rate only apparent — depreciation in Luke 18:10; Mark 10:18 (cf. already the modification in Matt. 19:17). The saying was particularly noticed and exploited also in gnostic circles (Valentinus in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* II, 20, 114; the Naassenes in Hippol. *Phil.* 5, 7; Tatian — cf. Hilgenfeld, *History of Heresy of Early Christianity* pp. 296, 254).

(whether inward or outward) (John 3 3. 5. Luc. 18 24—27) 1; and over against Jesus' reference to the necessity of γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν for Nicodemus stands in Luc. 18 17 (thus immediately preceding the synoptic passage in question) the assurance: ὃς ἂν μὴ δέξηται τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς παιδίον, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς αὐτήν 2. Nicodemus is clearly characterized as the pious and strictly legal (7 50) scribe who earnestly desires to see the hoped-for kingdom of God, the salvation of the perfected divine rule, and who from the signs with which Jesus confirms his teaching perceives that that reordering of things has drawn near. Accordingly, as the fundamental thought of Jesus' discussion with Nicodemus there results the following information 3. The appropriation of the good in question takes place only by way of an essential transformation of the human being: he must be born into the kingdom of God as into a new world 4; there must occur with him a (ἄνωθεν) γεννηθῆναι. As certain as this renewed "birth" is conditioned by faith in the Logos-Christ as reconciler and redeemer (corresponding to the synoptic μετανοεῖν and πιστεύειν Mark 1 15), that is, by that receptive (John 1 12) and

self-surrendering attitude by which those who are from God (from the truth) are recognized (8 47. 18 37) 5, just as certainly can it not

1 The reading *basileian tōn ouranōn* John 3:6 (on which cf. Th. Zahn, *History of the NT Canon* I 524 f.; Bousset, *Gospel Citations of Justin* p. 116 f.; Nestle, *Introduction to the Greek NT*² p. 235 f.) is not recommended by the literary context with the Lukan passage.

2 Likewise Mark 10:15, whereas Matthew places the Lord's saying in another context and thereby gives it a different turn (18:3).

3 We may here confine ourselves to the first part (vv. 2–12). On the relation to the second see above p. 7.

4 In place of the purely ideal sense of the synoptic image (*hōs paidion*) there enters a real one, and to the subjective moment an objective one.

5 These are not as such already *tekna Theou* (see above pp. 94 f., 99), nor are they to be identified with those who, according to the Epistle writer, are *ek tou Theou* (1 John 3:10; 4:4; 5:19 — against Holtzmann, who simply conflates Gospel and Epistle: *New Testament Theology* II 469 f.).

consist in this disposition brought by the salvation-desiring natural human being, of which possibly even a Nicodemus may still prove capable. It comes about only ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, in other words through the reception, bound to the sacramental mystery of Christian baptism, of a twofold salvific good: the forgiveness of sins and the Holy Spirit 1, — thus is a rebirth from above (ἄνωθεν cf. ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ in the in itself general thought 3 27) 2. But in that the begetting Spirit from above becomes not merely for the moral being of the human but for his entire being a new principle of life, it lays in the human the ground of a development for which his σάρξ, his earthly natural determination, does not enable him (οὐ δύναται), by which rather he is lifted beyond the ban of the latter and placed under the perfect law of life of the higher world. If now in this context an ethical determination, a moral incapacity, enters in with the σάρξ, it is nevertheless clear that the pneumatic and therefore perfect salvific good indicated by Christ must above all be thought metaphysically as the opposite of the flesh,

1 That the emphasis lies on *pneumatos* should already be shown by vv. 6–8. The reference to the requirement of the sacramental baptismal rite remains fully valid (— it may be asked whether with Nicodemus the reception of John's baptism is not presupposed), but the salvific value in question is granted only to that baptism which, in connection with the forgiveness of sins, mediates the reception of the Spirit from above. The comparison with Tit. 3:5, where the bath of baptism (bringing about the "cleansing from defilement of guilt") is directly designated as *loutron palingenesias*, but this latter is immediately explained as *anakainōsis pneumatos hagiou*, presses itself upon us (cf. also Eph. 5:26). If the standpoint of *katharismos* effected in baptism does not come to the fore, this is connected with a well-known characteristic basic trait of the fourth Gospel

(which does not speak of *metanoia*, and only once explicitly of *aphesis hamartiōn*). That the mentioned conception is a familiar and self-evident presupposition for the Evangelist is shown, following upon the Nicodemus narrative, by 3:26 (cf. also the indirect reference at the foot-washing 13:10); the *oun* sufficiently indicates that the *katharismos* in question refers to both baptisms.

2 Cf. also Wrede, *The Messianic Secret in the Gospels* 1901, p. 198 f.

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if the answer given to Nicodemus, in response to his desire for eternal life in the physical sense of later Jewish eschatological hope, is to be an apt one. This again shows that the concept of σάρξ in the fourth Evangelist is in principle a metaphysical one. Precisely from this, however, it is now explained that the flesh, by this Evangelist, in contrast to Paul, despite its inadequacy, despite its specific opposition to the spirit, finds a positive valuation christologically and soteriologically. The flesh of Christ, in the quality it has as an integrating constituent of his human nature, is at the same time — for the eye of the believer — the transparent covering of his divine spiritual being, the positive earthly means of the revelation of his glory (see above p. 100 f.), after the exaltation of Christ as a consequence of the revivification and transfiguration of his body (see above p. 75) standing indirectly still in relation to the pneumatic salvific effect of the mystery of the Lord's Supper (see above p. 290) 1.

So close, then, as the conception of the fourth Evangelist hereupon comes to touch that of Paul, so it nevertheless emerges at the same time from what has been said that it was only from the presuppositions of the Evangelist that it was possible to take the thought of incarnation seriously, as is the case in the confession of faith: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. In doing so, however, it is still especially to be noted that with the Evangelist it is a divine being (θεός) that incarnates itself, and that with this one goes beyond not merely the theological basic conceptions of Paul, but beyond the boundary of what is in general attainable starting from the common concept of God of Old- and New-Testament revelation.

1 It should be recalled in particular how Luke 24:39 uses *sarx* (*sarkes?*) to designate a spirit-bodily reality. It is interesting how the Gnosticism of the *Book of the Sophia of Jesus Christ* (with unmistakable reference to Luke 24 and John 20, also John 14:27) has the Risen One appear to his own in Galilee "not in his former form, but in the invisible Spirit — and he did not have flesh upon him that dies, but pure, perfect flesh" (Schmidt, *A pre-Irenaean gnostic original work in the Coptic language*, in *Proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences* 1896, p. 841). Evidently light is assumed as the substance of that "flesh."

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What is involved in this incarnation, more precisely stated, is the abiding essential union of an inner-divine personal being called θεός, yet absolutely distinguished from God as such (ὁ θεός), thus in any case a θεός in the full sense (not a somehow conceived intermediate being), with a

real, naturally originated, human individual (in the manner discussed). With this, however, we obtain a conception which, in the history of religions, does not stand isolated, but has its antecedents, albeit on an elementary level (s. 0. S. 74). The history of religions understands by incarnation, in a generalizing sense, the enduring, immediate, and complete union of the person of the deity with an earthly living being, in particular a human being, and likewise conceives this union in such a way that the consciousness of the latter is absorbed into the consciousness of the former. We do indeed not find the idea of incarnation in this form and at this level of development within the religious world of thought of the classical peoples and of the neighboring Orient, as it seems. One easily recognizes that in the comparable cases here a substantial element is always lacking. Either a god descends, but the human being in which he presents himself is only a temporary semblance 1; or the appearance of the deity is a real human being, but what has descended into the human is not a personal divine being, but a power that has proceeded from the deity, which perhaps moreover only temporarily

> **1** Narratives such as that of the visit of Jupiter and Mercury to the Phrygian couple Philemon and Baucis (Ovid, *Metam.* 8, 620 ff.) ultimately amount to this. If the former allow themselves to be entertained like human wanderers, there is as little presupposed here an entering into a real, bodily human person as in the Old Testament theophany Gen. 18:8. For parallels from Germanic and other mythology cf. Simrock, *Handbook of German Mythology*[3] p. 202. Related to the mentioned Asia-Minor myth is the motif reported in Acts 14:11–12 (cf. 28:6), where, through religious superstition, real human beings begin to be transformed into revelatory apparitions.

indwells the human 1. The former case corresponds more to the religious, the latter to the philosophical mode of representation. A third gradation likewise assumes, even with the descent of a (according to circumstances personified) divine power, a docetic form of revelation 2. Different is the situation with the incarnation-conception

> **1** Here lie above all the presuppositions of the deification of living human beings widespread especially in later Roman times, insofar as it was not of a purely philosophical, pantheistic nature (arising from Platonic or Stoic or Cynic basic conceptions): the *theopoiēsis* of rulers, teachers, and others (see numerous examples in Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*[31] p. 115). While such deifications by no means endangered that pagan monotheism “which had developed out of syncretism and philosophy and had not yet disavowed its origin in polytheism,” they constituted a peculiar temptation for Christianity as it struggled upward beyond paganism — a temptation by which criticism was provoked just as much on the pagan as on the Christian side (cf. Harnack, loc. cit.). It is noteworthy what a role among the Gnostics was played not only by the deification of others (the heads of schools), but also by self-deification. On closer inspection, the conception here too does not rise above the indicated level, and there can be no talk of an incarnation in the stated sense. With Simon Magus, the divine element that is supposed to have descended into him (*descendit*, *katabebēken*) is, strictly considered, only an efflux of power from the deity:

according to Acts 8:10 “the great power of God” (in distinction from the deity as such; cf. the expressly drawn distinction between God and the power of God in Aristobulus, above p. 160); according to later reports, the *sublimissima virtus*, the primal father (*supra omnia pater*), who finds his complement in the primal mother Ennoia dwelling in Helena — in analogy with the sexual dualism of Semitic religion (cf. Hilgenfeld, *History of Heresy* pp. 173, 175; Moeller, *Church History*² I 145). The union of the divine and the human essence, however, is not conceived as natural or proper, but docetically (the divine essence in Simon had previously also appeared in Jesus, but had suffered only apparently — *dokēsei monon*). Something similar may be the case when Simon’s pupil Menander presented himself as the envoy (*missus*) in whom the in-itself invisible and unknowable primal being, the *prima virtus*, revealed itself (Iren. *haer.* I, 23, 5). As expressly only temporary, not lifelong, appears the union of the Christ who descended from the *principalitas, quae est super universa*, appearing in the form of a dove, with Jesus the son of Joseph and Mary in Cerinthus (Iren. *haer.* I, 26, 1; cf. concerning the related Ebionites Hilgenfeld, loc. cit. p. 429).

2 Not merely the union with the higher principle, but the very essence of the human body itself becomes a mere appearance for a number of representatives of gnostic Christology. Thus with Saturninus: the Christ sent down as redeemer by the primal father assumes only the appearance of a human body (Iren. *haer.* I, 24, 2). The same holds for the Christ in the form of Jesus, whom, according to Basilides as reported by Irenaeus, the unnameable Father sent down as his first-born *Nous* (a “*virtus incorporalis*”): the body in question is absolutely mutable (adv. *haer.* I, 24, 4). According to Marcion, the *spiritus salutaris* sent by the perfect God comes into the world unborn, without assuming flesh, had only a *putativa corpulentia*, and therefore did not suffer in the crucifixion (Tertull. *adv. Marcion.* 3, 11; likewise Hippol. *phil.* 7, 31). The “Gnostics” of Irenaeus teach that the Christ sent down from the primal man (the highest being) united himself with his sister Sophia, who was to be redeemed, in the fatherlessly generated Jesus prepared by the latter as a pure vessel, and ascended with her into the aeon before the crucifixion of Jesus (Iren. *haer.* I, 30). In contrast, the Naassenes seem, proceeding from a pantheistic basis, to symbolize with the descent of the “Son of Man” revealed in the son of Mary, and with the redemption of souls effected through him, nothing but an absolutely universal law of human development (cf. Hippol. *phil.* 5, 6–11; 10, 9; Hilgenfeld, loc. cit. p. 261 f.). With Valentinus the more precise relation of Christ to Jesus cannot be determined.

as it confronts us on the ground of Indo-Aryan religion at the stage of development of Hinduism, when here there is talk of the Avatāras (the repeated descent) of the god Vishnu. A closer illumination of this seemingly remote and therefore theologically neglected material from the history of religions is indispensable for our purpose. One must, in order to understand that mythologem, first bring clearly to mind that the original Vedic Vishnu is a personification of the battling sunlight 1, a numen active chiefly in the service of the “slayer of the serpent” Indra (hence later also called Upendra), whose most wondrous and outstanding achievement is seen

in the fact that it has measured, or ever anew measures, the world (earth, atmosphere, and heaven) in its full expanse with three strides, and thereby, precisely by this means, creates for human beings

1 A more detailed demonstration, to which the presentation by Oldenberg (*The Religion of the Veda* 1894, pp. 227–230) gives occasion, cannot be entered upon here. Reference may, however, be made to Macdonell's prudent discussion (*Vedic Mythology* in Bühler's *Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie* 1897, p. 37 ff.).

a far-reaching dwelling place on earth and for the pious ("the generous") a place of abode beyond the realm of air, where they enjoy eternal joys in fellowship with the gods 1. It is possible — and the conjecture almost presses itself — that his movement from heaven down to earth was already in earliest times, perhaps among tribes that "were less involved in the creation of the Rigveda hymns" 2, designated as his avatāra. The significance of incarnation and becoming-human, however, this word certainly received only after Vishnu had been elevated to the highest god and as such had assumed the character of Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa is originally a formation of the theosophy of Brahmanism. The name is a derivation from *nara* (human being, man, ἀνήρ) and signifies something like: the human-like, human-resembling 3; according to all indications it initially served, like the Vedic name *Purusha* (i.e. human), to designate the world, the universe, as the highest being, the Absolute, in that the macrocosm was viewed by analogy with the microcosm 4. While,

1 Cf. Oldenberg, loc. cit. pp. 229, 227.

2 Cf. on this v. Schroeder, *India's Literature and Culture in Historical Development* 1887, p. 325.

3 Roth (in the Petersburg Sanskrit Dictionary) translates *Nārāyaṇa*, unmistakably with a shrewd allusion to the biblical parallels (כבר אנש; υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), as "the Son of Man." The word has the form of a patronymic (names with the affix *ayana* appear only in the latest parts of Brahmanical literature; cf. Weber, *History of Indian Literature*² p. 58).

4 How imagination even with this "primal man," from whom the entire world develops, retains the conception of bodily organism is shown by the famous Purusha hymn Rig-Veda X, 90. The description reveals that the Purusha is fundamentally conceived as the principle of the world lying beyond space and time, or as the primal substance from which the components and beings of the world have been formed. Of particular interest, however, is that already here (v. 0) the "primal man" appears more precisely as doubled: from the Purusha as the primal being as such (vv. 1–4) the Purusha as the one generated (from this and the primal matter), the first-created of the all-creating one, is distinguished — the latter also being designated in relation to the world as the firstborn (*prōtotokos pasēs ktiseōs*) (cf. Vajasaneyi-Samhita 31:17–22; 32:1–12 [Taittiriya-Āraṇyaka 3, 13; 10, 1, 2–4]; Deussen, *General History of Philosophy* I, 1, pp.

153 f., 289 ff.). The interpretation of *Nārāyaṇa* as the derived primal man mediating the Absolute and the empirical world could not fail to arise (cf. Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad 11 and Deussen, *Sixty Upanishads of the Veda* 1897, p. 249 ff.). The primal man is preferably envisioned as embodied in the sun. The creation legends of the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa then make the Purusha in various ways into the creator god (Prajāpati): VI, 1, 1, 1 ff.; X, 2, 2, 1; XI, 1, 6, 2. Already the mentioned Brāhmaṇa also speaks of the “Purusha Nārāyaṇa” (XII, 3, 4, 1; XIII, 6, 1, 1).

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however, the subsequently explicable identification of Nārāyaṇa with the non-popular world-creator Brahmā 1 remained without significance in the history of religions, the former was brought all the more effectively into parallel with Vishnu by the combination with the celebrated hero of the epic, Krishna, who originally seems to have been, similarly to Vishnu, a battling and victorious deity of light 2, the more so as the latter himself had meanwhile been identified with several popular gods and had become the favorite deity of a number of the most significant tribes of the Ganges region 3. In all probability the elevation of the Vishnu–Nārāyaṇa that emerged from this development to the dignity of a highest deity, to the great god alongside the unpopular Brahmā, took place in the first centuries after the death of Buddha 4. The conjecture

1 Thus already in the younger, second part of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* and in the oldest Buddhist texts; cf. Weber, loc. cit. p. 183 f.; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*[12] p. 918; v. Schroeder, loc. cit. p. 327. In *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* XI, 2, 3, 1; XIII, 7, 1, 1, the neuter *Brahman*, *Brahmā svayambhū*, corresponds at first exactly to *Purusha Nārāyaṇa* XIII, 6, 1, 1. Cf. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts* IV² p. 29; Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* I, 1, p. 259 ff. Further: Manu I, 6. 9. 10 f.; *Harivaṃśa* v. 35 ff., and others.

2 What prompted this combination cannot be shown here. The question would merit a more exact investigation. Krishna (properly “the black, the dark”) cannot of course have meant a demonic being of darkness (night, obscuration), but from the beginning only a divine being of light, which in characteristic fashion undergoes darkening and triumphs over it.

3 For further details on this interesting piece of the history of religions see v. Schroeder, loc. cit. pp. 323–327.

4 Cf. Lassen, loc. cit. I² p. 920; v. Schroeder p. 329. In the oldest Buddhist sūtras Vishnu’s name is not mentioned (Lassen p. 918). Concerning the position of the Upanishads cf. Weber, loc. cit. p. 184; Deussen, *Sixty Upanishads* pp. 250–252, 334, 609, 743, 747–749, 824 ff.

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therefore has grounds that this history-of-religions process did not stand outside of connection with the Buddhist movement itself, as well as with the other religious and religio-philosophical phenomena of precisely that time 1. To the mutually contending philosophical systems of

Vedānta (monism) on the one hand, of Sāṃkhya and Yoga (dualism) on the other, there had been added the popular philosophy of Buddha, related to Sāṃkhya. The naïve belief in the ancient world of gods had vanished; the fresh, joyful courage of life had given way to the brooding of the sharpened intellect and, in broad strata, to a feeling of world-weary despondency; the specter of transmigration of souls dominated minds; the great question of the day in the religious life of the people had become redemption (*mukti, moksha, apavarga*). The question of means and path to this redemption, however, was answered differently. Like philosophy, so Buddhism had diverted hope away from the gaze toward a divine beyond, toward help from above 2, and had placed the principle of redemption in the human being: this one must redeem himself (through knowledge of the highest truth — "*jnānān mokshas*"); the goal is attained when, as a consequence of inner mortification, consciousness and individual existence have come to an end 3. Along this path, however, the religion attached to life could not follow. To its need of belief only the power and redemptive deed of a god could correspond; and this god, moreover, had to be the highest being itself for the attained higher stage

1 Cf. v. Schroeder, loc. cit. p. 330.

2 The gods themselves are still subject to metempsychosis, are involved in *saṃsāra* (cf. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhyaphilosophie* 1894, p. 135; idem, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, loc. cit. pp. 11, 16 f.; Oldenberg, *Buddha* 1881, p. 331).

3 Cf. on the Vedānta Deussen, *Das System des Vedānta* 1883, pp. 489, 513; on Sāṃkhya Garbe, *Sāṃkhyaphilosophie* pp. 131–149 and *Sāṃkhya und Yoga* pp. 10–13, 32; on Buddhism Oldenberg, *Buddha* pp. 320 ff., 331; interesting and instructive is the theistic attempt at accommodation of the Yoga doctrine; see Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, loc. cit. p. 50.

of religious consciousness. Here it was precisely the belief in Vishnu–Nārāyaṇa that seemed to offer the fully sufficient solution of the task. For it not only assured the benevolent readiness to help of the Almighty 1, but at the same time also made possible the synthesis of a divine-human work of redemption, in that it conceived the descent of the "far-striding" (*uragāya*) god as incarnation and specifically as becoming-human, and indeed in the sense indicated above. "C'est moins par lui-même, says aptly Barth, qu'il intervient dans les affaires du monde et qu'il recueille les hommages des hommes, que par l'intermédiaire de ses incarnations. — C'est la théorie des Avatāras ou des 'Descentes', qui non seulement est caractéristique du vishnouisme, mais qui marque une phase nouvelle et nettement accusée dans le développement religieux de l'Inde. — Elle répondait par son élasticité et par son côté mystérieux à tous les instincts de ce peuple à la fois très sensuel, très superstitieux et très spéculatif, également avide de théosophie raffinée et de représentations grossières et qui n'a jamais su ni se contenter d'un seul Dieu, ni se résigner à en adorer plusieurs. Un Avatāra au sens le plus élevé et le plus complet (car ils n'ont pas tous la même valeur) n'est pas une apparition passagère de la divinité, encore moins la procréation par l'union d'un dieu et d'une mortelle d'un être en quelque sorte intermédiaire; c'est la présence mystique et en même temps réelle de

1 Already the Veda praises Vishnu's "benevolence coming to the good of all men" (*sumatim viśvajanyam*) (Rig-Veda VII, 100, 2). Remarkable also is the peculiar manner in which not only Vishnu (already in the prose sections of the Black Yajur-Veda) is stereotypically represented as the personified sacrifice ("*yajño vai Viṣṇuḥ*"; cf. Schroeder, loc. cit. p. 325 f.; Macdonell, loc. cit. p. 40; Muir, loc. cit. IV², 121 ff.), but also Nārāyaṇa is regarded as the one who gave himself as sacrifice in order to create the world (Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays* I, pp. 10, 61; Lassen, loc. cit. I² p. 918); to be compared further with the sacrifice of the Purusha as an image of the origin of the world in Rig-Veda X, 90, 6–10.15 f., and the self-sacrifice of Viśvakarman (Muir pp. 6–9).

l'Être suprême dans un individu humain, qui est à la fois vraiment dieu et vraiment homme, et cette union intime des deux natures est conçue comme survivant à la mort de l'individu en qui elle s'est réalisée. Bref, c'est un mystère, dans la contemplation duquel les esprits spéculatifs pourront s'abîmer à leur aise, tandis que le vulgaire se contentera d'y trouver les satisfactions commodes qu'offrent l'anthropomorphisme ou même le zoomorphisme unis à l'idolâtrie la plus grossière" 1. That in the becoming-human of Vishnu an essentially ethical purpose is involved — preservation and promotion of the welfare of human society through moral redemption — is attested in a famous passage of the *Bhagavadgītā*: "Again and again, whenever slackening of virtue sets in and injustice rises up, I create myself. For the protection of the good and for the destruction of the evildoers, with the purpose of re-establishing virtue, I come into being in one age after another" 2. If now, where the human organ of the avatāra-revelation was in question, one primarily had recourse to the son of Vasudeva and Devakī, Krishna, thus to that radiant figure of heroic legend, this is all the more understandable inasmuch as an ideal human being of the present or nearer historical past, like Buddha, was not to be found. On the other hand, it is self-evident that the now-assumed complete unity of the human and the divine consciousness in the person of the god-man Vishnu—Krishna 3 had to result in the displacement of the traits of the old rational hero by those of the perfected hero of virtue, religious thinker, and

1 Les religions de l'Inde 1879. p. 101 f.

[Added by Neil: "It is less by himself, says Barth aptly, that he intervenes in the affairs of the world and receives the homage of human beings than through the intermediary of his incarnations. — It is the theory of the Avatāras or of the 'Descents', which is not only characteristic of Vishnuism, but which marks a new and clearly accentuated phase in the religious development of India. — By its elasticity and by its mysterious aspect it responded to all the instincts of this people, at once very sensual, very superstitious, and very speculative, equally eager for refined theosophy and for coarse representations, and which has never known either how to content itself with a single God or how to resign itself to worshipping several. An Avatāra in the highest and most complete sense (for they have not all had the same value) is not a passing appearance of the divinity, still less the procreation, through the union of a god and a mortal woman, of a being in some sense intermediary; it is the mystical and at the same time real

presence of the Supreme Being in a human individual, who is at once truly god and truly man, and this intimate union of the two natures is conceived as surviving the death of the individual in whom it was realized. In short, it is a mystery, in the contemplation of which speculative minds may lose themselves at leisure, while the common people will be content to find in it the convenient satisfactions offered by anthropomorphism or even by zoomorphism united with the grossest idolatry."]

2 4, 7. 8. Cf. v. Schroeder, loc. cit. p. 331. It is clear that the many, or rather innumerable, avatāras of the god form the counterpart to the innumerable Buddha births. Cf. moreover on the latter Oldenberg pp. 330–335.

3 Krishna(-Vishnu), the highest being, must not be regarded as a mere human being; whoever does so is foolish, standing on the lowest level of humanity, frightfully darkened (*Mahābhārata* VI, 2985 ff.).

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sage 1. More closely connected with the becoming-human of Vishnu in Krishna is only the analogous one in Rāma, the hero of the southern epic 2, who is here likewise idealized in the highest degree ethically and religiously 3.

The result of our investigation is that the undeniable formal similarity between the Indian Avatāra-conception and the incarnation idea of the fourth Evangelist becomes all the more noteworthy through the fact that on both sides the "Son of Man," and indeed as the proper, original divine being 4, is drawn in. This state of affairs deserves all the more attention inasmuch as the basic conception of the Indian theologoumenon, the human-likeness of the highest being, is also shared by Gnosticism among many representatives and in manifold forms, although here the acceptance of the incarnation idea was obstructed by dualism 5. According to the Barbelo-gnosis the final member of the inner-divine development (of the world of light) is the "perfect and true Man," Adamas

1 The incarnation of Vishnu-Krishna aimed at the restoration of justice, the destruction of demons, the preservation of the world (*Mahābhārata* VI, 2964 f.).

2 Cf. Barth, loc. cit. p. 103, and concerning the probably later age of the legend of the incarnation in Rāma p. 105. With regard to the multiplication of Vishnu's avatāras and the transition to embodiment in lower beings cf. Barth p. 102; v. Schroeder, loc. cit. p. 337 ff.; Macdonell, loc. cit. p. 41. No less worthy of attention is the restriction of incarnation in the human being itself through the later conception of the "partial descent" of the deity (*aṃśāvatāra*); cf. Muir, loc. cit. IV², 253 ff., 282 (*aṃśāvataraṇa* is the name of a section of Book I of the *Mahābhārata*; cf. Lassen, loc. cit. p. 587, 831): here the avatāra clearly passes over into a merely dynamic indwelling of the higher being; alongside this, the transfer of incarnation from the originally one god to an indeterminately many takes place.

3 Cf. especially the later section *Rāmāyaṇa* VI, 119, 1 ff. (Muir IV², 178 ff.) and v. Schroeder pp. 337, 455; on the process of transformation of the two heroes in the two epics Lassen, loc. cit. I² pp. 585 f.

4 See above p. 73 ff.

5 The Pauline *ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος* and Philo's Logos as *ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος* and *ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ* (*conf. lingu.* 28 and 11; cf. *ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος somn.* I 37) are not to be considered here, since they are intermediary beings (see above). Concerning in particular the "Son of Man" of the Gnostics, cf. also the discussions of Lietzmann (*Der Menschensohn* pp. 62–68).

possessor of invincible power and perfect knowledge) 1. Among the "Gnostics" of Irenaeus the primordial father himself (the *primum lumen*) is called the primordial Man (*primus homo*), and the thought emanated from him (ἔννοια): the "Son of Man" or the *secundus homo* 2. The Naassenes also, whose party developed in Phrygia, call the highest being itself the Ἄνθρωπος, more precisely the Προών (sc. Ἄνθρωπος), as well as the ἄνωθεν ἄνθρωπος or ἀρχάνθρωπος. Although now this absolute primordial Man is expressly regarded as an undifferentiated unity (ἀχαρακτήριστος), the principle of differentiation is nevertheless already posited within his idea (so that one can speak of a kind of Trinity). How little, however, one is to think here of hypostases is shown by the circumstance that one and the same primordial being (πρώτη τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή) is called Man and Son of Man 3. Valentinus also speaks of the προών Ἄνθρωπος as the divine archetype of humanity (at the creation of man) 4, and his school at least in part held fast to the view that the primordial Man is the highest being itself: *Alii autem sunt, qui ipsum Propatorem omnium et Proarchen et Proanennoeton Ἄνθρωπον λέγουσι καλεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόκρυφον μυστήριον, ὅτι ἡ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὅλα δύναμις καὶ ἐμπεριεκτικὴ τῶν πάντων*

1 In the presentation of the *Evangelium Mariae* the primal being itself is already the *Πρωτάνθρωπος* (cf. Schmidt, *Ein vorirenäisches gnostisches Originalwerk in koptischer Sprache* in *Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 1896, pp. 843 f.). Cf. the "Man of Light" Adamas of a related, later form of this Gnosis (idem in *Texte und Untersuchungen* VIII, pp. 299, 309 ff., 658).

2 Both are, through the further emanation, the Holy Spirit (the "first woman"), begetters of the third, male-conceived divine-human being: the Christ, who is then sent down into the world of sense and becomes the supreme organ of redemption (cf. above p. 193). As with these "Gnostics" the Son of Man is the *Ennoia*, so the *Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad* designates Nārāyaṇa as the supreme thinker (*dhyātṛ* 114); see Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishaden* p. 251. Lietzmann is of the opinion that the "second man" among the Ophites could have received the indicated meaning only if it had already previously become a designation of the Messiah. That this assumption is not necessary will become clear from what follows.

3 Hippol. *Phil.* 10, 9. Cf. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergeschichte* p. 253 f.

4 Clem. Alex. *Strom.* II, 8, 3e.

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Ἄνθρωπος καλεῖται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο υἱὸν Ἀνθρώπου ἑαυτόν λέγειν τὸν Σωτῆρα 1.

Willingly or unwillingly, historical consideration, in view of these facts, finds itself confronted with the question whether between the New-Testamentally wholly unique 2 idea of the

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 12, 4. The account of Valentin's system in Irenaeus (*haer.* I, 11, 4) places *Ἄνθρωπος* among the begotten Aeons, at the end of the highest Ogdoad; whereas according to other testimonies of the Valentinian school it belongs to the third or the second syzygy (Hilgenfeld pp. 307, 310, 294). — The Gnosis related to the Naassenes, that of the Arab Monoimos, likewise represents the deity (the principle of the All) as Man (unbegotten and imperishable), and insofar as it reveals itself, as the Son of Man; "the Son of Man stands in relation to the Father as light to fire, the one is posited with the other" (cf. Jacobi in *Pr. REncl.*² V, p. 239). On the *υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* of the heresy mentioned by Origen, *c. Cels.* 8, 15, see Lietzmann, loc. cit. pp. 67 f. — Even in the Kabbalah the ten attributes (*Sephiroth*), in which the absolute deity unfolds its essence, "as it were the ideal form of the deity, in which it reveals itself according to Ezek. 1, 20; Dan. 7, 13, whereby, however, there is absolutely no thought of an anthropomorphic theophany in the vulgar Old Testament sense," are brought together under the name of the primal man (*אָדָם קַדְמוֹן*) (Reuss in *Pr. REncl.*² VII, pp. 381 f.). But if Job 15, 7.8 "clearly gives the conception of a primal man (similar to the Manu of the Indians), to whom as such the highest wisdom also belongs, a being who already existed before the creation of the solid parts of the earth, as it were listened in at God's council of creation and thus at least came into partial possession of world-creating wisdom, without however identifying it with the divine *ḥokmā*—remarkable enough in the Old Testament" (Dillmann ad loc.), then at most a kind of intermediary being is in question here; every more definite point of reference is lacking. If, on the other hand, Rev. 1, 13.17 the "one like a son of man" presents himself as "the First and the Last" (cf. 22, 13), then although the allusion to Dan. 7, 13 is not doubtful (cf. 14, 11), the designation *πρῶτος καὶ ἔσχατος*, repeating the Deutero-Isaianic self-designation of Yahweh (Isa. 41, 4; 44, 6; 48, 12), may, in view of Rev. 1, 8; 21, 6, speak for the fact that this "one like a son of man" is no longer a highest created hypostasis, an intermediary being, like the one in Dan. 7—according to which the explanation of 3, 14 will have to be oriented; even here the means for a sharper determination are lacking (cf. moreover Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I, pp. 469–471).

2 The Old Testament likewise transfers only the conception of human appearance to the appearance of God, but not the concept of man to the essence of God (cf. Num. 23, 19; 1 Sam. 25, 19; Hos. 11, 9; Isa. 31, 3; Job 33, 12).

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Son-of-Man in the fourth Evangelist and the corresponding Indian idea on the one hand, the Gnostic on the other, likewise between the incarnation idea of the Evangelist and that of Indian religion, a positive connection of any kind whatsoever, even if only of the most external sort, is possibly to be assumed. In this regard it is first to be emphasized that the Indian Avatāra-dogma is demonstrably already present nearly half a millennium before the transitional period from the first to the second century after Christ 1. Alongside this it deserves mention that, on the part of more recent Indology, a deeper influence of Sāṃkhya philosophy upon Gnosticism (as upon Neoplatonism) is asserted with noteworthy reasons 2. If analogously the possibility of a certain acquaintance of the Evangelist with the Indian religious ideas in question is in itself by no means excluded 3, then, should this be the case, it would nevertheless have to be assumed that the same stood in close connection with his general knowledge of the Oriental elements of thought that influenced the religious movement of his time—in Gnostic speculation and alongside it. Precisely that discussion which contains the fundamental passage for the statements concerning the “Son of

1 The opinion expressed by Weber (*Indische Studien* II, p. 169), that “the entire avatāra system arose from an imitation of the Christian dogma of the descent of God,” is already contradicted by the fact that the veneration of Vishnu as Krishna is attested by Megasthenes ca. 300 B.C. (Lassen, loc. cit. I² 921; II¹ 464, 1107; von Schroeder pp. 331, 361 f.); Panini III, 3, 120 need not be taken into account (Weber, loc. cit. II, p. 41). Cf. also Hopkins (*The Religions of India* 1898, p. 430 f.): “The doctrine of the incarnation is thoroughly Indic. It is Buddhistic as well as Brahmanic, and precedes Vishnuism as it does Christianity.” The recourse to totemism (ibid.) is a misconception (see also Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India* 1896, II, p. 156).

2 Cf. the exposition referring to Ferd. Chr. Baur (*Die christliche Gnosis* 1835) by Lassen (III, pp. 380–387), and especially Garbe, *Samkhyaphilosophie* pp. 96–99; *Sämkhya und Yoga* pp. 4 f., 40; *Philosophy of Ancient India* 1897, p. 46 f.

3 Incidentally, attention may also be drawn to Bousset’s remarks on Seydel, *Die Buddhalegende und das Leben Jesu*² 1897, in *Theologische Rundschau* 1899, pp. 75 f.

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Man” (see above p. 46 f.) points to this clearly enough. The emphasis on the typical relation between the serpent (ὄφις) raised by Moses in the wilderness and the Son of Man to be raised through death, already at the first introduction of Jesus under this name (3 13.14), recalls far too strongly the outstanding significance which the serpent attained in Gnosticism in general, and indeed evidently not only in those Ophitic systems of which we possess a somewhat more detailed knowledge 1, not to create the impression that the Evangelist wishes to set the salvation-historically true Son of Man over against the fantastical “Ophis–Son-of-Man” of gnostic-mysterious superstition 2. However that may be, from a contact of the theological thinking of the Evangelist with foreign circles of thought or from a merely polemical interest

alone there will by no means be gained a real explanation of the idea of the incarnation of the Logos peculiar to the fourth Gospel and of the inseparable, equally peculiar idea of the Son of Man 3. The most important requirement for understanding is and remains insight into the essential connection of those ideas with the concept of life that is fundamental for this Gospel. Proceeding from this, the advance from synoptic and

1 "In my opinion, an attentive study of Gnosticism teaches that it had its original home in Syria–Samaria and came to appearance in the so-called Ophitic sects." Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache aus dem Codex Brucianus* 1892, p. 566.

2 Cf. especially the presentation in the Naassene doctrine (Hilgenfeld p. 256). The Peratae made the Son, standing between the Father and the Hyle, the Logos of John 1, into the true Ophis (Hilgenfeld pp. 264 f.).

3 Cheyne's word may apply here as well: *We ought never to assume that ideas of an advanced religion have been altogether borrowed, until we have done our best to discover any germs of them in the native religious literature* (*Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter* p. 269).

Pauline Christology to the incarnation idea of our Gospel presents itself as follows. As has been shown above (pp. 69, 72 f., 337 ff.), the Evangelist retains from the Pauline conception the personal union of the higher being with the man Jesus (in contrast to the dynamic one in the synoptic Christ); from the synoptic, the only secondarily human-like character of the higher being (in contrast to the Pauline primordial Man); but in place of the Pauline as well as the synoptic intermediate being he sets the proper divine being itself (θεός). The explanation of this transformation, however, lies in a twofold inference drawn by the Evangelist from his theological basic conception:

1. The monotheistic concept of God is modified through the notion of a primordial duality grounded in the very essence of God himself, in his absolute personal life, as it finds expression in the relation of God (ὁ θεός) and Logos . 1

2. The idea of transcendence, more or less rigid, determining the Old- and New-Testament idea of God in varying degrees and connected with the old physical concept of holiness, is overcome, in that on the one hand, according to the testimony of the theologically modified self-designation of Jesus "Son of Man" (see above p. 73 f.), the synthesis of the divine and the human is grounded in the immanent essence of God himself; in other words, in this latter there is presupposed the eternal will and the eternally archetypal disposition toward a mode of operation, self-presentation, and self-fulfillment corresponding to human-personal being and life, and in that on the other hand the essence of human σάρξ as such, the bodily-soulish human nature, is grasped in principle metaphysically—as weak, not as hostile to God—and thereby as capable of

receiving the Logos-“Son of Man,” as suited to be the vessel and organ of the unified divine-human personal life (see above p. 339 ff.).

1 See above p. 175 f.

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That the drawing of this last consequence—the introduction of the moment of humanity (human-likeness) as a necessary presupposition of the Incarnation into the idea of the essence of God himself—was prepared by the Pauline elevation of humanity to the highest, absolutely God-like intermediate being in the ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος, ought already to be shown by the advance of “deutero-Pauline” Christology in the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle to the Colossians (see above p. 81 ff.). One will, however, have to guard against every one-sidedly intellectualistic explanation of the fact in question. We are dealing not merely with the result of a purely theoretical, school-like labor of thought in the Logos and “Son of Man” of the fourth Gospel and in the sarkosis of the Logos, but with the immediate effect of an overwhelming fundamental need of the mystically advanced and deepened Christian piety of a religious genius (*sit venia verbo*). Here, in this intuition sprung from the impulse of his consecrated spirit, dogmatic reflection as well—the determination of the value of those fundamental ideas of our Gospel under the standpoint of revelation—will for all time have to recognize its center of gravity.

Just as the mystery of life disclosed itself to the author of our Gospel in Jesus Christ as the Logos become flesh, so too did the mystery of death. With the preparatory turn of phrase that the Logos “tabernacled” in the flesh, the Prologue already softly hints also at the death of Christ. That this death must form, in the conception of the Evangelist, a fact of the highest degree of mystery follows from the Prologue itself: how could the divine being that entered, in the person of Jesus, into the flesh of humanity, die? 1 Of the dying and rising again of the deity nature religion speaks widely and in manifold ways. There one sees, in the eternal alternation of light and darkness, activity and rigidity of the organic world, the fate of

1 Cf. also Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* p. 298.

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personal powers. Here, however, there is more than Dionysus and other *numina* of light and life; here something presents itself in human, bodily historicity which appears like a revelation and fulfillment of what is there only dimly guessed at on an elementary level. For the Logos-Christ of the Evangelist death is no natural necessity, because the “Son,” in the life that he has in himself (5 26), possesses the power to transform the assumed fleshly being of his person, insofar as it is corporeality, into spiritual reality and thereby immediately to reshape it in accordance with his heavenly perfected glory. If Jesus nevertheless died, then already for this reason his death could not have been a compulsory, purely passive loss of bodily life, but only a voluntary surrender of it (10 17.18), in which he abandoned the earthly nature that he had assumed to its laws. The renunciation of the organically animating connection between body and spirit, as it

here temporarily occurred, was possible because it entailed no impairment of the spiritual being and no weakening of the absolutely self-subsisting divine life-power of Christ. But just as certainly as Christ in death remained completely lord of himself and of his life and unrestricted lord of the life of the world (6 33.51), as he indeed arose again by his own activity and in his own power (2 19. 10 17.18; see above p. 6.11), just so certainly does natural death have no power whatsoever over his person that weakens or destroys life itself; his dying was in reality only the path of departure to the Father chosen by him (14 2 ff.), of exaltation (3 11. 12 32), thus the means of glorification (13 32. 17 1). With this, however, for those human beings also who have taken into themselves the spirit of life of Christ through his word and sacramental mystery, the separation of body and soul has lost the significance of death: they remain in undiminished possession of the life-power flowing to them from Christ even in death and in this respect do not die at all (6 50. 8 51.52. 11 26); they have already passed through from

death to life in the earthly body (5 24). Just as, therefore, among those initiated into evangelical truth there can be talk of life only in one sense (see above p. 324 f.), so also of death: there is no other death than the hopeless spiritual and bodily state of ruin and judgment of those who, in the blindness of unbelief, resist the reception of the divine powers of salvation proceeding from Christ and thereby separate themselves forever from the source of life (3 18. 5 29). That is the mystery of death. And that now the fourth Evangelist wished precisely to testify to the mysterious character of his conception of life and death as a characteristic fundamental trait of Christian knowledge of truth and religion—this will emerge in a subsequent investigation that leads beyond the Prologue.

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For the present, there remains only a brief discussion of those statements of the Prologue itself which have not yet been examined more closely, and which, considered historically, shed further light on individual moments of the fundamental conception of the Prologue concerning the essence and activity of the Logos 1.

Here, first of all, the introductory words *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος* may be taken into consideration. Whether this sentence contains an anti-gnostic thrust, and whether this might then possibly be referred to “a pre-Valentinian specimen of gnosticizing thought” 2, cannot, given the way matters

1 An attempt at orientation in this direction from a Catholic standpoint is offered by: K. Weiss, *Der Prolog des hl. Johannes, eine Apologie in Antithesen* (in *Strassburger theologische Studien* III, 1899).

2 Cf. A. Aall (*Geschichte der Logosidee in der christlichen Literatur* p. 192 f.) on Ignat. *ad Magnes.* 8, 2 (*ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών*): “The conception recalls gnostic speculation. With Valentin the conceptual pair Logos and Zoe was regarded as an emanation of the aeonic pair Bythos and Sige. It is difficult to think the phenomenon in Ignatius apart from relation to the gnostic conceptual formation. — We are, however, not called upon to investigate the connection more closely.” In any case one would have to think rather of the Σιγή characteristic of Valentinianism than of that of the *Ἀπόφασις μεγάλη*.

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stand — already from the standpoint of literary history — be determined with certainty 1.

What sense the Evangelist connects with the figurative designation of the Logos become flesh as *μονογενής* (1 14.18) has been shown (see above, pp. 77, 104). It is striking that this concept and expression seem to have no prior history. The Old Testament *יְחִיד*, where it has the meaning of the only child, is translated by the Alexandrians as *ἀγαπητός* (*ἀγαπώμενος*), with the exception of Judg. 11 34 (*αὕτη ἦν μονογενὴς αὐτῷ*) 2. In this way, even those Old Testament passages which demonstrably presented themselves to the Evangelist for typical use are excluded from serving as points of connection. In Gen. 22 2. 12. 16, to which John 3 16. 18 and the “imitation” of this passage, 1 John 4 9, unmistakably allude, the son to be offered by Abraham is his *ἀγαπητός*; only Heb. 11 17 gives the more precise *μονογενής* 3. But the assumption that Zech. 12 10 (*καὶ ἐκχεῶ ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον Δαυὶδ καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς κατοικοῦντας Ἰερουσαλήμ πνεῦμα χάριτος καὶ οἰκτιρμοῦ· καὶ ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς με, ἀνθ’ ὧν κατωρχήσαντο, καὶ κόψονται ἐπ’ αὐτὸν κοπετὸν ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαπητῷ καὶ ὀδυνηθήσονται ὀδύνην ὡς ἐπὶ πρωτοτόκῳ*) underlies John 19 37 and 7 38 (see above, p. 16), as well as John 1 14, is — quite apart from the deviation of the translation from the base text already noted with regard to 7 38 — already undermined simply by the repeated *ἀγαπητός* 4. If, accordingly, the Christological use of *μονογενής* is peculiar to the Fourth Gospel (and 1 John) and at most touches only indirectly upon the use of the word in the typological passage of Hebrews, and if, furthermore,

1 Apart from everything else, it may at any rate be said that, simply on the basis of the Logos-idea of the Evangelist, by virtue of its relation both to the biblical and to the Philonic conception, the fundamental thought of the sentence in question was given in the opening of the Prologue.

2 Among the Apocrypha Tob. 3, 10; 8, 17 attach themselves here.

3 To the latter passage Luc. 7, 12; 8, 42; 9, 38 stand alongside. Cf. also the remarks of Th. Zahn, *Einleitung in das N. T.*² II, p. 546.

4 To adduce the *μονογενές* of Sap. 7, 22 (Baidensperger, *Prolog des 4. Ev.* p. 37) is forbidden by the Evangelist's position with respect to *σοφία* (see above).

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the Prologue in particular gives the impression that the term in question is introduced repeatedly with deliberate emphasis 1, then this compels us, at least, to reckon with the possibility that the choice of this attribute in the Fourth Gospel is connected with a reference to its gnostic application — that is, with the intention of setting the true over against the latter. Unfortunately, we are very inadequately informed on this point. The *μονογενὴς κόσμος* of Basilides (Clem. Alex., *Strom.* V, 11, 74) does not come into consideration here, at least not directly, since it is not the world of light but the corporeal world 1. It is, however, to be recalled that in Valentinus the Monogenes, together with Makaria, forms the last aeon-pair emanated from the Logos and the *Αἰώνια ζωή* 2. The status of the Monogenes as father of the Logos in Iren. *haer.* III, 11, 1 ("*et initium quidem esse Monogenem, Logon autem verum filium Unigeniti*") 3 is not entirely clear. In Barbelognosis, the Monogenes (according to the *Gospel of Mary*) appears as the aeon Christ belonging to the first tetrad of emanated syzygies, the *αὐτογένητος* God, the firstborn son of the All (see above, p. 192) 4.

However things may stand with the occasion and tendency of the questionable "Johannine" expression, there can be no doubt that the Evangelist, with the designation of the Logos become flesh as πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας, and with the statement concerning the salvation-historical significance of

1 Cf. Jacobi in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* I, p. 520 f. Hilgenfeld (*Ketzergesch.* p. 224): "Basilides did not agree with Plutarch's assertion (*de def. orac.* 24 sq.), *τὸ τῷ θεῷ μὴ μονογενὲς μηδ' ἕρημον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον*. He did not share the widely disseminated assumption of a plurality of worlds." See also on the philosophical usage of the word above p. 77.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 1, 2. On the later duplication of the Monogenes in Ptolemaeus, who makes him in the first instance the father of the Logos and Zoe, and on the related modification in Theodotus, cf. Hilgenfeld pp. 351 f., 507 f.

3 Attributed by Hilgenfeld to Cerinthus (p. 412), by Moeller to the "Gnostics" (*Lehrb. d. Kirchengesch.*¹ I, p. 139).

4 On the Monogenes of later Gnosis cf. Schmidt in *Texte und Untersuchungen* VIII, pp. 546, 551 f., 600 ff., 612, 614, 625, 646, 658.

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his πλήρωμα (1 14.16), has taken up a theological concept that had already undergone a longer development and had only recently become peculiarly significant[1]. The fullness of Christ presupposes the fullness of God. In the Old Testament the latter comes into consideration only in the transitive sense of the All-filling One: “Is it not I who fill heaven and earth?” (Jer. 23 24)[2]. If in Isa. 6 3 (מְלֹא כָל־הָאָרֶץ כְּבוֹדוֹ) it is more precisely the divine glory that fills the earth, then it is particularly noteworthy that here, in the case of the *kabod*, i.e. the radiant revelation of divine perfection of life and power, alongside and together with the physical there is thought also of the moral essence of Yahweh (see above)[3]. How, however, the transitive conception of the term points beyond itself to the intransitive — the conception of deity as the Filling One to the conception of the Full — this is shown already in its own way by Eleatic philosophy with the πλέον of Parmenides[4], and no less by ancient Indian theology. When here the absolute being (the Brahman) is called *pūrṇam apravarti*[5], i.e. the full, unchangeable (πλήρες [or πλήρωμα] ἀναλλοίωτον), whose knowledge is the cause of full, unchangeable bliss, this occurs because it is conceived as penetrating the entire world-space; and not merely that — not merely because it counts as the primal force filling world-space (*ākāśa*) of all bodily and psychic being, but because it is absolute spirit, the principle of cognition in the human being (*vijñānamayaḥ puruṣas*)[6]. Still more clearly this logical and substantive relationship emerges in Philo.

1 Turner in *The Journal of Theological Studies* 1900, I, pp. 120–125, 561 f., treats only the grammatical question concerning *πλήρης* in John 1, 14 (cf. also Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka aus Ägypten und Nubien* 1899, nos. 1071, 1222; S. Deissmann in *ThLZ* 1901, col. 69).

2 That the conception of “pure spirit” underlies this (Giesebrecht) may be said; only the “spirit” must be correctly defined.

3 Likewise in the passage based on Isa. 6, Num. 14, 21 (see above). Of another kind is Ex. 40, 34.

4 Zeller I⁴ p. 517.

5 Chandogya Upanishad 3, 12, 9.

6 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2, 1, 5; cf. Kaushitaki Upanishad 4, 8 and Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishaden* p. 52.

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Full (πλήρης) is, according to him, God as the absolutely Perfect One, who as such has relation to nothing outside himself and needs nothing outside himself, thus by virtue of his absoluteness and autarky. “Τὸ ‘ἐγώ εἰμι θεός σός’ (Gen. 17 1) λέγεται καταχρηστικῶς, οὐ κυρίως· τὸ γὰρ ὄν, ἢ

ὂν ἐστίν, οὐχὶ τῶν πρὸς τι· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ πλήρες καὶ αὐτῷ ἱκανόν, καὶ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως καὶ μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ παντὸς ἐν ὁμοίῳ· ἄτρεπτον γὰρ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον (*apravartí*), χρήζον ἑτέρου τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός· ὥστε αὐτοῦ μὲν εἶναι τὰ πάντα, μηδενὸς δὲ κυρίως αὐτό" (mut. nom. 4. III 161 CW; cf. *Cherub.* 25); "δεῖται γὰρ οὐδενὸς ὁ πλήρης θεός" (*qu. det. pot. ins.* 16. I 270 CW); "θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος ἄξιον ἂν εἴη χωρίον καὶ ἐνδιαίτημα, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ τόπος καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης καὶ ἱκανὸς αὐτῷ ὁ θεός, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιδεᾶ καὶ ἔρημα καὶ κενὰ ὄντα πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου περιεχόμενος, ἅτε εἷς καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ὤν" (*leg. alleg.* I 14. I 72 CW)[1]. When in the latter passage it is expressly explained that God, according to his essence, is the πλήρης, and that he is also the πληρῶν for the totality of what exists outside him, there takes place therein a mediation between Philo's strictly philosophical concept of God and his revelation-historically grounded conception of the world, in such a way that Stoic ideas exert an influence. The filling of the world created (formed) by God is regarded as an extension of his essence by means of the diffusion (outflow) of his powers[2]. As absolute, truly real and perfect being, pure activity and causality,

1 On Aristot. *gen. et corr.* II, 10, 336 b 31: *συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν*, cf. Philo *conf. lingu.* 27 (II 254 C-W): *ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος, οὐ περιεχομένου*; and Zeller II, 2³ p. 370.

3 *Poster. Cain.* 5 (Π 4 C-W): *περιέχεται (ὁ θεός) μὲν ὑπ' οὐδενός, ἐπιβέβηκε δὲ πᾶσιν· ἐπιβεβηκὼς δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ δημιουργηθέντος ὢν οὐδὲν ἧττον πεπλήρωκε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ· διὰ γὰρ — τῶν ὅλων τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις (? W) — ἄχρι περάτων τείνας ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονίας λόγους συνύφηνεν.*
Conf. lingu. 27 (II 254 C-W): *τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας μέρος οὐδὲν ἔρημον ἀπολέλοιπε τοῦ κόσμου*; *leg. alleg.* I, 13 (I 70 C-W), *mut. nom.* 4 (III 161 C-W), etc.

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God cannot enter into the world with his essence itself, but only with his activity; yet even this not immediately, because he may not defile himself through contact with matter (*ὕλη*) and may not call into existence from himself anything that is not in itself pure good[1]. Thus the δυνάμεις proceeding from God, which mediate the creation and preservation respectively the government of the world[2], must be substantiated into a relative self-subsistence, into a kind of intermediate beings[3]. As such they constitute a suprasensible κόσμος and are represented as God's constant entourage and ready retinue[4]. On the other hand, however, it again appears necessary, insofar as "a participation of the finite in the deity is to be made possible through them"[5], that they form an inseparable, essential unity with God[6]. Thus it comes about that the efficacious forces, which according to Stoic conception are immanent in the world, are "equated with Plato's extra-mundane ideas and referred back to the deity as an extra-mundane being," and in this way become "spiritual substances" which "flow out from God into the world, without, however, his stepping out of the unity of his essence or communicating himself with it to finite things"[7]. Despite the appearance of personality (angels, souls), they are "something inherent in and adhering to the divine essence itself

1 For individual documentation see Zeller III, 2³ p. 360. Only in the sense of this mediation is God himself called the *δημιουργός* of the world (*migr. Abr.* 32; II 303 C-W; *mut. nom.* 4; III 162 C-W).

2 As to their relation to the operative forces of the Stoics, the angels of the Old Testament and of Parsism, and the demons of Greek popular belief, cf. Zeller loc. cit. pp. 360 f.

3 Cf. the elucidation of the characteristic expression *αἱ μετ' αὐτὸν δυνάμεις* in Zeller loc. cit. pp. 364 f.; see also above p. 143.

4 For details on conception and expression (*δορυφοροῦσαι δυνάμεις*) see Zeller p. 362; alongside which Drummond's remark deserves every attention: *It will be remembered that the same figure was used of the powers of the human mind, so that we need have no scruple in recognizing here a simple personification* (II 117).

5 Zeller loc. cit. p. 365.

6 Cf. Drummond II, pp. 98 ff. (*the divine powers equivalent to the divine essence—God and the powers used interchangeably*).

7 Zeller, ibid. p. 361.

" ungenerated (ἀγένητοι) and infinite (ἀπερίγραφοι) like God himself[1]; they are called God's ἰδέαι[2], ἀρεταί[3], and χάριτες[4], and although forming an entire world of ideas (ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος), they nevertheless in substance count as nothing other than θεοῦ λόγος ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος[5]. Although they are innumerable, their "logical hierarchy" (Drummond) nevertheless finds a multiple consolidation through reduction to the principal powers: an occasional enumeration of six powers (including the Logos)[6] stands alongside the prevailing consolidation in the highest pair of powers, ἀγαθότης and ἐξουσία, and the Logos as the συναγωγός of the two[7]. Since now the Logos, despite a certain contradiction in the statements concerning his relation to the two primal powers — from which "it is evident that Philo has not yet formed a fixed theory concerning the sequence of the divine powers"[8] — can in the end nevertheless, as has been shown (see above, p. 143), be conceived only as the highest power of God in the sense of the comprehensive totality of all his powers, fullness is accordingly attributed to him explicitly just as to God himself, and indeed in such a way that he is repeatedly characterized as πλήρης χαρίτων, whereby the powers of grace present themselves specifically as those destined to be imparted to the human being as powers of salvation: Ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὃν ἐκπεπλήρωκεν ὅλον δι' ὅλων ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν ὁ θεός (*somn.* I 11. III 218 CW);

1 *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 17 (II 74 C-W); *opif. mund.* 6 (I 7 C-W).

2 *De monarchia* I, 6 (II 218 f. M). Cf. Drummond II, pp. 72–82.

3 *De animalibus sacrificio idoneis* 6 (II 242 M). Cf. Drummond II, p. 88 (“the word being used, presumably, not in the sense of moral goodness, but as we speak of the virtue of a plant or drug, a sense not unknown to classical Greek”).

4 *Leg. alleg.* II, 20 (I 106 C-W); *opif. mund.* 6 (I 7 C-W); *quod det. pot. ins.* 23 (II 79 C-W).

5 *Opif. mund.* 5.6 (I 6.7 C-W). Cf. Zeller loc. cit. p. 371.

6 1. the Logos; 2. *ἡ ποιητικὴ δύναμις*; 3. *ἡ βασιλική*; 4. *ἡ ἵλεως*; 5.–6. the commanding and forbidding *νομοθετική*; cf. especially *de profugis* 18.19 (I 560 f. M). Drummond II, pp. 83 f.

7 *Cherub.* 9 (I 176 C-W), etc.

8 Zeller loc. cit. p. 370.

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κόλλα γὰρ καὶ δεσμὸς οὗτος (sc. λόγος θεῖος) πάντα τῆς οὐσίας ἐκπεπληρωκώς· ὁ δ’ εἰρὰς καὶ συνυφήνας ἕκαστα πλήρης αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ κυρίως ἐστίν, οὐ δεηθείς ἑτέρου τὸ παράπαν (*qu. rer. div. h.* 38. III 43 CW); πλήρη τοῦ σοφίας νάματος τὸν θεῖον λόγον διασυνίστησι (— as the ποταμὸς τοῦ θεοῦ Ps. 65 10), — τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοῦ θείου λόγου ῥύμη μεθ’ ὁρμῆς καὶ τάξεως φερομένη πάντα διὰ πάντων ἀναχεῖ τε καὶ εὐφραίνει (*somn.* II 37. III 297 f. CW); ὁ μέγας ὄντως ἀρχιερεύς, ὃς τὰς τῶν ἀεννάων χαρίτων λαβοῦν προπόσεις ἀντεκτείνει, πλήρες ὅλον τὸ σπονδεῖον ἀκράτου μεθύσματος ἐπιχέων, ἑαυτόν (*somn.* II 27. III 288 CW); τὴν πλήρη χαρίτων διαθήκην ἑαυτοῦ — νόμος δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ λόγος τῶν ὄντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος — ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ βάσεως τῆς τοῦ δικαίου ψυχῆς ἄγαλμα θεοειδὲς ἱδρύσεσθαι παγίως φησίν (on Gen. 9 11 *somn.* II 33 cf. with 36 [τὸν τοῦ ὄντος λόγον, ὃν διαθήκην ἐκάλεσε] III 294. 296 CW)[1]. Only incidentally may there still be mentioned the Philonic interpretation — grounded in connection with Neopythagorean speculation — of unity as the element of all numbers (στοιχεῖον καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ) as applied to God and the Logos as πλήρης: μονὰς δὲ οὔτε προσθήκην οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν δέχεσθαι πέφυκεν, εἰκὼν οὖσα τοῦ μόνου πλήρους θεοῦ· χαῦνα γὰρ τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, εἰ δὲ που καὶ πυκνωθείη, λόγῳ σφίγγεται θείῳ[2].

Not without connection with the previous history of the concept is the adoption of the concept and expression πλήρωμα among the theological *termini* of the New Testament[3]. Already at first glance the use of

1 Cf. also *ebriet.* 36 (II 198 C-W): *χάριτος δ’ ἥτις ἂν πληρωθῇ ψυχή, γέγηθεν εὐθύς καὶ μειδιᾷ καὶ ἀνορχεῖται.* The specifically soteriological point of view is, understandably, not lacking even in the otherwise general concept of the *χάριτες* of God; cf. e.g. *leg. alleg.* III 56 (I 148 f. C-W), where their *πολύς πλοῦτος* is communicated *τοῖς ἀξίοις*. — Whoever keeps in mind the manner of citation in antiquity, which differs essentially from the modern one, will scarcely be able to resist the impression that the Evangelist, with the

words *καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος* (1 16), is alluding to the Philonic passage cited above (p. 113), *poster. Cain* 43.

2 *Quod rerum divinarum heres sit* 38 (III 43 C-W). Cf. Butherus (*περὶ ἀριθμῶν*): *τὸ ἕν οὐσία καὶ φύσις καὶ νοῦς καὶ πλήρωμα* (Stob. *ecl.* I, 12 f.), and in connection with this Zeller III, 2³, p. 123.

3 The New Testament *πλήρωμα* means first (as does the classical term): that which fills (physically: patch; fragment; spiritually: love as that with which the Law is fulfilled, Rom. 13 10); but then also: that which is filled, the full number, totality (Rom. 11 25; 15 29; Gal. 4 4; Eph. 1 10).

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the word in the "deuteropauline" letters to the Colossians and the Ephesians betrays an affinity with the statements of our Prologue here under consideration. The question is how the relevant statements are to be related to one another more precisely. The active sense — that of the Filling One — is offered by the Epistle to the Colossians. When in Col. 1 19 it is said: ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι, i.e. that in Christ, the head of the community (his body), the entire πλήρωμα was pleased to dwell, then under the subject (abstract for concrete) πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα is understood: the Godhead wholly and entirely, as the comprehensive totality of innumerable powers of life and, in particular, powers of salvation[2]. The author has in mind here a twofold contrast: on the one hand, against the conception of the absolute transcendence of the πλήρωμα, and on the other hand against the distribution of the πλήρωμα among a series of individual beings (Aeons)[3]. Whether Christ, as this bearer (possessor) of the πλήρωμα, is the pre-existent, the historical, or the post-existent one[4] is probably to be decided according to v. 29; this speaks in favour of the post-existent (v. Soden, H. Holtzmann), possibly (by way of Phil. 2 7. 8, the *status exinanitionis*, already pointing beyond in the direction of the "Johannine" conception) of the historical one (cf. Holtzmann). The indwelling of the πλήρωμα in Christ has come to manifestation and has been demonstrated in the fact of Christ's overcoming of death (Col. 1 18: πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν) and in the founding of the community conditioned by this (κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας). As a pure abstract the author uses πλήρωμα in 2 9. 10: ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς, καὶ ἐστὲ ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι. The πλήρωμα in the sense of the comprehensive totality of 1 19 is here more precisely determined as the (conceived as filling) content of the substance of God

1 "A *terminus technicus* which does not require explanation for the readers" (Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 240).

2 Cf. v. Soden ad loc.

3 This applies to Gnosticism, but not to Philo.

4 Cf. Holtzmann loc. cit. II 241 n. 2.

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(his θεότης)[1]. Mediately — through Christ — and according to the measure of union with Christ, that fullness of deity also enters into the Christians[2]. In place of the active meaning of πλήρωμα, the Epistle to the Ephesians sets the passive one: that which is filled, or the state of being filled; at the same time the concept is transformed from a theological–christological one into a christological–soteriological one. The words Eph. 1 23: ἥτις (sc. ἐκκλησία) ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου state: the community is the πλήρωμα of Christ, i.e. the living body of this Christ, continually permeated and governed by powers of salvation from the infinite fullness of the exalted Christ, and as such the mediation for the consummating integration of the totality of created beings, the heavenly as well as the earthly, into a unified organism of salvation ruled by Christ (cf. 4 10. 3 10. 6 ff.). In the community as the πλήρωμα κατ' ἐξοχήν, the πληροῦσθαι through Christ is realized in the most proper sense and in the most perfect measure[3]. Against the interpretation of πλήρωμα in the sense of the Filling One, or even of the Completing One (*complementum Christi*)[4], speaks above all the thought dominating the context of vv. 20—22, namely the subordination of all created things under the resurrected and exalted Christ. In Eph. 3 19: ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ, πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ designates the state of the Christ-believers that is to be brought about. The goal of the perfection of Christians effected by the Spirit of God or by the indwelling Christ is a being filled with spiritual powers of every kind (theoretical and practical) up to complete being-filled-with-God. The πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ of this passage is therefore not identical in meaning with πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος in Col. 2 9. The thought of Eph. 3 19 is not: until everything

1 Cf. in this connection, and on *σωματικῶς*, v. Soden (ad loc.).

2 Here not *πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα*. Cf. Rom. 12 3; Eph. 4 7.

3 *πλήρωμα* is conceived ethically and metaphysically at the same time.

4 "Therefore not only does the Church, as the body, need Christ as the head (Col. 2 10; Eph. 4 15 f.), but Christ also needs the Church as his body, as that which belongs to his completion, which first makes his being fully complete (Eph. 1 23)" (Holtzmann loc. cit. II 244).

that constitutes God's essence (see above) has entered into you, as into Christ, but rather: until from the fullness of God's essence everything has entered into you that serves for your filling and can be received by you. That in Eph. 3 19 the passage Col. 2 9. 10 is already presupposed[1] will, however, have to be assumed (— hence the similarity of expression with difference of concept). Closely connected with Eph. 3 19 is 4 13, where Christ is again directly conceived as the Filling One, as in 1 23: μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες — εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The totality of the members of the body, i.e. the community of Christ, is to attain to the measure of maturity of the state of those filled by Christ (πληρώματος τοῦ Χρ.).

As is already evident from the remark on Col. 1 19, the suspicion presses itself upon us that the Pleroma concept of the Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians does not lack a polemical edge against the πλήρωμα of the Gnostics, concerning whose history, to be sure, only relatively scant information has come down to us. In any case, word and concept show themselves with sufficient clarity in Valentin and his school. For Valentin the πλήρωμα is the Godhead that has arrived at the purely inward unfolding of its entire essence. The process of this self-unfolding is explained from an original polarity of the spiritual potencies in God, which, by analogy with the opposition of the sexes, is conceived as the principle of pairing and thus as the cause of emanations (προβολαί, καρποί)[2]. If by this conception, in a certain sense, life enters into the highest being, which as the summation of the primordial Godhead together with the emanated (γεννητούς) Aeons is called ὁ ζῶν αἰών[4], the principal significance accorded to the schema of the natural process

1 Holtzmann II 241.

2 One is tempted to recall the ethically generative *σύνοδος* and *κρᾶσις* of the divine *δυνάμεις* in Philo (*Cherub.* 9; I 177 C-W).

3 Iren. *haer.* I, 11, 1 ff.; Hippol. *phil.* 6, 37;

4 Clem. Alex. *str.* IV, 13, 89.

is nevertheless not to be overlooked[1]. Whether Satornil already called “the hypercosmic realm of the Godhead” or “the divine being full of itself” the πλήρωμα[2] remains doubtful, even if he “knew in the Godhead at least something related to the Simonian–Menandrian Ennoia,” and despite Epiphanius *haer.* 23, 4[3]. The same holds with regard to the *pleroma* of which Iren. *haer.* III, 11, 1 speaks, and which, like that of Valentin, signifies the Godhead as having come to unfolding within itself, albeit without any sexual differentiation emerging — the same applies as was remarked with regard to the Monogenes at the passage cited[4].

From all this it is evident that the statements concerning the divine fullness of the Logos become flesh in our Prologue are just as deliberately set in a positive relation to the Pleroma passages of the Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians as they are set in a negative relation to the gnostic idea of the Pleroma. From the need for the most decisive and emphatic rejection of the naturalization of the divine essence in the gnostic fundamental conception is explained the intentionality with which the fourth Evangelist avoids speaking of a πλήρωμα of God (— although for him an attachment to the Philonic concept, with corresponding modification, would have presented no obstacle, any more than it did for the author of the Epistle to the Colossians —), and with which he rather confines himself to a purely christological–soteriological utilization of the Pleroma concept. That in this respect the immediate preliminary stage is presented in the Epistle to the Ephesians follows of itself from the foregoing discussion.

1 In a derivative sense, the links of the chain are then also called Pleromas: *ὅσα ἐκ συζυγίας προέρχεται* (i.e. what constitutes a stage of development of the divine being itself) are *πληρώματα*, whereas *ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ἑνός* are *εἰκόνες* (Clem. Alex. *str.* IV, 13, 90; to be compared also with the later formulation in *excerpta Theodoti* § 32: *ἐν πληρώματι οὖν ἑνότητος οὔσης ἕκαστος τῶν Αἰώνων ἴδιον ἔχει πλήρωμα, τὴν συζυγίαν*).

2 Hilgenfeld loc. cit. p. 193.

3 *εἰ δὲ ἐγίνωσκε μὲν, ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐποίει τούτους ἃ μὴ θέμις ἐστὶ πράττειν παρὰ τὸ αὐτῆς βούλημα, ἐλάττωσιν ἔπερ περιπεσεῖται πάλιν (sc. ἡ ἄνω δύναμις), καὶ οὐδὲν πλήρωμα εὑρεθήσεται ἐν τῇ ἄνω δυνάμει.*

4 The Pleroma of the Peratae rests on Col. 2 9. Cf. Hilgenfeld pp. 266 f.

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This result is further confirmed by the connection into which the Evangelist places the concept of πλήρωμα precisely with that of χάρις. It is first to be recalled that the word χάρις, apart from the Prologue, is used neither elsewhere in the Fourth Gospel nor in the "Johannine" Epistles — a circumstance that certainly deserves careful attention. As to the light that falls upon this χάρις from the distinctive ἀλήθεια placed alongside it, what is necessary has already been remarked (see above, pp. 103, 201 ff.). The grace in question, which has appeared in the Logos become flesh, and only in him, is thereby more closely defined as the sole and absolutely true, perfect grace of revelation, in contrast not merely to the imperfect Old Testament one, but still more to the false gnostic one[1]. It was all the more natural for the Evangelist to place precisely the rich and comprehensive concept of χάρις in the foreground, since Philo had already assigned to it not only a fundamental significance in his entire doctrine of God and salvation, but had also, in particular, given it an explicit and characteristically significant relation to the Logos through the recurring thought of πλήρης χαρίτων (see above). What prominent place that strongly Hellenistically reshaped χάρις was also accorded elsewhere in theological systems is shown precisely by Gnosticism, insofar as Χάρις repeatedly appears as an Aeon. In a characteristic manner, in Leucius (see above, p. 199) it forms a kind of *syzygos* of the Logos. Among the Barbelognostics it has arisen from the syzygy of Θέλημα and Αἰώνια ζωή, and itself stands in syzygy with Σωτήρ, subordinating itself to the second fundamental dyad (Αὐτογενής and Ἀλήθεια)[2].

1 Note in this connection that Philo interprets the divine spring, which has the fullness of water (*ἐπληρώθη ὑδάτων* Ps. 65 10), as referring to the Logos as the *wise* one (*somn.* II 37). I refer to the earlier discussion of the relationship between *ἀλήθεια* and *σοφία* (pp. 201 ff.).

2 Even in Ptolemaeus, *Χάρις* appears as an Aeon and here even as the name of the *Ennoia*, the female side of the primal being (*Βυθός*), from whose union, as the second syzygy, *Νοῦς* with *Ἀλήθεια* proceeds. Here, therefore, *ἀλήθεια* is placed second — perhaps in adaptation to John 1 14?

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As regards, finally, the activity of the Logos, the unmistakable polemic of the Evangelist against dualistic doctrines of the Demiurge and of the ἄγγελοι κοσμοποιοί in 1 3, already noted in the discussion of the Prologue (p. 91), does not require an extended exposition[1]; these belong to the most general features of the gnostic worldview[2]. In combating them, the strong emphasis on the connection between the Logos as the creative being and the human world as his most proper work, on the special relation of belonging and ownership of the latter, vv. 10. 11, is also grounded (see above, p. 97): the Christ of the various Gnostics whom the Evangelist has in view does not properly come εἰς τὰ ἴδια when he descends into the human world for the sake of redemption[3]. Hardly more questionable is it that a rejection of gnostic false teaching is intended when it is said of the salvation mediated by the Logos become flesh (the ἐξουσία τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι) that it comes to those who recognized and received this Logos in faith as the light of humanity (v. 12 compared with v. 10)[1]. The thesis of the Evangelist contained herein asserts with equal emphasis the freedom of human reception and the freedom of divine giving in the appropriation of salvation. Status and essence of true, perfect salvation, i.e. of divine

1 On eternal matter see above p. 91.

2 Reference may be made to the details in Hilgenfeld. Cf. also Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* I 479 and Lipsius on Gal. 4 a (in the H. C.).

3 Nor is this altered by Iren. *haer.* I, 23, 3: *ἐπὶ λυτρώσει τῶν ἰδίων ἄνθρωπον* (*quapropter et solvi mundum et liberari eos, qui sunt ejus, ab imperio eorum, qui mundum fecerunt, repromisit* — sc. Simon); cf. Hippol. *philos.* 6, 19: *λύσιν δὲ αὖθις λέγουσι τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ λυτρώσει τῶν ἰδίων ἀνθρώπων*. Kreyenbühl wishes to derive the designation *τὰ ἴδια* and *οἱ ἴδιοι* from Simon of Gitta (*Die μεγάλη ἀπόφασις*, *Das Evangelium der Wahrheit* 1900, I 408).

4 On divine sonship in Philo see above (passages on the Prologue) and cf. Drummond: “From such exalted language in describing the spiritual relationship of man, we might expect Philo to represent him as a son of God; but though the expression is found, he makes little use of it and gives it an explanation which reduces it to an ordinary figure of speech” (II 281 f.).

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sonship (see above, p. 99), the human being attains only by means of the individual exercise of will that takes place in faith in the Logos-Christ. This πίστις is a trust of the human being who longs for salvation, which at first goes so far that he allows the instruction, counsel, and example of Jesus to exert influence upon his moral–religious thinking and acting, renders obedience to it (cf. 7 17. 31), and from here leads to the recognition of the divine truth of Jesus’ testimony and the divine dignity of his person, and is completed in unconditional submission to his authority and total surrender to his person (λαμβάνειν, παραλαμβάνειν)[1]. If, however, the human being who thus exercises his freedom in reciprocal interaction with the Logos-Christ

attains the good of salvation in question, this does not involve a result that is in itself necessary from his own expenditure of spiritual power; the decisive moment lies in the free resolve and the creative power of the Logos-Christ himself: he gives to the individual the ἐξουσία in the sense indicated above (pp. 98 f.). It is indeed as though here already a finger were being pointed at the fundamental doctrine of the oldest Gnosis, deliberately advocated, of the φύσει σώζεσθαι. According to Simon Magus, the human being comes to salvation through the χάρις of the divine primal father revealed in Simon and Helena and through faith in that mediating pair, not through obedience to a law deriving from the ἄγγελοι κοσμοποιοί (any external, historically given law, above all the Mosaic one): such obedience in works-righteousness enslaves the human being, because it comes about not φύσει but θέσει. Since, however, that alone saving faith, which is at the same time knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of God (the Father who appeared in Simon), signifies moral emancipation in the name of Simon absolutely,

1 Cf. further Holtzmann loc. cit. II 483 ff. Why the interpretation left here as a possibility of v. 12 — according to which "it is a matter of an authority granted to the believer to become, even in his own consciousness, what he already is by nature and has always been" — proves inadmissible, already follows from what was discussed above p. 99.

the "κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ χάριν σώζεσθαι" in reality becomes something purely natural, and faith itself is in substance only a letting nature run its course; instead of χάρις, as instead of πίστις, natural law prevails[1]. According to Basilides as well, the subjective mediation of salvation lies in πίστις. That this, however, although defined by the Basilidians as ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις πρὸς τι τῶν μὴ κινούντων αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι, is in truth not meant as the most proper, free act of the individual, is shown by a valuable statement of Clement of Alexandria, which, both on account of its content and of its text, is to be reproduced verbatim: Εἰ γὰρ φύσει τις τὸν θεὸν ἐπίσταται, ὡς Βασιλείδης οἴεται, τὴν νόησιν τὴν ἐξαίρετον, πίστιν ἅμα καὶ βασιλείαν καλῶν, ἣ κτίσιν οὐσίας ἀξίαν τοῦ ποιήσαντος πλησίον ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἑρμηνεύων, οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξουσίαν, καὶ φύσιν καὶ ὑπόστασιν, κτίσεως ἀνυπερθέτου κάλλος ἀδιόριστον, οὐχὶ δὲ ψυχῆς αὐτεξουσίου λογικὴν συγκατάθεσιν λέγει τὴν πίστιν· παρέλκουσι τοίνυν αἱ ἐντολαί, αἵ τε κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν αἵ τε κατὰ τὴν νέαν διαθήκην, φύσει σωζομένου, ὡς Οὐαλεντῖνος βούλεται, τινός, καὶ φύσει πιστοῦ καὶ ἐκλεκτοῦ ὄντος, ὡς Βασιλείδης νομίζει· ἦν δ' ἂν καὶ δίχα τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος παρουσίας χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἀναλάμψαι δυνατὸν τὴν φύσιν. εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαίαν τὴν ἐπιδημίαν τοῦ κυρίου, φήσαιεν, οἴχεται αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἰδιώματα, μαθήσει καὶ καθάρσει καὶ τῇ τῶν ἔργων εὐποιίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐ φύσει σωζομένης τῆς ἐκλογῆς[3] (i.e.: For if someone knows[4]

1 Iren. *haer.* I, 23, 3.

2 In *βασιλείαν καὶ καλῶν* of the Dindorf text, *καί* is to be deleted, not placed after *καλῶν*.

3 *Str.* V, 1, 3. Potter (see Dindorf IV 331) remarks on the passage: "These matters would not be quite so difficult as they now appear if the writings of Basilides were extant, from which his doctrines could be clearly understood; meanwhile, until something better presents itself, it seems possible to write thus [reads: — *τὴν νόησιν, καὶ τὴν ἐξαίρετον*

πίστιν, ἅμα καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καλῶν κτίσιν οὐσίας ἀξίαν τοῦ ποιήσαντος, καὶ πλησίον ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἑρμηνεύων —]. For Basilides affirmed that intelligence, exceptional faith, and the heavenly kingdom belong by nature to certain men, and that by nature, not by the use of free choice, they become like and near to God; therefore faith is implanted in them from the first creation, without prior exercise or instruction; hence he calls it *κτίσεως ἀνυπέρθετον* [or, if one prefers, *ἀνυπέρθετον*] *κάλλος*."

4 On *ἐπίσταται* and *πίστιν* one may recall the double definition in *str.* IV, 22, 143: *εἰ γοῦν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐτυμολογεῖν χρή, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῆς ληπτέον, ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως πρότερον φερομένην· ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐτυμολογητέον τὴν περὶ τὸ ὂν στάσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν* —. Cf. Aristotle, *Anal. post.* I, 2, 71 b (*τότε ἐπιστάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἴδωμεν*).

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God by nature — as Basilides supposes — calling that exceptional cognition faith and at the same time dominion, or interpreting it as a created substance worthy to exist near the creator, then he calls faith something substantial (οὐσίαν), but not a power (ἐξουσίαν), and a natural constitution (φύσιν καὶ ὑπόστασιν), an indeterminate splendour of an unsurpassable creation, but not a rational assent of the self-determining soul[1]. The commandments of both the old and the new covenant are therefore superfluous if someone, as Valentin wants, attains salvation by nature, and if someone is by nature believing and elect, as Basilides thinks: "it was even possible that, without the coming of the Saviour, nature might at some time flare up." But if they were to assert the necessity of the coming of the Lord, the properties of nature are lost to them, since what is elect is brought to salvation by learning and purification and the performance of good works, but not by nature). Here Clement is evidently exercising criticism of the concept of faith in the soteriology of Basilides by means of direct opposition to our Prologue passage (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν), in that he transfers the concept of ἐξουσία to πίστις itself, insofar as it is effective[2]. Basilides, although he speaks of election,

1 In Saturnilus this would correspond to the *σπινθὴρ τῆς ζωῆς* belonging to the *γένος ἀγαθόν* in humanity; among the "Gnostics" of Irenaeus, to the "breath of light" in the *animae sanctae*.

2 Note here how, on the other side, the Evangelist's *τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι* corresponds to *ἀξίαν τοῦ ποιήσαντος πλησίον ὑπάρχειν*: *ὑπάρχειν*, not *γενέσθαι*; for the fact that the blessedness of union with God is mediated by gnostic *πίστις* follows from the circumstance that the latter is only a necessary consequence of the original kinship with God (sonship of God) of the pneumatic human being (cf. the central significance of the concept of *υἱότης* in the Basilides of the *Philosophumena*).

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knows only a φύσει σώζεσθαι, because the salvific faith of the "elect" is a behaviour necessarily following from their "supramundane" nature[1], not something subsequently granted to them on

the divine side (ἐξουσία), and just as little something dependent on their rationally free will (ψυχῆς αὐτεξουσίου λογικὴ συγκατάθεσις)[2]. Into an even sharper contrast enters the Evangelist's conception with the naturalistic soteriology of Valentin, which Clement in the present passage rejects together with that of Basilides. With Valentin, not only does the freedom of believing conduct on the part of those in need of salvation fall away, but πίστις itself disappears. The φύσει σωζόμενον γένος of Valentin are the Pneumatics (spiritual natures), and these have nothing to do with πίστις, but with γνῶσις. The physical determination of their spiritual essence[3], by virtue of which they are ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοι καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς[4], casts the alleged freedom of will of the Psychics, later introduced, it seems, by Ptolemy, whose path to salvation is attached to "works and mere faith," in a questionable light[5]. On the fundamental opposition between the Christology of the

1 *Φύσει γὰρ σωζόμενον γένος ὑποτίθεται οὗτος (Valentin) ἐμφερῶς τῷ Βασιλείδῃ, ἄνωθεν δὲ ἡμῖν δεῦρο τοῦτο δὴ τὸ διάφορον γένος ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ θανάτου καθαίρεσιν ἥκειν* (Clem. Alex. *str.* IV, 13, 89); *ξένην τὴν ἐκλογὴν τοῦ κόσμου ὁ Βασιλείδης εἴληφε λέγειν ὡς ἂν ὑπερκόσμιον φύσει οὖσαν* (ibid. IV, 26, 165; cf. II, 3, 10: *ἐνταῦθα φυσικὴν ἡγοῦνται τὴν πίστιν οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, καθ' ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκλογῆς τάττουσιν αὐτὴν τὰ μαθήματα ἀναποδείκτως εὑρίσκουσαν κατάληψιν νοητικήν. — ἔτι φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου, πίστιν ἅμα καὶ ἐκλογὴν οἰκείαν εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον διάστημα (stage), κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῆς ὑπερκοσμίου τὴν κοσμικὴν ἁπάσης φύσεως συνέπεσθαι πίστιν, κατάλληλόν τε εἶναι τῇ ἑκάστου ἐλπίδι καὶ τῆς πίστεως τὴν δωρεάν*).

2 A similar situation will obtain with the over-deterministically conceived condition of salvation (faith and love) among the Carpocratians (Iren. *haer.* I, 25, 4. 5).

3 Cf. Iren. *haer.* I, 6, 2: *αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ διὰ πράξεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φύσει πνευματικοὺς εἶναι, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως σωθήσεσθαι δογματίζουσιν* (Ptolemaic-Valentinian doctrine).

4 Clem. Alex. *str.* IV, 13, 89.

5 Iren. *haer.* I, 6, 1 (*καὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο παραγεγονέναι τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτεξούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅπως αὐτὸ σώσῃ*); I, 7, 5 (*καὶ τὸ μὲν χοϊκὸν εἰς φθοράν χωρεῖν· καὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐὰν τὰ βελτίονα ἕληται, ἐν τῷ τῆς μεσότητος τόπῳ ἀναπαύσεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ χείρω, χωρήσειν καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια*). — On the concept of faith corresponding to the physical conception of spirit in Basilides, attention may be drawn to the more massive, peculiar one in Vedānta philosophy. Faith (*Śraddhā*), or faith paired with knowledge, as the principle of pious works, "the highest achievement of man," presents itself after death as an imperishable (material-like) substance, by virtue of which he either returns to new earthly life as his reward, or attains the blessedness of absorption into the Absolute (Brahman) (Chāndog. Up. V, 4, 1—V, 2, 9 = Brihadāraṇyaka Up. VI, 2, 9—VI, 2, 14; Chāndog. Up. V, 19 = Brihadāraṇyaka Up. VI, 2, 15. 16; Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishaden* pp. 137—140). — Should the absence of the substantive *πίστις* in the Fourth Gospel be no more a matter of pure chance than the discussed non-use of the substantive *γνῶσις* (*πίστις* only 1 John 5 4), then one might think that *πίστις* too had become a catchword in considerable circles, which for the Evangelist's sensibility had

something odious about it. One involuntarily recalls the situation in the Epistle of James. But if there the author speaks of the alleged *πίστις* in order to characterize it as false Paulinism used to cloak egoism, then the Evangelist perhaps avoids the same word with regard to the theoretical and practical mischief of gnostic counterfeiting attached to it. In any case, given the significance attributed to *πιστεύειν* in the Gospel, the peculiarity in question must strike one.

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Evangelist and the gnostic one, insofar as it enters into the soteriological question discussed, there is no need to dwell further here.

It is, however, well worth directing special attention to the Evangelist's explanatory remark in v. 13, according to which those who become partakers of the sonship of God οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν. Already the form of the thought here expressed reveals the heightened interest with which the Evangelist combats the false doctrine that allows the human being to come into possession of salvation through his natural spiritual power, given with bodily descent[1]. On blood and flesh in this passage some light has already been shed above (p. 340): it has emerged that the mode of expression employed is determined by the author's intention to allow the ethical moment

1 The assertion of a "clear reference to the incarnation of Jesus" in vv. 12–13 (Belser, *Einleitung in d. N. T.* p. 275) rests on misunderstanding.

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to recede behind the physical, and that precisely hereby the introduction of the concept θέλημα is also connected. But it is precisely this latter concept and expression that is for us of particular interest. The more familiar θέλημα of God is to our Evangelist (4 34; 5 30; 6 39. 40; 7 17; 9 31), the more unavoidable becomes the question why, in connection with the θέλημα of the flesh and of the human being (ἀνήρ), the opposing divine principle of generation is not designated precisely as θέλημα θεοῦ. This question arises all the more naturally since the parallel James 1 18 presses itself upon us: βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων (said of the πατὴρ τῶν φώτων). As the ultimate ground of the spiritual act of generation of God mediated through the word of truth (cf. 1 Pet. 1 23: διὰ λόγου ζῶντος θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος), his own most proper free will is designated[1]. This principle as a "male factor"[2] is certainly also in the Evangelist's mind. Nevertheless he does not say: ἐκ θελήματος θεοῦ; and why not? Here too the comparative glance leads to attention to certain phenomena in the gnostic world of ideas. Precisely in gnostic theology the concept of willing plays repeatedly a peculiar role. First of all, it must be recalled that the doctrine of the Aeons explicitly concerns itself with the divine θέλημα. In Barbelognosis Θέλημα is the name of an Aeon within the first tetrad of syzygies unfolding the essence of the primal syzygy, and indeed — what must not be overlooked — connected with Αἰώνια ζωή[3]; the Aeon named appears as one of the auxiliary lights of the second primal light, the inner-divine Christ. Parallel to this, within the following

tetrad (emanating from the second stem-syzygy), the Aeon Θέλησις (connected with Raguel) appears, which is an emanation of

1 The thought is: not following an external compulsion, unwillingly or half-willingly. One may recall the gnostic ideas of creation and redemption.

2 Cf. Holtzmann, *neutest. Theol.* II 347.

3 In John 1 12 it is a matter of the coming-into-being of higher life in the human being.

Θέλημα and Αἰώνια ζωή[1]. With Valentin the Aeon Θελητός (willing, inclined to striving? cf. θελητός LXX) appears as the male member of the last syzygy of the thirty Aeons (emanating from Ἄνθρωπος and Ἐκκλησία), as the companion of Σοφία. It corresponds to the Μονογενής in the last of the syzygies originating from the Logos and Zoe, and after the fall of Sophia withdraws for the purpose of union with the remaining Aeons[2]. This hypostatization of the divine faculty of will in Valentin deserves all the more attention since the Valentinians also attribute willing to the Aeons in a generalizing way, and indeed in such a manner that it is conceived as an essential principle of emanation, of the self-unfolding of the Godhead in syzygies. Of the Aeons of the second tetrad it is said: τούτους δὲ τοὺς αἰῶνας εἰς δόξαν τοῦ Πατρὸς προβεβλημένους, βουληθέντας καὶ αὐτοὺς διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου δοξάσαι τὸν Πατέρα, προβαλεῖν προβολὰς ἐν συζυγίᾳ[3]. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that in the *Excerpta ex scriptis Theodoti* (§ 31), of the twelfth Aeon of the Dodecad, that is, of Sophia, it is said: ὁ δὲ βουληθεὶς Αἰὼν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν λαβεῖν ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ καὶ ἀμορφίᾳ ἐγένετο[4]. That in all this there takes place only a seeming ethical animation and transfiguration of the Pleroma is sufficiently evident in view of the well-known fundamental traits of the systems in question, but is further confirmed by the finding in Basilides, who, in order to prevent misunderstandings with regard to the "unnamable" Godhead, openly made it known that one could speak of a θέλημα of God only improperly[5]. In view of

1 According to the *Gospel of Mary*, the sequence of the highest male Aeons is: *Monogenes, Nous, Thelema, Logos* (cf. above pp. 192, 363).

2 Cf. Hilgenfeld loc. cit. pp. 308, 311 ff.

3 Iren. *haer.* I, 1, 2.

4 Clem. Alex., ed. Dindorf III 438. Cf. above p. 195.

5 — *ὡς αὐτὸς φησιν ὁ Βασιλείδης, ἓν μέρος ἐκ τοῦ λεγομένου θελήματος τοῦ θεοῦ δεειλήφαμεν τὸ ἠγαπηκέναι ἅπαντα —, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μηδενὸς ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τρίτον μισεῖν μηδὲν* (Clem. Alex. *str.* IV, 12, 86). The one will foreseeing everything (*πρόνοια*) *ἐγκατεσπάρη ταῖς οὐσίαις σὺν καὶ τῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν γενέσει πρὸς τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ* (*str.* IV, 12, 88). This too must be kept in view when, on occasion, in Basilidian fashion the will (*θέλημα*) of God presents itself as the cause of punishments and sufferings (*str.* IV, 12,

86). Only incidentally may Hippol. *phil.* 7, 21 serve for comparison (*ἀβούλως ἠθέλησε*, sc. of the *οὐκ ὢν θεός*).

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this state of affairs it is self-evident that the Evangelist refrains, in the same context in which he speaks in a striking and visibly pointed manner of θέλημα in the sense of the natural–human principle of generation, from applying that very expression to the cause of a pneumatic act of generation of God in the human being forming the strongest possible contrast. What in other passages, where the notion of generation does not enter in, could be disregarded, was here to be prevented: the possibility of a combination with gnostic doctrine and terminology[1].

To a final comparison with Gnosticism the Prologue, in view of what has been said so far, challenges us through its determination of the essence and value of Old Testament revelation, with which it introduces, by way of explanation, the concluding judgment on Jesus Christ as the Logos become flesh: ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωυσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο (v. 17)[2]. In the first instance, to be sure, as the preparatory reference to the testimony of John in v. 15 already lets us recognize, we are dealing here — in contrast to the quite generally framed exposition in vv. 4. 5. 11—14 — with a specific position taken toward the views of the various representatives of Old Testament faith. From the outset this points to the confrontation of Jesus with the Ἰουδαῖοι reported in the following evangelical narrative. One would, however, be mistaken if one wished to seek the Evangelist's

1 That here, in place of the *λόγος ἀληθείας* mediating the begetting activity of God in the Epistle of James, the Logos *κατ' ἐξ.* who has come into the world appears, is not to be overlooked. The Evangelist may likewise have been restrained from adopting the concept of (pneumatic) *σπέρμα* (cf. Matt. 13 37. 38; Gal. 3 16. 19. 29; Rom. 4 13. 16. 18; 9 7. 29; Heb. 2 16; 11 18; Rev. 12 17; 1 John 3 9) by opposition to Gnosticism (cf. the *σπέρμα τῆς ἄνωθεν οὐσίας* of Valentinianism, Clem. Alex. *str.* II, 8, 36).

2 With regard to the concept of *νόμος*, which characterizes the entire Old Testament revelation since Moses (Law and prophecy), cf. 10 34; 12 34; 15 25 and above p. 99.

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main interest in the passage of the Prologue in question on this side. Already the words "the grace and the truth came through Jesus Christ" show that the actual task remains the further illumination of the Logos concept of v. 14. Above all this suggests a reference by the author to the same Alexandrian representative of Mosaic faith whose outstanding importance, both for the Gospel in general and in particular for the Logos doctrine of the Prologue, has been demonstrated above. The relationship between the two conceptions is also in this respect a twofold one. Common to them is the positive valuation of Old Testament revelation as one mediated through the Logos (in the sense of the one and of the other author). While Philo, however, idealizes the law, as well as the lawgiver Moses, as far as possible through allegoresis, and carries out the critique of the two historical phenomena that presses itself upon

him from the standpoint of his philosophical Logos idea more only indirectly and incidentally[1], the Evangelist makes the imperfection and inadequacy of the Mosaic religion of the law a matter of principle by applying New Testament revelation as the decisive standard. Insofar, however, as the opposition between Old and New Testament governing the Evangelist's view, although content as well as form of revelation display specific differences, is in the final analysis only a relative one, a difference of degree between the revelation of the one and the same God mediated by the Logos ἄσαρκος and the ἔνσαρκος (see above, pp. 92 ff.), he at the same time refutes the gnostic doctrine of the origin and value of the Mosaic law and of Old Testament revelation in general, according to which these are to be regarded as something in itself contrary to God, perverse, and harmful, as a creation of sub-divine, cosmic powers[2].

1 For further details see above pp. 113 f.

2 For details on the older Gnostics see Hilgenfeld loc. cit. pp. 156, 166, 177 f., 192, 197, 247.

With this we may conclude the conceptual-historical analysis of the Prologue. What conclusions result from the results gained so far for answering the question of the time and the external circumstances of the origin of the Fourth Gospel will be better discussed when the distinctiveness of this Gospel, as it asserts itself even apart from the Prologue, which in every respect lies at the foundation, has found an illumination supplementing the hitherto customary mode of consideration. This is to take place in the second part. Meanwhile it will be sufficiently evident to the attentive reader that the former dating of Ferd. Chr. Baur appears to me hardly less untenable than the present one of Ad. Harnack.

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Appendix

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On the secret language of gnostic name-giving.

An attempt.

1. Abraxas.

The mysterious name of the *princeps* of the 365 heavens, i.e. world-spheres according to Basilides 1: Abraxas or Abrasax, who resides at the top, in the *primum coelum* 2, has, as is well known, undergone the most manifold and adventurous interpretations. At times one has sought to make something of it by means now of Egyptian, now of Hebrew, now of Greek language (or of Hellenized Hebrew) 3. Harnack, by contrast, thought of a kind of glossolalia with words “that belong to no known language and already by their strange combinations of vowels and consonants betray that they belong to a ‘mystical dialect,’ respectively derive or

1 With regard to the probable age of the name cf. Dieterich, *Abraxas* 1891, p. 46.

2 Iren. *haer.* I, 24, 3. 7; cf. also Hippol. *phil.* 7, 26. Against the misleading interpretation of the name as referring to the highest deity in Ps.-Tertullian (*adv. omn. haer.* c. 4: *hic esse dicit summum deum nomine Abraxan*) and Jerome (*adv. Luciferianos* c. 23 *op.* II 197: *tunc Basilides summum deum Abraxas eum CCCLXV editionibus commentatus est*; on Amos 3 *op.* VI, 1, 257: *Basilides, qui omnipotentem deum portentoso nomine appellat αβραξας*), see Moeller, *Kirchengeschichte* I 148 (1st and 2nd eds.).

3 For further details see Drexler in *Pr. R.-Encl.*³ I 114.

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wish to derive from mantic divine inspiration” 1. I believe that the present riddle of the name can be solved with considerable probability as soon as one reckons with the possibility that the peoples of the Levant, whose religion and culture united Hellenic and Semitic elements, at the time when that name was in use sought to satisfy the intensified need for mysterious deepening of their religious world-view and their cult through the adoption of secret doctrines and secret names, some of which were fetched from afar, and that in this process the ancient classical land of the philosophy of religion and of mysticism, India, played a more significant role as place of discovery and source 2.

1 *Investigations into the gnostic book Pistis Sophia* in *T. u. U.* VII, 2, pp. 86 ff.

2 The question of Indian influence on West Asiatic and Hellenistic philosophy (and religion) is still far from having been sufficiently investigated. Whatever the case may be with the reports of the ancients concerning Pythagoras' journey to India and the Indian elements of his philosophy (cf. against this Zeller F 275 ff.; v. Schroeder, *Pythagoras und die Inder* 1884; *Indiens Literatur und Kultur* 1887, pp. 260, 719 ff.), and perhaps also with regard to the study journey of the Neopythagorean Apollonius of Tyana to India ("it may be that his travels led him as far as India," Zeller III, 23, 151. 156), the answer to that question does not depend on this. I refer in general to the cautious judgment of Schürer (*Geschichte des jüdischen Volks*[3] II 581 f.) and confine myself here to citing Garbe's discussion concerning "the connexion between Greek and Indian philosophy" in *Philosophy of ancient India* 1897, pp. 32—56. He remarks, inter alia: *It is a question desiring the most careful treatment to determine whether the doctrines of the Greek philosophers were really first derived from the Indian world of thought, or whether they were constructed independently of each other in both India and Greece. — For my part, I confess I am inclined towards the first opinion, without intending to pass an apodictic decision* (p. 37; cf. also Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*[6] ed. by Heinze I 36). As far as the Gnostics are concerned, it is expressly attested of Basilides and Isidorus that they valued barbarian wisdom more highly than Hellenic, even that of Aristotle (cf. Basilides *exegetica* log. 13 according to *acta Archelai et Manetis* c. 55 and thereto Hilgenfeld loc. cit. pp. 207, 215, 218; Krüger in *Pr. R.-Encl.*[*3] II 433 interprets "barbari" as referring to Zoroaster). As regards in particular the transmigration of souls taught by Basilides, this certainly does not lack a connection with the doctrine of the Orphics and of Pythagoras, which (despite Herod. II 123) is not of Egyptian origin (cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* II 738 f.), but with considerable probability can be derived from Indian belief (cf., following v. Schroeder [and earlier Indologists], Garbe loc. cit. p. 40 ff., and especially Ad. Furtwängler, *Die antiken Gemmen* III, 1900, pp. 256—263: "The thesis of the Indian origin of the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of souls has, as it seems to me, been demonstrated with compelling arguments by L. v. Schroeder in a too little known work [*Pythagoras und die Inder* 1884]. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker* I, 1896, p. 103, is also inclined toward it." p. 262). Perhaps attention also deserves the representation strikingly reminiscent of Buddha in a gnostic tomb of the necropolis at Syracuse, on which see H. Achelis in Preuschen's *Zeitschr. f. neutest. Wiss.* I 210 f. A Buddhist legend is said by v. Gutschmid to have been used in the *Acts of Thomas* (cf. Moeller, *Kirchengeschichte* I 161).

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Under all circumstances a methodical investigation must in the first place examine whether the character of the numen in question itself does not point to the right track. It is accordingly to be assumed that the higher being called Abraxas is the first and highest demiurge of the world. Basilides has come into being through *Dynamis* and *Sophia virtutes et principes et angelos, quos et primos vocat, et ab iis primum coelum factum, dehinc ab horum derivatione alios autem factos aliud coelum simile priori fecisse, et simili modo ex eorum derivatione eum alii facti essent, antitypi eis, qui super eos essent, aliud tertium deformasse coelum et a tertio deorsum descendentium quartum, et deinceps secundum eum modum alteros et alteros principes et*

angelos factos esse dicunt et coelos CCCLXV. quapropter et tot dies habere annum secundum numerum coelorum. — Trecentorum autem sexaginta quinque coelorum locales positiones distribuunt similiter ut mathematici. — esse autem principem illorum ABPAΣAΞ, et propter hoc CCCLXV numeros habere in se 1. We encounter in the Vedic religion a being with a similar name and of wholly analogous significance, the lord of the Ribhus: Ribhukshan, or (in the nominative) Ribhukshās. Here too we are dealing with the question of the origin of the world,—this, to be sure, in such a way that, as in the corresponding myth-cycles of other religions, the connection of the cosmogonic conceptions

1 Iren. loc. cit.

with the contemplation of natural processes recurring daily and annually is even more clearly recognizable 1. The Ribhus, celebrated in eleven hymns of the Rigveda, are not gods in the full sense. Their home and the place of their activity is the middle region between heaven and earth, the atmospheric sphere (cf. *antarikshasya nribhyas* I, 110, 6) 2, where they form three groups of indeterminate size, each with a *princeps*. As they are thereby assigned to the realm of rule of Indra, so they are moreover expressly designated as relatives of this god, as his υἱότης (cf. *indrasya sūno* IV, 37, 4); in their totality (collectively) as Indra-like (IV, 37, 5), as a new Indra (I, 110, 7), and like Indra, the “lord of power,” are themselves also praised as mighty (*pavaso napātas* ibid.). The peculiar divine dignity and the immortality that they have first won for themselves they owe, however, ultimately to their wondrous skill and craftsmanship (I, 20, 1. 8. 110, 3, 4. 161, 6. 7. IV, 33, 3. 4. 35, 3. 8. 9. 36, 4. 5. 37, 1): they are, as the activity ascribed to them in detail clearly enough shows, demiurgic beings, as indeed they appear as rivals of the chief demiurge Tvaṣṭar 3. Their work is, for example, the wondrous chariot of the Aśvins (the two twilight-gods), which moves around the atmospheric sphere (I, 20, 3. 161, 6. X, 39, 12; IV, 36, 1, inter alia); they created the two horses that carry Indra through the air (IV, 33, 10). They also fashioned (*tatakṣus*) the two worlds, i.e. heaven and earth (IV, 34, 9), and bring earth and heaven (like a blossom) to unfolding (IV, 36, 1). Refreshed by twelve days’ sleep in the house of Agohya (the sun, “that cannot be hidden” — at midwinter the “Twelfth”) 4, they created fair fields, guided streams: they covered the dry land with plants and

1 Note moreover *Rigv.* I, 161, 11.

2 More precisely the uppermost air-space (*divo rajas*) I, 110, 6; accordingly *brihaddiva* (“situated in the high heaven”) is to be understood in IV, 37, 3.

3 For further details see Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda* pp. 233 ff.; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* p. 116.

4 Macdonell pp. 133 f.

the lowlands with water (IV, 33, 7. I, 161, 11). Of particular importance for our question now is the fact that the name of the first Ribhu, the *princeps* of the first group, Ribhukshās, is later also transferred to Indra (I, 63, 3. 111, 4. 167, 10. VII, 37, 4. VIII, 45, 29. 85, 21. X, 74, 5) 1. The highest god of the middle realm, of the atmospheric heaven, is thereby at the same time characterized as supreme demiurge. That now with this Indra Ribhukshās a kind of parallel to the highest Archon and demiurge of the Basilidian system, Abraxas, arises, is obvious. Being, function, and position of the one correspond to the relations of the other as exactly as possible; in such a way, indeed, that to the highest "heaven" of the immaterially conceived middle realm (between the earthly world and the deity) as the seat of Abraxas in the older nature religion, there naturally corresponds the highest region of the airy heaven situated between the earth and the pure world of light of the gods as the seat of Indra Ribhukshās. This entitles us—provided that on this ground a conclusion is still at all permissible—to the conjecture that the Abraxas of Basilides has his oldest predecessor in that mythical figure of the later Vedic religion, whether now the knowledge of this and with it the usable secret name of a prominent Indian god found its way to the West by water or by land, through many or through few intermediaries. Harnack's general remark, however, that "Gnosticism delighted in mysterious words borrowed from the Semites" 2, is here in any case applicable in the sense that one had to seek, according to prevailing custom, to give the imported proper name a somewhat Semitic coloring. Here it will hardly be possible to find a more obvious reshaping than that dictated by the phonetic form Abraxas, which preserves the consonantal sounds as far as possible and at the same time takes account of the analogy of Semitic proper names by

1 Probably not I, 162, 1.

2 *Dogmengeschichte* P p. 246.

allowing the familiar *ab* (אב) to appear as an apparent first component. That Abraxas otherwise stands closer to the original than the more frequently used Abrasax is further evident from this. In addition, however, it must also be kept in view that the intention of producing a specific numerical value of letters was a co-determining factor. Precisely the significant sum 365, which symbolically relates the being of Abraxas at the same time to the totality of the days of the year 1, and thereby also to the total life of the year, confirms in its part the correctness of the interpretation of the numen in question as an essentially demiurgic power. With this also accord the designations Μεθρας and Νείλος occurring alongside Abraxas, yielding the same numerical value of letters 2. Insofar, however, as apart from the Abraxas-belief

1 With regard to the numerical value 365 in Basilides cf., apart from Irenaeus: Hippolytus (7, 26), Epiphanius (haer. 24, 7), Augustine (haer. 4), Praedestinatus (haer. 3), Ps.-Tertullian (haer. 4), Ps.-Hieronymus (indicio de haer. 2), Hieronymus (comm. Amos 3). Apart from Basilides, mention is to be made of the κοσμοποιία of the Leiden Papyrus J 395 (W in Leeman), where it is said: ὁ δὲ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ Ἀβραξάς; similarly the London Papyrus 122. Cf. Dieterich, *Abraxas* S. 46. 182. Drexler a. a. O. S. 114 f. — Of the adoption of the symbolic number 365 among the Valentinians and the "Gnostics"

Epiphanius reports (haer. 31, 4. 26. 9). Interesting is the notice by the same writer (haer. 24, 7) that Basilides designated the number of the limbs of the human body as 365, which is to be compared with an exorcism in Martene (*de ant. eccl. rit.* 3 p. 519), where the evil spirit is driven out de trecentis sexaginta quinque (quaecunque!) membris, quae Dominus noster Jes. Chr. ad suam similitudinem comparare dignatus est (cf. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch.* S. 198; Schneider, *gnostische Schriften* [T. u. U. VIII] S. 408 [286. 555. 568]; Drexler a. a. O. S. 115): the human being is unmistakably included in the problematic symbolism as microcosm.

2 Cf. Hilgenfeld S. 198. Drexler S. 115. Mithras is the Mithras of the mysteries altered with reference to the numerical value of the letters. Cf. concerning this “Father and Creator of all things” Preller, *röm. Mythologie*³ I 411—415; Fr. Cumont, *textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* 1899. I 187. 201. 225. 305. 307 (“Mithra est le démiurge et le maître de la génération”). Νηλός stands mythically as son of Okeanos and Tethys in closest relation to the beginnings of the world (Preller, *griech. Mythologie*¹ I 31 f.; Cumont a. a. O. I 155 f.: “la place attribuée à l’Océan semble indiquer que les mythes de la religion mithriaque faisaient remonter sa naissance aux origines de l’univers, de même que suivant les croyances helléniques — la Terre Ὠκεανῷ εὐνήθησα τέκ’ Ὠκεανόν βαθύδινῃ”); Νηλός = Ὄσιρις (Plutarch *Os. et Is.* 32) would (as with Mithras) be brought into relation with the sun (cf. Harvey, *Irenaeus adv. haer.* I 203).

of Basilides and his sect the name in question also played a role over the widest area as magically powerful in incantations 1, one must on the one hand recall that the Indian Ribhus are invoked for wealth (I, 20, 7. IV, 33, 8. 35, 6. 37, 5), for cattle, horses, heroic retinues, goods and sustenance (IV, 34, 10), for youthful strength, power, wisdom, abundance of children (I, 111, 2), for invincibility (IV, 36, 6), for help and booty in battle (I, 111, 5), and on the other hand point out that Abraxas-magic likewise addresses a cosmic power-being 2.

2. The “Prophets.” Barkabbas and Barkoph.

A similar situation to that of Abraxas is likely to obtain with the alleged prophets Barkabbas and Barkoph, of whom we likewise hear in Basilides and his school. The earliest opponent of Basilides, Agrippa Castor, says of him: προφήτας δέ ἑαυτῷ ὀνομάσαι Βαρκαββᾶν καὶ Βαρκώφ, καὶ ἄλλους ἀνυπάρκτους τινὰς ἑαυτῷ συστησάμενον, βαρβάρους τε αὐτοῖς εἰς κατάπληξιν τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τε-θ-ηπότων ἐπιφημίσαι προσηγορίας —3. That, however, the two “prophets” were also known in other

1 As regards the gnostic sect belonging to the end of the 4th or beginning of the 5th century in Spain and southern France, which likewise held the Abraxas-belief and which Hieronymus (ep. 75; comm. in Jesaj. zu c. 64, v. 4. 5; *contra Vigilant.* 6) groundlessly connects with Basilides, cf. Schmidt a. a. O. S. 562; Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl.*

Literatur I 160 f. — Further details on the numerous Greek magical papyri and on the artefacts serving as amulets and magical means (especially tablets and deeply engraved stones) see Drexler S. 115 f.

2 On two bronze tablets from southern France, e.g., there concludes an exorcistic invocation: κελεύει θεὸς ὑψιστος, καὶ σὺ συνέργει Ἀβραξάς, ἰαί, ἰαώ.

3 Euseb. *h. eccl.* IV, 7, 5. Hilgenfeld remarks on this: “The foreign prophets Barkabbas and Barkoph, whom he selected, agree well with the view reported by Irenaeus concerning the Antiochene prophets” a. a. O. S. 201.

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gnostic circles, we know, first, from Philaster, who reports of the Nicolaitans and the “Gnostici” connected with them that they venerate Barbelo and Noria—the latter in all likelihood corresponding to Sophia Prunikos 1; and that “*quendam etiam concubuisse eum illa muliere et virtute (sc. Noria), de qua nati sunt dii et homines et angeli et septem spiritus daemoniorum, addunt etiam prophetas natos de ea, specioso nomine ut (st. et) Barcabban*” 2. Then, moreover, Epiphanius states of his Γνωστικοί: ἄλλοι δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν — Βαρκαββᾶν τινα προφήτην παρεισάγουσιν, ἄξιον τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀνόματος, καββὰ γὰρ ἑρμηνεύεται πορνεία κατὰ τὴν Συριακὴν διάλεκτον, φονοκτονία δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἑβραϊκήν, καὶ πάλιν ἑρμηνεύεται τετάρτη μοῖρα τοῦ μέτρου. — φέρουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ θαυμασιωτάτου προφήτου διήγησιν αἰσχρὰν, ὅπως φθοριμαίοις σώμασι πλησιάσαι πεισθῶμεν καὶ τῆς ἄνωθεν ἐλπίδος ἐκπέσωμεν 3.

A threefold observation forces itself upon one above all in these notices: 1. Barkoph recedes behind Barkabbas; 2. the one as well as the other “prophet” already appears to the ancient reporters as an adventurous figure, lacking a historically tangible reality (ἀνυπάρκτους); 3. one labors in vain over the interpretation of the barbarous name-forms. To begin with the latter, it scarcely needs to be remarked that what is offered by Epiphanius is as good as worthless. This applies in the first instance to the reference to the Hebrew–Aramaic unit of measure 4 קב, קבא; not less, however, to the combination with Aram. קובתא (vaulted space, vault; tent) 5. Epiphanius himself makes

1 Cf. Hilgenfeld S. 239.

2 *haer.* 33.

3 *haer.* 26, 2. “Theodoret *haer. fab.* I, 4 excerpts Eusebius” Hilgenfeld S. 201. On the pronunciation Barcabbas and Barcoph cf. e.g. Ps.-Hieronymus *indic. de haer.* c. 2.

4 Cf. Nowack, *hebr. Archäologie* 1894. I 203 f. (a כַּב on the one hand = 1/6 סאה, “μέτρον” LXX, on the other hand = 4 לוג); Brockelmann, *lex. Syriacum* 1895 p. 309: כַּב gr. κάδος = χόες, *pars quarta aut quinta aut sexta modi* Epiphan. *de mensur. ac ponder.* I 4, 51. 39, 3 sq.

5 קֵב Num. 25 gives Symm. with πορνείαν, Hieronymus with *lupanar*. Whether the alleged φονοκτονία goes back to some misunderstanding of קֵב remains undecided.

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no secret of why precisely the interpretation of καββα in the sense of πορνεία is placed first: the name of the "prophet" in this case lent itself to authentic proof of the "licentious libertinism" of his adherents 1. As to the already very early recognized unhistorical character of the bearers of the one and of the other name, the context into which the Nicolaitans and "Gnostics" in Philaster place the prophets Barcabbas etc. with Noria, as *natos de ea*, is not the only criterion 2. A corroborating testimony is also to be drawn from the inscriptions of the so-called Abraxas gems. We see, among other things, Barkabbas placed on one line with Abraxas 3. This at the same time points to a definite track: the "prophet" Barkabbas will be a middle being similar to the demiurge Abraxas, related to him in some measure 4. This all the more entitles us to bring in for comparison the name of the likewise prophetic demiurge of Orphic theogony, Ericapaeus (Ἠρικαπαῖος, Ἠρκεπαῖος) 5, since it is admittedly the case that elsewhere as well cosmogonic points of contact arise between Gnosticism and Orphism—thus especially in

1 Cf. also Schmidt, *gnost. Schriften* (T. u. U. VIII) S. 566 ff.

2 One may also recall the "prophet" Marsianos = Marsanes of the Archontics (Epiphan. *haer.* 40, 7). Schmidt a. a. O. S. 602: "Certainly one must not believe that a man named Marsanes actually existed; he is rather, just like Martiades, Barcabbas and others, a purely fictitious personality."

3 According to Le Blant in *Bull. de la soc. des ant. de France* 1860 p. 34, an agate of his collection shows on one side the inscription ΑΔΩΝΗ ΑΒΡΑΣΑΞ, on the other ΒΑΡΚΑΒΑ ΙΑΩ. Cf. Drexler a. a. O. S. 116.

4 As here — and not only here! — from higher beings "prophets" are made, so already among the Indian Aryans in high antiquity Ṛṣis, i.e. the holy singers of the Veda. Epimenides bestows upon his daughter, the Night, the gift of prophecy (μαντοσύνην δ' ἔσχεν ἀψευδῆ πάντη Hermias on *Phaedr.* p. 140 Ast. fr. 88 Abel); cf. Kern, *de Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogoniis* 1878 p. 17. 18.

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Basilides 1—and since on the other hand that Orphic name likewise has predominantly made the impression of a non-Greek word-formation 2. However matters may stand with the origin of this name, in any case it may be regarded as established that it had long been at home in Orphic–Hellenic religion when the Gnosis of a Basilides and others began to speak of the prophets in question 3. If, however, from an Ἠρικαπαῖος there has here become a Barkabbas (Βαρκάββας), then this reshaping into Semitic, specifically Aramaic, is as easily understood as the analogous phonetic transformation of a foreign word from which Abraxas (Abrasax) came to be: if here אב presented itself as first component of the apparently composite proper name, so there the parallel בר.

One might—in order at least to hint further at the question of the presumed origin of Ἠρικαπαῖος–Βαρκάββας—think of the Vrishākapi of the Rigveda (X, 86) (and its feminine complement: the Vrishākapāyī); but of course not as it is represented in the myth spun out by a late-Vedic poet and drawn into the ridiculous 4, but on the basis of the interpretation advocated by the Indian Vedic commentators

1 Cf. with respect to the 365 heavens of Basilides the 365 gods of the Orphics (Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 364; Hilgenfeld a. a. O. S. 219).

2 "Bentlejus in Ep. ad Bernard. p. 160 "Ηρακλειος (quae est frequentior scriptura) nulli Graeco vocabulo simile esse docet'" Lobeck l. c. p. 479. Zeller holds with most that an oriental etymology is probable (I S. 85). Kern aligns himself with Diels's opinion, "to derive the planet from the Orphics, since it is devoured by Zeus, so that the names Ἠρακλεῖος, Ἠριγόνη, Ἠριγόνου, Ἠρακλείδος are similarly formed" (a. a. O. p. 21. 22). It is, however, much more probable that the name, just like Φάνης, Μίξις, Ἔρως, goes back to the essence signified, not to something that happened to it later; moreover, even assuming a genuinely Greek word-formation — apart from the fact that the ending -ειος (belonging to something or someone) evidently does not come into its own — it is difficult to understand how Ἠρακλειος (from κατ') could usually have given way to the form Ἠρακλεῖος (one may compare the other derivations from KAI).

3 Cf. against Zoëga, Schuster, Zeller: Kern a. a. O. p. 21 ff.

4 See the treatment of the material in Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda* S. 172—174.

and also attested in epic poetry, according to which one is simply to understand by it the sun (under Vrishākapāyī the dawn-redness) 1: the name Φάνης, to which Ἠρικαπαῖος is only an epithet, and which designates the Orphic demiurge as the most primordial manifestation of cosmic light, would undoubtedly favor such a combination 2. For proof of the connection, possible in itself, between name and thing, however, there is unfortunately a complete lack of more definite points of support. This is all the more to be regretted since perhaps, in view of Vrishākapi as Indra's phallic ape 3 in ancient Indian poetry of the gods 4, the double of Barkabbas—Barkoph (בר קוף, "son of the ape")—of the Gnostics might have proved to be the product of a mythological atavism 5.

3. Barbelo.

Only a brief word must still be said about this strange

1 Naigh. 5, 6. Nr. 12, & 27. *Mahābhārata* III, 191. Cf. Petersb. Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v.

2 "From this confusion of names it is at any rate certain that what appears, as it were, by a transference of names, is that the Orphics called Phanes or Erikepaios the Sun, the

primordial ruler of the world, the natural condition of the sun, since they likewise called Dionysus imperishable." Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 499. Cf. Kern, a. a. O. p. 22.

3 *Rigveda* X, 86, 5, is explicitly called *kapi* (the ape).

4 That in the questionable poem it is merely a matter of the excessive invention of an individual poet from the younger Rigvedic period (Oldenberg p. 172; Macdonell a. a. O. p. 64), is quite improbable; that the whole is a satire in which one had in mind, under the names Indra and Indrāṇī, a particular prince and his consort (v. Bradke in *ZDMG* XLVI, 465), Oldenberg too finds "hardly especially illuminating." The fact is rather, as is still clearly enough indicated, that an original solar myth is present here, which by means of the animal simile of itself offered the stimulus to burlesque elaboration. From a discussion of the individual details I must refrain. The more the original features of the mythical image were later lost, the more comprehensible is the subsequent transference of the name *Vṛṣakapi* to various deities (thus namely to Vishnu, indeed even to Indra himself).

5 It will be asked whether the prophet *Narchōs*, about whom Isidor wrote (Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VI, 6, 53), and the prophet *Narchōs* (Acts of Archelaus et Manes 52; Epiphanius, *Haer.* 66, 3), are not perhaps simply variants of the same person.

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name 1. Here too one must not forget the possibility that a foreign word was reshaped and that in the process the appearance of a compound with the Aramaic בר arose, although the name is applied to a female being 2. While Petavius explains "בר בעל" *filius Bahalis id est Jovis*, Bellermann derives the sense assumed by him, "son of the Lord," from ברה בעל, "daughter of the Lord" 3. Others, by contrast, find in the name the statement: "in the tetrad is God" 4 בארבע אלה, where one appeals to a repeated tetrad of derived syzygies, which is supposed to be particularly characteristic of the Barbelo system. Yet even this solution cannot be called very simple and convincing; for it will in particular remain questionable whether the tetrad is not here being accorded a significance that goes beyond the actual relationships. For my part, I am again and again led by the second part of the name to the Indian *velā* (to be pronounced with long *e*; fem.), the quite ordinary word for "boundary," and from there obtain, without forcing, the expression *paravelā* = most eminent or highest boundary. With this we would obtain the concept well known from the closely related 5 Valentinian system of the "Ὅρος": Barbelo would therefore be characterized as the highest "Ὅρος," because, following upon the Πατήρ ἀκατονόμαστος, as complete inner-divine primal revelation, she stands in a similar opposition to the following syzygies as in the Valentinian

1 *Barbēlō*, *Barbēlōth*, *Barbēriō*: cf. Iren. *haer.* I, 29, 1. Epiphanius *haer.* 21, 2; 25, 2; 26, 1. Philaster c. 33. Theodoret *haer. fab.* I, 13. On the names *Barbēlītai*, *Barbēlōtai*, *Borborianoi* cf. Schmidt a. a. O. p. 569 f.

2 According to another account (*Gospel of Mary*) male–female (see above).

3 Likewise Matter. Cf. Schmidt a. a. O. p. 559 f.

4 In connection with Harvey (in the edition of Irenaeus I, 221) Lipsius (*Gnosticismus* 1860, p. 115; "Ophitic systems" in *Z. f. wiss. Theol.* 1863, p. 445) and Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergeschichte* p. 233. Schmidt remarks (p. 560): "I do not venture to decide at this point in favour of one of the proposed explanations."

5 "What is communicated to us as Barbelo-Gnosis appears just as much as a continuation of Simonianism as it does as a preliminary stage of Valentinianism." Hilgenfeld p. 232.

system the Σιγή with the "Ἄρρητον (Βυθός)," the ἀγέννητος Πατήρ, to the γεννητοὶ Αἰῶνες, i.e. to all the other aeons that have arisen from syzygies 1. In Valentin, there would insofar be a certain further development, in that the inner-pleromatic, upper "Ὅρος" is conceived in the manner of an independent intermediate member 2. As for the lower "Ὅρος," which would then also be expected in the Barbelo doctrine, this naturally does not correspond to the Sophia (Prunikos) made, as it seems, by later writers into a second Βαβηλώ 3, but rather to the (born) *Lignum*, "*quod et ipsum Gnosin vocant*" 4, which arose from the last syzygy (the "Ἄνθρωπος τέλειος" and the "Γνῶσις τελεία"). This "wood" of Gnosis (cf. Gen. 2 17) separates the deity that has attained inner unfolding from the world and thus stands above all in essential opposition to Sophia as the lower principle. Here too we again have occasion to become acutely aware of the inadequacy of the reporting on the Barbelo system.

In any case, however, perhaps at least this much may emerge from what has been shown, that one will do well, in questions of this kind above all, to preserve a certain breadth of perspective. I expressly note that in what precedes I have wished only to put forward examples and must reserve further discussion to myself.

1 One should note how, in Ptolemaeus, it is *Sige* herself who restrains the *Nous* (Monogenes) from the desired contemplation and knowledge of the primal Father (Iren. *haer.* I, 2, 1).

2 "Horos is the one who stands between the Bythos and the rest of the Pleroma, separating the begotten Aeons from the unbegotten Father, but separating their Mother from the Pleroma" (Iren. *haer.* I, 11, 1).

3 Hilgenfeld op. cit., p. 239.

4 Iren. *haer.* I, 29, 3.